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ABSTRACT 
 
The push of funding restrictions and national competitive environments of 
provider institutions, coupled by the pull of host nation demands for 
higher education led to the proliferation of various forms of transnational 
education (TNE). The growth of TNEs has been phenomenal over the 
past three decades. In response to the ubiquity of TNE programs, a large 
body of literature and research has been devoted to this phenomenon. A 
survey of extant literature however, indicates that the majority of these 
studies are normative in approach, and mostly focused on the academic 
aspects of TNE. There is a dearth of studies focused on the commercial 
aspects of TNE, and much less that are empirical. 
 
This study argues that TNE has a commercial dimension that is critical to 
its success but that has not been sufficiently investigated. The lack of 
attention to the commercial aspect of TNE may have been influenced by 
the traditional paradigm of education as a public good. Recent literature 
suggests that TNE success is linked to commercial sustainability. This 
study aims to take the argument further through an empirical 
investigation of the Australian public university TNE phenomenon 
through the lenses of three leading theories of the firm, viz., transaction 
cost economics (TCE), property rights theory (PRT) and agency theory 
(AT). More specifically, this study will explore the criteria Australian public 
universities use in the selection between the Direct (DM) and Outsourced 
Models (OM) of TNE business delivery, and the explanatory power of 
these theories in explicating these criteria and the longevity of the 
models.  
 
The phenomenon is investigated via a constructivist qualitative 
methodology, starting with a focus group study to ascertain the 
appropriateness of the theoretical construct, and of each of these 
theories to the research questions. The research culminates in an in-
 vi 
depth dual case study to test the veracity of the identified theories in 
explaining the choice between the OM and DM. 
 
In the course of the focus group study, significant tipping points were 
identified along the TNE journeys of each university. These tipping points 
indicated the period when heightened quality expectations brought about 
significant changes in TNE strategy and delivery at both universities. The 
in-depth case studies that followed established the commercial 
orientation of the two universities. 
 
The Decision Model construct which is based on the Porter value chain 
provided the framework for unpacking and analysing the two universities’ 
TNE business delivery models, leading to the discovery of three variants 
of the hybrid governance models, viz., the in situ-monitored collaborative 
international branch campus (ic-IBC), the in situ-monitored franchised 
program (i-FP) and the remotely-monitored franchised program (r-FP). 
While the r-FP is an OM, the other two are DMs. The case study found 
that TCE was the driving consideration for the DM, a model of choice for 
full-suite (teaching, research and community engagement) operations, 
while AT for the OM which usually cater to teaching-only operations. A 
survey of industry practice provided prima facie evidence for this finding 
among TNE-active Australian public universities. PRT was postulated to 
possibly apply in certain DM selections with broader stakeholder 
interests. 
 
This study developed a fine-grained categorisation of TNE business 
delivery models and constructed a value chain to reflect TNE delivery. It 
also established the industry preference for hybrid governance models 
that were asset-light investments, providing good financial returns. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction to the Research 
 
This chapter introduces the objectives of the current research study, and 
delimits the scope of the study. It also identifies the significance of the 
research to both the research community as well as practitioners of 
transnational education. 
 
1.1 Objectives of the Study 
 
This study is an empirical investigation into the phenomenon of 
Australian university transnational education (TNE) programs. It is 
designed to investigate Australian universities’ rationale for their 
selection of business delivery models for these programs, and their 
attendant outcomes. 
 
The primary aim of the study is to determine if the phenomenon can be 
explained by the leading theories of the firm (Kim and Mahoney 2005).  
Through the lenses afforded by these theories, the study seeks to 
understand the criteria Australian universities use in selecting TNE 
business delivery models, and the impact of these decisions on the 
longevity of the institutions’ TNE programs. 
 
In the course of the investigations, the study is expected to contribute to 
the literature on Australian university transnational education, to the 
extension of the theories of the firm to this phenomenon, and to policy 
development in higher education, particularly in TNE. 
 
1.2 Scope of Research 
 
The present study had been initially confined to Australian public 
universities currently engaged in TNE, or have been engaged in TNE in 
the last five years prior to 2017. This sampling frame was designed to 
enable the study of both current TNE operations as well as terminated 
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ventures. In-depth semi-structured interviews of the two selected 
universities indicate a large number of TNE operations dating back to 
2005 for University A, and to 2011 for University C. The interview 
analyses thus expanded the scope of TNE cases to include cases that 
started or terminated in 2005. 
 
From 2011 statistics, there were 33 Australian public universities 
engaged in TNE (DEEWR 2011). Self-study distance education, and its 
online variants have been excluded from this study because of the 
absence of any face-to-face contact between faculty and student 
(DEEWR 2008, 11).  
 
The phenomenon has been examined as commercial activities primarily 
through the lenses of the three theories of the firm, viz., transaction cost 
economics, property rights theory and agency theory.  
 
1.3 Significance of Research 
 
This empirical study is aimed at testing the veracity of the three theories 
in explaining the selection of TNE business delivery models and TNE 
outcomes. It is aimed at enhancing empirical understanding of the TNE 
phenomenon, and contribute to organisational economics literature by 
extending the application of these theories to TNE research; in other 
words, ‘to expand and generalise theories’ (Yin 2014, 21). 
 
At the practical level, the study is framed to enrich TNE professionals’ 
understanding of key strategic planning processes as well as the TNE 
value chain, and the consequent impact on TNE sustainability and 
outcomes. It is hoped that this enriched understanding will contribute to 
higher success rates and the realisation of university mission for TNE 
operations, not just merely surviving, quoting Bartlett and Ghoshal, ‘… in 
the future, a company’s ability to develop a transnational organisational 
capability will be the key factor that separates the winners from the mere 
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survivors in the international competitive environment’ (1998, 212). 
Conversely, it is also hoped that the study will help universities avoid or 
prevent TNE failures. 
 
A British Council report argues that since TNE is at an ‘important 
juncture, … national governments would benefit greatly from a better 
understanding of this important dimension of internationalisation, so that 
the challenges and opportunities it presents can be effectively managed, 
and its potential evenly shared across societies, HE (higher education) 
systems and the broad student body’ (Garrett et al. 2017, 5). The study is 
therefore also expected to contribute to policy development and 
governance in the TNE sector for Australia as well as other countries. 
 
The study will also investigate the impact of business decisions on the 
longevity of TNE operations. Most management literature on business 
longevity are based on quantitative studies of organisations within their 
respective national systems. These quantitative investigations limit the 
possibility for in-depth analysis of the organisation, and cross-border 
business perspectives of business longevity (Riviezzo, Skippari and 
Garofano 2015, 982). The current study aims to use qualitative inquiry to 
extract rich data on both internal organisational characteristics and 
external environmental conditions impacting TNE business longevity, and 
thereby contribute to the business longevity corpus of knowledge. 
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Chapter 2  Transnational Education : Commercial  
Drivers, Theoretical Framework and 
Research Construct (A Literature 
Review) 
 
This chapter explores how TNE has emerged and evolved within the past 
four decades, its impact on nations and participating institutions, and the 
scope of extant empirical research into the phenomenon. A commercial 
view of TNE is argued, based on a well-documented, broad-based 
consensus amongst both practitioners and researchers. This commercial 
perspective is identified as an important gap in the research literature 
that requires investigation. 
 
Before developing theoretical constructs, the TNE operation is examined 
and various taxonomies explored to better understand the core 
processes within the operation. The modularisation of the TNE operation 
provides a framework for the application of the three theories of the firm. 
The chapter concludes with a research construct informed by core 
industry processes, to be tested by the identified theories of the firm.  
 
2.1 The Emergence and Development of Transnational Education 
 
This section recounts the emergence and the development of the 
phenomenon of TNE globally, and more specifically for Australian higher 
education institutions (HEI). It emphasises the commercial impact that 
TNE has on the HEIs. 
 
2.1.1 Cross-border Education 
 
Cross-border education (CBE) is not a new phenomenon. The University 
of London had made available its degree programs externally from 1858, 
and now has about 50,000 students worldwide in more than 100 different 
programs. Under the Colombo Plan, Australian universities have 
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educated thousands of international students from the early 1950s till 
about the 1980s. Today, CBE is delivered by both traditional education 
providers as well as various other organisations. The traditional 
education providers also include private institutions like Laureate 
International Universities (formerly the Sylvan Group which started as a 
network of American remedial tuition schools) and Phoenix University, 
the largest private US university operated by the Apollo Group. 
Prominent among non-traditional providers are media groups like 
Thomson and Pearson. 
 
Originally conceived as aid flowing from the developed world to the less 
developed countries, the provision of CBE has gradually shifted towards 
a more commercial orientation (Smart and Ang 1993). The burgeoning 
demand from a multiplicity of market niches worldwide has triggered 
rapid growth in the provision of CBE. In its various forms, CBE is now a 
ubiquitous phenomenon worldwide (Centre for International Economics 
2008).  
 
Its ubiquity, and impact on national education systems as well as balance 
of payments have triggered national and international attention. It is now 
formally recognised and defined by the UNESCO and OECD in a joint 
publication (UNESCO and OECD 2005) as ‘higher education that takes 
place in situations where the teacher, student, program, 
institution/provider or course materials cross national jurisdictional 
borders. Cross-border education may include higher education by 
public/private and not-for-profit/for-profit providers. It encompasses a 
wide range of modalities in a continuum from face-to-face (taking various 
forms from students travelling abroad and campuses abroad) to distance 
learning (using a range of technologies and including e-learning).’ 
 
The growth in demand for international education over the past three-
and-a-half decades has been phenomenal. Globally, international 
student numbers grew from a mere 800,000 in 1975 to 3.7 million in 
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2009 (IIE 2011). IDP, the global student recruitment company, forecasts 
that global demand for international higher education will increase from 
1.8 million students in 2000 to a staggering 7.2 million students in 2025 
(Bohm et al. 2002). Choudaha and van Rest similarly projected 6.9 
million international students by 2030 (Choudaha and van Rest 2018, 4). 
 
In the USA, international education accounts for more than USD21 billion 
of the 2010 US economy, an increase of about USD10 billion over a ten 
year period (IIE 2011). As a service export, international education was 
the USA’s sixth, and New Zealand’s fifth national service export 
delivering NZ$2.85 billion in revenue (Jones 2015). More recently, 
Australia’s international education industry has been acknowledged as 
the nation’s top service export earner at A$32.2 billion in 2017 
(International Consultants for Education and Fairs (ICEF) 2018). The UK 
has similarly set an ambitious target of generating GBP35 billion per year 
through 600,000 international students by 2030; this is from a 2016 base 
of GBP19.9 billion per year from 460,000 international students in 2018 
(Stern 2018). 
 
The size of these services has necessitated the introduction of 
international regulation. The provision of these services is now regulated 
internationally through the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) General 
Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS). The various delivery modes 
are categorised under one of the four GATS modes of supply described 
in the table below. 
 
In CBE, these modes are not mutually exclusive. Some students enroll 
under two or more different modes in the course of their studies.  
 
Students studying away from their home country, Mode 2, comprise the 
largest of the four modes of supply (Naidoo 2009). This is followed 
respectively by international branch campuses (Mode 3), and franchised 
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and distance-delivered (including online) programs (Mode 1). Mode 4 
services are negligible.  
 
Mode Mode Title Mode Description 
1 Cross-border supply Services flows from the territory of one 
member state into the territory of another 
member state (viz., distance education, 
online learning and franchised programs) 
2 Consumption 
abroad 
Refers to situations where a service 
consumer (e.g. international student) 
moves into another member state's 
territory to obtain a service. 
3 Commercial 
presence 
Implies that a service supplier of one 
member state establishes a territorial 
presence, including through ownership or 
lease of premises, in another member 
state's territory to provide a service (viz., 
international branch campuses). 
4 Presence of natural 
persons 
Consists of persons of one member state 
entering the territory of another member 
state to supply a service (e.g. teachers). 
The Annex on Movement of Natural 
Persons specifies, however, that member 
states remain free to operate measures 
regarding citizenship, residence or 
access to the employment market on a 
permanent basis. 
 
Table 2.1   GATS Modes of Supply 
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2.1.2 Transnational Education 
 
More recently, another term has been coined to describe the provision of 
higher education by institutions in foreign jusrisdictions, viz., 
transnational education. 
 
2.1.2.1 Defining Transnational Education 
 
In early TNE literature, TNE was used interchangeably with CBE. Adams 
uses TNE to describe twinning, distance learning, franchised programs, 
moderated delivery, offshore campus, joint awards and online delivery 
(1998). Broadly, transnational education refers to the provision of higher 
education, usually for-profit higher education, across national 
boundaries. Later research and literature tightened the TNE definition 
further. 
 
While some countries viewed TNE as a capacity-building opportunity, 
other countries harbored fears of neo-colonialism and loss of foreign 
exchange, manifestations of globalisation in education. The increasing 
influence and impact of TNE at local, national, regional and international 
levels have led governments and regional intergovernmental 
organisations like the Council of Europe and the Association of African 
Universities, to develop frameworks to understand, regulate and promote 
TNE in their respective regions. In fact, McBurnie and Ziguras (2009) 
concluded that ‘… transnational education is at the leading edge of the 
most fundamental changes taking place in higher education today’. 
 
In developing a Code of Practice in the Provision of Transnational 
Education, UNESCO and the Council of Europe used a working definition 
of TNE which includes ‘All types of higher education study programmes, 
or sets of courses of study, or educational services (including those of 
distance education) in which the learners are located in a country 
different from the one where the awarding institution is based. Such 
 9 
programmes may belong to the educational system of a State different 
from the State in which it operates, or may operate independently of any 
national system.’(UNESCO/CoE 2000) 
 
Banks et. al. in their report The Changing Fortunes of Australian 
Transnational Higher Education, categorises transnational education as 
Modes 1, 3 and 4 of the WTO GATS typology (2000). They have 
therefore excluded the provision of education services to international 
students in the home country of the providers. Most TNE researchers 
now use this definition of TNE. This classification will be followed in the 
present study of TNE. Further, in view of the low occurrence of Mode 4 
provision, the present study will focus solely on Modes 1 and 3 
provisions in TNE. 
 
2.1.2.2 Typology of Transnational Education 
 
What started as aid-inspired cross-border education provision, has now 
morphed into a multiplicity of business models, comprising various levels 
of involvement of the awarding institution and local partner institution. 
Countries with less developed higher education systems and new to TNE 
would usually feature franchised programs. This is driven by local need 
for capacity-building and technology transfer, as well as opportunity for 
profit-making. In some countries, e.g., Malaysia and Singapore, TNE has 
achieved an advanced level of maturity where the preferred mode is the 
international branch campus. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this shift 
may be due to the maturity of local providers, and quality issues arising 
from the complexity of cross-border organisational collaborations. 
 
Within the WTO GATS Modes 1 and 3 service provisions, there is a wide 
range of TNE business models based on the amount of student-faculty 
contact and the share of responsibilities between provider partners. The 
Two-dimensional Typology of transnational education developed by 
Davis, Olsen and Bohm (2000) classifies transnational education along 
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the provider and student dimensions. This classification was drawn from 
an IDP survey of Australian university offshore programs in 1999. The 
student dimension ranges from full face-to-face to online study 
experiences, while the provider dimension is a measure of the partners’ 
level of involvement in the delivery.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.1   Two-dimensional Typology of transnational education 
developed by Davis, Olsen and Bohm (Davies, Olsen and Bohm 
2000) 
 
On closer analysis using multiple regression, Davis et. al. (2000) 
classified the TNE programs into three distinct models, viz.,  
 
a) Program Type A 
Also labelled as the Direct Model, these programs are characterised by 
the University having full responsibility for the academic functions of the 
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b) Program Type B 
These programs feature the sharing of some or most of the academic 
functions between the university and its offshore partner. This shared 
responsibility is also known as the Joint Model. 
 
c) Program Type C 
When the offshore partner assumes some or complete responsibility for 
all academic functions of the program, they were known as the Partner 
Model. 
 
2.1.2.3 Global Demand for Transnational Education 
 
Recent trends point to a rapidly growing sector. The highest number of 
providers comes from the UK, Australia and the USA, with emerging 
numbers from Canada, New Zealand, Europe and even non-traditional 
TNE provider countries like China, India, Malaysia and Singapore. 
 
Out of an estimated 2,000 programs catering to 500,000 students 
worldwide on GATS Mode 1 in 2006, about 300,000 students were 
enrolled in British TNE programs (Bashir 2007). In 2017, the UK enrolled 
more than 700,000 offshore students; a compound growth of about 8% 
per annum (Stern 2018). 
 
In 2017, the total number of international students commencing in 
Australian public universities stood at 202,713 students (Department of 
Education and Training 2017a). Thirty-five Australian public universities 
enrolled 51,044 commencing students offshore in that year. This TNE 
cohort makes up about 25% of total international commencing students 
enrolled by these Australian institutions in 2017. IDP projected that 
Australian TNE programs will enroll more than 438,000 international 
students offshore by 2025 (Bohm et al. 2002). In the vocational 
education and training (VET) sector, 242 Australian VET providers 
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operated TNE programs for 39,526 offshore students in 2016 
(Department of Education and Training 2017b). 
 
According to the Council on Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) of 
the USA, there were 236 U.S.-accredited offshore programs (Naidoo 
2009). Naidoo remarks that this is most likely an understatement due to 
the existence of non-accredited or foreign-accredited programs. In 
quoting an Observatory of Borderless Higher Education article of 2003, 
Naidoo also reports that ‘offshore education enrolments (delivered via 
programme mobility) are growing three times as fast as the U.S. 
domestic level’ (2009, 324). The USA now leads the international branch 
campus (IBC) space with 771 IBCs delivering more than 2,500 program 
initiatives in 130 countries (SIG-TNE 2018). 
 
Other emerging provider countries include Canada and New Zealand. 
Knight (2000) reports that a survey conducted in 2000 by the Association 
of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) revealed that 42% of 
institutions operated Mode 3 TNE programs. In New Zealand, twenty-
nine institutions were known to be involved in teaching 2,200 students 
through 63 offshore programs in 2007 (Bashir 2007). 
 
The number of international branch campuses worldwide grew from 113 
in 2006 to 162 in 2009, a growth of about 43% over the three-year period 
(Murray et al. 2011, 25). The Observatory on Borderless Higher 
Education reports that the majority of the 162 international branch 
campuses were located in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East (Becker 
2009). Murray further reports that the number of host countries increased 
from 36 in 2006 to 51 in 2009. There are now 263 international branch 
campuses operating in 77 countries as at the end of 2017 (Garrett et al. 
2017, 2016). 
 
Some of the earliest host countries for TNE programs have been in Asia, 
e.g., Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, China, and India. It is now 
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ubiquitous in many regions of the world, including Europe, the Middle 
East, Africa and Latin America. McBurnie and Ziguras (2009) reports that 
one-third of Singapore’s higher education students comprise of TNE 
students. There were 126 officially-approved Chinese institutions 
operating 705 collaborative TNE programs in China in 2007 (Dong 2008). 
 
2.1.2.4 Australian University Transnational Education 
 
In the Australian context, the transition from ‘aid’ to ‘trade’ was a 
consequence of deliberate government policy initiated in the 1980s by 
John Dawkins, the then Minister for Employment, Education and 
Training, who identified education as an export that can help improve the 
current account deficit (Marginson and Considine 2000, 30). By 1985, 
full-fee international student places were created, and by 1988, foreign 
aid scholarships for international students were eliminated, save for a 
relatively small number of mission-related scholarship schemes. ‘In 1986, 
there were 20,000 foreign 'aid' students subsidised by the Australian 
government and only 2,000 full-fee foreign 'trade' students who fully paid 
their own way. Yet, by 1991, there were only 6,000 'aid' students and a 
burgeoning 48,000 full-fee students.’(Beazley 1992) 
 
Coincidentally, the dovetailing of curtailed funding, the national shift 
towards a corporatised and commercially-inclined higher education 
sector, pent-up demand for higher education in Southeast Asia, and the 
globalisation of higher education in the 1980s, led to the first Australian 
TNE programs in the region. Australian institutions have since then, 
grown their TNE offerings significantly, becoming a major provider 
worldwide. In 2003, 37 of the 38 Australian universities enrolled 
international students through 1,569 TNE programs (Universities 
Australia 2003). More than 70% of these programs were delivered in 
Malaysia, Singapore and China (including Hong Kong). By 2015, 
approximately ‘110,000 international students were undertaking all or 
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part of their Australian degree offshore’ (Bentley, Henderson and Lim 
2017, 339). 
 
Among Australian universities, TNE is a growing portfolio with 
increasingly critical financial importance. It is now the top services export 
for the nation. Even the Australian Universities Quality Agency (AUQA) 
reports that ‘Australia has become a leading exporter of (higher) 
education, and Australian institutions rely heavily on the income from 
foreign students.’ (Stella and Liston 2008, 10) 
 
The tightening of the Australian visa regulations since 2009 and the 
stubbornly high Australian dollar have led to a softening of onshore 
international student enrolments. These lingering factors, together with 
the currently weak global economic environment, are expected to provide 
strong impetus for TNE program growth in the future (Murray et al. 2011). 
Forecasting by IDP indicates that 47% of all Australian enrolments of 
international students will be through TNE programs by 2025. (Bohm et 
al. 2002).  
 
2.2 Scope of Research in Transnational Education 
 
The ubiquity of TNE has generated immense interest among researchers 
the world over. It has generated research from many different 
perspectives, including pedagogy, medium of instruction, quality 
assurance, education psychology, political economy, management, 
policy, and regulatory frameworks. AUQA identified nine 
internationalisation sub-themes for audit investigation, viz., quality 
assurance systems for international programs, standard and quality of 
offshore teaching, services to international students, use of agents, 
problems with international programs, English language issues, 
professional development for internationalisation, pedagogy of offshore 
teaching, and internationalisation strategy (Stella and Liston 2008). The 
following will outline briefly, some examples of research in TNE. 
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The phenomenon of TNE itself has been investigated through various 
lenses, e.g., Leasks’ discursive constructions of internationalisation at an 
Australian university for professional practice (2004), Kehm and 
Teichler’s survey of research on internationalisation in higher education 
(2007), the glonacal agency heuristic analytical framework for TNE 
(Marginson and Rhoades 2002), the impact of globalisation on higher 
education (Armstrong 2007), and TNE as an export (Douglass, Edelstein 
and Hoareau 2011). 
 
Offering a foreign curriculum in a different jurisdiction, TNE programs 
have attracted its fair share of criticism as the tools of cultural imperialism 
and hegemony in the developing world (Garrett 2005). But, it has also 
been held up as an affordable solution to national capacity building 
(Librero 2005). These are two of a number of studies exploring the 
political economy of TNE. More fundamentally, the notion of the 
Enterprise University (Marginson and Considine 2000) or Entrepreneurial 
University (Clark 1998), as well as the conceptualisation of academic 
capitalism (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004) questions the long cherished 
raison d’etre of the university of western civilisation. 
 
The quality of provision of TNE programs is perceived to be highly 
variable across providers and host countries. This has generated a 
number of studies on the quality assurance of TNE, and the regulatory 
environment within which these programs are delivered. They include 
studies on regulation and quality assurance (Martin 2007), legislative 
changes impacting TNE (Tan 2001), a transaction cost approach to 
quality control in TNE (Edwards, Crosling and Edwards 2010), policy 
considerations for TNE in China (Gu 2007), quality of engineering TNE 
programs (Chong 2005), and an Australian Learning and Teaching 
Council grant study to develop a framework to assure quality of TNE 
programs (O’Donoghue et al. 2010). In Australia, TNE was initially 
governed under the Australian Universities Quality Agency (AUQA) in a 
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light-touch manner, but later closely regulated under the Tertiary 
Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA), which took over from 
AUQA in 2011. TEQSA distinguished between TNE operating in 
Australia by a non-Australian institution (Tertiary Education Quality and 
Standards Agency 2017) and third-party arrangements which covers 
collaborative program deliveries both within Australia and offshore 
(Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency 2019). 
 
Closely related to quality assurance (QA) is the academic dimension of 
TNE, including teaching and learning strategies, as well as language 
issues. Some of these studies focus on academic work in TNE (Dobos 
2011), transnational computing education (Miliszewska 2006), QA 
framework for offshore programs in non-English media (Scarino, Crichton 
and Papademetre 2006), ethnographic evaluation of cultural difference in 
TNE (Hoare 2006), transcultural teaching (Witsel 2008), and teaching 
and learning quality in TNE (O’Donoghue et al. 2010). 
 
TNE programs have often been described as high risk ventures with high 
failure rates. This perception has been demonstrated in AUQA’s 
selection of Internationalisation as one of the two themes of its Cycle 2 
audits for institutions with significant TNE exposure. This follows AUQA’s 
view that ‘… Australian universities’ offshore programs … are 
categorised as high risk because of the difficulty of managing these 
programs effectively’ (Stella and Liston 2008, 10). The area of risk 
management of TNE programs has therefore also attracted strong 
research interest, e.g., key factors in the deterioration of offshore 
education partnerships (Heffernan and Poole 2004), and entrepreneurial 
TNE and risk management (Shanahan and McParlane 2005b). 
 
With the proliferation of TNE, and especially in light of a number of TNE 
program failures, host countries are increasingly stringent in their 
regulatory monitoring and control of such programs. Keen governmental 
interest in TNE regulatory and policy issues has spawned a number of 
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publications, e.g., TNE policy (Moutsios 2009), knowledge of, and 
compliance with, the educational, taxation, cultural and other 
requirements of the host government and country (Adams 1998), TNE 
regulations in Southeast Asia (McBurnie and Ziguras 2001) and an 
adapted Porter Diamond approach to TNE host countries (Tsiligiris 
2017). Healey recently contends that TNE is on a downward trajectory as 
a result of weaknesses in the industry’s supply-side and demand 
conditions (Healey 2019). 
  
In view of the high risks involved in TNE operations, it follows that 
interest in institutional strategies and the management of such programs 
would be high. This body of research is large, and encompasses a wide 
field of aspects and perspectives. Some of these investigations include 
the delivery of transnational programs (Adams 1998), the sustainability of 
TNE programs in Vietnam (Vinen 2007), leadership and management of 
international partnerships between institutions (Fielden 2011), the 
development of international branch campuses (Cao 2011), TNE 
franchising (Chin 2008), TNE marketing strategies (Hsiao 2003), TNE 
sustainability (Thompson, Baron and Newton-Smith 2003), key success 
factors in delivering TNE programs (Pidgeon 1995) (Garrett et al. 2017), 
the classification of TNE delivery models (Knight and McNamara 2017) 
and branding challenges for TNE franchisees (Juusola and Rensimer 
2018). 
 
2.3 Gaps in Transnational Education Research 
 
The extant literature indicates a gap in research on the commercial 
aspects of TNE operation. This is reflected in the stark absence of 
business and finance monitoring within AUQA audits of Australian 
universities. This may be due to the perception that education, including 
TNE, is a public good. Academics generally consider TNE as primarily 
‘education’, and ‘hence, TNE is subject to the same principles of public 
good and public responsibility …’ (Australian Universities Quality Agency 
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2009, 5). However, in 2008, Dr David Woodhouse, Executive Director, 
AUQA, recognizing the lack of monitoring in the financial dimension of 
TNE, indicated in an AIEC (Australian International Education 
Conference) pre-conference workshop that AUQA was considering the 
inclusion of financial queries within future AUQA audits (personal 
communication, October 7, 2008). 
 
In contrast to the perception of TNE as an altruistic public good, TNE is 
commonly described in commercial terms within industry literature. Miller 
and Pincus in their series on higher education funding in Australia, noted 
the shift from a public good to one with public and private elements 
(1997). It has also been noted that John Dawkins, the former minister 
responsible for the expansion of the Australian higher education system 
in the late 1980s, was of the view that education could be an export to 
help improve the current account deficit (Marginson and Considine 
2000).  
 
While reviewing institutional strategies for internationalisation, Kehm and 
Teichler (2007, 265) conclude that ‘there is a strong indication that high-
quality educational provisions have become a business that—at least in 
some countries—is a factor in the generation of institutional income.’ 
Ziguras, in developing a TNE good practice guide for New Zealand 
institutions, remarks that ‘transnational operations have the capacity to 
generate additional revenue for the New Zealand provider’ (2007, 5).  
 
Australia’s former Minister for Trade and Investment, Andrew Robb was 
quoted in The Australian news article ‘Asian Demand Needs Business 
Solution’ as saying, 'The sheer numbers of potential students presented 
a market opportunity that needed to be seen as ‘a business problem that 
requires a business solution, not an academic solution’ (Ross and Hare 
2012). 
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These observations of a commercial orientation for TNE therefore 
provide a clear indication of the need for an investigation of the 
commercial operation of TNE ventures. 
 
TNE is recognised as a risky venture, amply demonstrated by a number 
of failures, e.g., the failure of RMIT University to commence branch 
campus operation in Penang, Malaysia, the ending of the University of 
Southern Queensland franchise arrangement with the Informatics Group 
in Malaysia, and the pull-out of the University of New South Wales from 
Singapore. In contrast, there are also a number of clearly continuing TNE 
ventures, e.g., the Wollongong University franchise partnership with the 
Laureate International Universities Group in Subang Jaya, Malaysia, 
Curtin University branch campus in Sarawak, Malaysia, and RMIT 
University branch campuses in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam. 
 
How do some TNE ventures find longevity, while others fail? While there 
are a number of normative studies on recommended structures and 
processes to meet compliance requirements and ostensibly to succeed, 
there are very few empirical investigations into TNE business delivery 
models and how these models contribute to the longevity of the ventures. 
 
2.4 Researching Transnational Education as Commercial Venture 
 
It was earlier noted that there was a dearth of research on the 
commercial aspects of TNE, amidst a large number of TNE studies which 
are mostly set within academic contexts. This prevailing orientation is a 
consequence of the reluctance of academic researchers to embrace 
commercial paradigms. 
 
2.4.1 A Changing Conceptualisation of the University 
 
The global growth of TNE has occurred amidst a shift in the 
conceptualisation of the university. The University as an institution can 
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be traced to the Socratic and Aristotelian academies of Athens, early 
experiments in enquiry rooted in debates and discourses. In time, the 
modern Western University was birthed by students in 1088 as 
Universitas di Studorum, Bologna, a community of scholars where 
professors were employed by the student guilds. The early universities 
were characterised by the free pursuit of knowledge as an end in itself, 
unfettered by industry, the religious community or politics – where the 
gown takes precedence over the town. 
 
Over time, the University has evolved in its purpose, internal structure 
and external relations. Thorstein Veblen, writing Higher Learning in 
America (Veblen 1918), was one of the first academics to decry the 
invasion of commerce into the sacred precincts of the University. He 
argues that with the infusion of corporatism, the University has gradually 
lost its participatory decision-making culture, and subject to the pursuit of 
market-oriented production functions. Although his thoughts and writings 
were well received, this particular thesis did not find friendly reception 
then. 
 
The present-day University has been described by academics variously 
as a Dereferentialised University (Readings 1996), the Enterprise 
University (Marginson and Considine 2000), and the Entrepreneurial 
University  (Clark 1998). They all share a common characteristic : that 
the University has sold its soul to commerce, and in the process, lost its 
long-cherished raison d’etre of the free pursuit of knowledge. Readings 
interprets the loss of referents in the ‘primary institution of national 
culture in the modern nation state’ (1996, 12) as a result of globalisation, 
the alignment of national productive capacity to capitalistic objectives, the 
pursuit of economic efficiency (read ‘excellence’) and the reduction of 
government funding. Similarly, Slaughter and Leslie, through the lens of 
resource dependence theory, describes how the global political economy 
is inducing academic capitalism in the US higher education sector  
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(1997). They define academic capitalism as ‘the involvement of colleges 
and faculty in market-like behaviours’ (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 37).  
 
Marginson and Considine (2000) trace the evolution of the Australian 
university from the inception of the University of Sydney, the first 
Australian university in 1850 through the many sector reforms. They 
describe the shift towards the deployment of universities as public policy 
tools, the introduction of economic criteria in the assessment of public 
interest within higher education, the export of education to improve the 
current account deficit, and the ascendance of management over faculty.  
 
It is important to bear in mind these shifts in the conceptualisation of the 
university, the impact of globalisation, and the reconfiguration of 
governmental funding, as well as the consequent structural 
transformation of the university, in any study of TNE. TNE cannot be fully 
explicated without reference to these ongoing tensions. An example of 
this tension is the possible conflict between the university’s mission and 
its funding obligations, highlighted by Weisbrod, Ballou and Asch (2008) 
as the two-good perspective. They argue that the western university now 
has to ensure it has sufficient revenue goods, i.e., revenue-generating 
activities, to pay for its mission goods, viz., its teaching, research and 
public service.  While the parsimony of an investigation that assumes 
either a purely mission-driven university or a purely profit-focused 
university is welcome, the underlying tensions would render the analysis 
invalid. 
 
Many researchers have railed against the market-driven shifts in the 
purpose and structure of the University, but Readings advises against an 
attitude of denunciation, and proposes that ‘an engagement with and 
transvaluation of this shift can allow innovative and creative thinking to 
occur’ (1996, 167). It is with this perspective that the current research 
program has been framed to analyse Australian university transnational 
education. 
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2.4.2 The Business of Transnational Education 
 
Fundamental to this study is the question of why universities engage in 
TNE. Among some of the key reasons for this involvement are to 
internationalise student and staff experiences, internationalise curriculum 
and pedagogy, provide access to students who do not have the 
opportunity to study in Australia, generate new revenue streams, improve 
regional and international visibility, and brand profile for the promotion of 
onshore enrolment. However, some universities do not have a clear 
internationalisation agenda and are unable to articulate a reason for their 
TNE involvement (Armstrong 2007, 135; Adams 1998). 
 
In addressing the viability of TNE operations, Adams (1998) 
recommends that ‘commercial considerations must be foremost in the 
sense that unless the program is financially sustainable without subsidy 
from domestic programs, it is unlikely to survive’. It thus follows that the 
primary success factor for TNE is financial sustainability – the TNE 
program being a revenue good, which should pay for all the other 
mission goods. Naidoo also similarly conclude that ‘… the perceptions of 
higher education … as a lucrative service that can be sold in the global 
marketplace has begun to eclipse the social and cultural objectives of 
higher education generally encompassed in the conception of higher 
education as a ‘public good’’ (2008, 45). 
 
The political economy within which the western university finds itself in is 
marked by a highly connected network of country states vying for 
economic dominance, an expectation that the university’s primary role is 
one of human capital production for the state’s economic prosperity, 
reduced but competitive government grants, and consequently 
entrepreneurial university instincts. Globally, there is a clearly discernible 
conceptualisation that education’s role is to drive productivity which feeds 
into economic growth (Centre for International Economics 2008). 
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Amidst the shift in expectations of the role of universities and other 
higher education institutions, the funding of these institutions have often 
been dramatically reduced. The UK government for example, cut more 
than three quarters of university funding for teaching, and replaced it with 
a student loan system (Green 2011). To balance the books, programs 
that are deemed low in employability have been culled. The USA has 
explored the ‘ability to benefit’ criteria to favour institutions that can 
demonstrate commitment to student success. Even China is not immune 
to this trend – in responding to increasing unemployment, its Ministry of 
Education announced plans to phase out or downsize programs that 
have employment rates below 60% for two consecutive years (The 
Chronicle of Higher Education 2011). 
 
Like any other organisation, universities also face increasing budgetary 
pressures of growing operational costs, and asset investments and 
renewals. With reducing state funding and regulated fee regimes, they 
find themselves in a tightening cost-price squeeze. For many, 
globalisation provided the relief (Armstrong 2007). This fits well with the 
observation by McBurnie and Ziguras (2009) that ‘… the vast majority of 
transnational programs are funded wholly by students’ tuition fees, which 
places them alongside nationally based for-profit higher education as the 
most consumer-driven form of education delivery in the world today’. It is 
noteworthy that recent studies however, report that TNE surpluses might 
not be as worthwhile as traditionally conceived (Healey 2019). 
 
Australia responded to this cost-price tension by legislating a commercial 
approach to university funding. This was initiated in the mid-1980s 
through the ‘education as export’ strategy. Back then, Australian 
institutions were some of the first to export, and today, are still 
considered some of the most experienced in TNE. Marginson and 
Considine remarks that ‘almost every policy move from the mid 1980s, … 
was powered by faith in markets and the business model of higher 
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education ... this was a faith that the three ‘Cs’ of competition, 
corporatism and consumerism would lift efficiency, performance and 
rates of innovation; strengthen accountability to government, students 
and business; and provide fiscal relief’ (2000, 3) 
 
While there is a need to acknowledge and take account of Weisbrod et 
al.’s ‘mission good-revenue good’ tension, there is an equally potent 
argument for universities to operate commercial activities using 
commercial strategies and tactics. The imposition of an inevitable 
capitalistic paradigm onto universities requires a new, bold and 
innovative approach to university management and governance – as is 
suggested by Readings (1996). The increasing adoption of commercial 
principles has translated to the emergence of an interest in various TNE 
business delivery models. 
 
2.5 Transnational Education Business Delivery Models 
 
Universities engaging in TNE have been known to deploy an assortment 
of business delivery models. They gradually gravitated to a handful of 
proven models. This gravitation towards certain prefered models may be 
attributed to isomorphism, the move by organisations towards similar 
processes and organisational structure. DiMaggio and Powell noted 
three types of isomorphism, viz., coercive isomorphism due to regulatory 
pressure (e.g., the shift from twinning programs to franchised models), 
normative isomorphism resulting from the perception of proven models 
(e.g., the phenomenon of international branch campuses), and mimetic 
isomorphism arising from uncertainty (such as the strategic move by the 
University of South Australia to unwind from their wide network of TNE 
operations in 2008) (1983). 
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2.5.1 TNE Models and their Commercial Equivalents 
 
TNE has traditionally been delivered through distance learning including 
online learning and their hybrid variants, twinning arrangements, 
licensing, franchising, and international branch campuses. These 
delivery models mirror, and are derived from some of the commercial 
sector’s more common cross-border business delivery models.  
 
Within the commercial sector, strategic alliances can be seen as ‘non-
trivial, bilateral cooperation between autonomous firms’ (Adobor 2011, 
67). They span across the range from equity joint-ventures to loosely-
bound business relationships. Commercial entities engage in such 
alliances for a number of reasons, viz., resource leveraging, technology 
transfer, rapid market penetration and accelerated market expansion. 
 
Dussauge and Garrette (1999) categorise strategic alliances into two 
broad types, viz., non-competing partners and competing partners. The 
former includes equity joint-ventures, vertical partnerships of supplier-
customer relationships at various points of the value chain, and cross-
industry agreements for new market penetration. Competing partner 
alliances comprise shared supply alliances for economies of scale in 
supplies, quasi concentration alliances which produce joint products and 
complimentary alliances where partners contribute different skills sets. In 
this context, it appears that the more common strategic alliances 
employed by Australian universities include vertical partnerships, quasi 
concentration alliances and complimentary alliances. 
 
In the early years of TNE, the preferred business delivery model was 
distance learning (and their hybrid and online variants) and franchised 
programs. Later providers used franchised delivery models almost 
exclusively. In the last decade, the international branch campus grew in 
popularity among universities with a higher risk appetite. Verbik and 
Merkley (2006) surveyed 21 wholly-controlled TNE operations in 18 
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countries from 4 source countries, and 42 franchised operations in 15 
countries from 11 source countries. They established that the 
international branch campus holds the stature of an ultimate aspiration 
amongst TNE providers. However, despite its prestige and desirability, 
the international branch campus is an aspiration only for universities 
which have robust internationalisation agendas, strong financial standing, 
access to external funding, and are less risk averse. Not all universities 
can or should aspire to operate an international branch campus. In fact, 
Verbik and Merkley observed that franchised programs are much more 
established than international branch campuses (2006). 
 
The launch of TNE operations can be likened to multinational 
corporations ‘expanding abroad in search of revenues and markets’ 
(Ahmed and Rao 2011, 119). Using the Robbin and Coulter (2001) 
conceptualisation, Ahmed and Rao postulates that universities expand 
overseas by going through the same ‘classic’ sequence of Exports, Initial 
Overt Market Entry, and Establish International Operations. He refered to 
exports as the universities’ enrolment of international students onshore; 
initial overt market entry as light-touch offshore involvement with no or 
minimum involvement (e.g., examination centres and student mobility); 
and international operations as the various TNE operations.  
 
Ahmed and Rao further applies the parallel EPRG framework of Bartlett 
and Ghoshal (1989) to classify university TNE strategies according to 
whether the university ‘adjusts and adapts its policies and operations to 
suit its target markets’ (2011, 132), EPRG refering to Ethnocentric 
(International), Polycentric (Multidomestic), Regio and Geocentric 
(Global), or Transnational. 
 
Guimon (2016) researched branch campuses using an eclectic paradigm 
which focused on ownership of the operation, location of delivery and 
extent of internalisation. His framework is based on TCE, PRT and RBV, 
and provides the basis for studying TNE as an international business. 
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2.5.2 Reflecting on TNE Complexity 
 
A survey of Knight’s taxonomy of TNE operations indicates that newer 
forms of TNE business delivery models have emerged, e.g., the 
dual/multiple degree, the co-founded university, the foreign private 
university and the franchised university (2015). She also flags that the 
phenomenon of dual/multiple degrees might not strictly be a TNE 
business delivery model because of the use of validation as the basis of 
awards; a basis that is generally questionable in academia. Her 
classification of twinning and franchised programs as one and the same 
might be misinterpreted in certain host countries such as Malaysia, 
where twinning refers to the completion of a degree in two or more 
countries (see Section 4.3.4.2.2 for case evidence). These twinning 
programs may be based on a franchised arrangement or articulation 
between the participating higher education institutions (HEI) (Education 
Marketing Division 2010), the latter not considered TNE.  
 
Her taxonomy has been updated in the joint publication by the British 
Council and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) 
Transnational Education : A Classification Framework and Data 
Collection Guidelines for International Programme and Provider Mobility 
(IPPM) reproduced below (Knight and McNamara 2017).  
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Independent TNE Provision Collaborative TNE Provision 
1) Franchised Programmes 
(import/export; validation; 
foreign; non-local; international 
private programs) 
4) Partnership Programmes 
    (joint/double/multiple degrees;  
    twinning programs) 
2) International Branch Campus  
    (IBC) 
    (satellite; private international;  
    offshore campus; portal  
    campus) 
5) Joint University 
    (co-developed; bi-national; co- 
    founded; multinational; joint  
    venture universities) 
3) Self-study Distance Education 
    (fully online education; open  
    university; MOOCs; pure  
    distance education) 
6) Distance Education with Local  
    Academic Partner 
    (online or distance education  
    with reference to local academic  
    partner) 
 
Table 2.2   Common TNE Classification Framework for IPPM (Knight 
and McNamara 2017, 16) 
 
This Knight and McNamara (KM) framework is one of the latest attempts 
at classifying the myriad TNE models, and is driven by the need for 
better understanding and measurement of the TNE phenomenon, 
planning and policy development, quality assurance and accreditation, 
and assisting higher education institutions (HEIs) in strategic planning. 
The basis of classification lies in three key questions, viz., who awards 
the qualification, who is primarily responsible for curriculum design and 
delivery, and who is primarily responsible for external quality assurance 
and accreditation (QAA). The authors present the framework as a work-
in-progress to be updated with the discovery of new information and 
knowledge. 
 
2.5.3 Interpreting TNE Complexity for Empirical Analysis 
 
For the purposes of the current study, the KM framework cannot 
accurately or sufficiently capture the key characteristics of 
organisations/delivery models (by being based merely on the three key 
questions). This is especially relevant when the TNE phenomenon is 
studied using the theories of the firm, where the boundaries of the firm 
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are circumscribed by production functions as well as transaction costs, 
residual control rights influence the choice of organisational structure, 
and firms respond to governance environments. The KM framework 
needs to be modified to accurately and sufficiently capture TNE 
processes for analysis. 
 
First, the KM framework classifies franchised programs as independent 
TNE provision (i.e., controlled entirely by the sending HEI) based on the 
three key questions. However, apart from the three processes 
considered, TNE also encompass a number of other core processes as 
outlined and adapted from Hutaibat’s higher education value chain (as 
discussed in Section 2.7.3). Further, a commercial definition of business 
format franchises (Garg, Rasheed and Priem 2005, 185) clearly point to 
a collaborative venture between a franchisor and its franchisees, 
evidencing a collaborative relationship. The business format franchise 
refers to a firm licensing the production of goods or services to another 
firm under the former’s brand and delivery systems (Castrogiovanni, 
Combs and Justis 2006). 
 
Second, the inclusion of joint/dual/multiple degrees (JDMs) and twinning 
programs in the collaborative category is not well supported for the 
following reasons. Dual/multiple degrees are usually based on either an 
articulation or a validation agreement (Uroda 2010, 231-261). Articulation 
cannot be said to be a TNE operation, while we have argued earlier that 
validation is generally not a favoured arrangement due to its weak 
academic basis. Twinning programs, as also argued previously, are 
either based on franchised arrangements or articulation (Edwards, 
Crosling and Edwards 2010, 303). This leaves joint degrees as the only 
model under Partnership Program.  
 
Third, as argued by Knight and intimated in the KM report, distance 
education, and its online variant can be considered pedagogical 
alternatives and not true TNE models of delivery. If accompanied by local 
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host support, it can be subsumed under Partnership Programs (if the 
collaboration involves host HEI/partner providing non-academic inputs) 
or Franchised Programs (if the host HEI/partner provides the key inputs 
of curriculum design and/or delivery). Hence, Partnership Program now 
has two variants, viz., the distance education with local host support and 
the joint degree. 
 
Fourth, the KM framework may have mis-positioned the multinational 
university as a Joint University. These can also be stand-alone networks 
of autonomous universities in different countries, an example being the 
Laureat group of universities (Garrett et al. 2016, 45). 
 
Finally, there is a need to clarify the definition of an international branch 
campus (IBC). According to the second part of the fifth report on 
international branch campuses from the Observatory on Borderless 
Education (Observatory), an IBC is ‘an entity that is owned, at least in 
part, by a foreign education provider; operated in the name of the foreign 
education provider; and provides an entire academic program, 
substantially on site, leading to a degree awarded by the foreign 
education provider’ (Garrett et al. 2017). The Observatory lists the 
following IBCs as carrying Australian university badges. 
 
No. International Branch Campus Country Year Started 
No. of  
Programs 
Student 
Population 
1 Curtin University, Malaysia Malaysia 1999 34 4,100 
2 Curtin Singapore Singapore 2008 11 2,000 
3 JCU Singapore Singapore 2003 22 3,000 
4 Monash University, Malaysia Malaysia 1998 14 6,000 
5 Monash South Africa South Africa 2001 8 2,617 
6 Murdoch University in Dubai UAE 2007 11 600 
7 University of Newcastle International Singapore Singapore 2002 9 2,000 
8 RMIT Vietnam (HCMC) Vietnam 2001 23 5,755 
9 RMIT Vietnam (Hanoi) Vietnam 2004 10 1,200 
10 Swinburne University of Technology, Sarawak Campus Malaysia 2000 12 2,390 
11 University of Wollongong in Dubai UAE 1993 24 4,163 
 
Table 2.3   List of Australian University IBCs as at 2017 (Garrett et 
al. 2017, 74-90) 
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The KM framework places IBCs in the independent TNE provision 
category, arguing that IBCs do not collaborate with partners in the 
provision of TNE. While there are wholly controlled and operated IBCs 
(such as James Cook University Singapore), there are clearly cases 
where the sending HEIs are constrained by contracts with host 
HEIs/partners, e.g., the involvement of the Sarawak state government in 
the governance of Curtin University Sarawak through the chairs of the 
Board and Council in return for the provision of land, buildings and 
funding (Garrett et al. 2017, 14).  
 
Further, evidence from in-depth interviews (Sections 5.3 and 5.4) 
however, indicate that some of the listed IBCs in the Observatory’s report 
might have been mis-classified because at least one Australian ‘IBC’ was 
found to be wholly owned by the university’s offshore partner (OP). This 
type of IBC, together with the Curtin-Sarawak IBC (discussed previously) 
are distinguished from the wholly-controlled IBC, as collaborative IBCs. 
This important distinction has been accounted for in the development of 
the TNE Framework for Organisational Economics Research at Section 
2.5.5. 
 
2.5.4 The TNE Direct-Outsourced Dichotomy 
 
To be able to deploy cross-border strategic alliances effectively, 
commercial entities must be able to modularise their delivery process. 
Some of the resulting component processes of the modularised value 
chain can then be outsourced to strategic partners with the expertise 
and/or capacity to optimise the value chain. This attempt at optimisation 
through outsourcing can be observed in many TNE operations 
(Armstrong 2007), and has been studied by Davies et. al. (2000). The 
categorisation of TNE business delivery models into Direct Model, Joint 
Model and Partner Model by Davies et. al. is a useful framework to 
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examine institutional motivations and the attendant success or failure of 
their TNE operation. 
 
For the purposes of the present study where a comparison will be made 
between University-managed, and outsourced business delivery models, 
the typology of Davies et. al. will be modified and regrouped as  
 
a) Direct Model – where the university is responsible for all core TNE 
   functions; and 
b) Joint/Partner Model – where part or all of the program’s core TNE  
functions have been outsourced to the offshore partner 
(to be re-labelled the Outsourced Model). 
 
The dichotomy between the Direct Model and the Outsourced Model 
provides the framework for exploring the decision-making processes in 
explicating the Australian university TNE program phenomenon. This 
dichotomy can also be compared to the GATS mode 1-mode 3 
distinction which distinguishes between cross-border supply and 
commercial presence respectively. 
 
2.5.5 TNE Framework for Organisational Economics Research 
 
Noting the need for additional enhancements for a more complete 
analysis of complex TNE business delivery models in Section 2.5.3, the 
KM framework is proposed to be adapted in this Section. The KM 
framework requires the incorporation of the provision of teaching and 
learning (T and L) infrastructure, the deployment of staff and student 
support, post-graduation career placement and alumni relations (Hutaibat 
2011, 218), and the impact of online education and multinational 
universities (Hare 2012, 17) on the TNE landscape. Following discussion 
in Section 2.5.3 on the classification of IBCs, there is a need to separate 
wholly-controlled IBCs (w-IBCs) from collaborative IBCs (c-IBCs), where 
w-IBCs fully satisfy the IBC definition of the Observatory on Borderless 
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Education (Observatory), while c-IBCs are IBCs which are not owned by 
the foreign education provider, but satisfies the other three Observatory 
IBC requirements and are operated by an OP (Edwards, Crosling and 
Edwards 2010, 314). Finally, as scoped out in Section 3.2 Focus of 
Research, self-study distance education and online education are 
excluded from the current investigation due to the absence of physical 
faculty-student engagement. 
 
This adapted framework elaborates on the core processes involved in 
TNE, and indicates the possible entity/ies responsible for each process. 
In the spirit of the KM framework, this adapted framework is also 
proffered as a work-in-progress TNE framework variation. 
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No
. 
TNE Processes Direct Models Outsourced Models 
w-IBC Multina-
tional 
University 
c-IBC Franchised 
Program 
Partner-
ship 
Program 
Joint HEI/ 
provider 
A Primary Activities 
1 
A
ca
de
m
ic
 
re
cr
ui
tm
en
t Curriculum 
design S S or A S S 
S or 
SandH SandH 
2 Curriculum 
delivery S A H 
H or  
SandH 
H or 
SandH A 
3 Student 
recruitment S A H H H A 
4 
Te
ac
hi
ng
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
Awarded 
by S S or A S S 
S or 
SandH SandH 
5 Curriculum 
designed 
by 
S S or A S S S or SandH SandH 
6 Curriculum 
delivered 
by 
S A H H or SandH 
H or 
SandH A 
7 Career 
placement and 
alumni relations 
S A SandH SandH SandH A 
B Support Activities 
1 TandL physical 
infrastructure 
provision 
S A H H H A 
2 
S
tu
de
nt
 
su
pp
or
t Academic S A H H H or SandH A 
3 Admin/Pro-
fessional S A H H 
H or 
SandH A 
4 Academic staff 
support S A SandH SandH 
H or 
SandH A 
5 Divisional 
management S A SandH SandH SandH A 
 
Abbreviations :  1)   S – Sending Higher Education Institution/Provider 
   2)   H – Host Higher Education Institution/Provider 
   3)   A – Autonomous/semi-autonomous management 
Table 2.4   TNE Framework for Organisational Economics Research 
adapted from KM Framework (Knight and McNamara 2017, 16) and 
Hutaibat Value Chain (Hutaibat 2011, 218) 
 
The TNE delivery framework tabulated above builds upon work done by 
Hutaibat on the modularisation of higher education delivery, as discussed 
in Section 2.7.3, and incorporates the Direct-Outsourced dichotomy of 
TNE delivery adapted from Davies et. al.’s typology. 
 
2.6 Theoretical Bases for the Study of Business Delivery Models 
 
In this section, three theories of the firm are explored as lenses to 
investigate TNE decision-making. The universities being studied are 
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postulated to have undertaken TNE model selection decisions based on 
various commercial and related motivations underpinned by one or more 
of these theories. 
 
2.6.1 Theoretical Framework of Study 
 
Most of the TNE research to date have been normative studies. There 
are very few empirically grounded investigations. The present study aims 
to contribute to this small body of empirical work through an investigation 
of institutional motivations for different types of business delivery models. 
 
The present study aims to investigate institutional motivations for 
different types of business delivery models. The assumption is that the 
university has had to adopt corporate/commercial paradigms and 
practices to navigate the new industry environment that is characterised 
by intense domestic and international competition for students, staff and 
resources. This has been observed by many researchers, including 
Marginson, who noted that ‘… universities have always borrowed from 
the organisations outside them, …’ (1998, 43).  
 
A survey of the literature indicates face validity for several theories of 
organisational economics in explaining these business delivery models 
empirically. Three theoretical perspectives in particular, can be used as 
lenses for an empirical study of TNE business delivery models (Zhang 
2006). These are transaction cost economics, property rights theory and 
agency theory, constituent branches of organisational economics (Kim 
and Mahoney 2005).  
 
Seminal works by Coase (1960, 1937), Alchian (Alchian 1969, 1965a) 
and Demsetz (1964, 1966, 1967) laid the foundation for the development 
of transaction cost economics, agency theory and property rights theory. 
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Fig. 2.2   Economic Theories of Organisations (Williamson 1990, 62) 
 
Drawing from Williamson’s schema (see Fig. 2.2 above), the 
development of transaction cost economics, property rights theory and 
agency theory was a result of dissatisfaction with neoclassical economics 
in explaining economic institutions using price and production output 
(Williamson 1990, 62). His schema introduced a differentiation between 
the neoclassical focus on the technological (non-contractual) approach 
concerned with output and pricing, and the contractual approach of 
institutions. These latter institutions are broadly described as either the 
rules-based institutional environment (where property rights theory is 
located) or the hierarchical institutional arrangements within firms (where 
agency theory and transaction cost economics are located).  
 
The new institutional economists argue that comparative contractual 
issues must be addressed because firm boundaries are not clear, 
property rights are not well-defined, and contractual disputes are not 
costlessly settled by the courts (Gibbons and Roberts 2013, 2). 
 
Property rights theory assumes that when transacting parties can agree 
on their respective property rights, the markets through its governance 
		
	
 62 Oliver E. Williamson dHÏÏTIE
 j0 Neoclassical
 Noncontractual y^v
 (Technological)^/^ ^^^^
 ^^ X^Other Public
 ^r ^* a Choice
 N. Public/^^
 Contractual n. Environment^''^^^^^ Private
 (Institutional) N. (Rulesi^^ >^
 ^v^^^ ^^^^ ^^ Property •^ ^^ Rights
 >v ^^ Agency
 Arrangements >^ ^^^0^^^^^ Theory
 (Organizations) ^w^1^1^^ Complete
 *'^ (Ex Ante)
 Incomplete N.
 (Ex Post) >v
 >. Transaction
 • Cost
 Figure 1
 Economic theories o organization
 The first categorical distinction in the schema is whether a theory works out
 of a noncontractual setup or approaches the study of economic organization
 from a contractual point of view instead. The prevailing approach, until about
 1960, was to view the firm in technological (mainly production function) rather
 than in contractual/organizational terms. Comparative contractual issues were
 ig ored because (1) the b undary of the firm was taken as given (b ing defined
 mainly by economies of scale and scope), (2) property rights were assumed to
 be well-defined, and (3) disputes, if any, were assumed to be costlessly and
 efficaciously decided by the courts. All contracts being efficacious, there simply
 was no occasion to examine differences among them and ask whether these
 differences had comparative institutional (organizational) significance.
This content downloaded from 134.7.34.232 on Thu, 07 Dec 2017 06:05:38 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
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rules will ‘reliably assign resources to high valued uses’ (Williamson 
1990, 66). Transaction cost economics, while similarly assuming the 
incompleteness of contracts, focuses on ex post governance structures 
to minimise transaction costs. Agency theory, on the other hand, 
assumes that property rights are a given, and that ex ante agreement on 
incentives can form sufficiently effective contracts to effect cost 
minimisation. 
 
At the onset of this research, a resource-based view was also 
considered, viz., the ‘resource scarcity theory’ (Castrogiovanni, Combs 
and Justis 2006). While considering agency theory in the investigation of 
the Direct-Outsourced dichotomy in TNE, ‘resource scarcity theory’ also 
comes to fore as a rival explanation to this choice of business delivery 
model. Interestingly, the first three theories focused on minimizing 
transaction costs, while resource-based views focused on maximising 
benefits or returns (Kim and Mahoney 2005, 224).  
 
On closer scrutiny, the ‘resource scarcity theory’ and the resource-based 
view were not selected to complement the three other theories of the firm 
for three reasons. First, the ‘resource scarcity theory’ has had a very 
short-lived appearance in the empirical scene. While it was mentioned in 
the Castrogiovanni et. al. journal article and based on a much quoted 
journal paper by Combs and Ketchen (2003), there were very few other 
empirical studies that followed through with this line of research. In fact, 
Combs and Ketchen merely mentioned resource scarcity, but not 
‘resource scarcity theory’ in their 2003 paper. More importantly, Barney 
et al.’s review of the development of the resource-based view/theory did 
not feature ‘resource scarcity theory’ at all (Barney, Jr and Wright 2011).  
 
Second, the resource-based view is grounded on the assumption of 
sustained firm performance (Bromiley and Rau 2016), a condition which 
is not met in every TNE operation. And finally, Barney et al. 
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acknowledged that some sections of the research community does not 
yet recognise it as a theory (2011). 
 
The present study will thus be anchored empirically by the three theories 
of the firm. These theories will form the lenses to explore the dichotomy 
between the Direct Model and the Outsourced Model. 
 
2.6.2 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
 
Made known mainly by Williamson (1979, 1985), transaction cost 
economics (TCE) posits that the firm exists to reduce transaction costs 
(e.g., negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of contracts) through the 
buy-or-make boundary decision, executed using the different governance 
structures of the market or the organisation, respectively. This buy-or-
make decision is derived originally from Coase’s work which can be 
summarised as ‘what factors affect the relative costs of internal 
coordination and market transactions that determine whether a firm will 
internalise resource allocations or use the price (market) mechanism?’ 
(Klein and Sykuta 2010, 153).  
 
A transaction is one that ‘occurs when a good or service is transferred 
across a technologically separable interface’ (Williamson 1981, 552). In 
TCE, the basic unit of analysis is the transaction, which necessarily 
addresses conflict of interests of the parties to the transaction, requiring 
some form of order (viz., the governance structures of the market or 
hierarchy) in the transaction towards generating mutually beneficial 
outcomes for the parties (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997, 46). This concept 
was attributed to John R. Commons who defined the transaction as the 
ultimate ‘unit of investigation’ which includes the ‘three constituents of 
conflict, (mutual) dependence and order’ (1932, 265). He started off ‘with 
scarcity … to show that out of scarcity proceeds not only conflict, but also 
the collective action that sets up order on account of mutual dependence’ 
(Commons 1932, 265). The unit of analysis in TNE is represented by the 
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individual activities of the TNE value chain, as developed in Section 
2.7.3. 
 
Williamson theorises that the total cost of governance is the sum of 
production costs and transaction costs, where the transaction costs are 
the costs incurred in organizing the exchange (1990). He likens 
transaction costs to frictions in mechanical systems, and asks ‘do the 
parties to the exchange operate harmoniously, or are there frequent 
misunderstandings and conflicts that lead to delays, breakdowns and 
other malfunctions?’ (Williamson 1981, 552). Building on Williamson’s ex 
ante and ex post transaction costs, Rindfleisch and Heide (1997, 46) 
summarised transaction costs by sources and types as follows. 
 
  
Table 2.5   Sources and Types of Transaction Costs (Rindfleisch 
and Heide 1997, 46) 
 
The buy-or-make polar schema later evolved into a buy-make continuum, 
covering the market governance structure on one end, the hierarchy on 
the other end, and various hybrid structures in between (Zhang 2006, 
60). This construct seems a good fit to TNE with its similar outsource-or-
manage business delivery choice, comprising variations of business 
delivery models. 
 
TCE assumes that it is not possible to have complete contracts due to 
the assumed human frailties of bounded rationality and opportunism, and 
 
 
 
No. Nature of Transaction 
Costs 
Asset Specificity Environmental 
Uncertainty 
Behavioural Uncertainty 
A Source of Transaction 
Costs 
Nature of Governance 
Problem 
Safeguarding Adaptation Performance Evaluation 
B Type of Transaction 
Costs 
Direct Costs 
Costs of crafting 
safeguards 
Communication, 
negotiation and 
coordination costs 
Screening and selection 
costs (ex ante) 
Measurement costs (ex 
post) 
 
Opportunity Costs Failure to invest in productive assets 
Maladaptation; Failure to 
adapt 
Failure to identify 
appropriate partners (ex 
ante) 
Productivity losses 
through effort 
adjustments (ex post) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Potential New 
Entrants 
• New institutions 
• In ernational 
institutions 
• Duplicates from 
existing players 
Rivalry Among 
Existing Higher 
Education 
Institutions 
Substitutes 
• Online degrees 
• For profit 
universities 
Buyers 
• Parents 
• Students 
Supplierss 
• Faculty 
• Administrators 
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therefore assumes an ex post focus on governance structures for 
economizing outcomes (Williamson 1990). Bounded rationality refers to 
the limited ability of human actors to account for all contingencies while 
contracting, and has its antecedents in the human limitation for 
information processing and communication; opportunism refers to 
Williamson’s ‘self-interest seeking with guile’ which may arise from an 
environment lacking in trust and the presence of an opportunity for 
profitable exploitation (John 1984, 278). Bounded rationality results in 
performance evaluation problems due to uncertainties from difficulties in 
measuring performance, while opportunism gives rise to adaptation 
externalities due to uncertainties in the contracting environment. A less-
researched human behaviour that Williamson assumed as a basis for 
TCE is risk neutrality (Chiles and McMackin 1996). 
 
Williamson’s discriminating alignment hypothesis asserts that 
‘transactions which differ in their attributes are aligned with governance 
structures, which differ in their costs and competencies’, so as to reduce 
transaction costs (1991). Drawing from this hypothesis, he identified 
three key dimensions of TCE, viz., uncertainties affecting the transaction, 
the specificity of relational assets, and the frequency of transactions. The 
higher these are, the more the transaction will be undertaken within the 
organisation/hierarchy (Whinston 2003). This is due to the increased 
transaction costs compared to the total of production cost and the 
opportunity cost of making a less optimal governance decision 
(Williamson 1998).  
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Antecedents        
Of Human              
Behaviour   
  
Human        
Behaviour 
 
Dimension        Behavioural               Environmental 
(Uncertainty)       Uncertainty               Uncertainty 
 
Externalities/ 
Problems 
 
 
Dimensions  Low frequency and     asset specificity  High frequency and  asset specificity 
(Frequency and  (transaction costs    < production and opp costs) (transaction costs  > production and opp 
costs) 
Asset Specificity)  
            Information discovery 
Ex Ante Costs          Drafting 
            Negotiating 
 
Types of Contracts 
 
 
Types of Governance 
Structures 
   
Monitoring 
Ex Post Costs      Enforcing 
        Contract Renewal 
 
Fig. 2.3   Transaction Cost Economics Framework 
 
High asset specificity can result in the hold-up problem where one party 
to the contract may appropriate rent arising from transaction efficiencies 
provided by the other party’s investment in a relationship-specific asset. 
The solution to the hold-up problem is the classic paradigm case of 
vertical integration. Williamson originally identified four types of asset 
specificities, viz., physical asset, site, dedicated asset, and human asset 
Opportunity; 
trust; culture 
Limited 
Communica-
tion Ability 
Limited 
Information 
Processing 
Opportu-
nism 
Bounded 
Rationality 
Risk 
Neutrality 
Adaptation 
Problem 
Perfor-
mance 
Evaluation 
Problem 
Adverse 
Selection 
Problem 
Complex 
Contract 
(Incomplete) 
No 
Contract/ 
Simple 
Contract 
Organisa-
tional 
Structure/ 
Hierarchy 
Intermediate
/Hybrid 
Governance 
Structure 
Market 
Governance 
Structure 
Hold-up 
Problem 
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specificities, but expanded that to include brand name capital, and 
temporal specificities (1998). The focus group analysis identified possible 
asset specificity in investments towards physical infrastructure and 
facilities (e.g., engineering laboratories), international branch campus 
sites (e.g., central business district vs suburbia), organisational entities 
(e.g., host country office), University and OP brand equity, various 
dedicated training and quality assurance infrastructures, and time-bound 
operating licences. 
 
The externalities presented by performance evaluation difficulties, mal-
adaptation and holdup problems result in positive ex post transactions 
costs (viz., the costs of monitoring, enforcing and renewing contracts) 
(Zhang 2006) which will then determine the selection of governance 
structure which minimises these externalities. 
 
Figure 2.3 above summarises the TCE framework for analyzing the 
transaction cost minimizing behaviour of economic actors. 
 
In TNE parlance, the market represents a university’s direct engagement 
with partners across borders (as in the reliance on offshore partners in 
the marketing of the university’s programs), while the hierarchy 
represents the university’s direct engagement with students using its own 
infrastructure within the host country (best reflected in the international 
branch campus). Based on Williamson’s discriminating alignment 
hypothesis (1990), the choice of governance structure is essentially 
determined by three TCE dimensions, viz., the frequency of the 
transaction, the uncertainty of the transaction, and related asset 
specificity. The lower these dimensions, the more inclined firms will be 
towards the market governance structure (e.g., partner-marketed 
distance education and online education), and vice versa for the 
hierarchy structure (e.g., wholly-controlled international branch 
campuses). The emergence and longevity of international branch 
campuses might have their fundamentals in these key TCE dimensions, 
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especially relational asset specificity and uncertainties (in both 
performance and regulatory environments) associated with the 
governance environment of the IBC operations (McNamara and Doyle 
2014; Santos 2002). Straddling between the market and hierarchy are 
hybrid governance structures, organisational forms ‘that involve multiple 
partners pooling some strategic decision rights and even some property 
rights while keeping distinct ownership over key assets, so that they 
require governance to monitor and discipline their interactions’ (Klein and 
Sykuta 2010, 176), represented by various collaborative arrangements, 
e.g., franchised programs, licensed programs and collaborative IBCs 
(Knight and McNamara 2017). 
 
2.6.3 Property Rights Theory (PRT) 
 
Some scholars argue against the simplistic and discrete buy-or-make 
decision model of TCE. As an alternative to TCE, they suggest focusing 
on the details of the contract, an approach known as property rights 
theory (PRT). The works of Alchian (1965, 1969), Demsetz (1964, 1966; 
Demsetz 1967), Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart and Moore (1990) 
formed the base from which PRT developed. The current study does not 
distinguish between classical PRT promulgated by Alchian and Demsetz, 
and modern PRT by Grossman, Hart and Moore. Like TCE, PRT is also 
premised on the assumption of incomplete contracting. While 
governance structures matter in TCE, legal rules are the focus of PRT for 
efficiency outcomes in a world of positive transaction costs (Kim and 
Mahoney 2005). It makes sense to internalise these externalities (due to 
positive transaction costs) through spelling out resource ownership rights 
if the resulting gains exceed the costs of internalisation (Demsetz 1967, 
350). 
 
Established on the concept that firms are a ‘nexus of contracts’ or a 
‘bundle of asset ownerships’ (He 2016b, 261), PRT is focused on ex ante 
incentives alignment and hence, institutional arrangements (Williamson 
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1990), where ownership configurations emerge to manage different 
transaction costs. This is in contrast to the predominant focus of TCE on 
ex post costs to explain the paradigm case (i.e., vertical integration). PRT 
‘focuses explicitly on distortions in ex ante investments, in contrast to the 
ex post cost’ (Whinston 2003, 4, quoted in Zhang 2006, 61), and thus, 
Zhang proceeds to argue that ‘according to the PRT, a reason for 
integration is that ex ante  allocation of ownership may not maximise ex 
post surplus’ (2006). 
 
Property rights can refer merely to legal rights to access and ownership; 
but in the context of organisational economics, it refers to sanctioned 
behaviours of economic actors in deploying valuable resources for 
productive endeavours; these behaviors circumscribed by both formal 
legal institutions and non-formal social conventions (Alchian 1965b). 
Williamson argues that the ‘basic need is to get the property rights 
straight, after which, markets will reliably assign resources to high valued 
uses’ (1990). 
 
Property rights confer on the owner rights to use, to earn income, or 
otherwise to transfer assets and resources (Kim and Mahoney 2005). 
Under greater scrutiny, these rights are actually made up of bundles of 
partitions of residual control rights over various assets and resources, 
and not merely ownership of resources. Some examples would be rights 
to fishing in certain territorial waters, concession rights to oil and gas 
under those waters, and the rights to sail over those same waters. The 
firm’s boundary is thus defined by the combination of assets or resources 
that the firm exercises residual control rights over; it has the right to 
decide on how these assets/resources are deployed, and who to provide 
access to these assets/resources, subject to any restriction imposed by 
legally-enforced agreements entered into (i.e., obligation of specific 
rights). The TNE value chain activities make up bundles of property 
rights that are either specified within contracts or part of residual control 
rights. These features describe PRT’s broad stakeholder view of the 
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exercise of property rights, a view which is consistent with the ‘education 
as public good’ perspective, one of several perspectives of TNE (Naidoo 
2008, 45). 
 
An important distinction must be made between specific rights of control 
and residual rights of control; where the former are constrained by 
contract, while the latter are ownership rights that are not specified in 
contracts (Klein and Sykuta 2010, 100). Specific rights of control are the 
result of an exchange of property rights between contracting parties. 
Within mature regulatory environments, and in the absence of 
information asymmetry and opportunism, specific rights of control can be 
effective in producing efficient economic outcomes. However, the real 
world exhibits these externalities, and thus the exercise of residual rights 
of control becomes an important factor in organizing governance models. 
 
From the perspective of firm boundaries, PRT is better able (than TCE or 
agency theory especially) to explain shared ownerships which are neither 
market nor hierarchy, e.g., partnerships and joint-ventures, compared to 
other theories of the firm. TNE presents a unique business environment 
for PRT research, where ownership of both tangible and intangible 
assets, but more so, the intangible assets of education and intellectual 
property, within partnerships, form the basis of the commercial 
transaction (Kim and Mahoney 2005, 224).  
 
Property rights influence economic behaviour through the medium of 
incentives. They ‘delineate decision-making, specify permitted asset 
uses, define transferability, and direct the assignment of net benefits’ 
(Libecap 1986, 228). In fact, the higher the value of assets/resources 
(including human capital), the tighter the definition these property rights 
will be. Prima facie, the differences in asset investments and contractual 
complexity between franchised programs and the international branch 
campus seem to lend support to this argument.  
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Similarly, a more efficient TNE governance structure may emerge when 
transaction costs can be lowered, such as in more mature regulatory 
jurisdictions like Singapore and Malaysia. It would be insightful to explore 
if and why universities increase their offshore commitments over time as 
they gain experience (as with Monash University in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia) (Lane and Johnstone 2012), or if and why they would commit 
to large initial investments (as with Curtin University in Sarawak, 
Malaysia) (Murray 2011b). A comparative investigation of TNE across 
regulatory jurisdictions will contribute to the scarce number of PRT 
research on applications to internationalisation (He 2016b, 966). 
 
The observable switches between TNE business delivery models by 
active TNE operators over the span of their TNE involvement (Knight and 
McNamara 2017) seem to indicate the contracting parties’ willingness to 
give away or exchange certain residual rights, leading to a re-allocation 
of rights to meet market conditions and jurisdictional developments – 
what Barzel defines as the transaction in PRT (2005). Some of these 
switches may have been designed to address shirking on the part of the 
Offshore Partner (Al-Sindi et al. 2016), and rent-seeking behaviour (e.g., 
cross-selling of programs, knowledge transfer and reputational 
advantage from brand association) (Shanahan and McParlane 2005b). 
Further, the incentive for firm managers to invest in relationship-specific 
assets (which generate quasi rents) can be influenced by the allocation 
of residual control rights (Mahoney, Asher and Mahoney 2004, 7), as 
may be observed in international branch campuses formed as 
collaborative ventures between universities and the host country partners 
(Knight 2015).  
 
Klein and Leffler developed a PRT model that explored the ownership of 
brand name and organisational reputation as influential implicit ex ante 
arrangements to complement explicit contracts (1981). These 
considerations can find useful application in TNE operations which are by 
nature cross jurisdictional, and for which explicit legal arrangements may 
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not be sufficient constraints for opportunism and free-riding by the 
partners. Could these considerations have contributed to the longevity of 
some of the more established TNE operations? 
 
PRT decision-making can be analysed at two levels, viz., micro level or 
the macro (environment) level, as summarised in Fig. 2.4 below. 
 
The numerous business delivery models in TNE, where the partners 
choose to control various combinations of resources (e.g., branding, 
curriculum, the right to confer degrees, ownership of physical 
infrastructure, licensing, teaching, and assessment) in specific industry 
environments characterised by different institutions of governance 
provide rich ground for exploring hybrid governance arrangements under 
PRT (Ling, Mazzolini and Giridharan 2014). It is also increasingly 
becoming more relevant as a lens to investigate new types of firms and 
collaborations, in view of the growing knowledge industry, and the focus 
on human capital and intellectual property (in contrast to earlier focus on 
tangible resources). These new models of collaboration can present new 
forms of ex post distributional conflicts, e.g., infringement of copyrights 
(Section 4.3.4.2.5). 
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  Decision-making  
  via Property Rights 
  (micro analysis) 
              Through ex ante  
                 incentives alignment 
  Transaction costs 
a) search  Incomplete contracts  
b) communication  due to bounded  
c) bargaining  rationality and high 
d) contract drafting  contracting costs    
 
e) transfer of property   Through transfer of 
 rights    property rights  
 
 
 
 
 
f) establish and maintain      Negative Externalities 
    property rights                a)  Shirking 
g) contract monitoring       b)  Value dissipation 
   costs            c)  Free-riding 
             d)  Failure to fulfill promises  
            e)  Withhold/distort info 
      Operating within 
      Specified Legal  
     Environment 
     (macro analysis) 
 
 
    Legends :  
 
Fig. 2.4   Analysis of PRT Decision-making 
 
2.6.4 Agency Theory (AT) 
 
Many TNE programs are characterised by a business relationship 
between two partners. The two key issues in such business relationships 
are the difficulty the University experiences in selecting the right offshore 
business partner, and the ongoing difficulty in ensuring that the partner 
fulfills the University’s business objectives. These agency problems are 
the substance of agency theory (AT), a theory with origins in information 
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economics, pioneered by Ross (1973), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Arrow (Zeckhauser and Pratt 1985). It has since then also been applied 
in management accounting, strategic management and even psychology. 
The majority of early agency research studies are focused on the 
ownership structure of firms and the influence of capital markets on firms. 
 
AT has more recently been employed in research into typical business 
operational issues like strategic alignment (Robinson and Kuang 2007), 
disclosure (Spencer 2008b), managerial accounting (Baiman 1990), 
governance and decision-making (Dimitratos et al. 2009), corporate 
restructure (Conlon and Parks 1988), trust (Seal and Vincent-Jones 
1997) and bargaining power (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992; Spencer 
2008) between partners, performance-based funding (Kivisto 2005, 350), 
incentives in management accounting (Ronen and Balachandran 1995), 
control of multinational subsidiaries (Chang and Taylor 1999), and cost 
structures (Lamminmaki 2003). In TNE, AT has been applied in 
examining government-university relationships (Kivisto 2011), and 
decision-making in the boards of independent for-profit colleges (Olson 
2000). 
 
One critique of TCE is its focus on governance structures which relegate 
production functions to a black box approach. Opening this black box 
reveals key organisational issues such as trust levels, risk aversion, 
adverse selection, moral hazard and incentives – issues that are largely 
addressed by AT (Zhang 2006). 
 
Agency relationships can be argued to be present in all cooperative 
efforts. AT is deployed in studies of business models involving a principal 
hiring an agent with the appropriate specialised knowledge and skills to 
fulfill the principal’s business objectives for an agreed consideration. It 
requires the fulfillment of two necessary conditions, viz., that there is a 
potential for divergence of interests between the principal and agent, and 
for difficulties in ascertaining the capability and actions of the agent. 
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Agency problems arise from information asymmetry and differences in 
risk aversion between principal and agent, and are premised upon the 
assumption that the parties’ actions arise out of self interest (Kivisto 
2005). These conditions seem to mirror the management and structure of 
some TNE operations like franchised programs, and provide strong 
indicative face validity for AT as a theoretical base to study the 
performance of TNE business delivery models. 
 
During 1996, the former British Higher Education Quality Council found 
that many offshore partnerships had been established without sufficient 
information and due diligence (Tysome 1996). This finding mirrored 
observations made by AUQA on Australian universities involved in TNE 
(Australian Universities Quality Agency 2009). In Heffernan’s (Heffernan 
and Poole 2004) ten TNE case studies, he found that the early 
interactions between partners were critical to the TNE operations’ 
success. In particular, he identified effective communication, trust and 
commitment as key elements to be established in the initial phases of the 
TNE operations. These observations point to information asymmetry 
issues, i.e., the difficulty in ascertaining the capability of the offshore 
partner in the delivery of TNE. 
 
TNE operations, being cooperative efforts, have no lack of moral hazard 
issues, i.e., the difficulty in monitoring the actions of offshore partners to 
ensure alignment of strategic interests between the University and the 
Offshore Partner. Adams (Davies, Olsen and Bohm 2000) concluded that 
effective TNE operations feature win-win relationships based on trust and 
mutual respect, key elements considered in monitoring moral hazard. 
Perhaps this is the basis of the longevity of the Sunway-Monash 
relationship in Malaysia, where Sunway owns 76% of the Monash 
University Malaysia branch campus (Lane and Johnstone 2012). 
 
Agency relationships are usually compared with stylised models where 
the sharing of information and the reconciliation of principal and agent 
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interests are costlessly effected. The resulting difference is called agency 
costs or agency loss. The aim of course is the reduction of this cost, for 
example through matching principals and agents whose economic 
interests do not diverge substantially and where the cost of monitoring 
performance is low. These costs come in the form of the principal’s 
efforts in monitoring the agent’s performance (e.g., TNE business and 
QA reviews), the agent’s efforts in bonding with the principal, and any 
residual costs attributed to conflicts that are not resolved (e.g., 
reputational damage from poor quality TNE delivery) (Mahoney 2005, 
210). 
 
Finally, AT assumes an ex ante approach aimed at establishing incentive 
agreements to balance between incentives and risk; as opposed to TCE, 
which focuses on ex post governance structures (Parthasarathy 2010). 
The strategic intent of the TNE collaboration is the maximisation of the 
University’s payoffs, while ensuring maximisation of returns for the 
Offshore Partner. Similar to AT, PRT emphasises ex ante incentives 
alignment. All three focus on ensuring economizing outcomes. The AT 
framework for analysis is summarised below. 
 
Ex ante incentive alignment for 
a)  cost economisation   Problems (arising 
 for Principal    from information 
      asymmetry and  
      differences in risk 
          determines pay-     aversion) 
         off and appoints  Agency costs 
       a) monitoring a)  adverse 
            agent       selection 
b) bonding with 
         principal 
           
b)  economic incentive for 
 Agent 
 
               to run     b)  moral hazard 
          c) residual agency 
         costs (due to  
unresolved conflicts 
of interest) 
 
Fig. 2.5   Agency Theory Analysis Framework 
Principal 
Agent 
Business 
Venture 
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2.6.5 Applying the Theories of the Firm to TNE Research 
 
The foregoing discussion on individual theories of the firm are now 
brought together to develop a framework for the analysis of TNE decision-
making. 
 
2.6.5.1 Commonalities and Differences Among the Three Theories of 
the Firm 
 
The foregoing theories of the firm have common ancestry in 
organisational economics, and share some commonality of features, as 
depicted below.  
 
 
Fig. 2.6   Commonalities Amongst the Three Theories of the Firm 
 
The above Venn diagram illustrating commonalities and differences 
between the three theories of the firm provides a clearly defined 
 
 
The foregoing theories of the firm have common ancestry in 
organizational economics, and share some commonality of features, as 
depicted below. 
       TCE 
PRT 
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description of reflectors for the analysis of TNE operations. This clarity is 
necessary to ensure that the respective theories are not mis-identified in 
the current investigations – a measure to contribute towards internal 
validity. 
 
2.6.5.2 Parameterizing the Theories to Identify Reflectors 
 
Quoting dissatisfaction with neo-classical theories to address inefficient 
economic outcomes, Kim and Mahoney deployed the theories of the firm 
to the business case of oil field unitisation (2005). Their systematic 
parameterizing of each of the three theories provided a framework to 
identify reflectors of these theories within TNE operations.  
 
Based on an adaptation of their comparisons (Appendix A), a tabulation 
(Table 2.6) of the features and applications of the theories of the firm, as 
discussed above, has been developed to guide the current TNE 
investigations.  
 
It is worth noting that there is a possibility of having each theory hold 
during different stages of the growth cycle of a TNE operation. This is 
borne out through the focus group study which identified unique tipping 
points in the TNE experience of three universities.  
 
Table 2.6 is the basis for the development of case study propositions, as 
well as the generation of codes for the analyses of the focus group 
discussions and the in-depth semi-structured interviews. 
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Table 2.6   Comparative Perspectives Chart Of Theories Of The Firm  
As Applied To Transnational Education 
 
2.6.5.3 TNE Motivation and the Impact of Ownership, Location and 
Internalisation 
 
The theories of the firm also find similar application in the works of 
several other researchers, and provide useful perspectives to guide the 
current study. Guimon (2016) used the eclectic paradigm as a lens to 
analyse what he calls multinational universities (effectively international 
branch campuses), and thereby connect the TNE phenomena to 
international business research. He differentiates the multinational 
No Perspectives Theories of the Firm 
Transaction Cost 
Economics 
Property Rights 
Theory 
Agency Theory 
1 Unit of 
analysis 
Transaction 
TNE processes (as 
contractual transactions) 
Institution 
Collaboration types (as 
alternative institutions) 
Principal-agent contract 
University-Offshore Partner 
(representing principal-
agent relationship) 
2 Focal 
dimension 
Types of asset 
specificity 
a) Accreditation 
b) Local licensing/ 
approvals 
c) Intellectual property 
d) Local brand equity 
(including negative 
brand equity) 
e) Physical facilities 
Security of specific 
property rights 
a) Degree awards 
b) Intellectual property 
c) Individual brands 
d) Local brand equity 
e) Learning resources 
f) Teaching resources 
g) Managerial 
resources 
h) Marketing channels 
i) Equity capital 
Incentives 
a) Cost minimisation for 
UP (principal) 
b) Maximisation of 
financial returns for OP 
(agent) 
c) Reputational benefits 
for OP (agent) 
3 Focal cost 
concern 
a) Mal-adaptation due 
to changes in 
environment 
b) Underinvestment 
(holdup) in mission 
critical assets 
a) Shirking 
b) Rent-seeking loss 
from cross-selling 
(free-riding), 
knowledge transfer 
and brand 
endorsement (value 
dissipation) 
c) Withholding/ 
distorting 
information 
a) Monitoring costs, viz., 
business review, QA 
(internal and external) 
b) Residual loss from 
imperfect incentive 
alignment (e.g., 
reputational damage 
from poor quality 
delivery) 
4 Contractual 
focus 
a) Ex post choice of 
Direct or Outsourced 
model 
a) Maximise ex ante 
incentives 
b) Ex post 
distributional 
conflicts (e.g., 
copyrights) 
a) Ex ante incentive 
alignment to mitigate 
agency costs 
b) Monitoring of academic 
and business 
processes 
5 Strategic 
intent 
Minimisation of 
transaction costs to 
create shareholder value 
Stakeholder view 
(representing ‘education 
as public good’) 
Maximising University’s 
payoffs 
6 Sources of 
market 
frictions 
a) Performance 
uncertainty 
b) Regulatory 
uncertainty 
c) Relational asset 
specificities 
a) Unclearly defined 
rights, roles, 
responsibilities and 
entitlements 
b) Vested interests in 
similar or related 
ventures 
a) Imperfect observability 
of OP performance 
b) Risk aversion by the 
OP 
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university from distance education/online learning, and franchising, using 
the concepts of FDI (foreign direct investment), exporting and licensing 
respectively. The eclectic paradigm comprises the OLI framework 
applied to organisational motivations for the different modes of 
internationalisation. Ownership (O) can be mapped to property rights and 
decision rights in PRT, and in some cases, relation-specific assets in 
TCE and PRT (and VRIN in RBV). Location (L) relates to environmental 
conditions and resources affecting TNE operations, and may contribute 
to environmental uncertainties in TCE. Location (L) also invariably 
introduces the need to consider the stability of the governance 
environment impacting PRT decisions. Internalisation (I) of course refers 
to the classic vertical integration in TCE. He argues that a selection of 
varous OLI combinations may bring about ‘sustainable advantage over 
other firms in the foreign markets it plans to enter’ (Guimon 2016, 220).  
 
He recognises that universities are not just into TNE for the money, but 
to further their three-fold objectives of teaching, research and community 
engagement. These missions correspond to a traditional firm’s core 
business, research and development, and corporate social 
responsibilities respectively.  
 
He maps these three missions against three motives for going offshore, 
viz., market-seeking, resource-seeking and efficiency-seeking (see Table 
below).  
 
The focus groups have been able to identify all three motives. In-depth 
interviews will explore if these concepts hold for the TNE operations 
investigated, and thus expand on the universities’ motives in addressing 
the first research question. 
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Table 2.7   Motives for the Multinational University Across the Three  
Missions of Universities (Guimon 2016, 222) 
 
2.6.5.4 The Study of TNE on the Hybrid-Hierarchy Governance 
Continuum 
 
Claude Menard argues that hybrids are ubiquitous because they are 
considered ‘efficient in dealing with knowledge-based activities, solving 
hold-up problems and reducing contractual hazards’ (2013, 1066). 
Among his examples, the supplier park has a resemblance to TNE OPs 
that deliver degree programs awarded by multiple UPs; the franchise of 
course matches the TNE franchised arrangement; and joint-ventures 
mirror the IBCs.  
 
He defines hybrids as an ‘arrangement in which two or more partners 
pool strategic decision rights, as well as some property rights while 
simultaneously keeping distinct ownership over key assets, so that they 
require specific devices to coordinate their joint activities and arbitrate 
the allocation of payoffs’ (Menard 2013, 1066). This definition fits well 
with the many collaborative TNE business delivery models currently in 
vogue.  
 
globally, reaching economies of scale and reducing transaction costs. Thus,
efficiency-seeking motives are also relevant. Universities with a network of
international campuses gain O advantages that make them attractive for prospective
students interested in international mobility. For example, Schiller International
University offers students free inter-campus transfer opportunities between its five
locations in Europe and the USA, avoiding the burden of cumbersome cross-country
convalidation and application procedures (i.e. reducing transaction costs for students by
internalizing). Finally, resource-seekingmotives come at play when the universit finds
it interesting to hire foreign professors locally and to collaborate in teaching with
partner universities located abroad, often allowing to provide teaching courses at lower
costs than at home. Thus, investing in foreign branch campuses may respond
simultaneously to a revenue-increasing and a cost-reducing logic.
The second mission of universities – research – can also be driven by a combination
of market-seeking, resource-seeking and efficiency-seeking motives. From a
market-seeking perspective, universities may consider establishing research units
abroad to tap into new sources of public and private funding from foreign countries.
Second, resource-seeking motives often play a more significant role in the context of the
second mission of universities than in the case of the first mission. Indeed, universities
may enhance their O advantages by tapping into L advantages of foreign countries, e.g.
hiring local talent and engaging in collaboration with foreign research centers that may
offer complementary knowledge and skills or similar capabilities at a lower price. In
other instances, the decision to locate abroad may be driven by the need to perform
research activities in a fertile and unique empirical environment. For example, some
international universities and research institutes have decided to establish R&D centers
in Chile, among other reasons, because the country constitutes a unique “natural lab” in
Table II.
Motives for the
multinational
university across the
three missions of
universities
Mission Market-seeking Resource-seeking Efficiency-seeking
First mission Expanding teaching programs
to attract more students and
raise more money
Hiring foreign professors
and collaborating in
teaching with foreign
institutions to reach
more students at lower
costs
Achieving economies of
scale and scope through
the common
governance of
geographically
dispersed campuses
Second mission Gaining access to research
funding and public subsidies
from foreign countries
Hiring foreign
researchers,
collaborating in research
with foreign institutions
and conducting research
in relevant territories
Building a more
efficient global research
network
Third mission Expanding technology
commercialization abroad and
engaging in contract research
with foreign firms
Collaborating more
closely with foreign
firms and contributing to
the education and
research agenda of
developing countries
Contributing more
efficiently to addressing
global societal
challenges
Source: Author’s elaboration
MBR
24,3
222
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In fact, the focus group analyses showed quite clearly that TNE business 
delivery models are mostly hybrid governance models. There are 
relatively fewer true hierarchy governance models, represented by the 
wholly-controlled international branch campuses. Although there is a 
growing number of online learning operations (as contrasted to non-
credit-granting MOOCs), which represent the market governance model, 
these operations are not considered TNE for the purposes of the current 
study. The focus group (Section 4.5) and case study analyses (Chapter 
5) showed that the boundary between hybrids and hierarchy is not 
necessarily the same as the boundary between the Outsourced and 
Direct models respectively. Certainly, all wholly-controlled international 
branch campuses (w-IBCs) which are clearly hierarchies, can be 
considered Direct models. However, some hybrids are considered by the 
host university as Direct models because of the high levels of control and 
codification of the core TNE activities. These are represented by 
University A’s collaborative international branch campuses (c-IBCs). 
 
While Menard explored TCE, relational contracts, AT and RBV as 
possible theoretical bases of hybrids, he argues that TCE and AT stands 
out as the better alternatives; with TCE having some edge over AT in 
terms of predictability (2013, 1077). His typology comprises information-
based networks (closest to spot markets on one end of the TCE 
governance continuum), the strategic centre (closest to the hierarchies), 
and third-party coordination right in the middle (see Fig. 2.7 below). This 
typology arose out of the nagging question of why busines entities are 
willing to trade off significant rights without certainties in the rewards. He 
argues that three determinants can be observed from hybrids, viz., 
‘improved capacity to face uncertainty’, ‘the creation of value through 
mutually-accepted dependence’, and ‘expected spillovers if adequate 
sharing rules are implemented’ (Menard 2013, 1078). All three 
determinants have been observed in the focus groups as well as the in-
depth interviews. The empirical evidence seem to point to a preference 
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for a variation of Menard’s ‘strategic center’ mode of governance for 
Direct Models and ‘third-party coordination’ for Outsourced Models. 
 
 
Fig. 2.7   Menard’s Typology of Hybrids (Menard 2013, 1096) 
(The lens-shaped shaded area delineates the tolerance or acceptance zone) 
 
2.6.5.5 The Study of TNE as a Global Value Chain 
 
Building on TCE, production networks, and technological capability and 
firm-level learning, Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005), developed a 
typology of global value chain governance models based on the 
complexity of transactions, codifiability of transactions, and capabilities of 
the supply-base. The models include the Market and Hierarchy at the two 
ends of the typology, and three other hybrid models in between, viz., the 
Modular, Relational and Captive models. This typology was designed to 
address three key issues in global value chains, viz.., ‘which activities 
and technologies a firm keeps in-house and which to outsourced to other 
firms, and where the various activities should be located’ (Gereffi, 
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Humphrey and Sturgeon 2005, 79), key questions that the current 
research is interested to answer. 
 
 
Table 2.8   Key Determinants of Global Value Chain Governance  
(Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon 2005, 87) 
 
While some TNE business delivery models can be classified as Market 
(e.g., distance education and online learning, but which are out of the 
scope of the current study), and Hierarchy (e.g., w-IBCs), most TNE 
business delivery models, as observed from the focus groups and the in-
depth semi-structured interviews, demonstrate hybrid models of 
governance. Using the Gereffi et al. set of determinants will enable the 
classification of TNE into either the modular governance model (viz., high 
transaction complexity, high codifiability, and high supply-base 
capabilities), or the captive governance model (viz., high transaction 
complexity, high codifiability, and low supply-base capabilities). 
 
2.7 Transnational Education Business Delivery Decision Model  
Construct 
 
In this section, a theoretical construct is conceptualised for the present 
study. This forms the basis for the development of a set of propositions 
to be validated through a robust series of research methods. 
 
 
GEREFFI ET AL.: GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS
suppliers in order to exclude others from reaping the benefits of their
efforts. Therefore, the suppliers face significant switching costs and are
‘captive’. Captive suppliers are frequently confined to a narrow range
of tasks – for example, mainly engaged in simple assembly – and are
dependent on the lead firm for complementary activities such as design,
logistics, component purchasing, and process technology upgrading.
Captive inter-firmlinkages control opportunismthrough thedominance
of lead firms, while at the same time providing enough resources and
market access to the subordinate firms to make exit an unattractive
option.
5. Hierarchy.When product specifications cannot be codified, products are
complex, and highly competent suppliers cannot be found, then lead
firmswill be forced to develop andmanufacture products in-house. This
governance form is usually driven by the need to exchange tacit knowl-
edge between value chain activities as well as the need to effectively
manage complex webs of inputs and outputs and to control resources,
especially intellectual property.
Thefiveglobalvalue chaingovernance types, alongwith thevaluesof the
three variables that determine them, are listed inTable 1. These five types of
global value chain governance arise from ascribing different values to the
three key variables: (1) complexity of inter-firm transactions; (2) the degree
to which this complexity can be mitigated through codification; and (3)
the extent to which suppliers have the necessary capabilities to meet the
buyers’ requirements. Each governance type provides a different trade-off
between the benefits and risks of outsourcing. As shown in the last column
of Table 1, the governance types comprise a spectrum running from low
levels of explicit coordination and power asymmetry between buyers and
Table 1 Key determinants of global value chain governance
Ability Capabilities Degree of explicit
Governance Complexity of to codify in the coordination and
type transactions transactions supply-base power asymmetry
Market Low High High Low
Modular High High High
Relational High Low High
Captive High High Low
Hierarchy High Low Low
↑||↓
High
There are eight possible combinations of the three variables. Five of them generate global
value chain types. The combination of low complexity of transactions and low ability to
codify is unlikely to occur. This excludes two combinations. Further, if the complexity of the
transaction is low and the ability to codify is high, then low supplier capability would lead
to exclusion from the value chain. While this is an important outcome, it does not generate a
governance type per se.
87
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2.7.1 Developing the Basic Decision Model Construct 
 
In order to test the veracity of the three theories of the firm within TNE 
arrangements, a decision model construct needs to be developed. 
Guidance is drawn from the parallel concept of offshoring, which is 
defined as ‘… the cross-border (re)location of the firm’s value chain 
activities … that were once performed somewhere collocated (e.g., in the 
firm’s country of origin) to distant locations to serve global rather than 
local demand’ (Schmeisser 2013). This conceptualisation provides a 
highly accurate description of TNE operations. In his study of offshoring, 
Schmeisser used the Antecedents-Phenomenon-Consequences logic to 
develop an integrating framework for his offshoring construct, which fits 
very well with the research questions of the present study. 
 
 
Fig. 2.8   Schmeisser’s Integrating Framework for Literature on 
Offshoring of Value Chain Activities (Schmeisser 2013, 403) 
 
Based on the three theories, and the observed characteristics of 
Australian university TNE operations (Davies, Olsen and Bohm 2000), a 
preliminary theoretical construct has been developed to represent the 
decision pathways for the selection of business delivery models.  
 
Schmeisser’s Antecedents of firm specific factors and environmental 
factors corresponds to the University Partner’s characteristics and TNE 
operating environment respectively (see preliminary construct below). 
scale, followed by the efficient coordination of the globally dispersed system elements relying on a mix of market-, hierarchy-,
and cooperation-based mechanisms. For this reason, future research should harness its efforts towards developing a more
comprehensive and convincing conceptualization of the offshoring phenomenon and the offshoring organization to capture that
inherent uniqueness in comparison to other forms of firm internationalization.
The second group of articles is concerned with the offshoring organization “in action”. It covers articles on the activity,
loc tion, and governanc mode choice of firms in the course of formulating offshoring strategies. The key insights delivered by
these articles are that firms increasingly locate high-value adding activities and business functions to distant locations. Moreover,
the motivation for this practice does not exclusively follow exploitation but increasingly an exploration rationale. Furthermore,
the specific characteristics of the value activity that is considered to be offshored closely interacts with host country factors in the
course of making the location decision. Additionally, there exists evidence that traditional TCE-logic fails to explain or at least
does not fully capture the specific nature of the governance mode decisions for offshored value activities. However, what becomes
apparent is that these studies almost exclusively focus on the global location of value activities instead of considering the case of a
re-lo ation of activi ies across national borders to distant locations, which ultimat ly refe s to the substitution of value activity
performing units that were already existing elsewhere. This “re-location-variant” of offshoring implies considerable changes in
the organization which are likely to be more severe than those resulting from introducing an additional foreign subsidiary to the
existing organizational configuration. In any case, the relocation of organizational units emphasizes the importance of managing
firm's internal and external linkages. The concept of architectural modularity (Baldwin and Clark, 1997) in a firm's organizational
design offers a fruitful approach to accomplish that effort. Therefore, a promising avenue for future research regarding the crafting
of offshoring strategies will be to investigate offshoring practices of firms through a more rigorous organizational design lens
in order to capture the challenges and advantages of the offshoring organization that stem from its unique organizational
architecture and configuration. Furthermore, relocation may not only affect subsidiaries but also genuine headquarter functions
and may even culmi ate in (partial) headquarter relocations to foreign countries. Hence, offshori g s ategies for n t only high
value-adding operational but strategic headquarter activities and business functions open up another promising field for future
research.
Moreover, once firms have installed disaggregated and globally dispersed configurations of their value chains, offshoring
organizations must actively engage in coordinating and controlling their global networks of value activities. This involves the
capacity to e.g. optimally leverage the flexibility, arbitrage, and global learning gains from having a global network of value
activities in place (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994). This also includes the capacity of building or internalizing new resources and
capabilities at distant locations as well as to defend the existing resource and capability stock from imitation or deterioration by
global competitors or outsourcing service providers. Hence, future research might concentrate on the “offshoring coordination-
capabilities” as well as on the capabilities needed to successfully defend existing and build/internalize new resources and
capabilities in an international environment.
The “Consequences”-construct of the applied review scheme covers articles which focus on the outcomes of offshoring in
terms of the performance implications for the offshoring organization. The review revealed ambiguous results concerning the
question whether offshoring has positive effects on a firm's profits and sales suggesting that a realization of the potential benefits
of offshoring depends on certain contingencies, like the availability of relevant host country information and cultural proximity
to the firm's country of origin. However, the measurement of the degree to which a firm is engaged in offshoring as well as of
the sales- and/or profit-related performance impact still pose methodological challenges to the scholarly investigation of the
offshoring-performance relationship. Therefore, a fruitful avenue for future research will be to address these measurement
challenges and to conceptually link the degree of value chain disaggregation and global dispersion of value activities to firm
performance in a transparent and rigorous fashion. In addition to that, the consequences that offshoring - whether performed
Fig. 2. Integrating framework for literature on offshoring of value chain activities.
403B. Schmeisser / Journal of International Management 19 (2013) 390–406
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His conceptualisation and operationalisation of offshoring within the 
Phenomenon section can be adapted to correspond to the TNE decision-
making process. For the purposes of the present investigations, the 
impact of the decision-making process on the external environment will 
not be pursued because the focus of the investigations is on the 
decision-making process alone.  
 
Interestingly, Schmeisser’s conceptualisation of the two outcomes of 
‘managing captive offshoring’ and ‘managing offshore outsourcing’ 
directly matches our adapted conceptualisation of the Direct Model and 
Outsourced Model (from Davies et. al. 2000) respectively. 
 
Schmeisser’s Integrating Framework Consequences of ‘sales and profit’ 
relates to the TCE and PRT paradigms, while ‘resource and capability’ 
relates to the AT paradigm. 
 
 
         University Provider           Business Delivery Model 
 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Fig. 2.9   Preliminary Decision Model Construct Version 1 
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Decision factors and program longevity explained by one or more of the three main theories of the firm? 
Possible reflectors : 
a) TCE – governance structures, transaction costs, asset specificity, transaction frequency 
b) PRT – property rights bundles, opportunism, information asymmetry 
c) AT  – adverse selection, moral hazard, risk aversion, incentive alignment 
External Environment of the 
TNE Operation 
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A survey of the above preliminary decision model construct shows up 
two glaring gaps, viz., the nature of the external environment within 
which the TNE operation is deployed, and the nature of the business 
delivery models. We first address the details of the external environment.  
 
2.7.2 Identifying the Environmental Impact on TNE Decisions 
 
Universities do not undertake strategic decisions in TNE without 
considering the environment within which their proposed TNE operations 
will compete. They often have to consider the competition, e.g., the 
existence of similar programs or substitutes; the market demand for its 
proposed programs; the relative ease in engaging appropriately skilled 
administrative and academic staff; and the maturity and stability of 
government legislations governing TNEs. In a study of the university 
system in Ontario, Canada, authors Pringle and Huisman argued that the 
current higher education paradigm, as described in policy documents, ‘… 
calls for an analysis of higher education as an industry. In such a context 
the use of Michael Porter’s work (2008) can be ‘especially insightful’ 
(Huisman 2011), thus arguing for the use of Porter’s five competitive 
forces framework. Mathooko and Ogutu likened the higher education 
sector as an industry in their study of the Kenyan public university 
system (2015) based on the highly competitive nature of the sector, 
aiming for value creation towards income generation, and operating 
within the confines of a regulated environment. It is clear that TNE 
operate within an accepted ‘industry’ environment, and that there is a 
widely adopted framework to study this industry. This forms the basis of 
their application of the Porter five competitive forces framework in their 
study. 
 
Michael Porter’s five competitive forces framework is a widely used 
framework for the analysis of industries, based on industrial organisation 
economics (1979). Although originally conceptualised for industrial 
sectors, it has also been adapted for use in the services sector, and in 
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particular in education (Collis 1999; Ronquillo 2012; Ahmed et al. 2015; 
Mathooko and Ogutu 2015; Huisman 2011).  
 
A survey of the literature has identified two suitable adaptations of the 
Porter Five Competitive Forces Model that can be used in investigating 
the industry environment of TNE, viz., the Pringle and Huisman 
(Huisman 2011), and the Mathooko and Ogutu (2015) models. 
 
  
Fig. 2.10   Higher Education Viewed Through Porter’s Five 
Competitive Forces Framework (Huisman 2011, 41) 
 
While the Pringle and Huisman framework exhibits parsimony and 
adheres to the original Porter framework, it fails to sufficiently 
encapsulate key elements of the TNE environment, viz., institutional 
buyers, the local community and government as buyers, other suppliers 
(e.g., publishers, part-time teaching staff, student accommodation 
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providers, food services and health care providers), and other substitutes 
(e.g., in-house corporate training). 
 
  
Fig. 2.11   Higher Education viewed through Porter’s Five 
Competitive Forces Framework and Two Other Forces (Mathooko 
and Ogutu 2015, 341) 
 
The Mathooko and Ogutu framework encapsulated all the key elements 
within TNE, and also included two contentious ‘forces’, viz., the extent of 
complements (viz., complementary products/services such as travel) and 
government. These elements are widely accepted as additional factors, 
but not forces that make up the external environment of the industry 
(McGinn 2010). While complements will be excluded from the analysis 
due to their negligible impact on TNE operations, the influence of 
government will be retained as an important factor influencing each of 
the other five forces. The above discussion is summarised in the table 
below as applied to TNE operations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State Regulation Civil Regulation 
Strong (organized) Weak (spontaneous) 
Strong (centralized) Cell 1 
Authoritarian liberalism 
Market accelerationist state 
State-corporatist regulatory regime 
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State socialism 
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Suppliers 
• Faculty 
• Administrators 
• Part-time faculty 
Industry competitors 
Rivalry among higher 
education institutions 
Extent of complements 
 
Potential entrants 
• New institutions 
• International 
institutions 
• Duplicate offering from 
existing players 
Buyerss 
• Students 
• Parents 
• Industry 
Government 
• Provider of information 
• Funding to institutions 
• Funding to students 
• Purchase of research 
Substitutes 
• Online degree 
universities 
• New for-profit offerings 
• Training and seminar 
companies 
• Corporate universities 
• Distance, open and e-
learning 
1 
6 
5 4 3 
2 
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No. Five Forces plus 
Government 
TNE Environment 
1 Suppliers Represented by the suppliers of the value 
chain functions in Figure 2.13 
2 Buyers Students, organisations, government agencies 
3 New Entrants New international higher education providers 
operating in the host country 
4 Substitutes Other face-to-face higher education offerings 
in the host country 
5 Industry Rivalry Rivalry within the higher education sector in 
the host country 
6 Government Agencies that fund teaching and research; 
approve/accredit/quality assure/regulate 
higher education institutions and programs 
Table 2.9   TNE Operating Environment 
 
The Decision Model Construct is now refined to include the 
environmental elements, and reproduced below. 
 
         University Provider           Business Delivery Model 
 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry Environment of the  
TNE Operation (five forces) 
1) Suppliers 
2) Buyers 
3) New Entrants 
4) Substitutes 
5) Industry Rivalry 
             And Government impact 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Fig. 2.12   Preliminary Decision Model Construct Version 2 
 
Characteristics of 
University 
Type of Institution 
Size of Institution 
Resources 
Strategic TNE Agenda 
Experience in TNE 
TNE Growth Rate 
Offshore 
Business 
Delivery 
Model 
Decision 
 
Direct Model 
 
 
Outsourced Model 
 
Decision factors and program longevity explained by one or more of the three main theories of the firm? 
Possible reflectors : 
a) TCE – governance structures, transaction costs, asset specificity, transaction frequency 
b) PRT – property rights bundles, opportunism, information asymmetry 
c) AT  – adverse selection, moral hazard, risk aversion, incentive alignment 
External Environment of the 
TNE Operation 
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2.7.3 Disaggregating to Investigate TNE Decision-making 
 
The second gap in the preliminary TNE decision model construct refers 
to the details of the nature of the chosen TNE business delivery model/s. 
The business delivery model decision-making processes will necessarily 
consider assigning roles to each and every core function of the chosen 
model. This therefore, calls for a disaggregation of the TNE business 
delivery model, a necessary step described by Pringle and Huisman as 
‘… modularizing knowledge and delivering it in locally appropriate forms 
through (international) educational partnerships’ (McGinn 2010). Makassi 
and Govender describes this as ‘… the unbundling of academic 
processes into discrete components which have well developed 
measures’ (2015, 31). 
 
2.7.3.1 Typologies for Detailed Investigation of TNE Processes 
 
While Davies et. al (2000) studied academic functions at the detailed end 
of the spectrum, Healey and Michael (Healey 2015b) focused broadly on 
the three spectra of TNE activities in their conceptualisation of TNE 
operations at the other end. Various other studies concentrated on a 
limited range of TNE functions, e.g., quality assurance (Martin 2007), 
teaching and learning (Dobos 2011), and marketing (Hsiao 2003). The 
extant literature does not seem to have articulated a sufficiently 
integrated perspective of TNE business delivery functions.  
 
Among these studies, the most comprehensive range of TNE functions is 
articulated by Davies et. al (2000), but their scope is limited only to 
academic functions. From the literature surveyed, a comprehensive 
range of TNE functions should at least include academic (Dobos 2011), 
marketing (Hsiao 2003), financial (D. Woodhouse, personal 
communication, October 7, 2008), legal/contractual (Adams 1998), 
policy/regulatory (Moutsios 2009), student services (Fielden 2011) and 
quality assurance (Edwards, Crosling and Edwards 2010) functions. 
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In order to systematically and comprehensively address the TNE 
functions, the current research first considered the Student Life Cycle 
conceptualisation, and specifically drew from commercial expertise (viz., 
Systemanalyse und Programmentwicklung or SAP systems integration) 
in the development of customer relationship management (CRM) 
systems (Cohort IT Solutions Pvt Ltd 2017). These systems were 
however found to be less robust in terms of their scholarly application. 
Further literature surveys indicate that Porter’s Value Chain Analysis 
(1985) is a more widely accepted analysis tool for disaggregating and 
analysing the TNE functions. 
 
2.7.3.2 The Porter Value Chain as a Basis for Disaggregation 
 
The commercial imperatives of TNE dictate the need for universities to 
ensure value is created and sustained in the highly competitive industry 
(Elloumi 2004). Bolton and Nie describes TNE as a strategic alliance 
where value is created for their stakeholders through collaborative effort 
(2010). Makassi and Govender in their research on how tertiary 
education can contribute to Africa’s development agenda, noted that ‘… 
Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) are seemingly under intense 
pressure to create value and focus their efforts and scarce resources on 
activities that drive up value for their respective customers and 
stakeholders’ (2015). These observations of the need for tertiary 
institutions to create and sustain value in the service of their stakeholders 
laid the foundation for the deployment of Porter’s value chain analysis in 
their respective studies within the higher education industry. 
 
Porter developed the value chain as a framework to evaluate the 
competitiveness of each product of a manufacturing organisation. The 
framework calls for a disaggregation of the organisation’s chain of core 
interdependent activities into primary activities, and secondary or support 
activities. An organisation is said to have a competitive advantage over 
 68 
its rivals when it exhibits one or more of the following advantages : cost 
leadership, product/service differentiation and market segment focus 
(1985). Originally developed for manufacturing, value chain analysis has 
found utility in the service industry, and more particularly in the education 
industry (Perumal 2013; Makasi and Govender 2015; Bolton and Nie 
2010; Dorri, Yarmohammadian and Nadi 2012; van der Merwe and 
Cronje 2004; Elloumi 2004; Bornemann and Wiedenhofer 2014; Hutaibat 
2011; Makkar, ole Gabriel and Tripathi 2008; Pathak and Pathak 2010; 
Woudstra and Powell 1989; Rathee and Rajain 2013). 
 
2.7.3.3 Adapting the Porter Value Chain for Higher Education 
 
Several researchers have adapted Porter’s value chain for the education 
industry, viz., Cronje and van der Merwe, Makkar et. al., Pathak and 
Pathak, and Hutaibat. A survey of these adaptations indicates that the 
most comprehensive and relevant value chain adaptation for TNE 
research is the Hutaibat value chain adaptation, reproduced below. 
 
Fig. 2.13   Hutaibat’s Value Chain for Higher Education (Hutaibat 
2011, 218) 
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Figure 1. As adopted from Groves et al., 1997, p. 304 
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2.7.3.4 Value Chain for TNE Investigation 
 
The Hutaibat value chain has been compared with Davies et al (2000) 
and can be seen to be an expanded and more comprehensive range of 
TNE functions that also include non-academic business functions, e.g., 
student services, administration and career placement. For the purposes 
of TNE research, the Hutaibat adaptation has had to be modified to 
account for  
a) the usually low priority or absence of research activities due to its 
non-commercial attribute (Hill 2014); 
b) quality assurance that is subsumed under intermediate activity 
(Edwards, Crosling and Edwards 2010); 
c) key administration/professional services like legal, financial and 
compliance administration (Adams 1998; Moutsios 2009); 
d) alumni relations (Fielden 2011); 
e) the splitting of responsibilities between the university partner and the 
offshore partner (Davies, Olsen and Bohm 2000); and 
f) a refinement of the key stakeholders (Armstrong 2007; Cao 2011; 
Healey 2015b). 
 
It is modified (below), and allows for a better representation of the extent 
of participation of the University Partner (UP) and Offshore Partner (OP) 
in each of these value chain activities. The grey lines demarcate the 
extent of involvement of the UP and OP in each of these core TNE 
activities. As an example, a franchised program would likely display full 
OP responsibility for the infrastructure, while teaching preparation 
(defined as curriculum design and development) a fully UP responsibility 
(Knight and McNamara 2017). 
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 (UP)   University infrastructure   (OP) 
(UP)  Academic support/student services   (OP)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
 (UP)   Admin/professional services  (OP)                                                                                                                           
(UP)   Academic staff support   (OP) 
                                                                                                                                                          Parents          
 (UP)  Intermediate activity (including QAA)  (OP)                                  Employers                
   (UP)                                                                                       Community                                                                              
Staff                                                                                                (UP)                          Country                            
Recruit-           (UP)                       (UP)                        (UP)                           Career                                                               
ment                                                                                                                Placement                                           
   (OP)    Curriculum Devt Teaching    Assessment  and                                                                         
   (UP)                                                                                                              Alumni                                     
 Student       (OP)            (OP)  (OP)            Relations 
 Recruit-                                                                                                          (OP)              
 ment  
   (OP)                                                                                                                     
 
Fig. 2.14   TNE Value Chain Version 1 
(Abbreviations : UP for University Partner; OP for Offshore Partner) 
 
One demonstration of the above TNE Value Chain is the representation 
below of one common franchised program model as defined in Table 2.4 
(Section 2.5.5). This value chain reflects the assumption of responsibility 
for core on-ground TNE processes by the OP, while curriculum 
development, assessment, and quality assurance and accreditation 
(QAA) responsibilities lie with the UP. A few core processes are shared 
between the two partners; some of which are more skewed towards one 
partner. 
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    University infrastructure (OP) 
Academic support/student services (OP)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
    Admin/professional services (OP)                                                                                                                           
(UP)     Academic staff support   (OP) 
                                                                                                                                                          Parents          
 (UP)        Intermediate activity (including QAA)  (OP)                                  Employers                
   (UP)                  Community                                                                              
Staff                    (UP)                           Country                            
Recruit-                                                        Career                                                               
ment                                                                             (UP)                           Placement                                           
   (OP)    Curriculum Devt Teaching    Assessment  and                                                                         
                             (UP)                         (OP)                          (OP)               Alumni                                     
 Student                                     Relations 
 Recruit-                              (OP)            
 ment  
   (OP)                                                                                                                     
 
Fig. 2.15   Franchised Program Value Chain Examplar 
(Abbreviations : UP for University Partner; OP for Offshore Partner) 
 
In this construct, the experience of Australian public universities has 
been investigated to determine the circumstances and criteria that have 
led to the deployment of the chosen business delivery model/s. A set of 
propositions has been constructed to test the veracity of each theory 
against the experience of these universities. 
 
The research construct will be tested by examining the decision of each 
university in choosing either the Direct Model or the Outsourced Model 
within the identified activities of the value chain. 
 
2.7.4 Considering Business Success in TNE 
 
The final component of the construct that needs investigation is the 
concept of business success. While the first two research questions 
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explore the motivation behind Australian government universities’ TNE 
business decisions, the third research question is designed to investigate 
the outcomes of those business decisions. 
 
2.7.4.1 Australian Public University TNE Must Be Self-Funded 
 
Australian government universities are funded mainly by the government 
through Commonwealth funding circumscribed under the Higher 
Education Support Act 2003 (HESA2003) (Higher Education Support Act, 
Australia  2003). These Commonwealth funds comprise both demand-
driven grants as well as student loans that are available to Australian 
citizens, certain New Zealand citizens and permanent residents for 
onshore study as specified in Clause 36-10(2) of HESA 2003 (Higher 
Education Support Act, Australia  2003, 67). Universities are not 
permitted to expend Commonwealth funding on other types of students, 
and certainly not for TNE students. This notion is widely acknowledged 
by Australian government universities, as demonstrated by the focus 
group study of University C, where Participant CF2 remarked that ‘… we 
are an Australian public university, we could not justify using public funds 
to fund something offshore’ (Section 4.3.4.3). This also applies to most 
public universities the world over (Armstrong 2007, 134). The HESA 
2003 necessarily implies that all TNE initiatives undertaken by Australian 
public universities must be fully costed and fully self-funded. It is 
therefore no surprise that many universities have taken an 
entrepreneurial approach to TNE, e.g., the University of New England’s 
final TNE approving authority being vested in the university’s University 
Entrepreneurial Committee (Shanahan and McParlane 2005b, 225). 
 
2.7.4.2 Business Success as Financial Sustainability 
 
The business success (or failure) of a TNE venture is thus primarily 
defined by its financial sustainability – also a conclusion of the Fahed-
Sreih and Djoundourian study that ‘success is directly linked to the 
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continuity of the firm’ (2008, 61). A survey of the business management 
literature reveals a large corpus of knowledge in the area of business 
longevity. Business longevity is defined as business continuity (Lank, 
2001 as quoted in Fahed-Sreih and Djoundourian 2008, 10) or ‘long run 
success’ (Napolitano, Marino and Ojala 2015, 957). It simply refers to the 
length of time a business has been operating as a self-sustaining entity. 
 
The business longevity literature has tracked both the initial survival of 
new business start-ups as well as the antecedents of long-running 
businesses. Although there are business entities which have survived for 
long periods of time, Murthy argues that there ‘is compelling evidence 
that businesses have limited lifespans’, justified by the ‘theories of 
creative destruction and hypercompetition’ (2014, 33). Even the long-
running Japanese traditional temple builder, Kongo Gumi folded in 2006 
after 1,428 years in business. The focus is therefore not on the 
invincibility of business entities, but the longevity or sustainability of 
businesses amidst the evolving business environment and changes 
within the business entity – what Murthy describes as ‘existential 
challenges’ (2014, 44). There is evidence that at least one UK TNE 
operation had been in business for 31 years at the time of the HE Global 
2015 study (Warwick 2016, 59). 
 
2.7.4.3 Duration of Operations as Benchmark for TNE Success 
 
The early years of a firm are the most risky; the majority of new start-ups 
fail within the first few years of commencement. New business statistics 
for Germany in the 1994-2000 period saw the demise of 20% of new 
businesses (Falck 2007) within the first year of operations. Similarly, 
approximately 20% of new firms die within the first year of operation in 
the USA, and a further 40% fail within five years (Christie and Sjoquist 
2012). Studies across Europe also record a 50% survival of European 
firms after five years of inception (Napolitano, Marino and Ojala 2015). A 
2005 University of Technology Sydney new business guide estimates 
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that three out of four new Australian businesses fail after five years of 
inception (Petty 2005). Quoting an insolvency study in 2007, The 
Australian reported that about 34% of new businesses fail within the first 
five years (Switzer 2007). 
 
Survival and failure are two sides of the same business longevity coin, 
and most business historians consider survival as a benchmark for 
business success (Napolitano, Marino and Ojala 2015). Napolitano 
posed the obvious question : ‘how old should a company be before it is 
classified as a ‘survivor’?’ (Napolitano, Marino and Ojala 2015, 955). To 
answer this question, researchers use what is known as new business 
‘hazard rate’. Renski defines this as ‘the likelihood that the new firm fails 
at a specific point in time, given that it has survived up to that point’ 
(Renski 2008, 66). Falck reported on a longitudinal econometric 
modeling study of German businesses over the 1993-2007 period (Falck 
2007, 116). The Kaplan-Meier hazard function indicates that the highest 
hazard function is approximately five years after business inception. 
 
 
Figure 2.16   Kaplan-Meier Smoothed Hazard Function; analysis 
time in years (Falck 2007, 116) 
 
He also quotes another regional study which reported maximum hazard 
functions at around the 3- to 5-year period after inception. 
116      6 Micro-Econometric Survival Analysis of New Businesses 
 
Fig. 6.2. Kaplan-Meier smoothed hazard function; analysis time in years 
Source: Falck (2007b) 
Figure 6.2 reveals a bell-shaped hazard function, with the maximum oc-
curring five years after start up. This high vulnerability to failure in the 
first few years after start up is referred to in this chapter as the liability of 
young adults. This result is in line with Wagner (1994), who finds, on the 
basis of data restricted to Lower Saxony, the second largest sta e of West 
Germany, that small firms’ hazard rates tend to increase during the first 
years, reach a maximum between the third and fifth year after start up (de-
pending on the cohort being examined), and then decrease nonmonotoni-
cally. However, Wagner does not attempt to explain this high liability of 
young adults between the third and fifth year after start up. 
6.3.2 Liabilities in a Business’s Life 
Empirical studies have shown that new firms are characterized by a rela-
tively high risk of failure during the first years of their existence. Setting 
up an organizational structure and experimenting with ways of making the 
new unit work efficiently enough to keep pace with competitors have been 
found to be two reasons for this liability of newness (cf. Aldrich and Aus-
ter 1986; Brüderl and Schüssler 1990). 
Furthermore, Brüderl et al. (1992) find a bell-shaped hazard function 
having its maximum at about 10 months after start up. This liability of 
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The above confirms the Deller and Conroy (Deller and Conroy 2017) 
conclusion that the majority of business survival studies use five years as 
a benchmark. Deller and Conroy go on to explain that there are 
essentially two benchmarks, viz., a three-year benchmark where 
businesses usually are able to ‘cashflow their operations’, or to break-
even, and a five-year benchmark where businesses can offer a ‘fair rate 
of return’. For the purpose of the current study, the three-year benchmark 
will be adopted for business survival of TNE operations, corresponding 
to Falck’s liability of newness. The five-year reasonable rate of return 
benchmark will be used to benchmark business longevity 
(corresponding to Falck’s liability of adolescence and liability of aging), 
while keeping in view the possibility that some TNE operations have 
been observed to prioritise non-financial objectives such as 
internationalisation, over rate of return. 
 
Riviezzo et. al. showed that about 40% of the more prominent business 
longevity explanatory research papers focused on organisational 
characteristics, while another 22% added environmental characteristics 
to organisational characteristics (Riviezzo, Skippari and Garofano 2015, 
980). Napolitano et. al. outline four main explanatory models to explain 
the survival of firms, viz., internal characteristics, management practices, 
strategic choices and the external business environment (Napolitano, 
Marino and Ojala 2015). These survival models correspond to the current 
study’s construct focus on University characteristics, value chain 
activities and the operating environment, impacting on the TNE business 
delivery model selection. 
 
Falck observed that the ‘risk of business failure is lower the larger the 
initial size of set-up’ – providing some basis for asset specificity in TCE 
(Falck 2007, 88). It can be observed that these internal characteristics 
can also be researched from the TCE and PRT perspectives due to the 
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make-or-buy options, while AT provides a theoretical perspective for 
analysing the external business environment (Renski 2008, 4).  
 
2.7.4.4 Liabilities of Business Failure 
 
Business longevity studies track businesses over their lifecycle of 
existence. Shirokova (Shirokova 2009) tracks them over the inception-
growth-maturity-decline/redevelopment lifecycle, while Riviezzo et. al. 
(Riviezzo, Skippari and Garofano 2015) use the simpler creation-
maintenance-decline lifecycle. Business entities must first survive the 
early years of life against the competition and internal organisational 
shifts. These early risks of failure are what the business management 
literature describes as the liability of newness, which Falck attributes to 
risks inherent in the initial set-up of the organisational structure, and in 
experimenting with ways to make the organisational structure work 
efficiently to match the competition (Falck 2007, 86, 117).  
 
After surviving the early years, the business entity will need to weather 
growth risks in the form of competition and the evolving external industry 
environment; specifically, the judgement of customers and suppliers on 
the new business’s performance – the liability of adolescence (Falck 
2007, 116). Firms that have long histories, e.g., the Royal Dutch/Shell 
Group, have had to battle liabilities of obsolescence to stay in business 
(Riviezzo, Skippari and Garofano 2015). Falck classifies the liability of 
senescence (due to the ‘sclerotic inflexibility of established organisation’) 
and the liability of obsolescence (due to the ‘erosion of technology 
products, business concepts and management strategies over time’) 
under the broader category of the liability of aging for the larger 
organisations (2007, 117).  
 
The different liabilities corresponding to the firm’s age might find 
relevance in TNE operations. These liability concepts will be validated in 
the in-depth interviews of informants from two Australian university 
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cases, and to address the study’s third research question on the 
plausibility of one or more theories of the firm impacting the survival or 
longevity of the TNE operations. The table below provides a framework 
to identify these concepts in the multiple case study. 
 
No. Age-related 
Liability 
Reflectors of Age-related Liability 
1 Newness (i) weak organisational structure 
(ii) organisational inefficiency for competition 
2 Adolescence Rejection by students and/or suppliers 
3 Aging  
a) Obsolescence (i) obsolete programs 
(ii) obsolete value propositions 
(iii) obsolete management strategies 
b) Senescence Inflexibility of organisation 
 
Table 2.10   Reflectors of Age-related Firm Liabilities (Falck 2007) 
 
2.8 Chapter 2 Summary 
 
Chapter 2 traces the emergence and development of TNE, and more 
particularly within the context of Australian public universities. Gaps in 
the research literature were explored, and a conspicuous gap in the 
treatment of TNE as a business was identified. It was clear that TNE is 
considered a commercially-driven endeavour, despite its acknowledged 
value as a public good; hence, the mission good-revenue good tensions.  
 
A TNE Business Delivery Model Construct was developed on the basis 
of Porter’s value chain, providing a disaggregated model for detailed 
TNE business delivery investigations (1985). University motivations for 
the Direct-Outsourced dichotomy of TNE business delivery was then 
modelled to be underpinned by three theories of the firm, viz., transaction 
cost economics, property rights theory and agency theory. 
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A conceptualisation of business survival (i.e., new businesses lasting up 
to 3 years from inception), and business longevity (i.e., new businesses 
lasting up to 5 years or more from inception) was developed to 
parameterise and address research question 3. The concept of 
business survival correspond to the liability of newness, while the 
concept of business longevity correspond to the liabilities of 
adolescence and aging. 
 
The next chapter explores the research methodology employed in the 
TNE investigations.   
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Chapter 3  Research Methodology 
 
The Research Methodology chapter seeks to lay a defensible 
paradigmatic and methodological foundation to launch an empirical 
investigation into the TNE phenomenon. It argues for the perspective of 
constructivism within qualitative inquiry, and the deployment of the case 
study to elucidate the TNE phenomenon. 
 
3.1 Research Questions 
 
The foregoing extant literature indicate that there is a high likelihood of 
one or more of the theories of the firm providing an empirical explanation 
of the choice of business delivery models and outcomes for Australian 
public university transnational education programs. The study seeks to 
answer the following research questions : 
 
(1) What criteria do Australian public universities use in the selection 
between the Direct Model and the Outsourced Model of their 
transnational education programs? The operative term criteria refers 
to the ‘whys’ and ‘hows’ of university motivation for the selection of 
business delivery models. 
 
(2) To what extent are the main theories of the firm able to explain the 
choice between the Direct Model and the Outsourced Model delivery 
of Australian public university transnational education programs? 
 
(3) To what extent are the main theories of the firm able to explain the 
longevity of the Direct Model and the Outsourced Model deliveries of 
Australian public university transnational education programs? 
 
While the reflectors of each of the three theories of the firm were used in 
addressing research questions 2 and 3, an integrating framework (see 
Section 2.6.5.3) was deployed in answering research question 1.  
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The study also aims to develop a framework for understanding business 
delivery model selection, and predicting the performance of Australian 
public university transnational education programs.  
 
3.2 Focus of Research 
 
The research will be represented by two case studies of Australian public 
universities currently engaged in TNE, as selected in Section 3.7.4.2. 
This frame will enable the study of both current TNE operations as well 
as ventures that have been terminated within five years prior to 2017. 
 
Australian public universities were selected for study because of their 
pioneering achievements in TNE delivery as discussed in Section 
2.1.2.4. Their TNE operations have had a long history, and their TNE 
student numbers are significant compared to their onshore international 
student population. This history has also charted the evolution of 
Australian TNE business delivery models from distance learning models 
through basic twinning models, to the international branch campuses. 
These developments have not gone unnoticed, but have been picked up 
as critical areas for quality accreditation and assurance by the Australian 
Universities Quality Agency (AUQA, which was the predecessor of the 
Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency, TEQSA) as a 
mandatory second theme of the Cycle 2 audits of Australian universities 
which operate TNE (Shah, Nair and Wilson 2011). 
 
Self-study distance education, and its online variants have been 
excluded from this study because of the absence of any face-to-face 
contact between faculty and student. In addition, online learning facilities 
do not largely rely on human agency in the transactions investigated 
across the three theories of the firm. 
 
As postulated earlier, the phenomenon will be examined as commercial 
activities primarily through the lenses of the three theories of the firm.  
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3.3 Methodological Grounding for Research 
 
Every research endeavour requires an appropriate framework within 
which to situate the data collection, analyses and conclusions. This 
framework is informed by the nature of the research subject, the purpose 
of the research and the researcher’s own world view. 
 
3.3.1 Research Paradigms 
 
In order to ensure that the study accurately investigates the research 
questions, and produces outcomes that are acceptable to the research 
community, a robust research plan is required. The research plan 
provides a blueprint for conducting the study based on appropriately 
selected research methods, which in turn reflect a recognised research 
methodology. Generally, a research methodology adopted will depend on 
the researcher’s world view of the study in question, or what might be 
known as a research perspective or set of beliefs that guide action 
(Taylor, Bogdan and DeVault 2016, 163), more popularly, a research 
paradigm (Kuhn 1970). This follows from the observation that research 
can never be values-free (Gouldner 1970). 
 
A research paradigm is what Kuhn famously described as a subset of 
‘the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, …’ shared by the 
scientific community in identifying and investigating problems (Kuhn 
1970, 175). The conduct of research and the interpretation of its results 
will necessarily depend on how the researcher views the nature of reality, 
makes observations, and interprets the observations (Denzin and Lincoln 
2005). The research community today recognises the need for defining 
these three aspects of the research paradigm, viz., the ontology (the 
nature of reality), the epistemology (the relationship between the inquirer 
and the known), and the methodology (means by which knowledge is 
gained) of the study (Guba 1990) in order to underpin scientific research. 
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3.3.2 Research Paradigms for the Social Sciences 
 
Research paradigms can be classified into two broad approaches, viz., 
positivism and phenomenology (Taylor, Bogdan and DeVault 2016). 
Positivism is the basis for research in predominantly the natural 
sciences; research that is dominated by quantitative methodology. This 
has been first promulgated by Auguste Comte, a French philosopher, in 
a series of publications known as The Course in Positive Philosophy 
circa 1940 (Taylor, Bogdan and DeVault 2016). This paradigm is based 
on a realist epistemology that seeks to understand the objective causes 
of natural phenomena through the collection of quantitative data that are 
amenable to statistical processing. It was adopted widely by many 
researchers in the study of social phenomena, and in particular, Emile 
Durkheim (Simpson 1951), in his study of suicide rates among Catholic 
and Protestant populations in France. Durkheim sought to establish that 
social facts or phenomena are ‘things’ that necessarily impact on people, 
and that they can be objectively identified apart from the people’s own 
interpretation of these ‘things’ (Taylor, Bogdan and DeVault 2016). The 
deployment of positivism in social sciences in the early twentieth century 
was a consequence of its well-established usage in the natural sciences. 
Later researchers accepted the view that reality may be imperfect and 
probabilistic, a perspective known as post-positivism. 
 
As social researchers began to explore beyond objective causes of 
social phenomena to the impact of people’s interpretation of their world, 
there arose a need to capture these interpretations. This gave rise to the 
phenomenological approach to social science research. Prior to the 
adoption of such paradigms, the fields of journalism, sociology and 
anthropology had already been deploying various qualitative methods of 
inquiry, e.g., interviews, ethnography, fieldwork and participant 
observation. Researchers were interested to understand how the objects 
of their research perceive and view their own environment and 
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circumstances. By the 1970s, qualitative research became more widely 
accepted after a short history of development characterised by 
dissatisfaction with the limited efficacy of the mainly quantitative 
approach underpinned by positivism. Qualitative methods allow 
researchers to keep close to the empirical world through having intimate 
links between the data and what their subjects actually think, feel and do. 
These methods are also especially useful when ‘prior insights about a 
phenomenon under scrutiny are modest, implying that qualitative 
research tends to be exploratory and flexible because of ‘unstructured’ 
problems (due to modest insights)’ (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008, 5). 
 
Qualitative methods first became popular through studies undertaken by 
the Chicago School in the period 1910 to 1940. These University of 
Chicago researchers produced rich accounts of urban life, e.g., 
Anderson’s The Hobo (Anderson 1923), and Brothers in Crime (Shaw, 
McKay and McDonald 1938). Although there was a drop in the number of 
qualitative studies throughout 1940 – 1950 due to the resurgence of 
quantitative methodologies, the 1960s witnessed the beginning of the 
establishment and mainstreaming of qualitative methodologies. 
Subsequently, the number of qualitative studies grew exponentially, 
accompanied by extensive works on the theoretical groundings of this 
paradigm, and the prolific extension of the paradigm to applied research 
(Taylor, Bogdan and DeVault 2016; Denzin and Lincoln 1994; Bruyn 
1966; Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990; Prus 1996). 
 
As the social sciences took to the application of qualitative 
methodologies across multiple disciplines, new theoretical approaches 
developed from the initial phenomenological paradigm (Smart 1993). 
These include ethnography, constructivism and symbolic interactionism – 
paradigms that focus on subjectivistic aspects of ontology and 
epistemology. When researchers delved more critically into values-driven 
or values-based studies, new approaches like feminism, critical theory 
and participatory paradigm became popular. The latter two can be 
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considered post-modern and post-structural, having roots in the critical 
literary tradition, while feminism developed out of the need to give voice 
to the disenfranchised and the oppressed. In fact, Denzin and Lincoln 
noted that ‘researchers have never before had so many paradigms, 
strategies of inquiry, and methods of analysis to draw upon and utilise’ 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2005, 20). They go on to chronologically describe 
various moments in the development of qualitative enquiry, thus 
documenting the many paradigms available to social scientists faced with 
a wide array of research situations and contexts, and to fit into the 
researchers’ own research worldviews, purposes and objectives. 
 
3.3.3 Identifying An Appropriate Research Paradigm and 
Methodology 
 
Guba and Lincoln suggest that there are essentially five broad inquiry 
paradigms that qualitative researchers may base their studies on 
(reproduced as Table 3.1 below), viz., positivism, postpositivism, critical 
theory et al., constructivism and participatory paradigm (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2005, 195). The latter three are part of the broader 
phenomenology paradigm, as distinguished from the former two 
positivistic paradigms.  
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Table 3.1   Basic Beliefs of Alternative Inquiry Paradigms – Updated 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2005, 195) 
 
These latter three paradigms are underpinned by three characteristics; 
first, by relativist ontologies of multiple constructed realities; second, by 
interpretive epistemologies where the knower and the known interact and 
influence each other; and finally, by naturalistic methods. These five 
paradigms are presented in the matrix below, showing their ontology, 
epistemology and methodology. 
 
The study focuses on the TNE phenomenon in a naturalistic setting. 
While secondary data might provide clues to the views of TNE 
professionals, interviews with these informants are expected to generate 
rich data on the motivations of, and approaches taken in operationalizing 
TNE projects. The objective of the study is to understand the ‘why’ and 
‘how’ of TNE, and not the objective ‘what’. This effectively rules out the 
use of the positivistic and post-positivistic approaches. Silverman 
demonstrates that these paradigms by their ontological and 
Issue Positivism Postpositivism Critical Theory  
et al. 
Constructi- 
vism 
Participatory 
Ontology Naïve realism – 
‘real’ reality but 
apprehendible 
Critical realism – 
‘real’ reality but 
only imperfectly 
and 
probabilistically 
apprehendible 
Historical realism 
– virtual reality 
shaped by social, 
political, cultural, 
economic, ethnic 
and gender 
values; 
crystallised over 
time 
Relativism – local 
and specific co-
constructed 
realities 
Participative 
reality – 
subjective-
objective reality, 
co-created by 
mind and given 
cosmos 
Epistemo
logy 
Dualist/objectivist; 
findings true 
Modified 
dualist/objectivist; 
critical 
tradition/communit
y; findings 
probably true 
Transactional/sub
jectivist; value-
mediated findings 
Transactional/sub
jectivist; co-
created findings 
Critical 
subjectivity in 
participatory 
transaction with 
cosmos; extended 
epistemology of 
experiential, 
propositional, and 
practical knowing; 
co-created 
findings 
Methodo 
logy 
Experimental/mani
pulative; 
verification of 
hypotheses; chiefly 
quantitative 
methods 
Modified 
experimental/mani
pulative; critical 
multiplism; 
falsification of 
hypotheses; may 
include qualitative 
methods 
Dialogic/dialecti 
cal 
Hermeneutical/di
alectical 
Political 
participation in 
collaborative 
action inquiry; 
primacy of the 
practical; use of 
language 
grounded in 
shared 
experiential 
context 
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epistemological assumptions, do not address the social and cultural 
dimensions of their quantitative variables (Silverman 2013). Further, by 
virtue of the need for reconstructing human experience, Iacono et. al. 
stresses that, ‘given the human capacity to talk, the object of 
understanding a phenomenon from the point of view of the actors is 
largely lost when textual data are quantified’ (Iacono, Brown and Holtham 
2011, 58). 
 
The study is not emancipatory as it does not promote any 
disenfranchised segments of society nor any ethical standards. It is thus 
appropriate to exclude the participatory, critical and other related 
paradigms as bases of the study. 
 
Constructivism implies the existence of multiple realities as perceived 
and interpreted by both the researcher and their research objects, i.e., a 
socially-constructed reality. It also embraces the notion that there is no 
universal truth, and that reality is subjective, dependent on the person, 
contexts and time period.  
 
The methodological approach of constructivism assumes that the truth 
about a situation needs to be extracted from a naturalistic inquiry which 
is hermeneutical as well as dialectical; hermeneutical in the sense of 
being interpretive, and dialectical in moving towards consensus through 
reconciling the different perspectives of the informants (Bradmore 2007). 
The constructivist researcher is empathetic in that the researcher strives 
to understand and interpret the views of the research participant. 
 
The constructivist or interpretivist (Schwandt 1998, 22, 184; Denzin and 
Lincoln 2005) therefore takes a relativist ontology, a transactional 
epistemology, and a hermeneutic, dialectical methodology. These are 
succinctly summarised by Thomas below. 
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Feature Description 
Ontology 1. There are multiple realities.  
2. Reality can be explored, and constructed through 
human interactions,  and meaningful actions.  
3. Discover how people make sense of their social 
worlds in the natural setting by means of daily 
routines, conversations and writings while interacting 
with others around them. These writings could be text 
and visual pictures.  
4. Many social realities exist due to varying human 
experience, including people’s knowledge, views, 
interpretations and experiences. 
Epistemology 1. Events are understood through the mental processes 
of interpretation that is influenced by interaction with 
social contexts.  
2. Those active in the research process socially 
construct knowledge by experiencing the real life or 
natural settings.  
3. Inquirer and the inquired-into are interlocked in an 
interactive process of talking and listening, reading 
and writing.  
4. More personal, interactive mode of data collection.	 
Methodology 1. Processes of data collected by text messages, 
interviews, and reflective sessions 
2.  Research is a product of the values of the researcher.  
 
Table 3.2   Characteristics of Constructivism (Thomas 2010, 298) 
 
This study is a naturalistic investigation that aims to reconstruct TNE 
participants’ understanding and motivations towards operationalizing 
TNE in their respective universities, reflecting on the operating milieu of 
the TNE programs. These investigations would also naturally take into 
account the participant’s own background and experiences, and the 
organisational structure and culture within which TNE decisions were 
executed. The constructivist perspective using a qualitative methodology 
thus provides an appropriate research paradigm to address both the 
ontological and epistemological requirements of the current study. 
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3.4 Research Methods 
 
Marshall and Rossman raised the need for a framework for research 
subjects to interpret their thoughts, feelings and actions, and for the 
researcher to be able to document these constructions (Marshall and 
Rossman 2006). Different research paradigms make use of varying 
methods for the collection and analysis of research data. Crotty (Crotty 
1998, 106) describes methodology as a strategy or blueprint that 
connects methods with outcomes; qualitative research in particular 
employs multiple methods. 
 
The study is an investigation of the understandings and motivations of 
universities for engaging in TNE. These constructions will have to be 
extracted from the various participants who were responsible for TNE 
decisions within these universities, operating within various TNE host 
countries. In turn, these participants would have been influenced by their 
own personal background, training, organisational culture and socio-
economic-regulatory environment, and also by each other (co-creation of 
understandings) as they interact in making TNE decisions. Under the 
constructivist paradigm, it is accepted that we can never achieve 
objective reality in our understanding of a phenomenon. A variety of 
qualitative methods are available to the researcher, viz., secondary 
data/artifact analyses, surveys, experiments, historical research and 
case studies – to reconstruct representations of the multiple realities of 
the phenomenon. These in-depth methods provide for the reconstruction 
of the phenomenon under investigation, and have a ‘relatively long 
history within business research’ (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008, 9). 
 
Yin lists various research methods against the relevant research 
questions and their conditions of use (Yin 2014, 9). His tabulation is 
reproduced in Table 3.3. 
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Method Form of Research Question Requires 
Control of 
Behavioral 
Events? 
Focuses on 
Contempor-
ary Events? 
Experiment how, why? Yes Yes 
Survey who, what, where, how many, how much? No Yes 
Archival 
Analysis 
who, what, where, how many, how much? No Yes/No 
History how, why? No No 
Case Study how, why? No Yes 
 
Table 3.3   Relevant Situations for Different Research Methods (Yin 
2014, 9) 
 
The research emphasizing the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the TNE phenomenon 
discounts the use of surveys and archival analyses of Table 3.3. The 
experimental method is also unsuitable because there is no possibility of 
controlling behavioral events. While historical research investigates the 
‘how’ and ‘why’, it does not focus on contemporary events.  
 
The nature of the present inquiry requires the reconstruction of the views 
of a number of actors (comprising multiple realities) within the TNE 
operation of participating universities and as such, to work towards a 
consensus within each university, representing the collective voice of the 
university. It therefore requires the researcher to extract rich data from 
the nature of the case, its historical background, physical setting, 
economic environment, political environment, legal environment, related 
cases, and informants with first-hand knowledge of the case (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2005, 447). As the current business delivery model construct 
indicates in Section 2.7.2, the TNE phenomenon is set within a complex 
industry environment. Decisions are made within this environment, 
impacted by the university’s own organisational structure and the 
individual decision-maker’s background, experience, skills sets, and 
interactions with other decision-makers. This environment justifies the 
use of the case study methodology informed by multiple interviews of the 
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TNE actors, as affirmed by Yin (Yin 2014, 16), defining a case study as 
‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the 
‘case’) in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly 
evident’. The current TNE research clearly also satisfies Benbasat et al.’s 
(Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead 1987) criteria for deploying the case 
study method – natural case setting, focus on contemporary events, no 
control/manipulation of subjects/events, and scarcity of theoretical bases. 
 
The case study as a research method is contrasted from legal cases as 
part of court evidence, and the pedagogical case study method for 
teaching. Case study research is now a well-grounded and extensively-
used research method which has been deployed across a broad range of 
fields, e.g., psychology, anthropology, management information systems, 
nursing, education and business. These include cases as diverse as 
Malinowski’s study of the Trobriand islanders’ sexuality, and Allison’s 
research on the Cuban missile crisis (Stake 1995). Lee was one of the 
early Management Information Systems researchers to tackle issues of 
rigor in the use of case studies. He addressed the specific issues of the 
need for controlled observations, controlled deductions, replicability and 
generalisability (Lee 1989). Other researchers like Benbasat et. al. and 
Eisenhardt added to the collation and development of the case study as 
research method. The former described the case study as particularly 
useful in addressing research questions where ‘research and theory are 
at their early, formative stages’ and ‘where the experiences of the actors 
are important and the context of action is critical’ (Benbasat, Goldstein 
and Mead 1987, 369). Eisenhardt focused on building theory using case 
study research (Eisenhardt 1989). Two prominent case study 
researchers stand out, viz., Stake and Yin who documented case study 
research methods extensively (Bazeley 2013). Yin in particular, 
meticulously justified the use of the case study as a bona fide research 
method by addressing issues of rigor, generalisation from findings, level 
of effort (to produce research acceptable to the scientific community), 
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and ‘comparative advantage, in contrast to other research methods’ (Yin 
2014, 21).  The current research will draw mainly from the rigorous 
research processes developed by Stake and Yin. 
 
The case study is a preferred method when the research needs to focus 
on an in-depth knowledge of a person, community or system, within its 
contemporary environment (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, 443). Drawing 
from Stake and Yin, Creswell considers the case study as a qualitative 
study of a ‘real-life, contemporary bounded system (a case) or multiple 
bounded systems (cases) … through detailed, in-depth data collection 
involving multiple sources of information …’ (Creswell 2013, 97). 
 
The current research makes use of an initial set of focus groups to  
1) validate/invalidate each of the three theories, and possibly indicate 
applicability of other theories; 
2) validate and refine the relevance of the theoretical construct; and 
3) categorise TNE processes and the reflectors for each of the theories. 
 
These focus group findings were then corroborated through secondary 
data analyses of various government, industry and university 
publications. Government and industry publications included 
AUQA/TEQSA (Australian Universities Quality Agency and its successor, 
the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency) audits of 
universities, Department of Education and Training statistical data, IDP 
publications and news reports. The primary university publication for 
analysis was their annual reports. These were supported by various 
other university publications, e.g., published policies, operations manuals 
and press releases. 
 
While the focus groups and secondary data analyses provided initial 
corroboration and construct refinements, a series of semi-structured 
interviews of key TNE players provided the hermeneutical and dialectical 
reconstruction of the phenomenon, and thus completes the repertoire of 
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methods within the case study. This mixed methods approach is a 
deliberate choice in contributing towards internal validity through 
triangulation (Barbour 2007), and a specific strategy for constructivists 
using ‘… case studies to report their findings’ (Bradmore 2007, 114). 
 
3.5 Assuring Rigor in the Current Research 
 
Qualitative research has come a long way in its development, and in the 
construction and grounding of a wide range of paradigms. Denzin and 
Lincoln traced the development of qualitative research over several (in 
his words) historical moments, viz. the traditional (1900-1950); the 
modernist or golden age (1950-1970); the blurred genres (1970-1986); 
the crisis of representation (1986-1990); the postmodern (1990-1995); 
the postexperimental inquiry (1996-2000); the methodologically 
contested present (2000-2004); and the fractured future (2005- ) (Denzin 
and Lincoln 2005, 3). 
 
The traditional moment was characterised by the adoption of positivism 
from quantitative research, for want of more informed paradigms. 
Through the passage of these historical moments, the qualitative 
research community then gradually explored various frames of 
interpretation and paradigms, such as postpositivism, interpretivist 
approaches, critical inquiry, postfoundationalism, poststructuralism, 
emancipatory discourses, feminism and morality. These diverse frames 
of interpretation and paradigms cut across multiple disciplines and 
research purposes, leading to a diversity of approaches in assuring 
research rigor. 
 
At one end of the spectrum for assuring rigor are the traditional 
positivistic criteria of ensuring validity and reliability, criteria which are still 
well accepted in the wider research community. At the opposite end are 
new voices like Laurel Richardson that clamor for the flexibility of their 
research to accommodate a wide range of shifting interpretations 
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(including mental and emotional states) through a ‘transgressive’ form of 
validity that is multidimensional, akin to crystals in their reflective and 
refractive properties (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, 208). In between these 
extremes are various qualitative researchers proffering various 
seemingly well-argued frameworks for assuring rigor in their respective 
research disciplines. Of these, Guba and Lincoln seem to have 
articulated a well-received framework to assure trustworthiness, based 
on four aspects, viz., credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Other researchers have 
proffered a wide range of criteria such as the utility of the research 
findings in post-research social programs, simulacra/ironic validity, and 
even voluptuous/situated validity. It has now become almost a free for all, 
leading Wolcott to remark that ‘Whatever validity is, I apparently ‘have’ or 
‘get’ or ‘satisfy’ or ‘demonstrate’ or ‘establish’ it …’ (Wolcott 1990).  
 
The use of various criteria for assuring rigor may have its merits, 
especially in the new moments’ focus on small scale, local research 
which do not address grand theories but trains on emancipatory or 
activist agenda. The blind use of the new criteria may lead to the notion 
that qualitative research lacks integrity, rigor and authority, or as Denzin 
and Lincoln put it ‘…identified as undisciplined, sloppy research 
comprising subjective observations …’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, 22). 
 
However, in the pursuit of the more traditional research themes, many of 
which are inert to e.g., activism and poststructuralism, we can safely 
resort to the traditional measures of validity and reliability for assurance 
of rigor. Morse quotes several authors (viz., Hammersly, Kuzel and 
Engel, and Yin) in asserting that the traditional, well-grounded criteria of 
validity and reliability ‘… can be applied to all research because the goal 
of finding plausible and credible outcome explanations is central to all 
research’ (Morse et al. 2002). These criteria have been developed to 
assure rigor at every stage of the research endeavour, through a self-
rectifying process. Patton is even more assertive in advocating validity 
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and reliability as the primary assurance criteria for qualitative research 
(Lincoln and Guba 1985, 290). 
 
The current research, by its nature a naturalistic case study of an 
organisational phenomenon, which has no undertones of activist, 
emancipatory or critical agenda, will deploy the traditional criteria of 
validity and reliability for assurance of rigor. This is confirmed by Yin’s 
well-established use of these criteria in his seminal works on case 
studies (Yin 2014). The rigor of the research will be monitored throughout 
the research planning and execution processes through an assessment 
of construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. 
 
These four tests are constantly verified throughout the research 
endeavor, providing a self-rectifying mechanism to ensure 
methodological coherence, adjust theoretical conceptions, correct errors, 
address faulty fit of data and refine data interpretations. This would 
necessarily mean a constant moving forward and backwards along the 
research process to assure integrity in the research endeavor (Morse et 
al. 2002). 
 
The robustness and credibility of the research will also be strengthened 
by the use of triangulation, both of the case descriptions as well as the 
interpretations of the findings, continuously throughout the entire study 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2005, 444). Two examples of the use of triangulation 
are the analysis of university focus group participants’ (across different 
TNE portfolios) lived experience, and the cross-case analysis across the 
focus groups (Chapter 4). 
 
3.6 Deployment of Focus Groups 
 
This Section traces a brief history of the use of focus groups in qualitative 
research, and its application in the current TNE investigations. 
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3.6.1 Using Focus Groups for Interpretivist Research 
 
The earliest reference to focus groups can be traced to Emory Bogardus’ 
book, The New Social Research (Bogardus 1926), where he referred to 
the use of ‘group interviews’ as a more economic means of data 
collection compared to the personal interview. He deliberately used the 
‘group interview’ to extract ‘new points’, which would otherwise be 
‘obscured’ in what he called an ‘explorational enterprise’. 
 
It was not until the 1940s, when a more dedicated use of the focus group 
was deployed at the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia 
University. Under Paul Lazarsfeld, the bureau used ‘focus interviews’ to 
test people’s responses to various marketing initiatives, e.g., radio soap 
operas. Later, Robert Merton joined Lazarsfeld in providing the US 
government with research on the effectiveness of government wartime 
propaganda on radio. There, Merton and his colleagues developed more 
refined techniques of interviewing in groups of participants. These were 
published as The Focused Interview in the American Journal of 
Sociology in 1946 by Merton and Patricia Kendall, and later in 1956 in a 
book of the same title by Merton, Kendall and Marjorie Fiske (Bloor et al. 
2011). Merton and his colleagues used ‘focus interviews’ as secondary 
research methods, supporting other main quantitative methods. 
 
3.6.2 Application of the Focus Group in TNE Research 
 
The focus group is now used mainly in three types of investigative 
endeavours, viz., commercial marketing research, academic research 
and lately, in critical research with the aim of empowering voiceless 
segments of society (Simpson and Fitzgerald 2014). It is distinguished 
from group interviews by its inclusion of interactions between group 
members, thus facilitating the sharing of ideas, questioning each other, 
encouraging and extracting otherwise undiscovered facts and 
interpretations, and the co-creation of interpretations. The focus group, 
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as its name suggests, is also focused on unpacking the individual as well 
as group/sub-group’s construction of a topic or a related set of topics 
(Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008). 
 
Focus groups can be used at the start of, in the middle, and at the end of 
a study. They are deployed at the beginning as pre-pilot studies to inform 
on constructs and survey designs; within studies as complementary 
methods to enrich findings; and at the end of studies as a communication 
channel (Bloor et al. 2011). 
 
In this study, the focus group was used as a preliminary research method 
to test the theoretical construct and validate, or otherwise, the identified 
theories within a smaller group of institutions, prior to embarking on the 
case studies. A chronological list of TNE functions (derived from Davies 
et. al. 2000) was developed to guide the group discussions. This list was 
utilised as an a priori framework to cast the group’s discussions. 
 
The rationale for the selection of the focus group as a preliminary 
research method is its potential to enable participants to unearth rich 
accounts of the phenomenon under enquiry resulting from group 
dynamics, or what Kamberelis and Dimitriadis describe as ‘… relevant 
constitutive forces in the construction of meaning …’, allowing the 
participants to ‘take control’ and ‘own’ the interview space (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2005, 902), and is one of the quickest and lowest cost methods 
for generating complex information (Liamputtong 2013). 
 
Criticisms against the use of focus groups stem from reduced 
structure/control over the discussion, chaotic data, small numbers 
disabling proper sampling, and possible distortion of responses due to 
dominant participants (Morgan 1997). These concerns are not significant 
in the present study due to the chosen constructionist paradigm, 
deliberate interview structure, and selection of participants. The adopted 
paradigm encourages the production of rich (not chaotic) data, including 
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co-created interpretations among participants, through a semi-structured 
but focused group discussion. As for sampling, a purposive sampling 
strategy was adopted, generating a good representation of active TNE 
universities across four well-recognised categories of Australian 
universities. 
 
3.6.3 Using Focus Groups to Test Construct in Australian Public 
Universities 
 
Four public universities in Australia were selected for focus group 
sessions. This served the purposive criterion sampling strategy to 
address research purpose and suitability of participants (Miles and 
Huberman 1994), and allowed access to information-rich cases (Patton 
1990). They represented a spread of Australian university categories, 
viz., a Group of Eight university (University D), an Australian Technology 
Network university (University A), an Innovative Research University 
institution (University C), and one non-classified institution (University B) 
(Simpson and Fitzgerald 2014).  
 
A letter explaining the purpose of the research, and the focus group 
requirements (including the use of a voice recording device) was sent out 
to potential participants. This letter also reiterated the anonymity of all 
participants, and that participants were free to withdraw from the session 
at any time. Participant demographics were recorded, including age, 
gender, TNE experience and public/private sector work experience. 
These documents are presented in Appendix B (Focus Group 
Documentation) as part of reliability measures (see Section 3.5). 
 
The focus group discussions lasted for about two hours each, held within 
the participating universities, with the exception of University D, where a 
group could not be gathered. A one-on-one telephone interview was 
used to interview an active TNE advocate in this case. Wherever 
possible, the participants of the focus group interviews were drawn from 
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strategic planning, managerial and academic staff involved in TNE, and 
limited to a maximum of eight people in each group. The focus groups 
were held in an informal setting, where participants sat around the room, 
facing the centre. This enabled all participants to view and interact with 
each other. Light refreshment was served as it was held in the afternoon. 
 
The focus groups were asked about the processes of establishing, 
managing and terminating TNE projects. This was part of the research 
effort to examine motivations for deploying various business delivery 
models in each TNE operational function. Preliminary TNE functions 
identified by Davies et al. (Simpson and Fitzgerald 2014) were written on 
flipcharts as a guiding framework so that all participants could view them, 
and comment on them. The guiding questions were derived from the 
study’s research questions and TNE functions of Davies et. al. 
 
No. Focus Group Guiding Questions Basis for Guiding Question 
1 Describe the types of TNE 
business delivery models run by 
your university 
Research question 1 and 2 
2 Identify the location of these TNE 
operations 
Research question 1 and 2 
3 What is the rationale for starting 
these TNE operations? 
Research question 1 and 2 
4 Identify terminated TNE 
operations 
Research question 3 
5 What is the rationale for the 
termination of these TNE 
operations? 
Research question 3 
6 Describe the core TNE processes Research question 2 and 3 
7 What improvements would you 
wish to see implemented in these 
processes? 
Research question 2 and 3 
8 How does the university select its 
offshore partner? 
Research question 2 and 3 
9 How does the university monitor 
its offshore partner? 
Research question 2 and 3 
 
Table 3.4   Guiding Questions Posed at Focus Groups 
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The format of the discussions was deliberately kept semi-structured to 
enable the participants to express themselves more freely, and thereby 
permit a richer environment for their constructions of knowledge and 
practice (Liamputtong 2013). 
 
As a facilitator, I was easily accepted by the participants because of my 
long and active involvement in TNE within both provider and host 
capacities. To keep the interactions localised within each university, I did 
not participate in conversations beyond asking questions, providing 
clarifications where needed, or pulling back conversations from any 
tangential divergence. Apart from recording the interactions using an 
audio recording device, the social interactions (e.g., resistance, 
awkwardness, assertiveness) amongst the participants were also 
observed and recorded to add higher granular context to the focus group 
findings. An example of the social interactions is the awkwardness of an 
academic participant in explaining how he was not consulted on offshore 
processes - amongst academic managers who were well informed about 
those processes. 
 
The recordings of the focus group interviews were transcribed for 
analysis using NVivo (version 11), a computer-assisted qualitative data 
analysis (CAQDAS) software. Two sets of coding were developed, viz., 
one for testing the validity of the theoretical construct (see Table 4.2 
Coding Framework for TNE Decision Model Construct Evaluation), and 
the other for testing the plausibility of the three theories of the firm (see 
Table 4.9 Coding Framework for TNE Theory Evaluation). While Table 
4.2 was developed from the parameters framing the theoretical construct, 
Table 4.9 was developed based on the reflectors of the three theories of 
the firm as identified in Table 3.9 (Theoretical Reflectors Targeted in TNE 
Operations).  
 
At this stage of the study, no propositions were tested. The intent of the 
focus group investigation is to test the validity of the theoretical construct 
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and the plausibility of the three theories in explaining TNE model 
selection decisions. The focus groups were also not expected to be 
sufficiently in-depth to provide a robust test of the propositions (which will 
be tested in the later in-depth semi-structured interviews). Hence, the 
focus group investigations to evidence the three theories focused only on 
the detection of the reflectors of the three theories, including their 
respective assumptions, foci and outcomes. 
 
The transcripts were analysed to identify the participants’ views on the 
prevailing business delivery model/s, motivation for the adoption of each 
model, their thoughts on the reasons for the successful delivery or 
termination of TNE programs, and indications of support for each of the 
three theories of the firm.  
 
Reporting of the analysis was planned to take on the chronological form 
(as opposed to the thematic, narrative or ethnographic forms) due to the 
use of the chronologically-ordered TNE functions from Davies et. al. 
(Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008). The use of the chronological order 
provided a framework for eliciting rich data in a systematic fashion, while 
also permitting some minor but useful tangential discussions. While the 
analyses took on the chronological form, the reporting of three of the 
university focus groups took a thematic form due to the rich stories that 
unfolded in the course of the focus group discussions. 
 
3.7 Qualitative Case Study Research Methodology 
 
Case study research is well documented as a means for exploratory and 
explanatory studies, as well as for theory-building and theory-testing 
(Iacono, Brown and Holtham 2011; Lee 1989; Eisenhardt 1989). The 
current TNE research deploys the case study for theory-testing; this is 
especially appropriate given the scarcity of a priori theories of the firm 
within TNE (Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead 1987).  
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The literature review suggests face validity for the assessment of TNE 
decisions using the three theories of the firm. These theories provide an 
a priori base of knowledge to jumpstart the case study under the 
constructivist paradigm. This prior knowledge is expected to be 
continuously challenged and refined throughout the study (Flick 2015, 
11).  
 
Drawing from case study literature, Creswell (Creswell 2013) 
summarised the defining characteristics of case studies as 
 
a) case identification, that can be bounded to enable robust 
investigation; 
b) intent of the investigation, i.e., following Stake’s intrinsic case (an 
understanding of a single case), instrumental case (an 
understanding of a specific issue) or collective case (an 
understanding of a phenomenon across multiple cases); 
c) in-depth understanding of the case using a wide range of relevant 
data for triangulation to ensure research rigor; 
d) case design, i.e., single or multiple cases to meet the research 
intent; 
e) rich case description, ‘… within its own world …’ (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2005, 450); 
f) choice of organisation of the report, e.g., by chronology, across-
case, or theoretical modeling; and 
g) case conclusions about the overall meaning of the case/s (viz., 
Stake’s ‘assertions’, or Yin’s ‘patterns/explanations’). 
 
Similarly, Stake requires the following ‘major conceptual responsibilities’ 
of case researchers to meet accepted standards of research rigor : 
bounding the case, identifying the phenomenon/theme/issue, seeking 
data patterns, triangulating key observations, selecting alternative 
interpretations, and developing assertions. These characteristics will be 
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observed for the TNE research, and anchored by the methodologies 
codified by Stake and Yin (Bazeley 2013). 
 
3.7.1 Case Identification and Research Questions 
 
Creswell’s case identification refers to Yin’s identification of the unit/s of 
analysis. It is imperative that case studies be demarcated within clear 
conceptual, spatial and temporal boundaries to enable systematic 
research to be conducted within a reasonable timeframe.  
 
The TNE phenomenon has been identified and bounded as the 
theoretical construct in Fig 3.2 (TNE Decision Model Construct), where 
the study focuses on the decision-making processes in TNE operations 
of Australian public universities, within their respective TNE operational 
environments, as interpreted by their staff. The TNE operations studied 
will be either the Direct or Outsourced models that are still operating in 
2018, and those that have ceased from 2005 to 2018. This follows 
Stake’s definition of the collective case study, and therefore the two units 
of analysis of the current study are the Australian public universities’ 
decision-making processes for the Direct and Outsourced models 
respectively, and that are impacting 2018 TNE operations and TNE 
operations that have ceased within five years prior to 2018. These 
parameters provide the boundedness in terms of conceptualisation 
(business delivery models), space (Australian public universities 
operating TNE), and time (within the period 2005 to 2018).  
 
The analyses of the TNE operations will seek to answer the three 
research questions, and be conducted using the lenses afforded by the 
three theories of the firm. Using an initial construct adapted from Davies 
et. al. (i.e., the Direct/Outsourced Delivery Models), the initial theoretical 
construct, and reflectors of the three theories were tested within the 
focus group inquiries of four Australian public universities. These 
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inquiries yielded a more refined theoretical construct for further 
investigation using in-depth case studies. 
 
3.7.2 Case Study Intent 
 
The intent of the case studies is to confirm or refute the practice of one or 
more of the theories of the firm in Australian public universities’ TNE 
decision-making processes (Longhofer, Floersch and Hartmann 2017). 
This endeavor will be executed via a deterministic approach instead of a 
probabilistic approach as discussed in Section 3.3.3. This will inevitably 
imply the need for analytic generalisation, or in Yin’s words ‘an 
opportunity to shed empirical light about some theoretical concepts or 
principles’ (Yin 2014, 40). Bazeley describes this as substantive theory 
that illuminates a phenomenon using ‘argument by analogy … which 
requires seeing similarities among disparate entities and asking whether 
what is known to be true about one might be generalised to another’ 
(Bazeley 2013, 330).  Analytical generalisation can be used to re-
explicate other similar cases or extend propositions to new cases. 
 
Instead of the positivistic approach to theory testing using statistical 
methods (statistical generalisation) which requires generalizing from a 
statistically significant sampling to a population, the case study uses 
Level Two inferencing, similar to a singular, non-randomised laboratory 
experiment (Yin 2014, 41).  Eisenhardt describes this as an iterative 
process of constant comparison and contrasting between theory and 
data, towards a theory that fits the data (Eisenhardt 1989), similar to 
Morse’s theory development through moving ‘from the particular to the 
general in small steps’ (Bazeley 2013, 412). Denzin and Lincoln views 
this generalisation process as lessons learnt from the singular case 
being ‘like and unlike other cases we do know, mostly by comparison’, 
and how case studies generalise to the case ‘at times still to come and in 
other situations’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, 454, 449). 
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This approach therefore entails the avoidance of terms that refer to 
statistical generalisations, e.g., sample, sample sizes, population, 
hypothesis and statistical inference, and the use of a different language 
of inquiry. We refer to cases (whether from single- or multiple-case 
designs) where theoretical/conceptual propositions are tested or drawn 
through logical inference (Small 2009). 
 
3.7.3 Case Study Design 
 
The research design is the ‘logical sequence that connects the empirical 
data to a study’s initial research questions and, ultimately, to its 
conclusions’ (Yin 2014, 28). It is also a ‘logical model of proof that allows 
the researcher to draw inferences concerning causal relations among the 
variables under investigation’ (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992). 
Miles and Huberman summarise the qualitative research process as an 
interaction among four activities, viz., data collection, data reduction, 
data display, and drawing and verifying conclusions (Miles and 
Huberman 1994). Case study research has evolved into a method with a 
unique research design, which has been codified chiefly by Stake and 
Yin. 
 
Yin’s case study methodology calls for five key components, viz., a case 
study’s questions, its propositions (if any), its unit/s of analysis, the logic 
linking the data to the propositions, and the criteria for interpreting the 
findings (Yin 2014, 29). The three research questions seek to uncover 
the ‘hows’ and ‘whys’ of decision-making in TNE operations through 
specific propositions derived from the theoretical construct, and 
developed in Section 3.7.5 (and refined in Section 4.5), and hence fall 
clearly within the ambit of case studies. The current TNE research 
employed the focus group as a means to clarify the construct and test 
the theory (and preliminary propositions), and hence, pre-empted the 
need for a pilot case study. 
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The selection of cases for multiple case studies follows a purposive 
selection, unlike sampling procedures practiced in quantitative studies 
where statistical analysis is used to falsify hypotheses. Cases are 
selected through a replication logic which aims to duplicate findings 
across cases. The cases are selected either because the researcher 
expects similar research outcomes (literal replication), or contrasting 
outcomes for anticipatable reasons (theoretical replication) (Yin 2014, 
57). 
 
While Stake categorises case studies into intrinsic, instrumental and 
collective case studies, Yin encapsulates these in a more comprehensive 
2x2 matrix of case study design typology (Yin 2014). These designs are 
categorised by the number of units of analysis and the number of cases. 
The current TNE study will deploy Yin’s Type 4 case design which calls 
for studying multiple cases of the dual units of analysis (decisions on 
Direct and Outsourced models) within their respective contexts or 
industry environments (Fig. 3.1 below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.1   Yin’s Type 4 Multiple Case Design with Embedded Units of 
Analysis (Yin 2014, 50) 
 
The selection of the multiple case design is driven by the need to 
contrast and compare cases, as well as to increase the robustness of the 
study. Drawing from Section 2.6, the Decision Model Construct is 
reproduced to show the embedded units of analysis for one university 
case. 
Industry Environment 
 
University Case 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry Environment 
 
University Case 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Embedded 
Unit of 
Analysis 1 
(Direct 
Model 
Decision) 
Embedded 
Unit of 
Analysis 2 
(Outsourced 
Model 
Decision) 
Embedded 
Unit of 
Analysis 1 
(Direct 
Model 
Decision) 
Embedded 
Unit of 
Analysis 2 
(Outsourced 
Model 
Decision) 
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5) Industry Rivalry 
And impacted by government 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.2   TNE Decision Model Construct 
 
In order to enhance the reliability of the multiple-case study, the design 
and execution of the case (individual as well as cross-case) studies need 
to be systematically documented. This is particularly critical given the 
complexity of most cases, and the need to develop thick, rich 
descriptions and analyses linking the research questions with the data 
through a chain of evidence (Baskarada 2014a). The current research 
will adopt Yin’s case study protocol as a guide to the conduct and 
documentation of individual TNE case studies due to its conciseness, 
and its usefulness in providing a systems view, in anticipating procedural 
implications, and in ensuring an efficient, parsimonious research 
endeavor (Yin 2014, 84-85). This protocol is adapted and is outlined as 
follows. 
 
Characteristics of 
University 
Type of Institution 
Size of Institution 
Resources 
Strategic TNE Agenda 
Experience in TNE 
TNE Growth Rate 
Offshore 
Business 
Delivery Model 
Decision 
Decision factors and program longevity explained by one or more of the three main theories of the firm? 
Possible reflectors :          a)   TCE  – governance structures, transaction costs, asset specificity, transaction frequency 
b) PRT – property rights bundles, opportunism, information asymmetry 
c) AT    – adverse selection, moral hazard, risk aversion, incentive alignment 
University A 
Unit of Analysis 1 
Unit of Analysis 2 
Country X 
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Fig. 3.3   Case Study Protocol for TNE Study 
 
In some studies, a pilot case study is used to enable the crafting of 
research questions, and to clarify the theoretical construct. It is not a ‘dry 
run’ to prepare for the actual case studies (Baskarada 2014b). In the 
current TNE study, the focus group (instead of the pilot case study) has 
been used as a methodological triangulation strategy to address the twin 
objectives of clarifying the theoretical construct, as well as provide prima 
facie validation for the three theories in a more in-depth manner. 
 
 
TNE CASE STUDY PROTOCOL 
University ABC 
 
1.0 Case Overview 
1.1 Objectives of Protocol 
1.2 Research Questions 
1.3 Theoretical Construct 
1.4 Propositions 
 
2.0 Data Collection 
2.1 Data Collection Plan (including cases, units of analysis, 
sources of evidence) 
2.2 Preparations (including access documentation, aide 
memoire and data entry forms for secondary data (viz., 
archival records and documentation) collection and 
interview, interview questions, schedule of access, 
equipment) 
2.3 Field issues (including ethical considerations) 
 
3.0 Data Analysis 
3.1 Analytic Strategies Identified 
3.2 Analytic Techniques Identified 
 
4.0 Reporting 
The current TNE study will take a realist presentation style, 
using the linear-analytic and comparative reporting structures 
as the main presentation formats. It will also explore the use of 
vignettes and the funnel for subsidiary story-telling. 
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3.7.4 Case Selection 
 
Recalling the distinction made of analytic generalisation from statistical 
generalisation, it is critical to note that cases are not samples from which 
to draw inferences to a larger population. The selection of cases for 
study therefore does not follow the rules that govern the naturalistic 
sciences’ nomothetic research.  
 
3.7.4.1 Case Selection Criteria 
 
Various researchers have justified their case selection strategies, such 
as the ‘anomalous case’ against the ‘comparative case’ (Longhofer, 
Floersch and Hartmann 2017) the ‘crucial case’ against the ‘pathway 
case’ (Gerring 2007), and the ‘reputational and criterion-based selection’ 
(LeCompte, Goetz and Tesch 1993). One of the most comprehensively 
documented set of case selection criteria was developed by Patton. He 
developed selection criteria that identifies sixteen different types of 
cases, based on the purpose for which the research has been designed 
(Patton 1990, 182-183). His rationale for this selection framework is 
based on the need for in-depth study through ‘information-rich cases’. 
For example, one of the most popular is maximum variation selection 
which seek to explore a diverse range of case features. The critical case 
on the other hand seeks logical generalisation. To test the current 
research’s theoretical construct, the theory-based, and 
confirming/disconfirming case selection criteria would be employed.  
 
Patton suggests that there are no general rules around the number of 
cases that are needed, although other researchers recommend various 
numbers, based on their respective research objectives and design 
(Patton 1990). Eisenhardt for example suggests a range of four to ten 
cases, subject to reaching ‘theoretical saturation’ (Eisenhardt 1989). 
Specifically for post-graduate research endeavours, Perry recommends 
selecting between two and four cases as the minimum that is widely 
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approved by methodologists – to accommodate the constraints of time 
and funding (Perry 1998). 
 
3.7.4.2 Analyzing Australian Public Universities for Case Selection 
 
Preliminary investigations show that the following Australian public 
universities have significant offshore student numbers (exceeding 10% of 
their respective total international student enrolments) as at 2015 
(extracted from each university’s annual report of 2015). 
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No. University Univer
-sity 
Cate-
gory 
Offshore Students Type of 
TNE 
Model 
Enrol-
ments 
% Intl 
Stu-
dents 
%Total 
Stu-
dents 
A New South Wales      
1 Charles Sturt University Others 928 17% 2% O 
2 Macquarie University Others 1,461 26% 3% D 
3 Southern Cross University RUN 460 23% 3% O 
4 The University of New England RUN 120 26% 0.5% D 
5 The University of Newcastle IRU 490 21% 1% B 
6 University of New South Wales G8 3,772 39% 6% D 
7 University of Technology Sydney ATN 801 11% 2% D 
8 The University of Wollongong Others 2,828 42% 8% B, O 
9 Western Sydney University Others 620 20% 1%  
B Victoria      
1 Federation University Australia RUN 625 25% 4% O 
2 La Trobe University IRU 701 17% 2% O 
3 Monash University G8 4,545 34% 6% B, O 
4 RMIT University ATN 5,771 46% 9% B, O 
5 Swinburne University of Technology Others 2,571 54% 6% B, O 
6 The University of Melbourne G8 2,203 22% 3% D 
7 Victoria University Others 2,562 51% 10% O 
C Queensland      
1 Central Queensland University RUN 3,241 100% 14% D 
2 Griffith University IRU 1,083 30% 2% D 
3 James Cook University IRU 1,334 49% 6% B 
4 University of Southern Queensland RUN 313 23% 1% D 
D Western Australia      
1 Curtin University ATN 2,814 58% 6% B, O 
2 Edith Cowan University Others 483 20% 2% O 
3 Murdoch University IRU 2,448 79% 10% B, O 
4 University of Western Australia G8 579 25% 2% D 
E South Australia      
1 Flinders University IRU 808 38% 3% O 
F Tasmania      
1 University of Tasmania Others 361 12% 1% O 
G Australian Capital Territory      
1 The Australian National University G8 680 15% 3% D 
2 University of Canberra Others 334 24% 2% O 
 
Note : Abbreviations used  
1) B (international branch campus); O (business delivery models other than 
international branch campuses, e.g., franchised programs); D (distance education 
or online delivery) 
2) ATN (Australian Technology Network) G8 (Group of Eight); IRU (Innovative 
Research Universities); RUN (Regional Universities Network); Others (Other 
universities not categorised elsewhere) 
 
Table 3.5   Profiles of Offshore Student Enrolments at Australian 
Public Universities (Department of Education and Training 2015a) 
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Further investigation through university annual reports and university 
websites indicate the types of TNE operations undertaken by these 
universities, and shown as international branch campuses or other TNE 
business delivery models in the above table. They also include the 
enrolment of international students by distance education and online 
delivery. 
 
The above list categorises the Australian public universities under 
Moodie’s widely-referenced five classes, viz., the Australian Technology 
Network universities, the Group of Eight universities, the Innovative 
Research Universities, the Regional Universities Network universities, 
and Others (Moodie 2014). It has been reported to be a more balanced 
representation compared to Marginson’s typology (Bradmore 2007; 
Marginson 2004).  
 
In developing a protocol for case selection, Australian public universities 
that operate TNE programs were identified and compared by the number 
of TNE students in 2015. These universities were further shortlisted 
through their delivery jurisdictions; most were operating in Malaysia, 
Singapore and Hong Kong SAR. A summary of those operating within 
Malaysia and Singapore is reproduced below. 
 
Ideally, to cover all replications 
a) in one country, there will need to be at least  
(i) one TNE program from each of the five university categories, 
comprising 
(ii) at least two international branch campuses (representing the 
direct model), and  
(iii) at least two non-international branch campuses (representing 
the outsourced model); 
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No. University University 
Category 
Location and Type of TNE Program 
Malaysia Singapore 
1 Curtin ATN International 
branch campus 
Franchised 
2 Monash G8 International 
branch campus 
 
3 James Cook IRU  International 
branch campus 
4 Newcastle IRU  International 
branch campus 
5 Murdoch IRU Franchised International 
branch campus 
6 Federation RUN Franchised (3) Franchised 
7 USQ RUN Franchised Franchised 
8 Swinburne Others International 
branch campus 
Franchised 
9 Victoria Others Franchised Franchised 
10 Wollongong Others Franchised Franchised (2) 
 
Table 3.6   Australian Public Universities Operating Large TNE 
Programs within Malaysia and Singapore in 2015 (extracted from 
2015 university annual reports) 
 
b) in two countries, there will need to be at least 
(i) one TNE program from each of the five university categories 
within the two countries, comprising 
(ii) at least two international branch campuses (representing the 
direct model) within one jurisdiction, and  
(iii) at least two non-international branch campuses (representing 
the outsourced model) within one jurisdiction. 
 
The above ideal case selection schemes by replication cannot be 
undertaken because the types of TNE programs delivered by these 
universities are limited in terms of the Direct-Outsourced Dichotomy and 
their delivery locations.  
 
The best case selection by replication will necessarily forgo replication by 
university category, which is a less important replication criterion. It will 
be determined by the availability of direct and outsourced TNE programs. 
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This scheme proposes the following case selection, which will involve 
two cases and four units of analysis as tabulated below. As discussed 
earlier, all university cases will be de-identified to protect the privacy of 
both university and informants. 
 
No. Business Delivery 
Model Dimension 
University Type and Jurisdiction Dimensions 
Case 1 : University A 
(ATN) 
Case 2 : University C 
(IRU) 
1 Direct model Wholly-controlled 
international branch 
campuses in 
Countries T, X 
Wholly-controlled 
international branch 
campus in Country X 
2 Outsourced model Collaborative 
international branch 
campuses in 
Countries U, V 
Franchised programs 
in Countries O, W, Y 
Franchised programs 
in Country V 
3 Countries O, T, U, V, W, X, Y X, V 
 
Where T, V and Y are Southeast Asian (SEA) countries, and O, U, W and X are non-SEA 
countries (See Section 4.3.4 for the rationale for the SEA/non-SEA dichotomy)  
Table 3.7   TNE Case Selection 
 
The above case selection will allow for an exploration of decision-making 
in the two units of analysis involving the Direct and Outsourced Models, 
within two different regulatory jurisdictions (viz., countries X, a non-SEA 
country, and V, a SEA country), and operated by universities categorised 
under two different university classifications. These two universities 
coincided with two of the focus group universities, and will hence allow 
for an in-depth multiple case study building upon data already gathered 
earlier.  
 
While meeting literal and theoretical replication requirements, the case 
selection also meets convenience and temporal requirements to enable 
in-depth investigation, ‘building in variety and acknowledging 
opportunities for intensive study’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, 451). 
Reflecting on Patton’s case selection framework, the foregoing selection 
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emphasised stratified-purposeful, and theory-driven criteria, and derived 
through the process of constant comparison. 
 
The diagram below summarises the case study research design as an 
adaptation of Yin’s multiple-case study procedure. 
 
 Define and Design   Prepare, Collect, Analyse  Analyse and 
Conclude   
   
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.4   TNE Case Study Procedure; adapted from Yin (Yin 2014, 
60) 
 
3.7.5 Developing Case Study Propositions 
 
This Section will seek to develop the preliminary case study propositions 
to be tested through in-depth semi-structured interviews, and triangulated 
through secondary data analysis as well as previously-conducted focus 
group analyses. 
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3.7.5.1 Research Methodology 
 
Recalling previous discussions on the research paradigm selected, i.e., 
constructivism, the current research seeks to use a qualitative approach 
to heuristically interpret the lived experience of decision-makers of 
Australian public university TNE operations. This approach necessarily 
makes use of analytical generalisation, a research technique that is akin 
to single, non-randomised experiments (Yin 2014, 41). Rich data is 
extracted and analysed against the theories to test propositions that are 
designed to confirm/disconfirm each of the three theories of the firm as 
the basis of TNE decision-making on the Direct-Outsourced dichotomy of 
business delivery models (Bazeley 2013, 412; Eisenhardt 1989). Or in 
Harman’s perspective, being able to proffer an ‘inference to best 
explanation’ through accounting for all the facts that explain the data, and 
‘that is plausible enough or simple enough to be accepted’ (Bazeley 
2013, 339). This paradigmatic technique (Longhofer, Floersch and 
Hartmann 2017, 190) contrasts with the pursuit of the falsification of 
hypotheses in the statistical generalisation techniques of nomothetic 
research within the positivism paradigm. 
 
3.7.5.2 Research Propositional Framework 
 
To generate internally and externally valid propositions, the foregoing 
sections have explored extant research on TNE operations, as well as 
the prima facie applications of the three theories of the firm in TNE. A 
detailed TNE framework (Table 2.4) is proferred for use in organisational 
economics investigations, adapted from the recent British Council TNE 
publication (Knight and McNamara 2017).  
 
The three organisational economics theories were then scrutinised in 
Section 2.6.5 to identify commonalities and specifics – enabling the 
extraction of observable reflectors. The next three sections discuss the 
application of each of the three theories of the firm to TNE business 
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delivery model selection, through perspectives identified in Table 2.6 
(Comparative Perspectives of the Theories of the Firm), yielding the 
following propositional framework, which focuses on the business 
delivery model outcome as the dependent variable. 
 
No. Business 
Delivery Model 
Outcome 
(Dependent 
Variables) 
Theoretical Antecedents  
(Independent Variables) 
Operating Environment 
(Independent 
Variables) 
1 
Direct 
TCE 
a) High asset specificity 
b) High level of behavioral uncertainty 
c) High transaction frequency 
High level of business 
and/or legal-political 
uncertainty 
PRT 
a) Mission critical resources controlled by 
the university 
b) Risk of opportunism is high 
c) Information asymmetry is high 
High level of maturity of 
socio-legal-political 
environment 
AT 
a) High costs of search and/or monitoring 
b) Low risk aversion for the university 
c) Low incentive alignment 
Low level of maturity of 
legal-political 
environment 
2 
Outsourced 
TCE 
a) Low asset specificity 
b) Low level of behavioral uncertainty 
c) Low transaction frequency 
Low level of business 
and/or legal-political 
uncertainty 
PRT 
a) Mission critical resources controlled by 
the OP 
b) Risk of opportunism is low 
c) Information asymmetry is low 
High level of maturity of 
socio-legal-political 
environment 
AT 
a) Low costs of search and/or monitoring 
b) High risk aversion for the university 
c) High incentive alignment 
High level of maturity of 
legal-political 
environment 
 
Table 3.8   Propositional Framework for TNE Business Delivery  
   Model Selection 
 
3.7.5.3 Bases for TCE Propositions 
 
The propositions to be tested for TCE are derived from Williamson’s 
discriminating alignment hypothesis (discussed in Section 2.6.1), which 
focuses on the three key exchange attributes of asset specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency of transactions. Klein refined these three key 
independent variables further by adding transaction complexity (Klein 
and Sykuta 2010, 168). Lamminmaki considered owner/operator 
structure as an important fourth independent variable in her study of 
 117 
outsourcing in the Australian hotel industry (Lamminmaki 2007). The 
current study will focus on Williamson’s three exchange attributes as the 
independent variables, while also investigating the influence of the 
university’s characteristics and of the TNE operating environment, as 
developed in the theoretical construct. It is proposed that high asset 
specificity, high levels of behavioral uncertainties and high transaction 
frequencies will lead the university to deploy the Direct Model in TNE, 
while low levels of these three dimensions will result in the use of the 
Outsourced Model.  
 
Asset specificity has been observed in the focus group study, particularly 
in the branch campus operations. The case studies will be guided by 
Williamson’s six asset specificities, viz., physical asset, site, dedicated 
asset, human asset, brand name capital, and temporal specificities 
(Section 2.6.2).  
 
The investigation into uncertainties will focus on both behavioral and 
environmental uncertainties. Behavioral uncertainties underpin 
performance evaluation problems, particularly the holdup problem 
associated with asset specificity (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997, 46). 
Environmental uncertainties may lead to mal-adaptations due to 
incomplete contracting.  
 
It is also proposed that high environmental uncertainty will result in the 
deployment of the Direct Model, because it ‘increases the costs of 
adapting contractual agreements’ (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997, 44). On 
the other hand, country-specific advantages might come in the form of 
favorable government regulations, lower risks and the benefits of host 
country opportunities (Rugman and Verbeke 2012). It is therefore 
proposed that the Direct Model will be selected when the TNE business 
and/or legal-political environment is considered uncertain, and the 
Outsourced Model selected when the environment is considered certain. 
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The value chain of the theoretical construct quite evidently demonstrates 
that TNE is a high transaction frequency business, involving a large 
number of organisational entities and people. For this reason, TCE is not 
expected to underpin the Outsourced Model - as indicated in the cross-
case analysis of the focus groups (Table 4.11 University Motivation for 
Deploying TNE Business Delivery Models). 
 
3.7.5.4 Bases for PRT Propositions 
 
Segal and Whinston outlined two basic challenges facing firms, viz., the 
challenge to create incentives for efficient behavior (to overcome 
opportunism) and to efficiently allocate resources available to and 
produced by the organisation (Gibbons and Roberts 2013). They go on 
to suggest that firms can address these challenges through either 
contracts or ‘allocate decision rights to parties and leave them 
considerable discretion’ (Gibbons and Roberts 2013, 100). Using game-
theoretic analysis of decision rights allocation, they showed that assets 
should be allocated to agents who value them. Kim and Mahoney 
similarly, studied oil field unitisation by assuming, inter alia that key 
assets should be allocated to the firm that has the most to gain or lose 
(Kim and Mahoney 2005). Closer to TNE, Driffield et al. investigated post 
entry change in foreign affiliate ownership, and argues that under the 
PRT perspective, it is ‘optimal for ownership control to rest with those 
who have the greatest impact on the value of the venture’ (Driffield, 
Mickiewicz and Temouri 2016). And in Hart’s words, ‘specific rights (are) 
spelled out in contracts. It’s the residual control rights that cause 
problems’ (Hart 2009, 62). The current study will thus propose that 
universities will opt for the Direct Model when they control mission critical 
TNE resources (because they have the most to gain if the TNE operation 
succeeds, or lose if the TNE operation fails), and if the risk of 
opportunism is high. On the other hand, the University will opt for the 
Outsourced Model when the OP controls mission critical TNE resources, 
and if the risk of opportunism is low. 
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When parties to a collaboration are left to ‘considerable discretion’ , there 
is a need for a high level of transparency (Gibbons and Roberts 2013, 
100, 139). Libecap asserts that the presence of serious information 
asymmetry can lead to intensified distributional conflicts (Libecap 1986). 
Driffield et al. also argues that the allocation of property rights takes on 
higher significance when ‘investments by partners are observable but not 
verifiable’ (Driffield, Mickiewicz and Temouri 2016). Further, Segal and 
Whinston asserts that in the presence of information asymmetry, re-
negotiations might be disrupted by the propensity of agents to 
misrepresent uncertainty (Gibbons and Roberts 2013, 140). The current 
study therefore proposes that the university will opt for the Direct Model 
when there are high levels of information asymmetry, and opt for the 
Outsourced Model when information asymmetry is considered low. 
 
Similar to TCE, the environment is also a key factor in the selection of 
governance models. The environment specifically refers to both the 
formal legal institutions, as well as the informal systems of customs and 
relationships. Libecap argues that property rights might be changed as a 
result of pricing changes, production and enforcement technology 
changes, and changes in political parameters (Libecap 1986), which 
relate to the competitive market environment, legislated quality 
assurance (e.g., AUQA and TEQSA audits), and the socio-legal-political 
environment within which TNE is conducted respectively. Mahoney, 
quoting North, asserts that ‘the inability of societies to develop effective, 
low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source of … 
stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the third world, and 
that uncertainty could be due to ambiguity of legal doctrine and/or of 
behavior of the judicial system’ (quoting North, 1990 in Mahoney 1995, 
18). The current study proposes that the University will be motivated by 
PRT within TNE environments that exhibit high levels of maturity of the 
socio-legal-political infrastructure. 
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3.7.5.5 Bases for AT Propositions 
 
The focus group study indicates a predominance of reflectors pointing to 
the AT approach in TNE business delivery model selection across all 
three universities studied. This agrees with Michael who quoted 
Lafontaine and Slade as having identified AT as a driver for franchising, 
a common TNE model (Lafontaine and Slade, 1997 quoted in Klein and 
Sykuta 2010, 186). 
 
Following Kivisto’s framework, the TNE business delivery models in the 
focus groups also exhibit agency relationships, because the university 
delegates tasks to the OPs to execute, the university provides various 
resources for the OP to operationalise its role, and the university has 
strong interest in quality-assuring the OP’s role outcomes (Kivisto 2011, 
340). Given that the university has to rely on the agent to accomplish its 
business objectives, the agency problem facing the university is two-fold, 
viz., to be able to determine the motivation, capability and performance 
of the OP (adverse selection and moral hazard), and to narrow the goal 
and risk aversion gaps between the university and the OP.  
 
The first challenge requires the university to overcome information 
asymmetry regarding the OP’s capability and performance (Section 
2.6.4). It is proposed that the university will select a Direct Model when 
the costs of search and monitoring are high, and an Outsourced Model 
when the costs of search and monitoring are low. 
 
In her study of Australian hotel outsourcing, Lamminmaki confirmed the 
AT perspective that the principal will outsource when it considers the 
activity high risk (Lamminmaki 2007). Similarly, the focus group study 
provided evidence that universities franchise because they consider 
offshore operations risky (Table 4.10). It is therefore proposed that the 
university will choose the Outsourced Model when there is high risk 
aversion for the university, and the Direct Model when the university has 
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low risk aversion towards the TNE operation being considered. While this 
outcome seems counter to the foreign entry mode literature (Anderson 
and Gatignon 1986) (Douglas and Craig 1995, 1989) which advocates 
risk aversion for the lower risk direct investments (i.e., presumeably DM 
operations), extant TNE literature generally indicates that the industry 
considers DM operations high risk (Cao 2011) (Healey 2015a). 
 
To narrow the goal divergence of the principal and agent, there is a need 
to provide sufficient incentive to the agent to act in the best interest of the 
principal – calling for an alignment of incentives between the two parties, 
a key construct in AT (Parthasarathy 2010). It is therefore proposed that 
the university will deploy an Outsourced Model when there is strong 
incentive alignment between the university and the OP, and the Direct 
Model when there are difficulties in establishing incentive alignment 
between the partners.  
 
AT is premised on complete contracting, and hence the parties rely on a 
legal-political environment that is mature and effective in enforcing the 
terms of the contract (Kivisto 2011). It is therefore proposed that the 
university, motivated by AT, will choose to operate an Outsourced Model 
within a mature legal-political environment, and a Direct Model within 
environments of lower legal-political maturity. 
 
3.7.5.6 Scope of Propositional Framework 
 
Case study research will investigate each of the university cases using 
the propositional framework of Table 3.8. These investigations will 
explore perspectives of the three theories of the firm as outlined in Table 
2.6, and detailed below. 
 
As derived from Table 2.6, the focus of case study investigations will be 
on transactions for TCE, institutions for PRT, and contracts for AT. The 
transactions will be investigated through TNE processes developed in 
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Section 2.7.3, while institutions observed through the various governance 
structures described by informants. It was not expected that informants 
would divulge the contents of contracts; focus group and in-depth 
interview questions were hence designed to extract comments and 
observations pertaining to contractual concepts and terms. Fortunately, 
at least one focus group, and many interview informants provided rich 
insight into contractual terms of the TNE operations. 
 
The focal dimension of asset specificity in TCE will be investigated 
through institutional and program accreditation, host country 
licensing/approvals, intellectual property, brand equity, specialist TNE 
expertise, and dedicated physical facilities. Property rights in PRT will be 
focused on program awards, intellectual property, brand ownership, 
learning resources, teaching resources, managerial resources, marketing 
channels, and equity capital. AT investigations will focus on the 
dimensions of cost minimisation for the principal, maximisation of returns 
for the agent, and reputational benefits for the agent. 
 
The focus of contracts will be the ex post choice of either the Direct or 
Outsourced Models in TCE, the ex ante property rights (represented by 
the roles of the parties) and ex post distributional conflicts (e.g., 
copyrights) in PRT, and ex ante incentive alignment (to mitigate agency 
costs) and the monitoring of academic and business processes for AT. 
 
Cost concerns for TCE comprise of ex ante costs of information 
discovery, and drafting and negotiating contracts, ex post costs of 
monitoring, enforcing and renewing contracts, mal-adaptations due to 
changes in the operating environment, and underinvestment (holdup) in 
mission critical assets. PRT will look out for concerns with shirking, loss 
from rent-seeking (e.g., free-riding), and the withholding or distortion of 
information. AT concerns are mainly in search costs (e.g., due diligence 
prior to starting new TNE operations), monitoring costs (e.g., student 
satisfaction surveys and regular quality assurance audits) and residual 
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loss from imperfect incentive alignment (e.g., reputational damage from 
poor quality delivery). 
 
Market frictions from the TCE perspective will be observed from 
performance uncertainty (of OPs), uncertainty in regulatory environment, 
and relational asset specificity. PRT will look out for rights, roles, 
responsibilities and entitlements that are poorly defined, and vested 
interests in similar or related businesses. In AT, market frictions arise 
from opaque/poor observability of OP performance and difference in risk 
aversion between partners. 
 
Using Williamson’s four levels of analysis, the current study will observe 
for the influence of the operating environment, viz., resource allocation 
and employment, contractual arrangements, regulatory and legislative 
requirements, and informal institutions (Lamminmaki 2007). The shift 
across these environments is characterised by an increasing time for 
effecting change. The influence of these environments is important to 
support or explain the working of the theories of the firm, TCE and PRT 
in particular. In the case of TCE, there is a possibility of ‘under-estimating 
the social aspects of market activities with the assumption of 
opportunism’ (Williamson 1998), and possibly not detecting higher trust 
levels, which ‘may serve as a substitute for formal mechanisms such as 
contracts and direct controls’ (Zhang 2006, 62). For PRT, the 
governance environment includes both the formal regulatory and 
legislative infrastructure, as well as the informal institutions like local 
business customs and long term business relationships. Further, Klein 
observed that ‘in countries with stable legal institutions, … contracts tend 
to be less complete’, while Nickerson argues that ‘governance costs vary 
not only by governance mode but also by institutional environment’ (Klein 
and Sykuta 2010, 30, 146). 
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3.7.5.7 Two-phase Research Process 
 
Initial tests of the theoretical construct and applicability of the theories of 
the firm in TNE was conducted via focus groups of three Australian  
public universities and one phone interview of another public university. 
These investigations provided the basis for the validation of the 
theoretical construct, and the prima facie justification for the use of the 
three theories. They also indicated the plausibility of a rival theory in 
explicating TNE decisions.  
 
After conducting these generic validation exercises via the focus groups, 
the next step in the research is to investigate the impact of the theories of 
the firm on the longevity of the respective university’s TNE operations. 
From a broad test for the reflectors of the theories of the firm, the next 
stage of the research will tighten up the measures through the aforesaid 
propositional framework to enable higher precision multi-case study 
analyses (Yin 2014, 147).  
 
3.7.5.8 Reflectors of the Theories of the Firm 
 
The multiple-case study is guided by the propositional framework (Table 
3.8) and attempt to identify reflectors of the theories within the 
characteristics of the University, TNE value chain processes, and TNE 
operating environment (as per Table 2.6 of Section 2.6.5.2) as tabulated 
below.  
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No. Reflectors of Theories 
(theories that share aspects, if any) 
TNE Operations (from TNE Value 
Chain) 
Charac-
teristics of 
University 
TNE 
Process-
es 
Operating 
Environ-
ment 
A Common Reflectors    
1 Cost economisation outcome (all 3) x x  
2 Information asymmetry assumption      
(all 3) 
x x x 
3 Incomplete contracting assumption 
(TCEandPRT) 
x x x 
4 Asset specificity focus (TCEandPRT) x x  
5 Ex ante incentives alignment outcome 
(PRTandAT) 
x x  
B TCE    
1 Behavioral uncertainties assumption x x  
2 Environmental uncertainties 
assumption 
x x x 
3 Transaction cost concerns  x  
4 Frequency of transactions x x x 
5 Externalities handled by choice of 
governance structure 
x x x 
C PRT    
1 Efficient governance environment for 
contract enforcement assumption 
x x x 
2 Establish, transfer and maintain PR  x  
3 Rent-seeking externality concerns  x x 
4 Externalities handled by negotiation or 
unilateral decision 
x x  
D AT    
1 Complete contracting assumption x x x 
2 Differences in risk aversion assumption x x  
3 Adverse selection problem x x x 
4 Moral hazard problem x x x 
5 Agent aims for economic incentives x x  
 
Table 3.9   Theoretical Reflectors Targeted in TNE Operations 
 
This exercise is designed to confirm/disconfirm the theories as bases of 
the universities’ decision in selecting between the Direct and Outsourced 
models. This table will also form the basis for the design of data 
collection and analysis procedures. These reflectors comprise 
assumptions (8), outcomes (5) and foci (6) of the respective theories as 
applied to TNE operations (Section 2.6.5.2). 
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3.7.6 Case Study Rigor 
 
Following arguments for the use of the well-established tests of validity 
and reliability for quality assurance and rigor in the current research in 
Section 3.5, this section looks more closely at how to operationalise 
these tests. 
 
In his survey of quality assurance in qualitative research, Lewis highlights 
the danger of practicing ‘sloppy research’ through the abandonment of 
the foundational practice of assuring validity and reliability (Lewis 2009). 
He went on to propose a series of tests based on an expanded 
conceptualisation of validity and reliability for good research practice, as 
listed below. 
 
a) Validity Checklist 
(i) Triangulation 
(ii) Negative cases, discrepant data, or disconfirming evidence 
(iii) Bias, or researcher reflexivity 
(iv) Member checking 
(v) Prolonged engagement in the field 
(vi) Collaboration 
(vii) Audit trail 
(viii) Thick, rich description 
 
b) Reliability 
(i) Research worker reliability 
(ii) Variations in observations 
(iii) Test-retest method 
(iv) Split-half method 
 
By virtue of the current research which is undertaken by a single 
researcher, Lewis’ validity recommendations for bias, member checking, 
collaboration, and variation in observations will not need to be 
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addressed. Research worker reliability can be addressed by the use of 
researcher declaration of interests (including any personal biases and 
presumptions) and informant review (Morse et al. 2002), an alert that 
Creswell advises to enable the reader to assess reliability and improve 
on replication (Creswell 2013). In the interest of the tight PhD timeframe, 
the test-retest method and prolonged engagement in the field will not be 
possible.   
 
Creswell argues for the use of ‘accepted strategies to document the 
‘accuracy’ of’ the research – what he calls validation strategies. Like 
other researchers, he also addressed the need for reliability in good 
research (Creswell 2013, 250-253). His checklist comprises : 
 
c) Validation Strategies 
(i) Prolonged engagement and persistent observation 
(ii) Triangulation 
(iii) Peer review or debriefing 
(iv) Negative case analysis 
(v) Clarifying researcher bias 
(vi) Member checking 
(vii) Rich, thick description 
(viii) External audits 
 
d) Reliability Perspectives 
(i) Detailed field notes (recommending an audio recording device) 
(ii) Intercoder agreement 
 
Similar to the critique of Lewis’ tests, member checking, peer review and 
intercoder agreement will be unnecessary, while prolonged engagement 
is not possible. His negative case analysis strategy will contribute 
significantly towards the disconfirmation of theory. 
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The above contributions will be incorporated into Yin’s four design tests 
to enable the systematic monitoring and assurance of research rigor, as 
adapted below (also see Section 3.7.8.3 for identification of analysis 
techniques). 
 
Tests Case Study Tactic Phase of Research 
Construct 
validity 
• Use multiple sources of evidence 
• Establish chain of evidence 
• Test of theoretical construct 
• Review of draft report by key informants 
Data collection 
Data collection 
Focus group 
Composition 
Internal 
validity 
• Use multiple sources of evidence 
• Pattern matching 
• Address rival propositions (incorporating 
negative case analysis) 
Data collection 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 
 
External 
validity 
• Replication logic in multiple-case studies 
• Replication logic in dual cases 
• Triangulation against industry practice 
Research design 
Case analyses 
Case analyses 
Reliability • Case study protocol (including researcher 
reflexivity) 
• Case study database 
Data collection 
 
Data collection 
 
Table 3.10   Adapted from Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests 
                    (Yin 2014, 45) 
 
The above case study tactics for assurance of research rigor have been 
demonstrated throughout the entire study, across the research 
preparations, the focus group discussions, secondary data collection, the 
in-depth semi-structured interviews, and the analysis and reporting of the 
research.  
 
The selection of informants for focus groups and interviews across 
divisional/central roles, across portfolios (Strategic; management; 
academic), across informants with public/private sector experiences, and 
across seniority of TNE experience illustrates the collection of data from 
multiple sources of evidence. This is replicated across four different 
universities and four different categories of universities in the focus group 
discussions. The use of focus groups, secondary data and interviews 
also provides a triangulation of evidence. 
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The chain of evidence is an important element of construct validity, and 
can be traced through the flowchart of Figure 3.4, tracking the process 
from construct development, to final conclusion and reporting. The use of 
focus groups to test the theoretical construct and evaluate the plausibility 
of the theories of the firm in TNE decision-making provides assurance of 
construct validity before a full multiple-case study is rolled out. 
 
Pattern-matching is used through constant comparisons across units of 
analyses and across university cases. Examples include the comparison 
and contrasts between focus group universities’ experiences in 
managing the intractable problem of managing different study periods 
across TNE operations, comparing TNE processes across multiple 
cases, and evaluating the responses (and reflectors of theories) of 
different universities in making TNE business delivery model decisions. 
The focus groups and in-depth interviews also identified several factually 
incorrect information – through triangulation of participants/informants’ 
knowledge base. 
 
Coding was also designed to capture any deviant process, and 
disconfirming evidence. These NVivo nodes were useful in identifying the 
plausibility of the Upper Echelon Theory, in discounting the Resource-
based View in the focus group analyses, and in detecting elements of 
Network Theory in the interviews. 
 
External validity was addressed via literal and theoretical replication 
within the multiple-case study as discussed in detail in Section 3.7.4.2. It 
was also tested through a comparison of empirically generated 
conclusions against industry practice in Sections 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3. 
 
Case study reliability was anchored on the structuring of a case study 
protocol for each university. This protocol incorporated an aide memoire 
for each interview informant. It is also qualified by a researcher 
declaration (Appendix E : Reflexivity – Researcher’s Background). This 
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will explain the rich data collected – the researcher is a known TNE 
practitioner within the industry and has been engaging many of the focus 
group participants and interview informants prior to the study. 
 
The split-half method was used to good effect in both the focus groups 
as well as the interviews. Examples include the questions on TNE 
motivation for existing and discontinued TNE operations; the questions 
on which TNE partner would benefit most in a TNE operation, and which 
partner would lose the most in the event of a termination; and the 
questions on core processes and core resources for TNE operation. 
 
Case study reliability was also addressed through the set up and storage 
of the case study database using NVivo and Microsoft Excel, and voice 
recording files – all of which have been securely saved within the Curtin 
Business School’s R-drive for a period of seven years after thesis 
publication. 
 
Finally, all research involving humans must be carefully planned and 
executed with a view to the welfare of the research subjects as well as 
parties related to the study. The researcher must amongst other 
responsibilities, ensure that informants have been clearly briefed on the 
objectives, conduct (including the use of an audio recording device) and 
risks (if any) of the study; their rights to anonymity and voluntary 
withdrawal at any stage of the research exercise; and the confidentiality 
of the interaction and information produced. Precautions must also be 
made to handle field issues such as the discovery of classified 
information and legal violations.  
 
The current research has been cleared by the Curtin University Human 
Research Ethics Committee in accordance with the Australian Code for 
the Responsible Conduct of Research 
(http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/guidelines/publications/r39). This research was 
approved through a Form C Application for Approval of Research with 
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Low Risk (Ethical Requirements) (Protocol Approval GSB 18-12 as 
enclosed in Appendix C) for the focus groups, and Protocol Approval 
HRE2018-0216 (as enclosed in Appendix C) for the remaining research 
investigations, including the semi-structured, in-depth interviews of two 
universities.  
 
Further, I have completed the mandatory Curtin University Research 
Integrity Program that trains researchers on best practice and ethical 
conduct of research, as well as obtained permission to access university 
staff of University A through its Office of Strategy and Planning (as 
required by University policy on research access to its staff). University C 
did not require prior approval for research access to its staff. 
 
3.7.7 Data Collection 
 
Case study research has an idiographic focus as opposed to the 
nomothetic research of the natural sciences (Dodes and Dodes 2017). It 
goes beyond the statistical manipulation of data for demonstrating 
correlations, to peer into ‘what details of life the researchers are unable 
to see for themselves’ through interviews of people who have witnessed 
these details or through unearthing documents that record them. The key 
is in what people perceive their reality to be through their own spoken 
and written accounts, as well as their behavior (Taylor, Bogdan and 
DeVault 2016). The researcher thereby becomes ‘experientially 
acquainted’ with the case that has now become ‘embraceable’ (Denzin 
and Lincoln 2005, 453). This closeness with the case therefore allows for 
an intimate constructivist understanding, separating out experiential 
knowledge from mere opinion and preference (Stake 2004).   
 
3.7.7.1 Data Collection Process 
 
The data collection process must not be a random exercise in 
accumulating all and sundry data. It must be guided to enable a tight 
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focus on what data is required, where it may be found, and how it can be 
efficiently collected. For the current research, Creswell’s data collection 
process circle has been adapted, assuming that cases and units of 
analysis have already been identified – adaptation shown below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.5   TNE Data Collection Cycle; adapted from Creswell 
(Creswell 2013, 146) 
 
This process starts with gaining access to sources of evidence, through 
collection, recording and safe storage of data. The safe storage of 
research data is mandated by Curtin University (for seven years after 
thesis publication), and provided through the university’s VPN-encrypted 
R-drive. Finally, the data collection process also requires the researcher 
to pay attention to, and resolve field issues as they arise. 
 
In the quest for thick, rich descriptions, and assuring internal and external 
validity, evidence will be collected on the individual cases as well as on 
the environment impacting each case, e.g., TNE participants, TNE 
organisational structure, committees, TNE processes, significant TNE 
events, regulatory environment, economic environment, time of year and 
location of TNE operations (Baskarada 2014b). This clarity of focus will 
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enable a higher quality, in-depth data analysis of the contemporary TNE 
phenomenon of study. 
 
3.7.7.2 Sources of Evidence 
 
Yin summarises case study data into documents, archival records, 
interviews, direct observation, participant observation and physical 
artifacts (Yin 2014, 105). A cursory review of the target cases in the 
current research readily shows that only documents, archival records and 
interviews are practical sources of case study evidence (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2005, 379). Direct and participant observations are impractical 
due to time constraints, while there are few, if any, physical artifacts 
amenable to analysis in TNE.  
 
3.7.7.2.1 Secondary Data 
 
Documentation and archival records are mostly on print and electronic 
media, and forms the study’s basis for secondary data analysis. It is 
worthwhile noting that one of the key evidence for the use of the three 
theories of the firm, especially TCE and PRT is contractual agreements. 
Informants are not expected to share or make available such information 
due to commercial confidentiality, and hence informant and 
organisational behaviors will need to be inferred from alternative sources 
of evidence, e.g., TNE processes, publicly available university 
documents, news reports and interviews (Mintzberg, Raisinghani and 
Theoret 1976).  
 
Secondary data has been collected to provide an initial analysis of TNE 
delivery models, and to corroborate the findings of the focus groups. 
These data comes from published archival records such as 
AUQA/TEQSA publications and Australian Department of Education 
reports, and documentation such as university annual reports and TNE 
operating manuals.  
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3.7.7.2.2 In-depth Semi-structured Interviews 
 
While archival records and documentation enable the initial construction 
of the conceptual understanding of TNE operations, it is in-depth 
interviews that allow the researcher to enter the informant’s world (Perry 
1998), and provide a first-hand understanding of the phenomenon, 
especially when informants are able to freely express themselves 
(Lofland and Lofland 1995). Skilled interviewers are also attentive to the 
political and emotive displays of informants, including the presence of 
‘rogue’ informants who knowingly or unknowingly are outliers in the TNE 
operation. These call for skills in understanding the structure of 
conversations, turn-taking and other facets of conversation analysis, 
although they may not be as important in the current research as in 
linguistic and other phenomenological studies (Bazeley 2013, 72). 
 
The in-depth interview serves to enable the continuous linking back-and-
forth across theory and data towards confirming or disconfirming the 
propositions (Yin 2014, 72). To enable the capture of rich accounts while 
maintaining focus, the interview questions are usually semi-structured, 
wide-ranging and open-ended (Chua 2012), and recorded with an audio 
device. The uniqueness of the interview as a data collection source lies 
in the opportunity (or complexity) to analyse the data while collecting it. 
This calls for skills in conversation analysis during the interview, and also 
during the post-interview audio transcription and coding. While the use of 
conversation analysis is critical in humanistic approaches in qualitative 
studies such as ethnography due to the need for accurate interpretation 
of human relations (e.g., turn taking), it’s usage while beneficial, will be 
limited to clarifying factual data and post-interview transcription within the 
current TNE research (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, 869-886). 
 
An aide memoire was developed to help prepare for each interview, 
containing logistical and informant details, list of equipment and 
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stationery, opening and closing briefing notes, semi-structured questions, 
theoretical construct (incorporating key concepts and disconfirming 
concepts) and contextual parameters (to look out for), and non-verbal 
cues and documentation/artifacts (to observe/collect). The use of the 
aide memoire is part of the repertoire of tools to assure research 
reliability. 
 
There are generally no hard and fast rules governing the number of 
interviews required for good research. While this is usually determined by 
the purpose of the study, and availability of time and resources (Baxter 
and Jack 2008), most researchers aim to exhaust the interviews of new 
information before stopping – what is known as reaching ‘data saturation’ 
(Patton 1990). A total of 31 interviews were conducted across the two 
selected universities; 20 in University A and 11 in University C. Twenty-
three interviews were conducted face-to-face, while eight had to be 
conducted via telephone. 
 
In the process of gaining access and conducting the interviews, it 
behoves the researcher to ensure that this privilege of entering the 
informant’s private world is respected – through ethical conduct, 
including formally requesting their consent, providing them with the 
option to terminate the interview pre-maturely, and making available 
transcripts of the interview for clarification and verification. While there 
are no strict guidelines on the duration of interviews, interviews of less 
than 30 minutes are unlikely to yield useful data, and interviews of over 
one hour might be an unreasonable ask of informants. Each of the 
current study’s interview was limited to between 45 minutes and an hour. 
(Rubin and Rubin 2005). 
 
3.7.7.2.3 Informant Selection 
 
For the purposes of the current TNE research, the interview data 
collection plan has been designed to access various types of informants 
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to ensure the efficient and accurate collection of appropriate data – thus 
contributing to both the validity and reliability of the study (Birnbaum 
1985).  
 
These informants comprise : 
 
a) senior decision-makers such as the vice-chancellor, or deputy vice-
chancellor, pro-vice-chancellor, director and other senior managers 
responsible for international or TNE – to draw out strategic and 
planning decisions and information; 
b) middle managers (both onshore- and offshore-based) such as the 
TNE or international office director, faculty dean and/or offshore 
campus director/manager – to address administrative and financial, 
as well as intermediate/divisional value chain processes and 
decisions; and 
c) academic staff responsible for designing and delivering TNE 
academic programs – to tease out academic and academic 
administration value chain processes and decisions. 
 
3.7.7.3 Guiding Principles of Data Collection 
 
The data collection process is not a haphazard undertaking; it requires 
clarity of focus, sensitisation to cues, procedural discipline and good field 
manners. Yin calls for adherence to four principles of data gathering (Yin 
2014, 118-130) to provide research integrity to the case study. Taylor et. 
al. emphasise establishing and maintaining rapport with informants to 
maximise the discovery of accurate informant’s experiential reflections 
and to successfully manage field issues (Taylor, Bogdan and DeVault 
2016, 44-86). Yin’s four principles has been adapted to incorporate 
Taylor et. al.’s emphasis on informant rapport for the current research. 
 
a) Using multiple sources of evidence to ensure ‘redundancy of data 
gathering’ and set up ‘procedural challenges to explanation’ towards 
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clarifying meaning, including multiple interpretations of reality (Denzin 
and Lincoln 2005). This triangulation of evidence from archival 
records, documentation and in-depth interviews contributes to 
internal and external validity; being careful to avoid the danger of 
triangulating for the sake of ‘celebrating diversity’. 
b) Establishing and maintaining good rapport with informants and other 
sources of evidence to ensure integrity of data and information, and 
to manage good field relations. 
c) Creating a case study database enables the researcher to focus on 
the multiple dimensions of the study and to assure reliability. This 
consists of field notes, collated documents, data tabulations and new 
case narratives developed by the researcher.  
d) Maintaining a chain of evidence to connect the research questions, 
case study propositions, specific evidence, case study data base and 
case study report, in an effort to provide the reader with the 
opportunity to follow the research process and thereby better assure 
reliability. 
e) Exercising care when using data from electronic sources – to be alert 
to information overload, unauthenticated information, inaccurate 
information, and inadvertent participation in the phenomenon of 
study. 
 
3.7.7.4 TNE Data Collection Plan 
 
Building on the theoretical aspects identified in Section 3.7.5, a data 
collection plan has been developed to guide the collection of data for the 
TNE study. The collection of this data will be guided by the types of 
information required for the current TNE study, viz., information about the 
universities, value chain processes and the TNE operating environment – 
domains that have been identified from the value chain analysis of 
Section 2.7.3. This follows the case study requirement for boundedness 
and context. The use of eclectic sources of evidence is also part of a 
triangulation strategy to assure research rigor. 
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The types of evidence amenable to the current study are circumscribed 
by the research paradigm chosen and the nature of the phenomenon 
being studied. These sources include archival records, various 
documentation, transcripts of interviews and relevant artifacts. The bulk 
of the evidence is expected to come from documentation and interviews, 
with limited data from archival records and the rare audio-visual material. 
Archival records are useful for analysis of historical events and possible 
antecedents of contemporary events. Documentation will be sourced 
widely from the university being studied, trade publications, regulatory 
publications, manuals, proposals, white papers, green papers, news 
articles and personal notes, where relevant. There will hopefully be 
available other artifacts such as audio-visual materials. 
 
No. Sources of Evidence TNE Operations (from TNE Value Chain) 
Characteristics 
of University 
TNE Processes Operating 
Environment 
A Archival Records    
1 Location maps x   
2 Surveys x x x 
3 Public census x   
4 Government archives x x x 
B Documentation    
1 Communications x x x 
2 University documents, e.g., 
guidelines 
x x x 
3 Reports, e.g., annual reports x x x 
4 News articles x x x 
5 Electronic documents, e.g., 
websites 
   
6 Personal notes x x x 
C Interviews    
1 Semi-structured x x x 
2 Personal discussions x x x 
D Artifacts    
1 Audio visual materials x x x 
 
Table 3.11   TNE Data Collection Plan 
 
A Research Data Management Plan has been deposited with Curtin 
University. This Plan captures the description of the study, data 
collection, data management, data storage and data dissemination. It is 
attached as Appendix D, as part of assurance of research reliability. 
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3.7.8 Case Study Analyses 
 
The foregoing described the data collection process; we now have on 
hand a mass of data, comprising textual and numeric data from 
secondary sources, and voice and non-verbal descriptions of 
conversations drawn from focus groups and semi-structured interviews. 
They mean nothing if they are not analysed and interpreted; and more 
importantly, accurate interpretation is critical given the constructivist 
research paradigm needed for the current research as a result of the 
complexity of the TNE phenomenon within its real world environment. 
Schram describes this difficult task as ‘doubly hermeneutic’ – requiring 
an interpretation of the informant’s interpretation (Schram 2017). 
 
Longhofer et. al. describe the case study as  ‘many stories being re-told’, 
having ‘many different outcomes emerging from detailed accounts of 
practitioners’ (Longhofer, Floersch and Hartmann 2017, 190). The case 
study data collected requires experiential understanding, sorting and 
interpreting to enable the discovery of these myriad re-interpretations of 
the TNE phenomenon. Data analysis within the current TNE qualitative 
research is a process of data preparation and organisation, data 
reduction, and data representation for interpretation towards answering 
the research questions (Creswell 2013, 180).  
 
The current research is crafted to test, and confirm or disconfirm the 
applicability of the three theories of the firm in Australian government 
universities’ TNE decision-making. There is therefore a need to provide 
evidence of causation in the analysis of the data. David Hume is quoted 
in Bazeley to have argued that causation cannot be proven, but is 
empirically acceptable when observed as a ‘constant conjunction of 
events’ provided the three conditions of covariation, sequence and 
exclusion can be established (Bazeley 2013, 332).  
 
 140 
These observations may be made by using any one or more of the logic 
of induction, deduction, abduction and retroduction (Kothari 2004; Flick, 
Kardorff and Steinke 2004); and more frequently, all four are employed in 
case studies. Due to the qualitative approach applied to test a priori 
theories, the current research is expected to utilise all four logical 
inferencing methods in analyzing the data (Priem and Butler 2001). 
Induction is used to develop assertions from an analysis of the data. This 
inferential logic can be applied to the first research question where the 
objective is to draw out the reasons for the selection of TNE models. 
Retroductive logic will complement inductive inferencing from an 
opposing direction, through the construction of plausible antecedents of 
the TNE decision models. The deductive logic is used in the 
development of propositions from the three theories of the firm, and then 
tested through the analysis of the data. The current multiple-case study 
will also make use (howbeit to a limited degree) of the abduction logic 
through a re-contextualisation of the three theories across different units 
of analysis to produce re-interpretations and possibly new constructs.  
 
Transforming raw data into believable stories in data analysis can be a 
daunting exercise, especially in case study research due to the need for 
rich description and careful attention to assuring research rigor. It is not a 
haphazard undertaking. It needs to be grounded in specific strategies to 
address the research intent and research paradigm, and thereby satisfy 
validity scrutiny. It also needs to have an agreed process to assure 
reliability. The next two sections explore and identify the appropriate 
case study analytic strategies and process to undertake the current TNE 
research. 
 
 
3.7.8.1 Data Analysis Strategies 
 
Qualitative data analysis calls for the interpretation of raw data through 
specific analytic techniques to produce new, synthesised knowledge of 
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the phenomenon under study. This analytic strategy is described by Yin 
as ‘examining, categorizing, tabulating, testing, or otherwise recombining 
both quantitative and qualitative evidence to produce empirically based 
findings’ (Yin 2014, 132). 
 
The choice of an analytic strategy depends on the objective of the study, 
the research paradigm within which the study is located, the research 
construct and the type/s of data that are available for analysis. These 
strategies can broadly be categorised into two sets of strategies, viz., 
categorical analysis and holistic analysis. Categorical analysis is focused 
on the development of analytic categories, while holistic analysis on 
description (Rossman and Rallis 2017). The current TNE study is based 
on selected a priori theories, and neither reliant on the ground-up 
development of theories nor focused on mere case description. 
 
Stake takes a more descriptive approach to case studies, and places 
less emphasis on understanding causation (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, 
449). His analytic strategies comprise the categorical aggregation, direct 
interpretation, pattern establishment and naturalistic generalisation, 
which focus on either descriptive analysis or grounded theory 
development (Stake 1995). These strategies are not amenable to the 
current research where the focus is on testing theory. 
 
Yin proposes a more eclectic mix of general strategies for data analysis, 
viz., relying on theoretical propositions, working the data from ‘ground 
up’, developing a case description, and examining plausible rival 
explanations (Yin 2014, 136-142). The current research was thought to 
find utility in the following two strategies. 
 
a) relying on theoretical propositions –  the propositions developed in 
Section 3.7.5 will be tested within two specific cases through an in-
depth investigation. 
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b) examining plausible rival explanations – the propositions developed 
were derived from the three theories of the firm, which are to be 
ultimately tested for applicability within the two TNE cases. 
 
Focus group analysis however, presented two very rich university cases 
that explored several TNE stories in depth. This development provided 
the opportunity to include the use of the case description analytic 
strategy to better understand the TNE decision-making phenomenon, 
and hence ‘help to identify the appropriate explanation to be analysed’ 
(Yin 2014, 140). 
 
Bazeley’s preference of analytic strategies comprise analytic induction, 
theory elaboration, event structure analysis, qualitative comparative 
analysis, and the exploration of extreme, deviant or negative cases 
(Bazeley 2013, 345-355). Her focus is mainly on ensuring a deeper 
understanding of ‘causal relationships and mechanisms’. On closer 
scrutiny, only analytic induction and event structure analysis will find 
utility in the current TNE study. Theory elaboration is a medium- to large-
n maximum variation approach for theory-building, while qualitative 
comparative analysis is a medium-n approach - both approaches being 
incongruent with the current dual-case TNE study. Extreme case 
exploration follows the qualitative comparative analysis in requiring 
medium-n studies. 
 
The remaining two analytic strategies may be used in the current TNE 
study, and are briefly described here. 
 
c) analytic induction – this strategy is designed to derive causal 
explanation and analytic generalisation one case at a time; 
eliminating variables through cross-case comparisons - an approach 
that is useful in theory testing. 
d) event structure analysis – this strategy uses narrative sequence to 
compare whole narratives to demonstrate causal relationships, and is 
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useful for studies in, among other phenomena, organisational 
changes.  
 
Of lesser significance are the four analytic strategies identified by 
Thorne, viz., constant comparative analysis (or grounded theory 
analysis), phenomenological approaches, ethnographic methods, and 
narrative and discourse analyses. While the first three strategies are 
clearly outside of the chosen TNE research paradigm, narrative and 
discourse analyses are expected to be possible techniques in data 
analysis. As the study unfolded, narrative analysis found more utility than 
discourse analysis. The focus group analyses of two universities yielded 
very rich TNE stories, providing opportunity for narrative analysis. 
 
The identified analytic strategies have been applied at two levels of 
analysis, viz., the single-case and then, cross-case analysis. 
 
3.7.8.2 Data Analysis Process 
 
After identifying the analytic strategies to employ, case analysts will need 
to set up a systematic process of analysis. Case analysis does not begin 
when data collection is completed; it should begin when the research 
question is first framed. In fact, data collection and data analysis work in 
tandem, continuously probing the data sets and theorizing (Taylor, 
Bogdan and DeVault 2016). 
 
This process will involve the conversion of voice and non-verbal cues of 
focus groups and interviews into text and numeric data. The resulting 
data sets, and other text and numeric data from secondary sources will 
then have to be processed and analysed. Eisenhardt was one of the 
earlier methodologists to offer a three-step process comprising case 
identification, similarities identification across two cases at a time, and 
researcher triangulation (Eisenhardt 1989, 540-541). Miles and 
Huberman likens data analysis as a four-step process that starts with 
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developing an initial ‘story’ about the phenomenon and its environment; 
then, establishing a ‘map’ that links key components of the ‘story’, and  
proposing a construct that explains how the components are linked 
together; and finally, re-telling the ‘story’ in more detail as an iterative 
step (Miles and Huberman 1994, 91). The focus group analyses of 
Universities B and C provided the opportunity to compile several TNE 
stories, that are then investigated using reflectors of the a priori theories 
of the firm, and finally re-telling the ‘story’ of TNE operations across the 
universities in a cross-case analysis. 
 
Rossman and Rallis enumerates the process as a crisp, logical seven-
step process (2017, 237) of  
 
a) data organisation 
b) data familiarisation 
c) category identification 
d) data coding 
e) theme generation 
f) interpretation 
g) search for alternative understandings. 
 
Taylor et. al. summarises the above process into three steps, viz., 
discover (a-c), coding (d), and data discounting (e-g) (Taylor, Bogdan 
and DeVault 2016, 142-161), while Morse categorises the above into a 4-
step process of comprehension (a-c), synthesizing (d-e), theorizing (f-g), 
and recontextualizing (Morse et al. 2002).  
 
Morse’s categories introduce an important iterative element to the above 
analytic process in the form of recontextualisation; analytic iteration 
having increasing currency among researchers. Creswell takes the 
process further by introducing a process spiral which incorporates 
analytic iteration at every level of the process (Creswell 2013). The data 
analysis spiral, reproduced below, illustrates possible iterative analytic 
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techniques at each level of the process. The current TNE study will adopt 
this more comprehensive process; the final ‘account’ process being the 
outcome of the testing of propositions.  
 
 
Fig. 3.6   The Data Analysis Spiral (Creswell 2013, 183) 
 
When applied to case study research, the above data analysis spiral 
translates into the following analytic activities, with some adaptations.  
 
No. Procedures Activities 
1 Data organisation Create and organise files for data 
2 Reading, memoing Read through text, make margin notes, form 
initial codes 
3 Describing the data 
into codes and 
themes 
Describe the case and its context 
4 Classifying the data 
into codes and 
themes 
Use categorical aggregation and various 
data analysis techniques to establish 
themes or patterns 
5 Interpreting the 
data 
1) Use direct interpretation 
2) Develop naturalistic generalisations of 
what was ‘learned’ 
6 Representing, 
visualizing the data 
Present in-depth picture of the case (or 
cases) using narrative, tables, and figures 
7 Accounting for the 
interpretation/s 
Confirm or disconfirm propositions, through 
extinguishing rival propositions 
 
Table 3.12   Data Analysis and Representation for TNE Case Study; 
adapted from Creswell (Creswell 2013, 190-191) 
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The above iterative process must also incorporate a conscious search for 
disconfirming evidence and rival explanations. Yin lists rival explanations 
under craft rivals (viz., the null hypothesis, threats to validity, and 
investigator bias), and real-world rivals (viz., direct rival, commingled 
rivals, implementation rival, rival theory, super rival, and societal rival) 
(Yin 2014, 141). Having accounted for case study rigor in Section 3.7.6, 
the current study needs to be especially alert to the rival theory, super 
rival, and societal rival. 
 
On a practical note, one of the most critical initial processes in data 
analysis is coding. It is preceded by reading and re-readings of the data, 
(e.g., focus group and interview transcripts, and secondary data), and 
note-taking - an immersion in the mass of data to make sense of the data 
(Robson 2011). Each re-reading provides a richer perspective of the 
data.  
 
A code represents a distinct concept gleaned from the data. Coding is a 
process by which data is analysed, and deciphered or interpreted; it 
comprises three levels of coding, viz., open coding, axial coding and 
selective coding (Flick, Kardorff and Steinke 2004, 271-274). Open 
coding unpacks the data into distinct concepts, and in the current study, 
is guided by pre-designed codes that have been generated from the 
theoretical construct, and a few in vivo codes, and translated into nodes 
in NVivo.  
 
Axial coding takes the data analysis further by differentiating the 
concepts into categories or themes, which are represented by reflectors 
of the theoretical construct and the three theories. In this process, 
disconfirming evidence, anomalies and rival theories are also actively 
searched out. Axial coding enabled the current research to discount 
Resource-based View (RBV) as a possible rival theory, while flagging the 
possibility that the Upper Echelon Theory, a theory outside of 
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organisational economics, might be able to explain certain TNE business 
model decisions (See Section 4.4.2). 
 
Finally, core categories represented by key elements of the theoretical 
construct or the theories are distinguished through selective coding, 
noting the context and intervening conditions. The process of selective 
coding helped identify two significant discoveries with respect to the 
Direct-Outsourced Delivery dichotomy as conceptualised by the two 
University cases studied. First, in situ oversight of TNE operations is 
considered a preferred Direct Model, while remote oversight a less-
favoured Outsourced Model (See Section 5.4); this was a surprising 
discovery because current industry literature suggests a Direct/Branch 
Campus – Outsourced/Franchised dichotomy. Second, the intervening 
condition represented by various tipping points in the collective 
experience of the two universities was identified as an important factor in 
TNE business delivery model decisions (See Section 4.4.2). 
 
The interview transcripts were combed through multiple times; first, using 
a broad data collection approach, and later populating the coding 
template with more detailed observations and quotes (See Appendix G 
Coding Frame). The first round of reading provided scoping for 
preliminary open coding, while subsequent rounds drilled down into 
concepts, stories, rigor, unexpected information, rival theories and 
disconfirming evidence. 
 
This coding exercise is guided by Flick et al.’s coding paradigm 
(reproduced below), which maps against the current study’s theoretical 
construct. 
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Fig. 3.7   Coding Paradigm for Social Science Research Questions 
adapted for TNE Research (Flick, Kardorff and Steinke 2004, 272) 
 
3.7.8.3 Data Analysis Techniques 
 
Data analysis can be described as a reduction process that re-arranges 
the data to produce conceptual and visual linkages such that it yields 
concepts. These concepts in turn form basic elements of theoretical 
perspectives of the phenomenon. It is worthwhile to note while 
techniques are being surveyed, that the current TNE study takes an a 
priori theory-testing approach, instead of a ground-up theory-
development approach. 
 
Initial contact with the data requires the researcher to determine the type 
of qualitative content analysis for the data (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). 
Voice data will require techniques of conversation analysis (CA), while 
textual data calls for text analysis (TA). CA investigates the structure and 
process of human social interactions, such as observing turn-taking and 
interjections, and coaxing informants to explore and verbalise their 
personal experiences – techniques used in both the focus groups as well 
as in-depth interviews. TA (e.g., semiotics, discourse analysis and 
membership categorisation analysis) underpins the study of textual signs 
Causal Conditions 
(Nature of 
University) 
Consequences 
(TNE Models) 
Context and 
Intervening 
Conditions 
(Environments) 
Action and 
Strategies 
(Theoretical 
Orientation) 
Phenomenon 
(TNE Model 
Selection) 
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and their meanings (Denzin and Lincoln 2005; Elo and Kyngas 2007); 
demonstrated by the interpretation of university strategic plans and 
University C’s White Paper (Section 5.1.2). An analysis of University C’s 
White Paper was insightful in that it calls for the setting up of robust TNE 
systems and processes (including technology-enabled processes), and 
at the same time, emphasises (rather unashamedly) the protection of a 
‘significant revenue stream’ – through the assessment of several profit-
and-loss scenarios. 
 
The first stage of analysis involves an immersion in the data to generate 
a deep understanding of the data – requiring multiple readings and 
descriptions to make sense of the data. This immersive process 
produces thick description that is the foundation for strong analysis and 
interpretation (Rossman and Rallis 2017, 233), and helps in the selection 
of various techniques of analysis (Patton 1990). Multiple readings and 
initial codings were necessary to enable the identification of common 
concepts, more accurate re-construction of the informants’ experiences, 
and constructing an organisational-level interpretation of the 
phenomenon – as exemplified in the focus group, interview and 
secondary data analyses. An example is the distinction between the 
franchised (remote oversight) [r-FP] and franchised (in situ oversight) [i-
FP] modes of delivery, representing the Outsourced and Direct Models 
respectively (Section 4.4.2.2). 
 
Based on research intent, paradigmatic perspective and availability of 
tools, a number of techniques have emerged to analyse the reduced 
textual and numeric data. Miles and Huberman (Miles and Huberman, 
1994 reproduced in Bazeley 2013, 225) take an iterative visual and 
textual approach to data analysis and re-analysis towards distilling 
relevant themes, patterns and concepts (the display and analytic text, 
DAT technique). The textual data informs on displays (e.g., conceptual 
maps, diagrams, tables, charts), while the displays in turn, informs on 
new textual re-interpretations. The focus group analyses demonstrate 
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this iterative process through the collation of data using NVivo11, and the 
generation of word maps (to show intensity of narrative), which in turn, 
provided the cues to re-examine the data. Various tables were eventually 
developed to analyse the emerging codes. Secondary data analyses and 
interview analyses also made use of this technique, e.g., the comparison 
of university TNE population and TNE revenue (Section 5.2.1), and the 
visual mapping of the duration of operation of various TNE models 
(Section 5.4). 
 
 
Fig. 3.8   Interaction Between Display and Analytic Text (DAT) (Miles 
and Huberman 1994) 
 
Another researcher who employed visual techniques is Bazeley. Her 
collation of four visual techniques has been investigated because they 
are designed for theory building – the focus of the current TNE research 
on confirming/disconfirming theoretical propositions (Bazeley 2013, 358-
369). The first technique has been ascribed to Patton as a 
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process/outcomes matrix (POM) designed to enable reflections on 
causal relationships. The technique provides the researcher with a visual 
platform to iteratively work between the data and the propositions 
through a tabulation of one ‘dimension or typology’ against another, filling 
in the table with data sets that then demonstrate if there is any possible 
causal relationship. The Miles and Huberman explanatory effects 
matrices (EEM) are similarly constructed to highlight ‘contrasts and 
patterns’ and are mainly employed for explanatory purposes. The focus 
group tabulations of Tables 4.8, 4.10 and 4.11 demonstrate these 
techniques of constant comparisons. These comparisons culminated in 
the propositional framework of Table 4.12. 
 
The third technique known as conditional matrix (CM) makes use of 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) to query 
a matrix consisting of a process, enabling conditions for the process to 
occur, and outcomes of the process – to look for causal relationships. 
The fourth technique uses causal networks and flow charts to track 
processes over time, and is usually employed in program evaluations. 
The flowchart has been utilised in framing the theoretical construct, 
thereby providing a visual representation of the TNE decision-making 
process. 
 
Specific to case study analysis, Yin recommends the use of five analytic 
techniques, viz., pattern-matching, explanation building, time series 
analysis, logic models, and cross-case synthesis (Yin 2014, 142-168). 
Explanation building is a technique that is aimed at explanatory studies, 
while time series analysis at longitudinal studies, both intents incongruent 
with the current TNE study. The logic model is also unsuitable for the 
current TNE study because it is designed for program evaluations.  
 
Pattern matching (PM) is a technique to compare empirically developed 
data patterns against a priori theoretical propositions. It comprises two 
variations on the technique. The first utilises nonequivalent dependent 
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variables as a pattern where multiple dependent variables are predicted 
to occur according to a priori theory. Patterns in data sets are sought that 
confirm or disconfirm the predictions of these occurences. The second 
looks out for rival independent variables as a pattern, where multiple 
cases are investigated to draw patterns that confirm the a priori 
theoretical predictions for independent variables. PM was employed in 
comparing reflectors of the theories of the firm against the TNE 
experiences of the focus group participants, tabulated as key reflectors of 
the theories. The a priori expectations were argued in Section 5.1, and 
compared to empirically-generated constructs (from the case studies) in 
Section 5.4. 
 
The cross-case synthesis technique (CCS) is an obvious choice of 
technique for the current multiple-case TNE study. This technique utilises 
word tables and other displays to categorise data sets from individual 
cases. These tables enable the researcher to determine if the individual 
cases demonstrate replication or contrasts between them - through 
similarities or differences in the profiles of the cases. The underlying 
basis of analysis is the use of ‘argumentative interpretation’, as opposed 
to numerical justifications. CCS was used in the cross-cases analyses of 
the focus groups, viz., in testing the validity of the theoretical construct, 
and in evaluating the plausibility of the theories of the firm to explicate 
TNE business delivery model decisions. The cross-case analyses also 
detected the common experience of Universities A, B and C with 
watershed TNE tipping points that triggered re-thinking, reviews and 
significant change in TNE strategies and policies, including the need to 
change an Act of State Parliament governing a self-accrediting 
university. 
 
Following a survey of the techniques, the relevant techniques are 
identified below for the different stages of the current TNE study. 
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No. Data Analysis 
Procedure 
Analytic Techniques on Sources of Evidence 
Secondary Data Focus Groups Interviews 
1 Data organisation TA CA CA 
2 Read; memo TA TA TA 
3 Descriptive coding DAT DAT DAT 
4 Thematic coding DAT DAT DAT 
5 Interpretation DAT, POM/EEM, 
CM, PM 
DAT, POM/EEM, 
CM, PM 
DAT, POM/EEM, 
CM, PM 
6 Representation DAT, POM DAT, POM DAT, POM 
7 Accounting CCS CCS CCS 
 
Table 3.13   Deployment of Data Analytic Techniques in TNE 
Research 
 
3.7.8.4 Computer-assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software 
 
Underpinning modern data analysis is the effective use of computer-
assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS), e.g., NVivo, 
ATLAS.ti, and MAXQDA. It is important to note at the outset, that 
CAQDAS are not designed for analysis; they are meant for the 
‘structuring and organisation of text data’ (Flick, Kardorff and Steinke 
2004, 277).  
 
Most of these CAQDAS have similar features, while they each provide 
one or more technical advantages over the others. Some studies require 
sophisticated queries related to CA or TA, as in ethnographic 
investigations; some require capacity for multiple researchers; while 
others might incorporate statistical treatments requiring SPSS 
capabilities (Silver and Lewins 2014). The current TNE study does not 
require such sophistications. It requires the basic functionalities of textual 
and numerical data entry and manipulation; memo recording; coding 
entry, categorisation; visual displays; traceability; and report generation. 
In addition, the selected CAQDAS must also be easy to use (with 
minimum training) and come with efficient technical support. The 
CAQDAS chosen for the current research is the NVivo (version 11). It 
more than meets all of the above functionality requirements, including 
quick response support from the Curtin University technical support 
team. 
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The more important caveat to the use of CAQDAS is the need to avoid 
over reliance on the software for analysis through mere mechanical data 
manipulations (Silver and Woolf 2014). As the term implies, the software 
is meant as an assistance and a tool to enable more sophisticated and 
rapid data sorting and interpretation. Interpretation is an art which while 
planned, also anticipates serendipity (Flick, Kardorff and Steinke 2004, 
321-325) – capabilities that cannot be expected from CAQDAS. 
 
3.7.9 Case Study Reporting 
 
Qualitative research may be reported via myriad formats of reports, 
including descriptive essays, papers, poems, novelettes or even plays. In 
fact, Miles et. al. comment that the evaluation of qualitative research is 
not codified in any research canon (Miles, Huberman and Saldana 2014). 
More specifically, Merriam notes that case study reporting is not 
governed by any standard format (Merriam 2014). However, various 
researchers have offered a number of guiding principles as well as 
reporting formats to communicate case study findings. 
 
The objective of the case study report is to communicate the purpose, 
methodology, case evidence, analysis and interpretation. The format of 
the report will depend on the purpose of the study, the research 
paradigm location and the audience. The researcher faces two main 
challenges in communicating the findings of the research, viz., the 
challenge of describing the phenomenon accurately, and the challenge of 
presenting the findings accurately (Flick, Kardorff and Steinke 2004). 
 
3.7.9.1 Guiding Principles 
 
To guide the reporting of a well-presented case study, various principles 
must be adhered to. Yin for example, recommends that the report’s 
audience be identified, composition be initiated early in the research 
 155 
process, and sufficient evidence be presented to enable the readers to 
embrace the case vicariously and arrive at their own conclusions (Yin 
2014). 
 
Since there is ‘no value-free writing of cases’ (Longhofer, Floersch and 
Hartmann 2017, 196), it is incumbent on the researcher to be reflexive, 
and clarify the research paradigm selected, describe the context of the 
case, and disclose the researcher’s background, interests and biases in 
the case. This is underpinned by the notion that the reader might know 
more than the author, and that the reader’s interpretations are equally 
important. Therefore, the author is urged to take responsibility for the 
validity of the reader’s interpretations (Stake 2004), and acknowledge 
that the readers ‘have a right to know about us’ (Wolcott 2010, 36). 
 
The format of the report needs to meet the needs and capabilities of the 
selected audience (Richardson 1990). In the case of the current TNE 
research, the thesis is aimed at the research community in general, and 
the examiners in particular. The format will therefore need to 
demonstrate the appropriate research skills sets, the application of these 
skills sets to the research at hand, knowledge of theoretical contexts, 
authenticity and accuracy of findings, and research rigor. 
 
The large volume of data and rich description in case studies can lend 
itself to confusion, slang/jargon and superfluity of text. It is important to 
keep the report concise and clear via the economic use of text and 
visuals (Elo et al. 2014). 
 
In many instances, case studies investigate phenomena where personal 
and confidential information might be discovered. The case report needs 
to consider whether the identity of informants and other participants can 
be, or ought to be disclosed (Thomas 2011). 
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3.7.9.2 Report Structures 
 
As discussed previously, case study researchers have developed their 
own classifications of case study reporting structures amidst a field that 
is wide open. Van Maanen locates textual presentations within three 
categories, viz., the realistic (realist tales), the confessional (confessional 
tales), and the impressionistic descriptions (impressionistic tales) 
(Maanen 2011). The first is a third party account of a formal case study. 
The second is a more candid account in a first person style of writing that 
allows for more expression. Like the second form, the third style is also a 
first person account, but that highlights the lived experience of the 
researcher in a more sensational fashion. The latter two are more 
suitable for ethnographic accounts; the first will be a good fit for the 
current TNE study. 
 
Yin specifies six different reporting structures for both single- and 
multiple-case studies, viz., the linear-analytic, comparative, 
chronological, theory-building, ‘suspense’, and unsequenced structures. 
The current TNE study will benefit from the theory-driven linear-analytic 
and comparative structures. The chronological and theory-building 
structures were thought to be unsuitable because the current research is 
not a longitudinal study, and is not a grounded theory research exercise 
respectively. However, focus group analysis later provided the 
opportunity for the use of the theory-building structure through the 
discovery that two focus group discussions unexpectedly yielded rich 
stories. The ‘suspense’ and unsequenced structures are more suitable 
for ethnographic studies.  
 
Rossman explores six different models for organizing the case report, 
viz., by chronology, an individual’s life history, themes, composite 
account (‘a day in the life of’), critical episodes, and miniportraits 
(Rossman and Rallis 2017, 290-292). The current TNE study can make 
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use of the thematic model to test the theories of the firm as part of Yin’s 
linear-analytic and comparative structures. 
 
Similar to Rossman’s models, Creswell’s writing strategies are 
categorised under two different writing structures, viz., overall writing 
structures and embedded writing structures (Creswell 2013, 236-239). 
The first comprise the format with vignettes, the substantive case report, 
and Yin’s alternative case reporting structures. The embedded structures 
comprise the funnel and descriptive approaches. The funnel approach 
starts with a broad description of the case and its contexts, and work 
towards narrower and detailed descriptions. The descriptive approach 
focuses on description over interpretation. The current TNE study will 
make use of the format with vignettes, and the funnel approach to 
illustrate and evidence selected elements of the phenomenon as 
subsidiary story-telling formats within the substantive case report.  
 
The current TNE study was initially anticipated to take a realist 
presentation style, using the linear-analytic and comparative reporting 
structures as the main presentation formats. It was also designed to 
explore the use of vignettes and the funnel for subsidiary story-telling. As 
the study developed, the data that was collected from the focus groups 
presented some unexpected perspectives and deep insights. While the 
University A focus group stayed true to the questions asked, Universities 
B and C focus groups unearthed what could be described as very rich, 
in-depth ‘critical episodes’ (Rossman and Rallis 2017, 291). 
 
As demonstrated in the focus group analysis, the linear analytic style was 
used, but with two different layouts. The participant inputs obtained from 
the first focus group (University A) stayed true to the question structure 
and hence, the themes. The participant inputs for the second and third 
focus groups, while guided by the focus group questions, revolved 
around rich TNE stories. The first focus group analysis report on the 
theoretical construct therefore used a thematic layout (Section 4.3.4.1), 
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while the second and third used a descriptive layout (Sections 4.3.4.2 
and 4.3.4.3) – in order to present the cases more clearly and enable 
better interpretation of participants’ lived experiences – in Yin’s words ‘a 
descriptive approach … help to identify the appropriate explanation to be 
analysed’ (Yin 2014, 150).  
 
3.8 Chapter 3 Summary 
 
Chapter 3 outlined the research questions, scoped the research 
investigation, and argued for the qualitative case study approach to the 
current TNE investigation.  
 
The current study comprises two stages, commencing with the test of 
prima facie validity of the theoretical construct in explaining, and the 
investigation of the plausibility of the three theories of the firm in driving, 
the motivation of four Australian public universities in their selection of 
either the Direct or Outsourced business delivery model of TNE 
operations, through focus group analyses. The second stage comprises 
in-depth semi-structured interviews of key informants of two of the four 
universities. The focus group analyses and in-depth interviews will be 
qualified by separate secondary data analyses, as a triangulation 
strategy for assuring research rigor. 
 
The next chapter reports on the focus group analyses of the four 
Australian public universities. 
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Chapter 4  Focus Group Analyses 
 
This chapter provides an analysis of the three focus group transcripts 
towards accomplishing two objectives, viz., checking the validity of the 
theoretical construct, and undertaking a preliminary test of the relevance 
of each of the three theories of the firm with respect to the TNE 
operations of these universities. While documented, the telephone 
conversation with the lone TNE researcher at University D was too lean 
on details and uncorroborated to provide any meaningful analysis. The 
chapter concludes with a set of propositions for a subsequent multiple 
case study.  
 
The focus group transcripts were entered into NVivo (version 11) for 
coding and analysis aimed at executing a cross-case study approach. 
This chapter first analyses each university as a single case, followed by a 
cross-case analysis focusing on construct evaluation and preliminary 
theory testing. 
 
4.1 Detailed Objectives of Focus Group Research 
 
The twin objectives of construct and theory evaluations are broken down 
into their respective components to allow a detailed consideration of the 
focus group transcripts. These detailed components are grouped as 
follows: 
 
4.1.1 Construct Evaluation 
 
a) Identification of evidence for a structured approach within the 
university, aimed to differentiate between the Direct and Outsourced 
Models 
b) Identification of core TNE value chain functions/processes that are 
critical to effective TNE operation 
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c) Identification of evidence for the importance of the operating 
environment in influencing TNE decisions 
d) Identification of important university characteristics in influencing 
TNE decisions 
 
4.1.2 Theory Evaluation 
 
Identification of evidence for the application of one or more theories of 
the firm in explicating TNE decisions, and detection of a plausible over-
arching theory 
 
4.2 Description of Focus Groups 
 
The focus group discussions were semi-structured. They were guided by 
a fixed series of topics (administered to all focus groups), viz., the types 
of TNE operations, location of TNE operations, rationale for starting TNE 
operations, terminated TNE operations and reasons for termination, core 
TNE processes, suggested improvements in TNE processes, partner 
selection, and partner monitoring (based on Fig. 3.2 TNE Decision Model 
Construct of Section 3.7.3). 
 
The focus group at University A comprised two senior academic 
managers, one senior manager, one middle manager and two 
academics. University B representation consisted of one senior 
academic manager, one academic manager, one senior manager, one 
middle manager and one academic, while University C had one 
academic manager and one middle manager. University D featured a 
senior academic. Academic managers refer to academics with 
managerial responsibilities, while other managers refer to TNE 
administrators. These participants have between one and 20 years of 
TNE experience, with four of them having private sector working 
experience. 
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University Partici-
pant 
Gender Age 
Range 
Role Experience 
TNE Public Private 
University 
A 
AF1 M 31-40 Sr Manager 10 Y N 
AF2 M >60 Academic 11 Y N 
AF3 F 41-50 Middle 
Manager 
14 Y N 
AF4 F 41-50 Academic 20 Y N 
AF5 F 51-60 Sr Academic 
Manager 
12 Y N 
AF6 M 41-50 Sr Academic 
Manager 
10 Y N 
University 
B 
BF1 M >60 Sr Academic 
Manager 
15 Y N 
BF2 F 51-60 Academic 
Manager 
13 Y Y 
BF3 M 31-40 Sr Manager 3 Y N 
BF4 F 41-50 Academic 7 Y Y 
BF5 F 41-50 Middle 
Manager 
5 Y N 
University 
C 
CF1 F >60 Academic 
Manager 
10 Y Y 
CF2 M 31-40 Middle 
Manager 
1 Y N 
University 
D 
DF1 M 41-50 Academic 10 Y Y 
 
Table 4.1   Profiles of Focus Group Participants 
 
The focus group at University A featured a good spread of TNE 
professionals comprising decision-makers, managers and academics. 
The focus group participants represented the central TNE office, and the 
Business, Science and Humanities faculties. The session saw all 
participants taking an active part in the discussion and demonstrated the 
value of having a homogenous (employer-wise) group of participants. 
There were no major disagreement or misalignment of perspectives 
among the participants. While some minor group think episodes occurred 
due to the differences in seniority of the participants, the discussions 
were observed to be robust and the participants largely acted 
independent. There was an uncomfortable instance where an academic 
noted that they (i.e., academics) are usually not consulted or informed of 
strategic decisions and two senior academic managers immediately 
acknowledged this. 
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The focus group at University B also featured a good spread of TNE 
portfolios. The most senior staff was the head of the University’s 
International Office responsible for onshore recruitment, TNE and 
student mobility, and was appointed directly by the new Vice-Chancellor. 
His deputy, who managed the International Office, was also a direct 
Vice-Chancellor appointee who was relatively new to TNE compared to 
the rest of the focus group. These appointments demonstrate the 
commitment of the new Vice-Chancellor to restructuring the University’s 
International operations. The International Office was also represented 
by an experienced middle manager. The Business and Science faculties 
were represented by an academic manager and an academic 
respectively. While the presence of acknowledged Vice-Chancellor 
appointees resulted in rich insights into the strategic thinking of senior 
management, it also slightly dampened the participation of the other 
participants. This was anticipated and detected early, and the focus 
group interaction was carefully directed to ensure all participants were 
debriefed for their insights and lived experience. Overall, the focus group 
discussions were cordial and friendly. 
 
The University C focus group featured two very experienced TNE staff. 
They are both in central roles (as opposed to faculty or school positions). 
One of them is a middle manager responsible for TNE liaison with OPs, 
while the other is an academic responsible for the University’s Learning 
Management System, and the provision of online materials to OPs. It is 
useful to note that their lived experiences revolved around current 
managerial and academic processes. They have limited knowledge of 
strategic TNE decisions. The discussion was lively and provided a 
glimpse into three in-depth TNE phenomena that were characteristic of 
the University’s stage of development in TNE. 
 
Insights into University D were represented by Participant DF1, a senior 
academic with extensive public and private sector work experience. 
While there were a few interesting quips, it was not possible to draw 
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grounded conclusions about University D – due to the absence of within-
university triangulation. However, the participant’s views may be 
contrasted against the perspectives drawn from the other focus groups. 
 
A total of 72 codes emerged to analyse the theoretical construct, and 27 
codes to verify the three theories. The numbers of these codes are well 
within the range typified by Creswell’s 30 codes (Creswell 2013), 
Lichtman’s 100 codes (Lichtman 2013), and Miles et. al.’s 60 codes 
(Miles, Huberman and Saldana 2014). These codes are summarised in 
tables in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, and represented as cluster categories in 
the figure below. 
 
                                    TNE Environment 
                                          TNE Contracts 
                          Temporal Dimension 
 
 
 
 
University     TNE Current Operations 
Characteristics    TNE Terminated Operations 
      Theories of the Firm 
Fig. 4.1   NVivo Coding Categories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Value Chain 
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4.3 Evaluation of Theoretical Construct 
 
The evaluation of the theoretical construct is designed to identify TNE 
value chain functions that are core to TNE operations, and to determine 
the importance of the TNE operating environment and university 
characteristics in impacting TNE operations. 
 
The analysis is two-pronged, viz., examining the data using an a priori 
theoretical construct, and extracting concepts through a ground-up 
approach. The former approach implies the use of codes derived from 
the construct, while the latter approach implies looking for in vivo codes.  
 
The 72 codes for structuring the analysis of the theoretical construct are 
presented in the table below. 
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No. Reflectors of TNE 
Concepts/Construct 
Proposed Codes (in vivo codes in italics) 
Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 Code 4 Code 5 
1a Type of TNE 
operation (AT) 
Wholly-controlled 
International 
branch campus 
(ATWBC) 
Collabora-
tive Interna-
tional branch 
campus 
(ATCBC) 
Franchised 
program 
(ATFrP) 
Partnership 
program 
(ATPnP) 
Licensed 
program 
(ATLiP) 
Joint HEI/provider 
(ATJOP) 
    
1b Rationale for TNE 
involvement (TN) 
Commercial 
(TNCom) 
Branding 
(TNBrd) 
Giving back 
(TNGbk) 
Network 
(TNNwk) 
Capacity-
building 
(TNCap) 
Strategic (TNStr) Industry 
engagement 
(TNInd) 
   
1c TNE countries (OP) 
Country O (OPO) Country T 
(OPT) 
Country V 
(OPV) 
Country P 
(OPP) 
Country U  
(OPU) 
Country W (OPW) Country Y 
(OPY) 
Country S 
(OPS) 
Country Z 
(OPZ) 
Country X  
(OPX) 
1d TNE decision-
making within 
temporal dimension 
(TI) 
Era bound (TIEra) AUQA2008 
(TIA08) 
Timing and 
frequency of 
TNE functions/ 
processes 
(TIFnc) 
  
2a Terminated TNE 
models (TT) 
Franchised 
program (TTFrP) 
Partnership 
program 
(TTPnP) 
Virtual 
University 
(TTVrU) 
Licensed 
program 
(TTLiP) 
 
2b Terminated TNE 
countries (TP) 
Country P (TPP) Country Y 
(TPY) 
Country R 
(TPR) 
Country T 
(TPT) 
Country V 
(TPV) 
Country W (TPW) Country O    
(TPO) 
Country S   
(TPS) 
Country Q  
(TPQ) 
Country Z   
(TPZ) 
2c Rationale for termination (TR) 
Financial (TRFin) Partner 
(TRPar) 
End of 
lifecycle 
(TREOL) 
Competition 
(TRCop) 
Academic 
quality 
(TRAQL) 
Quality of facilities 
(TRFQL) 
Consolida-
tion (TRCon) 
Non-compliant  
(TRNCm) 
  
2d Success of TNE 
operations (SU) 
Definition of 
success (SUDef) 
TNE Models 
(SUMod) 
   
3a TNE value chain 
(VC) 
General (VCGen)     
3b TNE value chain 
primary activities 
(VP) 
Staff Recruitment 
(VPSfR) 
Student 
Recruitment 
(VPStR) 
Curriculum 
Development 
(VPCDv) 
Teaching 
and 
Assessment 
(VPTandA) 
Post-
graduation 
Services 
(VPPSv) 
3c TNE value chain 
support functions 
(VS) 
Physical 
Infrastructure 
(VSInf) 
Academic 
Support/ 
Student 
Services 
(VSSSv) 
Admin/Profess
-ional Services 
(VSASv) 
Academic 
Staff Support 
(VSAcS) 
Interme-
diate 
Activity 
(VSInt) 
4 TNE contract (CN) Generic (CNGen) Joint venture 
(CNJve) 
   
5 TNE operating 
environment (EN) 
Legal-political 
(ENLPl) 
Business-
economic 
(ENBEc) 
Socio-cultural 
(ENSCl) 
  
6 Characteristics of 
University (CH) 
Type (CHTyp) Size (CHSiz) Resources 
(CHRes) 
Strategic 
TNE Agenda 
(CHSTA) 
TNE 
Experience 
(CHExp) 
TNE Growth Rate 
(CHGrR) 
    
 
Table 4.2   Coding Framework for TNE Decision Model Construct  
   Evaluation (Codes drawn from focus group data are in  
   italics) 
 
 166 
Drawing from Table 2.4 (TNE Framework for Organisational Economics 
Research) and discussions during the focus groups, the core types of 
TNE operations identified were the wholly-controlled International Branch 
Campus (w-IBC), the collaborative International Branch Campus (c-IBC), 
the franchised program (FP) and the partnership program (PP). The FP 
was inappropriately refered to as a ‘twinning program’ in common 
parlance, as discussed in Section 2.5.3. The University B focus group 
identified a pseudo TNE model, known within the University as the 
‘licensed program’. The University also refered to FPs as ‘managed 
programs’. The rationale for generic TNE involvement as well as for 
specific TNE models, and the country of host were largely drawn in vivo.  
 
In the course of focus group discussions of University A, references were 
made to the era of TNE operations, viz., decisions made before/after 
1999 and 2008, and during the leadership of certain senior university 
executives. The year 1999 was pivotal in the University’s TNE history as 
it was the year that the University commenced branch campus 
operations. The 2008 is also a watershed year for the then-AUQA as it 
was the year that it introduced the ‘Internationalisation’ theme as a 
compulsory second theme in its Cycle 2 audits of institutions of higher 
education engaged in international education delivery (Office Of Strategy 
& Planning University A 2018). Other temporal dimensions include 
references to the specificity of TNE decisions made during different eras, 
a notion picked up in vivo during University A’s focus group discussion. 
TNE practice at Universities B and C also demonstrate the influence of 
timing of critical events, e.g., the University B TNE review which 
coincided with an external audit, and University C response to a rapidly 
growing TNE operation which threatened its revenue stream and 
reputation. 
 
Discussions on terminated TNE operations provided most of the codes 
for the types of terminated operations, host country of terminated 
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operation, and rationale for termination. In vivo codes for the types of 
TNE contracts were also drawn from the focus group discussions. 
 
The TNE value chain (Fig. 2.14) provided a priori codes for the 
discussion on primary and support value chain functions, and TNE 
operating environments. Similarly, the theoretical construct (Fig. 3.2) 
provided the codes for university characteristics. 
 
4.3.1 TNE Business Decision Model Construct 
 
The theoretical construct was developed to model university decision-
making that was expected to be influenced by the university’s inclination 
towards preferred approaches underpinned by one or more of the three 
theories of the firm. The decision to either ‘go it alone’ (i.e., Direct Model) 
or use intermediaries (Outsourced Model) in rolling out TNE operations is 
proposed to be influenced by the character of the university, the current 
preferred TNE paradigm, and the environment and era within which the 
TNE operation is organised, as represented below.  
 
                                    TNE Environment 
                                          TNE Contracts 
                          Temporal Dimension 
 
 
 
 
University     TNE Current Operations 
Characteristics    TNE Terminated Operations 
 
Fig. 4.2   NVivo Coding Categories for Testing Theoretical Construct 
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The task at hand is to look for evidence that the university being studied  
a) takes into consideration the Direct-Outsourced dichotomy of TNE 
operations; 
b) considers its own characteristics (e.g., resources, capabilities, 
experience and reputation) in TNE decisions; and 
c) considers the external operating environment in TNE decisions. 
 
This exercise also aims to identify possible disconfirming evidence, such 
as a pattern of TNE start-ups that are not strategically planned, and the 
absence of TNE strategic planning. 
 
4.3.2 TNE Value Chain 
 
The modified Hutaibat value chain discussed in Section 2.7.3 (Fig. 2.14) 
will be tested to determine if the identified university processes are 
critical to the TNE operations of the university being studied.  
 
The value chain of activities for TNE comprises primary activities and 
support activities. The primary activities coded in NVivo are staff 
recruitment and management, student recruitment (viz., marketing 
activities), curriculum development, teaching and assessment, and post-
graduation services (e.g., alumni engagement and advancement). 
Support activities comprise physical infrastructure, academic support and 
student services, administration and professional services (e.g., legal, 
regulatory, financial oversight), academic staff support services, and 
intermediate activities (e.g., inter-departmental committees, university-
level coordinating bodies, quality assurance, and central grade centres). 
 
These activities are pivotal in the analyses of TNE decisions to determine 
if any one or more of the theories of the firm hold sway on these 
decisions. Two examples illustrate this. First, the decision to invest in 
assets specific to the TNE operations (e.g., physical and people 
infrastructure) may evidence asset specificity for TCE and PRT. Second, 
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investments in governance processes to monitor Offshore Partners 
(OPs) may also evidence the university’s risk averse concern with moral 
hazard, an indicator of AT. 
 
If however, there is evidence to suggest that the majority of these TNE 
processes are irrelevant to TNE operations, the reliance on the theories 
of the firm to explain TNE decisions will be weakened. 
 
4.3.3 University Characteristics 
 
A priori, it is hypothesised that TNE decisions are also a function of the 
nature of the university. This section of the study will explore the 
influence, if any, of the category of university, size of university, 
university resources, university strategic TNE agenda, TNE experience 
and TNE growth rate on the university’s decision to participate in TNE 
(based on Fig. 3.2 TNE Decision Model Construct of Section 3.7.3). 
 
For instance, 2015 Australian university annual reports suggest that 
universities that were active in TNE come mainly from the ‘Australian 
Technology Network’ (ATN), ‘Innovative Research Universities’ (IRU) 
and ‘Others’ (see Table 4.3 below). It is interesting to note that while the 
‘Group of Eight’ (G8) universities record the highest proportion of 
onshore international students at 25% of total student population, they 
register only 3% offshore international students. The AUQA audit of the 
University of Western Australia (UWA) in 2009 hints toward AUQA 
influence on G8 universities’ TNE decisions in the form of a 
recommendation by the audit panel to seek offshore partners of 
equivalent standing, in reference to UWA’s then MBA delivery in the 
Philippines through a non-university entity (Australian University Annual 
Reports, 2015). 
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No. University Category % Onshore 
International Students 
% Offshore 
International Students 
1 
Australian Technology 
Network 
19% 9% 
2 Group of Eight 25% 3% 
3 
Innovative Research 
Universities 
15% 9% 
4 
Regional Universities 
Network 
18% 2% 
5 Others 15% 6% 
6 All Universities average 18% 6% 
 
Table 4.3   Proportion of International Students in Australian 
Universities (Australian Universities Quality Agency 2009) 
 
The current study anticipates that a combination of the university 
characteristics identified had an influence on TNE decisions. The focus 
group is a preliminary attempt at identifying these characteristics. 
 
4.3.4 Single Case Analyses of Theoretical Construct 
 
As discussed earlier in Section 3.7.4.2, University A is an ATN university, 
University B an ‘Other’, University C an IRU university, and University D 
a G8 university – using the Moodie classification (Moodie 2014). 
 
To protect the confidentiality of the university and its participants, the 
names of the universities and their descriptors were kept confidential, 
countries of TNE operations were identified as either within Southeast 
Asia (SEA) or outside of SEA (non-SEA), and references to the 
universities follow their labels (e.g., University A). The rationale for 
classifying between SEA and non-SEA countries is due to the 
predominance of SEA TNE operations. For SEA operations, all four 
universities had TNE operations in Country V, three had TNE operations 
in Countries R and T, two had TNE operations in Country Y, and one had 
TNE operations in Country M (see the focus group analyses for 
 171 
reference to Countries M through Z, where M, R, T, V and Y are SEA 
countries, Sections 4.3.4.1, 4.3.4.2, 4.3.4.3 and 4.3.4.4). 
 
4.3.4.1 University A 
 
University A had a student population of more than 50,000 students in 
2015, of which more than 7,400 students are studying offshore. This TNE 
student population makes up about 15% of its total student body, 
comparable to 16% onshore international students. The University 
earned a TNE revenue of A$7.3 million in 2015, or 4% of its total revenue 
(University A 2015). An immediate observation of the offshore student 
number and revenue indicates lower financial returns from offshore 
operations, compared to onshore revenue.  
 
The University conducted TNE programs in four SEA countries and four 
non-SEA countries at undergraduate and postgraduate levels; selectively 
across the disciplines of accounting, business, finance, marketing, 
business information, communication, architecture, engineering, health 
sciences and linguistics. 
 
No. Country Current TNE Business Delivery Models 
Terminated 
Operations 
1 Non-SEA  Country O One Franchised  
2 Non-SEA  Country P One Franchised Two Franchised 
3 SEA Country R One Franchised A few Franchised 
4 SEA Country T One wholly-controlled international branch campus Two Franchised 
5 Non-SEA  Country U One Franchised  
6 SEA Country V One wholly-controlled international branch campus Five Franchised 
7 Non-SEA  Country W One Franchised One Franchised 
8 SEA Country Y One Franchised One Franchised 
 
Table 4.4   University A TNE Models and Host Countries 
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4.3.4.1.1 Validity of Theoretical Construct for University A 
 
The rationale for initiating TNE programs were a combination of the 
following – profit (AF1, AF2, AF3, AF6), branding (AF1, AF3, AF4, AF6), 
giving back to the host country (AF1, AF5), developing education 
networks (AF5), and building host country capacity (AF3, AF4, AF6). The 
focus group was in consensus that the profit motive was the common 
rationale across all TNE operations. Branding (another commercial 
motive) was a close second for most TNE operations, while the other 
reasons were for one or two specific TNE programs. This provides prima 
facie evidence that TNE operations at University A have a commercial 
basis. 
 
Over the years, several TNE operations were terminated. The reasons 
for the terminations were again invariably commercial in nature (referring 
to two Country P TNE operations, ‘they were financial to my knowledge, 
both of them’ – AF3’; ‘lack of financial viability’ – AF5). For most of the 
terminated operations, student numbers declined and led to 
unsustainable financials (‘the numbers were down, so we had to pull out’ 
– AF3). These declining enrolments were observed to be the result of 
increased competition and the end-of-life-cycle (AF1, AF3). Interestingly, 
the introduction of workload management for academic staff involved in 
TNE operations at the University also led to a financially unsustainable 
environment and resulted in the adoption of new business delivery 
models (‘then, when we had the management system so you couldn’t do 
things anymore … so you’d have to modify your model, to fit the policies 
here’ – AF6) that relied more on OP teaching resources (e.g., franchised 
programs) or the use of the Direct Model (e.g., the IBCs), as AF3 
explained ‘invariably the unit coordinators don’t go offshore to teach … 
that is done either more or increasingly by the local area or we send 
tutors across these days’. Another oft-quoted reason for termination is 
the poor quality of facilities and teaching resources of the OPs (‘teaching 
facilities that weren’t what we expected’ – AF4).  
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The experience gained from terminating unsustainable TNE operations 
provided the impetus for the University to develop specific policies and 
processes for TNE due diligence and governance processes (AF1). The 
University now has a restructured leadership team for the management 
of TNE programs, headed by a Deputy Vice-Chancellor (International), 
an Associate DVC (International), a Director (International), and a Deputy 
Director (Transnational Education and Partnerships) (University 2018a). 
The work of the team is clearly laid out through the University’s Strategic 
Plan 2017-2020, which seamlessly incorporates TNE within the 
University’s larger strategic agenda (University 2018b). Two dedicated 
websites, viz., the Transnational Teaching and Learning (University 
2018d), and the Transnational Education and Internationalisation of 
Education (University 2018c), are purposed for the dissemination of TNE 
policies and training of staff involved in TNE. These developments point 
to a strategic and structured approach to TNE management, and 
therefore supports the decision modelling of the current study’s 
theoretical construct. 
 
4.3.4.1.2 Relevance of Value Chain Activities for University A 
 
This section investigates the existence and relevance of value chain 
activities within the University’s TNE operation, benchmarked against the 
modified TNE value chain for TNE of Section 2.7.3.4. The value chain 
can be broken down into primary and support activities. 
 
While word clouds in NVivo cannot substitute rigorous analysis, they do 
provide simple but useful comparisons. A cursory review of the word 
clouds of statements capturing focus group data on the primary activities 
of University A indicates that all primary activities were heavily 
commented on, except post-graduation services of career placement and 
alumni relations (see Figure 4.4 below).  
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Fig. 4.3  University A TNE Value Chain Primary Activities 
 
Responding to the question on what activities or processes are critical to 
the success of TNE operations, the participants were unanimous in 
identifying quality assurance (AF6), marketability (AF1, AF2), financial 
sustainability (AF3), regulatory compliance (viz., government, licences, 
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Fig. 4.4   University A TNE Value Chain Primary Activities
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and both internal and external compliance) (AF1, AF2, AF3, AF6), 
teaching staff (AF1, AF4), teaching resources (AF3, AF4), and student 
performance (AF4). These activities, covering all six of the value chain 
primary activities, are discussed in sections (a) to (d) below.  
 
The word clouds of statements on the a priori support activities indicate 
robust comments for all support activities, although physical 
infrastructure, and academic support/student services recorded slightly 
fewer comments (see Figure 4.5 below). These support activities are 
discussed separately in Sections (e) to (i) below. 
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a) Curriculum Development 
 
University A has traditionally provided all teaching materials for their TNE 
programs (‘unit controllers … provide all teaching materials’ – AF4), and 
OPs do not contribute to curriculum development. The control of the 
curriculum is deemed a ‘quality assurance’ requirement to assure 
acceptable ‘student performance’ (AF4). Only recently have branch 
campus staff begun to contribute to curriculum development (AF5). 
University unit coordinators are also entrusted with the responsibility to 
review their OP’s own curriculum towards advanced standing into the 
University’s program (‘academics look at some units which will be taught, 
at international universities ... whether or not these units will be 
recognised as comparable to units which are included in our degree ... 
and we look at their study plan, assignments’ – AF3). The University also 
values TNE for the ‘ties’ it establishes with the higher education sector of 
the host countries, and enabling the University to ‘stay up to date with the 
changes in the higher education sector’ (AF5). It is thus evident that 
curriculum development is a core element in TNE operations. 
 
As an aside, it is interesting to note that AF4 referred to branch campus 
staff in numerous occasions as ‘partner staff’ in describing the increasing 
contribution of such staff in curriculum development. This could either be 
an unique reflection, or may indicate a specific view of branch campus 
staff not being truly University staff. 
 
b) Staff Recruitment, Teaching and Assessment 
 
This section discusses three separate value chain primary activities, viz., 
staff recruitment, teaching and assessment. There was consensus 
among focus group participants that the University has the ultimate say 
in the appointment of both OP teaching staff and branch campus staff 
(AF5). While OP teaching staff are identified and remunerated by the OP, 
OPs need the prior approval of the University for such appointments 
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(‘locally engaged at the start but they will … get their appointment 
approval from the University’ – AF5). The management of teaching staff 
differs between the Direct and Outsourced Models – branch campuses 
manage them as their own staff, while OP staff are managed by the OP 
(AF1, AF6) but quality-assured by the University via monitoring 
processes such as lecturer training and moderation of grading (‘they are 
monitored by us, by unit controllers’ – AF4; ‘unit coordinator approves all 
results’ - AF2). This was considered one of the basic requirements of 
good quality assurance to ensure equivalence of teaching between 
onshore and offshore programs (AF5). The set up of the workload 
management system (which two of the participants intimated to be a 
less-than-welcome policy imposition) is another indication that the 
University takes a structured and strategic approach to teaching staff 
recruitment, curriculum development, teaching and assessment (AF2, 
AF5, AF6). 
 
c) Student Recruitment 
 
There was obvious support for the importance of student recruitment 
activities in the TNE value chain. Participants emphasised that TNE 
programs must be financially viable (AF1, AF5). This viability is 
influenced by the maturity of the TNE market (e.g., the university ‘got into 
the market really early on in this transnational education arena and we 
did really, really well’ – AF3), the ability of the OP to project demand and 
market the programs (AF1), the competition (i.e., offering equivalent and 
substitutes) (AF3, AF6), regulatory limitations on fees chargeable (AF5), 
and the tax regime for profit repatriation (AF5). The University was also 
involved in the ‘vetting of marketing materials’ (AF1). AF1 described 
student recruitment well by concluding that ‘marketing is the 
responsibility of the partner’. 
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d) Career Placement and Alumni Relations 
 
The low number of comments for post-graduation services arguably 
mirrors the level of importance placed on such post-operational activities, 
captured by only two comments. The first relates to the University’s role 
in capacity-building for its English teacher training programs in Country 
Y. The second refers to the University’s rationale for the same program, 
i.e., to build up a ‘whole lot of ambassadors in English’ in the country 
(AF6). These observations indicate that the post-graduation activities of 
University A are not specifically directed to the welfare of alumni, as is 
the common meaning of post-graduation services. It is not possible, 
however, to surmise that University A places a low priority on post-
graduation activities. More realistically, the observed low attention to 
post-graduation activities may be due to the outsourcing of such services 
to the OP, under the Outsourced Model, or to the branch campus, under 
the Direct Model (‘they’ve got their networks’ – AF1) – which makes 
these activities less visible to on-campus University staff. 
 
The focus group data suggests that the five value chain primary activities 
(with the exception of the post-graduation activities of career placement 
and alumni relations) are basic requirements of TNE operations. The 
post-graduation activities will need to be further tested.  
 
e) University Infrastructure 
 
Although there were slightly fewer statements on physical infrastructure, 
the statements were unequivocal in supporting the importance of 
physical infrastructure for good TNE operations. For example, AF4 
mentioned that the University relied on OPs to provide teaching and 
learning facilities offshore. This participant also observed that one of the 
Country Y TNE operations was terminated as a result of poor ‘teaching 
facilities’. AF5 mentioned the need to have access to health providers to 
enable the delivery of health science programs, an indication of the need 
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for investment-specific assets. AF1 acknowledged that the set up of a 
branch campus requires critical scrutiny due to the higher investment in 
‘infrastructure’, which the he equated with ‘a lot more risk’. 
 
f) Academic Support/Student Services 
 
The relatively lean comments on, or lower visibility of academic 
support/student services reflect the outsourcing of such services to OPs 
and branch campuses, as well as to the deployment of new technologies, 
e.g., oLecture (a pseudonym for the University’s online lectures and 
student support) (AF2, AF5). The outsourcing of services is evidenced in 
the participants’ comments regarding the reliance on OPs to service 
students (‘experience in delivering (TNE)’ – AF1), and in AF2’s specific 
statements on the proxy student support provided through the 
participant’s offshore lecturers (AF2 is a senior academic who is also a 
TNE unit coordinator). 
 
g) Administrative/Professional Services 
 
TNE operations cannot be run out of schools or faculties alone. They 
require the support of administrative and professional services. 
University A is no different, as evidenced by the many references to 
central support for due diligence of new projects (e.g., financial 
assessment, risk profiling, marketability, regulatory compliance - AF1), 
contract negotiation and drafting (AF1), and the acknowledgement that 
the University is increasingly moving towards the branch campus model 
to ensure a more efficient and consolidated TNE administration (AF6). 
While TNE opportunities frequently originate with schools or faculties, 
these opportunities invariably are channelled to the University’s 
International Office for due diligence and contract administration (AF1, 
AF5). Other departments mentioned are the legal department and 
financial services (AF1). The introduction of the workload management 
system for TNE administration is one outcome of the University’s agenda 
 181 
in providing efficacious support for TNE operations. These administrative 
processes, including cross-institutional University Partner-Offshore 
Partner (UP-OP) processes, are reviewed annually to set targets for 
improvement (AF1). 
 
Main campus academic entities such as schools and faculties are 
invariably part of the value chain of administrative and professional 
services (AF1, AF2, AF5). The participants further acknowledged that 
OPs and branch campuses provide valuable on-ground, host country 
administrative and professional services, such as governmental links, 
corporate services, tax advisory, and marketing (AF1).  
 
h) Intermediate Activity 
 
The focus group also identified various inter-departmental entities that 
support TNE operations, e.g., the central International Office to 
coordinate across faculties (‘the faculty will work with University A 
International (Office) to go through the process’ – AF1), inter-institutional 
bodies tasked to undertake quality assurance, both internal as well as 
external (‘present data for review at faculty and university level’ – AF4), 
and grade centres to process grades (AF1, AF3).  Taken together, these 
observations provide credible evidence for the importance of 
administrative and professional services, as well as intermediate 
activities (referring to inter-departmental and inter-institutional entities) in 
the running of TNE operations at University A. 
 
i) Academic Staff Support 
 
Academic staff support for both onshore unit coordinators and offshore 
lecturers are observed in the focus group discussion. First, all such staff 
are provided access to the University’s TNE policies and training 
(Section 4.3.4.1.1). Second, unit coordinators receive their instructions 
from their respective schools, while offshore lecturers in turn receive their 
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instructions from the respective unit coordinator – evidencing a chain of 
support from onshore to offshore (AF2). Third, the University has 
developed various teaching materials and technologies to assist lecturers 
to deliver their lessons, e.g., the availability of oLecture (AF4). Finally, 
AF5 remarked that in some instances, the financial motive is replaced by 
the offshore higher education sector networking that provides the 
University with invaluable knowledge and expertise. 
 
The above observations provide support for the relevance of the five 
value chain support activities to TNE operations. 
 
4.3.4.1.3 Importance of University Characteristics for University A 
 
This section explores the impact of university characteristics on the 
University’s TNE decisions. These characteristics comprise the category 
of university, the size of university, university resources, the university’s 
strategic TNE agenda (if any), and the university’s TNE growth rate. 
 
a) Category and Size of University 
 
Evidence from the focus group for the importance of university category 
and size is relatively lean but highly relevant to the University’s TNE 
model selection. Four participants contributed to these codes. AF4 
remarked that University A’s reputation is an important factor in brand 
recognition, and hence, in the marketability of the TNE programs. This is 
supported by AF3’s statement that the University has had a long history 
of operating TNE in the SEA region (since the 1980s) – which enables 
students in the region to easily recognise the University’s brand. AF2 
added that the geographical location of the University places it within the 
same time zone as many parts of SEA, making the administration of TNE 
much easier. The only reference to university size in the focus group 
relates to the large multi-campus institution where decision-making can 
be slow, ‘like a big tanker – it takes a long time to turn it’ (AF6). In an 
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offshore entrepreneurial TNE environment characterised by rapid 
changes, this university characteristic might present some resistance to 
TNE sustainability or success. 
 
b) University Resources 
 
University resources emerged as a key consideration in any new TNE 
initiative for University A. AF1 of the International Office emphasised the 
‘huge investment’ required for branch campuses. This investment include 
resources deployed for pre-operation due diligence, contract negotiation 
and drafting, systems set-up, staff training, and physical infrastructure 
(AF1, AF2, AF4). On the part of the OP, expertise in handling host 
country regulatory requirements, marketing, provision of teaching staff 
and physical resources are some of the identified criteria in the selection 
of an OP (AF1, AF5). There was also a general statement made that 
Australian universities are ‘not really geared towards’ TNE, and ‘don’t 
have the capability to deliver’ offshore (AF1). Therefore, the participation 
of the OP is valued because ‘they add value’ and can provide the 
necessary physical infrastructure (AF4). 
 
Teaching staff is another area of resource constraint in TNE operations. 
University A’s more than 30 years of TNE experience has resulted in the 
University developing processes, and teaching and learning technologies 
to reduce its staff involvement offshore (AF4, AF5, AF6). In the 1980s, 
University teaching staff taught up to 27 hours out of 36 hours per unit 
offshore (AF1). This has over time been replaced in some jurisdictions 
with teaching by onshore staff, with the exception of Country O where a 
legal requirement to provide one-third of the teaching hours remains (i.e., 
12 hours) (AF3). The reduction of onshore lecturers requires the 
University to outsource teaching to offshore lecturers – an exercise that 
requires close supervision, especially considering high staff turnovers at 
some of the OPs (AF2). On a more positive note, AF4 remarked that 
some OP teaching staff are highly experienced due to their involvement 
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in other TNE programs – a practice that might ironically contribute to 
value dissipation, and yet also negate the need for specific asset 
investments in the area of TNE teaching. 
 
Teaching and learning resources, and materials is the primary 
responsibility of the University, although some contribution is now 
permitted from the branch campuses (AF4). The foregoing observations 
provide ample justification that University resources and its ability to 
outsource to meet offshore resource needs influence the University’s 
TNE decisions. It is also logical from the same observations that the 
code ‘TNE Experience’ is an important influence in the University’s TNE 
decisions. 
 
c) Strategic TNE Agenda 
 
The focus group provided rich input to validate the University’s strategic 
approach to TNE, and the obvious preference for the Direct Model over 
the Outsourced Model (thus also supporting the Direct-Outsourced 
dichotomy of the theoretical construct) (AF1, AF5, AF6). As discussed in 
(b) earlier, the University’s long experience in TNE has resulted in the 
establishment of policies and processes to handle TNE programs. The 
University took deliberate action in Country V to consolidate its five TNE 
programs into one branch campus operation, absorbing three of the 
existing programs and terminating the other two – an action that AF5 
described as an ‘evolutionary thing’. The University also instituted annual 
and triennial reviews to monitor and improve on its TNE operations 
(AF1). These reviews included enrolment trend analysis, pass rate 
analysis between onshore and offshore students, and setting annual 
administrative improvements targets. Finally, the University embeds its 
TNE strategic agenda within its annual strategic plans (Section 
4.3.4.1.1). 
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d) University TNE Growth Rate 
 
There does not seem to be much support for ‘University TNE Growth 
Rate’ as a key influence on the University’s TNE decisions. While there 
was a comment by AF2 of ‘growth of international operations’ as a 
possible rationale for starting TNE programs, this was not supported by 
the rest of the participants. AF5 mentioned that the University’s changing 
TNE priorities over the years was an ‘evolutionary thing’. TNE growth 
rate does not seem to be an antecedent for TNE decision-making as far 
as University A is concerned. 
 
Overall, the theoretical construct and its coding categories have been 
sufficiently validated, with the exception of post-graduation services 
(under the value chain primary activities), and TNE growth rate (under 
University characteristics). There is a possibility that these two codes 
might prove valid for one or more of the other university focus groups. 
 
4.3.4.1.4 Impact of Industry Environment on TNE Decisions 
 
The focus group also validated the importance of the industry 
environment (i.e., the Porter five forces, plus government) for TNE 
decision-making. AF5 explained that various elements of the TNE 
environment ‘affects the viability and the structure of the programs’. 
 
a) Suppliers and Buyers 
 
AF2 took pains to explain the difficulty he faced in trying to engage 
offshore teaching staff (the ‘suppliers’), who are mostly part-time 
lecturers and often do not stay employed by the OP for very long. TNE 
customers (the ‘buyers’) comprise students, organisations and the 
government. AF4 commented that, over the last 30 years since the 
University first delivered TNE programs in the SEA region, the TNE 
markets in selected countries have matured and offer many program 
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choices from many different countries (but mainly from Australia, the UK 
and the USA).  
 
b) New Entrants, Substitutes and Industry Rivalry 
 
The substitute programs offered by the multiplicity of new entrants, some 
of which are home-grown, have intensified industry rivalry (‘the partners 
have now changed, and we need to change as well’ – AF5). Substitutes 
include both University A and other Australian university offshore 
programs, although these seem to not have serious impact on the 
offshore operations (AF2).  
 
AF5 also remarked that the current competitive environment was a far 
cry from the early days when the University first started TNE in the SEA 
region, adding that ‘a degree provider coming from offshore had the right 
to a bigger market than they are now’.  
 
c) Government 
 
AF5 emphasised the increasingly stringent host government regulations, 
e.g., the Chinese authorities regulating fees, profit repatriation and tax. 
These were some of the reasons that the University worked through OPs 
offshore – these partners are ‘linked to the government … know what 
type of operations work in that country’, and ‘instead of re-inventing the 
wheel’, the University could just leverage on the OP’s networks and 
capabilities (AF1). AF1 added that the University was also regulated by 
AUQA and later, TEQSA. He observed that ‘quite a few of the (TNE) 
terminations happened leading up to the AUQA of 2008’. 
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4.3.4.2 University B 
 
University B is an ‘Other’ university according to the Moodie 
classification, and in 2015 enrolled more than 25,000 students, of which 
a little over 500 students are studying offshore. This TNE student 
population makes up about only 2% of its total student body, comparable 
to onshore students of 14% (University B 2015). This TNE population is a 
far cry from the University’s heydays in 2011 where TNE students 
account for almost 2,000 students or about 7% of its total student 
population (compared to 13% onshore students) (Department of 
Education and Training 2015a). This erosion of TNE numbers makes for 
an interesting study of wrenching TNE terminations resulting from 
strategic restructuring of its international portfolio. BF3 noted that there 
were 19 TNE operations when he started in his position, and the 
restructuring has left only two operations still standing. The review of the 
University’s TNE operations which was called by the new Vice-
Chancellor to prepare for the 2008 AUQA audit uncovered serious non-
compliance, contractual weaknesses, lapses in strategic TNE leadership, 
and weak intermediate activities. 
 
The University’s TNE revenue was A$2.2 million in 2015, and accounts 
for 3% of its total revenue (University B 2015). Compared to its TNE 
student population of only 2%, this is an above average financial return. 
The focus group was unanimous in agreeing that financial return is the 
chief motivation for the University’s TNE operations. BF1 summed up the 
notion well by noting that  ‘education is a commodity, no longer (like) 
before’. 
 
TNE programs were delivered by University B in four SEA countries and 
six non-SEA countries. By the time of the focus group, the University had 
terminated or was terminating TNE programs in Countries O, T, Y, R, S 
and Z. The programs delivered were at pre-university, vocational 
certificate, undergraduate and postgraduate levels, selectively across the 
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general disciplines of business, information technology, exercise and 
sports science, communication, and education. These programs were 
delivered either via the traditional franchised model or what the 
University calls a ‘licensed’ model (BF2). The ‘licensed’ model is not a 
genuine TNE business delivery model, and as explained later, is rather a 
model that is non-compliant with traditional higher education regulations. 
 
No. Country Current TNE Business Delivery Models 
Terminated 
Operations 
1 Non-SEA Country O One Franchised 
One Franchised 
(being terminated) 
2 SEA Country T One Franchised One Franchised 
3 SEA Country V One Licensed and Franchised 
One Franchised 
(being terminated) 
4 SEA Country R One Franchised Two Franchised 
5 SEA Country Y One Franchised One Franchised 
6 Non-SEA Country Q One Franchised One Franchised 
7 Non-SEA Country W 
One Licensed and 
Franchised; 
One Franchised 
(being revamped) 
 
8 Non-SEA Country X One Franchised  
9 Non-SEA Country S 
One Licensed and 
Franchised 
One Franchised 
(being terminated) 
10 Non-SEA Country Z 
One Licensed and 
Franchised One Franchised 
 
Table 4.5   University B TNE Models and Host Countries 
 
Unlike the focus group at University A which provided cursory insights 
into its operations, the focus group on University B was a rich exploration 
of specific TNE cases and themes. Therefore, the analysis and reporting 
format for University B will take a descriptive (vignette) approach, 
howbeit still a linear-analytic composition (Yin 2014, 188) similar to that 
of University A. The analysis and reporting format of University A, in 
contrast, is structured by an a priori framework informed by the 
objectives of the focus group – in response to the content of the 
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discussions. The reports below revolve around eight key TNE 
phenomena. 
 
4.3.4.2.1 Country X TNE Operation 
 
Country X TNE operation was acknowledged to be a ‘strategic’ TNE 
operation in that the Vice-Chancellor pursued a ‘strategic partnership’ 
with a leading international airline (BF3). BF3 further remarked that it was 
‘profitable’ in the beginning, but was no longer profitable by the time of 
the focus group discussion. The ‘strategic’ rationale seemed to have 
overridden the need for commercial sustainability.  
 
When asked about the rationale for the Country X TNE, BF1 described 
the operation as an ‘industry engagement’ to ‘provide service to industry’. 
These rationales seem to provide evidence of the opportunity afforded by 
the TNE environment, and in this case, the ‘buyer’ (i.e., the airline 
partner) of the Porter five-forces model, adopted in the theoretical 
construct. They further support the importance of University 
characteristics in TNE decision, specifically the University’s ‘strategic 
TNE agenda’, and the University’s dependence on OP ‘resources’ (refer 
to Figure 3.2).  
 
This vocational certificate program delivered an assortment of units in 
security management and ground handling as a ‘purely in-house 
program’ (BF1). The on-site delivery was overseen by a senior academic 
manager equivalent to a Dean, but delivered by OP teaching staff as 
informed by BF1 when he remarked that ‘in theory, we deliver, but 
actually, all are local staff members’. This ‘in theory’ business delivery 
model seems to project a branch campus aspiration, but which does not 
actually transpire in reality, and points to a possible breach of operational 
protocols. This possible breach was seemingly glossed over by the 
participants, quoting BF3’s comments that ‘they do a bunch of units and 
they get a certificate’, and ‘it doesn’t have the same level of academic 
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governance’ (compared to degree programs), underlining the low level of 
concern over the possible breach. 
 
The University’s intention for a Direct business delivery model (where 
teaching was designed to be undertaken by University teaching staff) 
seemed to have not been realised. However, the TNE operation 
continued by relying on OP teaching staff, reflecting a franchised 
program (Outsourced) model. This state of events provides evidence for 
the TNE decision dichotomy of Direct-Outsourced delivery at University 
B. 
 
4.3.4.2.2 Country O TNE Operation 
 
Although BF1 believed that the Country O TNE operation was initiated 
because of a sister city relationship, and therefore ‘strategic’ in rationale, 
BF5, who had a longer experience with the operation disagreed, and 
insisted that the rationale was financial. In response, BF1 acquiesced 
and remarked that the OP was ‘still crying’ due to the high fee of A$1,200 
per student per unit imposed by the University – reflecting the sensitivity 
of the TNE operation to the buyer (i.e., the OP) within the highly 
competitive industry environment. This high fee was attributed to the 
higher cost of bilingual delivery. 
 
This Master’s program was delivered partially, i.e., only four units were 
delivered by the University. This was possible because of an articulation 
arrangement with the OP, where students were granted advanced 
standing based on an OP-run four-unit post-graduate diploma program. 
BF1 called this the ‘4+4 program’, and defined this as a twinning program 
(as observed in Section 2.5.2). 
 
BF3 reminded the group that this TNE operation is in ‘technical teachout’, 
i.e., being terminated. The reason for terminating this program is 
because it is not equivalent to any onshore program, a requirement of 
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TEQSA (BF1). This termination supports the construct’s assumption that 
the regulatory environment (the sixth element of the adapted Porter five-
forces model) is an antecedent of TNE business delivery model 
decisions. 
 
4.3.4.2.3 End-of-Lifecycle Terminations 
 
The Country Q TNE operation was elaborated on by the focus group to 
demonstrate the rosy prospects OPs usually predict before the start of 
the operations (‘they’re going to give you hundreds of students’ - BF3), 
the unpredictable behaviour of OPs (‘we allowed the operations to run 
differently’ – BF3), the competitive business environment (BF2), and the 
unsustainability of some TNE operations (‘we can’t cope’ – BF1). 
 
The Country Q OP promised the University a very promising flow of TNE 
students, and indeed delivered on this promise, resulting in high 
profitability over the initial years of operations (BF2). The OP could not 
however, sustain the enrolment numbers over time due to what the 
participants agreed were the competitive environment, and changes 
within the OP’s management (‘it wasn’t a sustainable model’ - BF3). The 
latter years of the operation saw the OP reaching out to rural market 
segments where the quality of the students were suspect (BF3). 
 
The initial pre-operating due diligence in this TNE case did not pick up 
the environmental (i.e., business) uncertainties, the OP’s shift in student 
recruitment focus on lower quality students and management changes at 
the OP (BF3). These weaknesses require robust and regular reviews, 
and indeed the problems were subsequently identified through these 
reviews (BF1) – evidencing the role of administration/professional 
services and intermediate activity (represented by reviews of OPs 
conducted by cross-departmental University bodies) within the 
University. 
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4.3.4.2.4 University B TNE False Starts 
 
In recounting the University’s termination of TNE operations, the 
participants mentioned operations in Countries T, R and Y as false starts 
(BF2, BF3). Similar to the terminated Country Q TNE operation, these 
OPs also promised high student throughputs and financial returns (BF3). 
However, these operations were short-lived. All three did not deliver on 
the promised numbers (BF2).  
 
These false starts seem to indicate poor or a lack of due diligence on the 
part of the University, as noted by BF3. The poor due diligence was the 
result of the University’s ‘massive expansion’ (BF3) in TNE activity, 
supporting the theoretical construct’s assumption of the impact of the 
University’s ‘TNE Growth Rate’ priority on TNE decision-making.  
 
The University had to undertake a ‘clean-up phase’, and now has 
documented due diligence processes in place, complemented by a 27-
step TNE ‘service checklist’ (BF3). These developments are evidence 
that the University has established a formal TNE decision framework, in 
support of the present study’s theoretical construct and in particular, the 
need for strong professional services support and quality assurance (as 
an intermediate business activity). 
 
4.3.4.2.5 The Tale of Licensed Programs 
 
The University had evolved a business delivery model that was 
commonly known as the ‘licensed’ program (BF1). The participants 
described how OPs would offer one-third of an undergraduate degree 
program to provide their students with advanced standing entry into the 
second year of the University’s degree program (BF2, BF5). Due to cost 
considerations, the University would usually limit its offshore unit 
offerings to the third year of the degree. This left the middle second year 
units in limbo. The University and some of its OPs addressed this 
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missing middle third through the licensing of the University’s second year 
units to the OP for offshore delivery by the OP. For as long as the TNE 
operations continued, and in the absence of robust reviews, this model 
made good process and commercial sense, and delivered an affordable 
university pathway to students (BF2).  
 
With the strategic restructuring of the International Office, new University 
staff started to probe the licensed program, and found serious non-
compliance (BF1). The probes intensified when there was a fallout with 
the University’s Country V OP, exposing second year students to being 
neither the OP’s nor the University’s students (BF1). The crux of the 
problem was that neither the OP nor the University was authorised by the 
local host country authorities to deliver and award the ‘second year’ 
(BF3).  
 
The non-conforming ‘second year’ units problem was compounded by 
three other circumstances. First, students who had not fully completed all 
their second year units had to sometimes be allowed to enrol in the 
University’s third year units against standard authentication processes; 
this is especially when these students had only one remaining second 
year unit to complete, due to prior timetabling issues or re-sits (BF1). 
There were also instances where students have completed their third 
year units, but still have outstanding second year units to complete 
(BF3). Second, international students studying in Country V who wanted 
to transfer onshore to the University’s home campus faced difficulties 
with their student visa applications due to the lack of documentation 
(e.g., transcript) attesting to completion of these ‘second year’ units 
(BF3). Finally, the OPs had misrepresented to their students that the 
second year units were the University’s units (BF1). 
 
The University resolved the problem in Country V by making special 
concessions for the non-conforming students to continue studying in 
another Country V TNE operation (BF2), and closing down the TNE 
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operation in dispute (BF3). A legal suit followed, which was not resolved 
as at date of the focus group discussion (BF1). The transfer of students 
to another TNE operation demonstrated the availability and usefulness of 
having substitutes within specific TNE jurisdictions. 
 
This problem also occurred in another three of the University’s TNE 
operations in three different countries, as these operations were initiated 
by one of the University’s highly valued TNE OPs (BF1, BF3). Since the 
scale of the collaboration was large and the relationship enduring, both 
partners agreed to resolve the problem amicably. The University 
continued to license its second year units to the OP (at very low fees), 
which then licensed them on to their offshore partners (or in some cases, 
subsidiaries or associates) for delivery under local host country 
approvals (BF3). Thus, the OP benefited significantly through a low-fee 
(e.g., A$180/unit/student) transfer of the University’s intellectual property 
(IP) for use as the OP’s own IP (BF1). It is important to note that the 
licensed units are not part of a TNE model because they are not 
delivered or awarded by the University – hence the heading of this 
Section ‘The Tale of Licensed Programs’. This model survived only in 
one country. The other two countries’ TNE operations were terminated 
for other reasons, one of which on allegations of plagiarism (BF1). 
 
The ‘licensed’ program episode demonstrated a number of useful 
observations in support of the theoretical construct. First, it showed how 
market forces can negatively influence TNE decisions. Second, it 
evidenced the need for robust due diligence and regular reviews within 
the University’s core TNE processes. Third, effective monitoring 
capabilities are needed on the part of the University to detect non-
conformance in OP marketing and student recruitment.  
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4.3.4.2.6 Experience with TNE Agreements 
 
This focus group provided valuable insights into University TNE 
contracting, a tightly guarded dimension of most university activities. The 
participants unveiled how the University had in the past negotiated 
contracts that were unfavourable (‘too much in their favour’ – BF4), 
where ‘the product doesn’t match our internal systems’ (BF3). 
 
The University now conducts contract negotiation after formal due 
diligence. This is followed by contract signing before implementation 
(BF3). BF3 acknowledged that the University’s contract management is 
still weak, e.g., the lack of followup on insurance certificates 
(authenticating the OP’s cover for various liabilities), and on OP 
recruitment plans. These areas are weak because they are not clearly 
specified in the contracts. BF1 concluded that ‘nobody follows … nobody 
looks at’ the agreements. 
 
BF3 noted that in the past, the University had allowed the TNE contract 
to be breached in order to provide concessions to the OP, or to meet 
student needs. The former refers to instances where the University 
permitted the OP to start cohorts even though minimum numbers 
specified in contracts were not achieved. The latter refers to the 
University allowing students to enrol onshore without completing their 
‘licensed’ units.  
 
It is obvious that the OP was driven by incentives of higher profitability 
through lower costs of the ‘licensing’ model (BF1). The terminated 
Country V TNE operation enrolled a large annual cohort of about 500 
students (BF3), translating into a revenue of more than A$1 million per 
annum for the University (BF2). 
 
The ‘licensed’ program agreement did not specify any award for these 
second year units, and hence there was no legitimacy to the completion 
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of these units for credit. Further, advanced standing processes are 
usually not specified within the University’s TNE contracts, prompting 
BF1 to say that ‘you’ve got to have a separate agreement; a separate 
negotiation; a separate arrangement’. 
 
The participants concluded that the University best stick to a ‘legalistic’ 
approach to contract execution (in order to avoid concessions and 
breaches), and to strengthened contract monitoring (BF2, BF3). BF1 
made forceful (and candid) assertions that the University should only go 
into TNE collaborations where the OP recognises and submits to a 
benevolent University (‘you are my hen … you lay the eggs for me’ and 
‘I’m not going to hurt you ... but if you don’t listen to me, you’ll be hurt’).  
 
4.3.4.2.7 The Impossible Market-driven Delivery Schedule 
 
Of all the problems encountered in the University’s TNE operations, the 
three-semester delivery schedule turned out to be the most exasperating 
(BF1, BF2, BF3, BF4). Onshore, the University operates on a two-
semester schedule, with a short summer semester for re-sits and 
program acceleration. Market demand offshore dictated the scheduling of 
full-load three semesters in a year. This delivery schedule appealed to 
students as they can complete their degrees in a shorter period of time, 
sometimes within two years. This was also touted as a ‘standard within 
their country’ (BF3), an accepted market norm amidst intense 
competition for students. It also meant that OPs (and the University) will 
see an increase in their revenues (BF2). 
 
This three-semester delivery schedule had perverse consequences for 
the University. It required the University to complete marking (and/or 
moderation) and results release within a very short turnaround time, 
which often are not achieved – resulting in students enrolling in the 
subsequent semester without knowing their previous semester’s results 
(BF3). The University often has had to waive prerequisite rules to 
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accommodate students who enrolled in a unit which required 
prerequisites, but discovered that they failed in the prerequisite unit in the 
previous semester. This is a clear breach of academic rules (BF5). 
 
To resolve the problem of students who failed their prerequisites, the OP 
often pressured the University to administer supplementary examinations 
even though the rules specifically disallow them. These supplementaries 
are sometimes administered five or six weeks into the following semester 
– again, breaching academic rules (BF1). 
 
The three-semester delivery schedule was also a HR hazard because 
teaching staff have had to put up with long working hours, and reduced 
breaks (BF3).  
 
Up until the focus group discussions, the University had not been able to 
resolve this perverse problem (‘the University hasn’t been able to get its 
head around’ – BF3). There was acknowledgement among participants 
that some Australian universities are already using the three-semester 
delivery model onshore, e.g., Bond University and the Australian National 
University, and hence, that it can work for their university (BF3). 
 
The three-semester delivery schedule problem demonstrates the 
pressure exerted by both (Porter five-forces) buyers and suppliers, 
represented by students and faculty respectively. BF1 summarises this 
state of affairs as ‘tension between the academic pressure and the 
market pressure’. The scheduling problem also supports the importance 
of well-planned curriculum development, teaching and assessment, and 
staff recruitment and management as core TNE processes. 
 
4.3.4.2.8 Inequitable Remuneration 
 
In the course of discussions about the motivation of University staff to 
participate in TNE operations, participants identified staff remuneration 
 198 
as an issue of equity. University teaching staff had traditionally been 
engaged in TNE as out-of-load activities to encourage them to take up 
this work considered additional to their normal work. BF2 noted that this 
income was very welcome in ‘having all these extras for paying the 
school’s fetes’, a policy that the rest of the participants candidly agreed.  
 
The out-of-load remuneration implied that staff were working on TNE 
operations outside of their normal working hours (BF3). Two specific 
issues were identified. First, it was obviously not true for many to be 
working on TNE operations outside of normal working hours. Second, 
there were cases where staff were drawing significant remuneration from 
TNE work, e.g., one staff was quoted to have earned more than 
A$70,000 in a year.  
 
The University recognised this issue and implemented a workload 
management system, where among other policy changes, staff had to 
deliver their TNE responsibilities in-load (BF2). This system was also 
intended to encourage staff to undertake more research. This 
consequent ‘loss’ of income led to clearly demonstrable resistance by 
staff to participate in TNE work. BF4 ‘noticed the difference in the energy 
of the lecturers’, and that they were now ‘busy’ and unable to participate 
in TNE work. On probing further about research output, BF2 and BF3 
asserted that there was no observable increase in research output as a 
result of the workload management system. 
 
The inequitable remuneration problem and the resulting workload 
management system resolution shows the nature of supply within the 
higher education environment, and supports the construct’s assumption 
that University resources impact on TNE operations, as well as the 
importance of effective staff management as a core TNE process. 
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4.3.4.3 University C 
 
University C’s 2015 annual report reported almost 8,000 TNE students 
out of a total student population of more than 23,000 students (University 
C 2015). This TNE population is significant as it represents more than a 
third of its total student population. Compared to its 2011 statistics, the 
2015 TNE student population grew by almost 100%, while its 2015 
international onshore student population of 2,168 students recorded only 
a growth of 12% (Department of Education and Training 2015a). As 
reported in Section 4.3.4.3.4, this steep growth rate precipitated the set 
up of a TNE project team in 2011, tasked with reviewing its TNE 
deliveries and making recommendations to institutionalise TNE 
operational improvements. The University’s response provides evidence 
that TNE growth rate is an influence in its TNE decisions, as 
conceptualised in the theoretical construct. 
 
In 2015, the University earned more than A$15 million, accounting for 
24% of its A$62 million income. Compared to its peers within the 
Innovative Research Universities (IRU) group (at 9% of total income), 
University C performed above expectations. On both TNE student and 
revenue proportion, the University is ahead of all Australian public 
universities. There seems to be evidence that the IRUs are 
comparatively more active in TNE than other universities, and University 
C is a prime example.  
 
It is also noteworthy that the 24% revenue does not compare favourably 
against its 36% TNE student population, similar to the case of University 
A. However, a more detailed study on university finances is needed to 
explore this further. 
 
University C delivered TNE programs offshore in four countries, out of 
which three were within SEA (CF1, CF2). There was one recorded recent 
termination within a non-SEA country (Country N) which CF1 speculated 
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to be due to language issues arising from bilingual delivery. The 
remaining TNE programs were delivered by five schools at both 
undergraduate and postgraduate levels. These programs were delivered 
under what CF2 described as ‘partnership’ programs, which on closer 
scrutiny later, can be classified as franchised programs. 
 
No. Region Current TNE Business Delivery Models 
Terminated 
Operations 
1 SEA Country T One Franchised  
2 SEA Country V Two Franchised  
3 Non-SEA Country N  One Franchised 
4 Non-SEA Country X One Franchised  
 
Table 4.6   University C TNE Models and Host Countries 
 
The University C focus group comprised of only two University staff. Both 
of them in central roles, as opposed to faculty or school roles. One is a 
middle manager (CF2) with wide experience in the University’s TNE 
management, and a key member of the Vice-Chancellor’s newly 
commissioned TNE project team. The other is an academic (CF1) with 
lengthy experience in the University’s TNE operations, and responsible 
for learning management systems. The information shared by the 
participants was therefore limited to TNE processes in management and 
academic administration. Efforts to probe their experience in strategic 
issues drew some blanks, e.g., both were not privy to the reason why 
one TNE agreement allowed the OP to mark assessments while the 
others required final grading to be done by the University’s unit 
coordinators. This focus group analysis will therefore treat comments on 
strategic TNE decisions with some caution, while recognizing the 
participants’ authority in managerial and academic administration. 
 
The focus group discussion for University C, similar to University B’s, 
revolved around significant TNE sub-phenomena. The two focus groups 
differed from that for University A, where the discussions were focused 
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on the a priori themes identified by the researcher. University C focus 
group discussions revolved around the administration of the most 
successful of their TNE operations, the setting up of a host country office 
to manage growth, and the newly commissioned TNE project team. The 
concentration on that one TNE operation reflects its predominance, 
accounting for about 75% of TNE students. The phenomenal growth of 
that particular operation resulted in serious administration problems, 
which in turn, led to the Vice-Chancellor’s setting up the new TNE project 
team to review the University’s entire TNE operation. The following 
analysis therefore takes a descriptive form (similar to the analysis of 
University B) to enable a clearer understanding of the case chronology, 
and tease out reflectors to test the validity of the theoretical construct and 
relate the theories of the firm, if identified, to TNE decisions.  
 
4.3.4.3.1 University C TNE Operations – a Description 
 
All four TNE operations were described by CF2 as being delivered 
through ‘partnerships’, providing evidence for University C’s preference 
for the Outsourced business delivery model. The original arrangements 
relied on the OP to deliver most of the TNE processes. The University 
limited its involvement to the provision of materials, approval of OP 
teaching staff, moderation of assessments, and thrice-yearly visits to the 
OP location for student orientation and OP teaching staff training (‘what 
we have been doing so far, which is deliver materials, approve OP 
teaching staff, set the exams, moderate, but pretty much hands-off ... in 
terms of delivery … was a function of the partners’ – CF2). When probed, 
CF2 admitted to being unsure of the meaning of the term ‘partner’, and 
neither could CF1 clarify – an indication of a lack of clarity of the 
University’s TNE legal and strategic agenda among managerial and 
academic staff.  
 
The TNE operation in Country T delivered only undergraduate programs 
and was a small operation in terms of student numbers (CF2). Since the 
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operation adopted a semester delivery schedule similar to onshore 
scheduling, the management of the operation was deemed easy – in 
comparison to the ‘trimester’ delivery schedule implemented elsewhere 
(CF2). The deployment of a delivery schedule different from the onshore 
norm at the other locations points to the influence of the other OPs on 
the University’s structuring of its TNE processes, specifically on the 
primary activities of student recruitment, curriculum development, and 
teaching and assessment. As presented in Section 4.3.4.3.2, the 
‘phenomenal’ growth of TNE operation V2 in Country V also resulted in 
pressures on the support activities of university infrastructure, academic 
support/student services, and academic staff support. 
 
TNE operation in Country X is a new initiative (‘the latest of the partners’ 
– CF2) that offered both undergraduate and postgraduate programs; yet 
is still a small operation. In the course of discussions, it emerged that the 
OP at Country X was allowed to mark examinations (CF1). This was in 
contrast to the University’s standard practice of grading all TNE student 
examinations. Both participants speculated this being the result of a 
concession in the course of negotiations. This anomaly led CF1 to 
remark that some academics complain that contractual terms involving 
academic processes were negotiated ‘on their behalf’ by senior 
executives who were not sufficiently familiar with such processes. These 
academics resent the need to have to ensure that the ‘University is 
compliant with these decisions where they had no part in making’ (CF2). 
This state of affairs supports the conclusion that parts of the University 
recognised the need for more extensive consultations (intermediate 
activity) within the TNE value chain. 
 
The University runs two operations in Country V. The older of the two 
operations (V1) is a small operation of approximately 1,200 students, 
which included both undergraduate and postgraduate Accounting 
programs that cater to the working adults market segment (CF1). The OP 
is an association of about 100 manufacturers (CF2). CF2 explained that 
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the V1 programs were initially requested by the OP for delivery to their 
association’s members, many of whom are working adults. This 
observation evidences the influence of buyers as one of the Porter five 
forces within the theoretical construct. 
 
Unique to this operation is the use of ‘block teaching’ where the 
University sends lecturers to teach in compact blocks of time, rather than 
to conduct regular classes spread out over the trimester. CF1 suggests 
that this costly teaching arrangement is the result of regulatory 
requirements when remarking that the need for ‘block teaching’ mode 
was ‘related to some requirements for them to get accreditation … sort of 
with the Society of Accountants’. The use of ‘block teaching’ provides 
evidence of the influence of the market and regulatory environment on 
TNE decisions within the theoretical construct. 
 
The newer operation (V2) enrolled the largest number of TNE students, 
viz., at about 5,000 students, and is discussed at length in Section 
4.3.4.3.2. Both the V1 and V2 operations enrol mostly local host country 
students, and a small number of international students (‘a vast majority of 
them will come from Country V’ – CF2). 
 
Both participants believe that the University’s rationale for starting TNE is 
financial. CF1 remarked that the University makes ‘more money’ through 
TNE (i.e., as in additional revenue), while CF2 speculated that TNE is an 
important ‘revenue stream’. Similar to the previous two universities, the 
commercial rationale seems to dominate this University’s TNE 
motivation.  
 
A close second reason for the University’s participation in TNE given by 
both CF1 and CF2 is ‘branding’. Taking both the financial and branding 
rationale together, it can be observed that there is evidence that 
University C’s TNE motivation is commercially-driven. 
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The University’s TNE programs in Countries T and V were marketed 
under the respective OP’s institutional brands (e.g., ‘if you looked at the 
brochure for V2 for instance, it’s an OP brochure, and then, they’ll say 
about University C’s Bachelor of Commerce’ – CF2). CF2 recounted that 
the University tried to convince the smaller of Country V’s OPs to market 
the University’s programs exclusively under the University’s brand, but 
was unsuccessful (‘there was an attempt to call V1, University C 
International Studies Country V’ – CF2). The University also 
subsequently successfully negotiated for an exclusive University brand 
representation at Country X whereby its programs are marketed under 
the University’s registered institutional branding (‘they’ve branded 
themselves University C Country X’ – CF2). The OPs in Countries T and 
V also market and deliver programs of other foreign institutions (CF2). It 
is thus clear that over time, the University wizened up to the value of its 
own brand in the TNE market. 
 
4.3.4.3.2 ‘Very Phenomenal Growth’ – Happy Problems 
 
The focus group discussions naturally revolved mainly around operation 
V2 because of the size of the operation (‘the number of students there 
has grown astronomically’ – CF1; ‘the growth has been phenomenal in 
the last few years … very phenomenal’ – CF2), and hence the 
challenges that ensued. CF2 explained how ‘we’re trying to make sure 
that we are still able to provide a good quality program, a good quality 
service to the students … in spite of the growth ... to help cope with some 
of the challenges we are facing as a result of the large student cohort’. 
Although V2 started long after V1, its growth was described as ‘very 
phenomenal’ and its student population dwarfed that of V1. The 
University’s V2 student population stands at about 5,000 and makes up 
three-quarters of the University’s total TNE student population (CF2).  
 
The V1 operation is a collaboration with an industry association, which 
also delivers programs from other foreign universities (CF1). On the 
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other hand, the V2 operation is a collaboration with a private higher 
education institution (CF2). Similar to the V1 OP, the V2 OP also offers 
programs in collaboration with other foreign universities; its range of 
programs is much wider (‘the V2 OP is much bigger’ - CF2). The V2 OP 
is described as part of a ‘worldwide institution’ (CF1). The University 
seems to have improved in its selection of OP in Country V (‘time has 
shown that the V2 OP are better at marketing the courses, because they 
are much bigger than the V1 OP’ – CF2); it is obvious that the OP 
(‘supplier’ as one of the Porter five-forces) in V2 has contributed 
positively to the success of the TNE operation. In a somewhat 
paradoxical twist, both OPs of V1 and V2 also demonstrate market 
substitutes through their offer of similar and competing programs from 
other university partners (CF2). 
 
CF1 described the growth of the V2 operation as having grown 
‘astronomically’, while CF2, used the phrase ‘very phenomenal growth’. 
When asked about the reason for the growth, CF2 attributed the growth 
to the OP’s ‘good marketing team’, a ‘well-oiled machine’ with which his 
team was ‘struggling to keep up with their performance’. Emerging from 
the success of Country V operations, the V2 OP had spearheaded 
potential TNE opportunities in another two SEA countries with the 
University (CF2). The University’s reliance on the OP for new business 
development strengthens the notion that the University favours the 
Outsourced business delivery model. 
 
The V2 operation is managed under two separate OP institutions. One of 
the institutions enrols full-time students, while the other enrols part-time 
students (drawn mainly from working adults) (CF1). The former operates 
during the day, while the latter during the evenings and weekends. CF2 
explains that the classes for students of these two institutions ‘don’t mix’. 
This separation was attributed to host country regulations, in compliance 
with ‘Country V’s immigration laws’ (CF2). While the students are 
enrolled under separate institutions, they attend at the same premises, 
 206 
providing the OP with high occupation and returns on space. In fact, CF2 
commented that they are ‘operating at full capacity now’, and ‘getting 
their third location’ to cater for expansion. University C is fortunate to be 
working with an OP that is shrewd with space utilisation, confirming the 
importance of university infrastructure within the theoretical construct. 
 
CF2 commented that his team’s struggle to keep up with the V2 OP’s 
sales team was ‘a happy problem but it does present significant 
challenges both for us here, but also for the OP … to cope with growth’. 
The V2 OP was so aggressive that their student recruitment plan 
included delivering the University-branded pre-university English 
program in another large non-SEA country as a feeder into their TNE 
programs (CF2). The University clearly has a champion at the core TNE 
student recruitment process of the theoretical construct. 
 
The growth of the operation resulted in a number of challenges, viz., the 
tight turn-around time pressures for processes within a trimester delivery 
schedule (CF1), the blurring between lectures and tutorials (CF1, CF2), 
the pedagogical challenges of managing very large and very small 
cohorts (CF2), the administration of in-term tests (CF2), OP lecturer 
appointments (CF2), OP lecturer engagement with University unit 
coordinators (CF1), lack of ‘clearly articulated guidelines, processes and 
manuals’ (CF2), quality of materials (CF1) and graduation logistics 
(CF2).  
 
Similar to University B’s struggles with a three-semester delivery 
schedule, University C’s trimester delivery schedule impacted on staff 
resourcing – as CF1 commented that there was ‘never a good time for 
staff to go on leave’. CF2 added that the short turn-around time for the 
teaching periods also increased pressure on staff to turn-around 
trimester results, appeals, deferred assessments, subsidiary 
assessments and re-sits. The University’s struggles with the three-
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semester delivery schedule serve to illustrate the importance of both 
primary and support activities for a sustainable TNE operation. 
 
The commercial nature of OP delivery is probably a cause for the blurring 
between lectures and tutorials, as ‘they might have 50 students in a tute’ 
(CF1). CF1 commented that at V2, students attend classes which double 
up as both lectures and tutorials. Many of these classes are large 
classes. It was interesting to hear from CF2 that the large classes had 
‘evolved’ over time, unrestricted by contract. The OP did not emulate the 
University’s standard practice of delivering small group tutorials after the 
lectures. The University thus had to monitor the enrolment lists every 
trimester to ensure that class sizes were kept manageable (‘we’ve had to 
initiate and create new processes ... and work with the partners, and say, 
‘Look, it’s not acceptable to us that you run classes of 70’ ... so, for every 
unit that we are delivering offshore, we have gotten these schools to give 
us the constraints, the maximum (recommended class size) … so, we’ve 
been working very closely with the partners to say, ‘These are the 
constraints you have to adhere to’, and to ensure that they comply with 
those … that’s an on-going conversation we are having at the moment’ – 
CF2). CF1 also added that there were the infrequent cases where some 
class sizes were too small for certain tutorial exercises (‘some classes 
even have minimum constraints, where if you’ve got less than a certain 
number of students, the activities can’t work’); such is the vagary of 
private higher education delivery impacting TNE teaching and 
assessment.  
 
In Australia, in-term tests could be administered en-masse to 200 
students at one time, allowing for the setting of one test (CF2). In V2, the 
student enrolment numbers per unit may run up to 500 students, and 
‘you cannot deliver the mid-term test in class’ (CF2). First, the V2 class 
cohorts were smaller, at about 50 students each to accommodate the 
physical classrooms. Second, V2 had to cater to the schedules of both 
full-time and part-time students (‘the have day and night; part-time, full-
 208 
time’ – CF1). The administration of in-term tests at V2 therefore had to 
be in multiple cohorts, resulting in higher costs from the setting of 
multiple sets of tests and marking guides, and more complicated logistics 
(CF2). These class-size issues demonstrate the strong influence of the 
OP (as ‘supplier’ within the construct’s Porter five-forces model) in the 
delivery of TNE, as they respond to local market forces. 
 
The management of OP lecturers was another serious problem resulting 
from the phenomenal growth. CF2 reported that there were about 73 
University unit coordinators and 144 OP lecturers to manage. Although 
OP lecturers could be cleared by the University for appointment, the 
actual scheduling of the unit might not be suitable for the OP lecturer – 
note that most of these OP lecturers teach on a part-time basis and have 
other commitments (CF2). CF1 also found that the engagement between 
OP lecturers and University unit coordinators was patchy. There were 
some highly dedicated and top performing OP lecturers, and there were 
also some poorly performing ones. The better ones were sometimes 
recommended by their unit coordinators to teach onshore. The serious 
issues arising from the management of both OP and University staff 
provide evidence to support the theoretical construct’s identification of 
University resources as a core element of the TNE decision-making 
process. 
 
Management of teaching staff was the ‘biggest problem’ of ‘consistency’ 
as CF2 noted a lack of ‘clearly articulated guidelines, processes, 
manuals’; ‘it’s all there somewhere; we’ve got policies here, there’ – that 
people did not know where to look for policies and guidelines, resulting in 
inconsistent decisions. CF2’s division, responsible for managing the 
liaison and support of TNE partners, has proposed to the senior 
leadership of the University to collate all the disparate policies, 
guidelines, and processes to ensure consistency. CF2 touted the 
consistency represented by the McDonald’s chain of restaurants as 
exemplary. The division’s proposal provides support reiterating the 
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importance of staff clarity and familiarity with processes in the TNE value 
chain as well as the need for clear processes governing intermediate 
activities. 
 
Problems arising from the logistics of graduation are another 
consequence of the large operations at V2. The University traditionally 
conducted one graduation ceremony a year over a three- or four-day 
period (CF2). The University is now considering conducting two 
graduations in a year to cater for the growth in numbers. It also has an 
alumni office in the home campus to support its Country V alumni, which 
is one of the most active (CF2). Unlike the focus groups at Universities A 
and B, University C focus group described the University’s strong 
commitment to its offshore alumni activities – one of the elements of the 
theoretical construct (CF2). This commitment is underpinned by the 
University’s interest in growing its international onshore enrolment, as 
evidenced in Section 4.3.4.3.2, where it was observed that one of the key 
performance indicators (KPIs) of the University’s Country V office is 
growing onshore enrolments. 
 
CF1 commented that the ‘quality of materials was not as good as they 
should be’. These materials include unit guides and presentation slides 
that are provided online. It was noted that OP lecturers are not allowed to 
make changes to materials, but can propose changes which can be 
evaluated and implemented (if appropriate) by the respective unit 
coordinators. One case was noted where Country X lecturers were asked 
to edit the materials to conform to local cultural sensitivities, with the 
resulting material being of poor quality, including ‘spelling mistakes’. 
However, both participants agreed that the contribution of OP lecturers 
was important in assisting the University to improve its materials. This is 
especially relevant in view of the University’s interest in being ‘more 
engaged and involved in the countries’ where it operates. This interest 
reinforces the University’s commitment to the theoretical construct’s 
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primary activities relating to curriculum development, and teaching and 
assessment. 
 
4.3.4.3.3 ‘A Very Large Beast’ – Institutionalizing Support 
 
The V2 TNE operation, characterised by the above challenges, was 
described by CF2 as having ‘evolved into a very large beast … it wasn’t 
always this way … for as long as it was small, there was a level of quality 
that was possible through interactions of a few individuals’. 
 
The University very quickly responded to the above problems and 
challenges at V2 by setting up a host country office (HCO) in Country V 
to ‘facilitate greater engagement and academic oversight’ (CF1) over the 
operations within Country V. In CF2’s words, there was a need ‘to ensure 
that quality is not compromised with its growth … that’s why we’ve had 
that Country V HCO created … to help … cope with some of the 
challenges we were facing as a result of the large student cohort’. That 
the University acted very quickly was demonstrated by the appointment 
of the HCO Principal (who later became Dean) before the office was 
ready – he had to operate out of his home while the office was being 
renovated.  
 
The presence of this office did not change the framework of the TNE 
relationship, but resulted in better oversight of core University functions. 
CF2 explained how the HCO now employed Student Services Officers 
(SSO) to manage admissions (including issuing offer letters), process 
approval of OP lecturers, and facilitate the training of OP staff. 
Previously, these SSOs were appointed by, and reported to the OP; the 
internalisation thus meant increased costs of TNE administration to the 
University. The HCO has an in-house Learning Development specialist to 
support OP lecturers through training, advisory support and materials 
development. CF2 explained that the added expense of these 
internalised processes, the result of the University’s desire for ‘more 
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involvement’, was to assure ‘academic quality and equivalence’ of 
student experience. The set up of the HCO effectively internalised 
several primary and support activities of the TNE value chain, resulting in 
a shift in the configuration of the TNE business delivery model. 
 
The country Marketing Officer was now located within the HCO to 
manage onshore student recruitment; this move facilitated expeditious 
approval of TNE OP marketing materials (instead of having the OP liaise 
with marketing staff at the University’s home campus) (CF2). The HCO 
now has an additional key performance indicator (KPI) to work against, 
i.e., to increase onshore enrolments. CF2 noted that the presence of the 
TNE operations in Country V had a positive impact on onshore 
enrolments; the Country is now the ‘number one’ source country for 
international onshore enrolments, reflecting the importance of university 
branding through TNE. 
 
The TNE operations, supported by the HCO in Country V seem to be 
shaping up well, so much so that CF2 remarked that the University ‘might 
(be) having similar offices in the other locations’. The two partners have 
clearly found a comfortable division of labour for their TNE value chain of 
activities. 
 
When asked if the University is considering setting up a branch campus 
to cater for the growth, CF2 thinks that this might not be possible due to 
the immediate need to stabilise the current operations. Further, the 
resource implication of a branch campus is currently beyond what the 
University is capable of undertaking – since an Australian public 
university ‘could not justify using public funds to fund something 
offshore’. The Direct TNE model is clearly not a favoured model for now. 
 
In the course of the focus group discussions, online delivery, including 
Massive Online Open Courses (MOOCs) as an alternative basis for TNE 
operations was explored. Both participants were sceptical that online 
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delivery can be an effective business delivery model for TNE due to 
current student inclinations for face-to-face interactions (CF1), and the 
extensive back-room support logistics required (CF2). Like the branch 
campus model, this blended online model (another Direct TNE model) is 
also not favoured due to resource constraints. 
 
4.3.4.3.4 Laying the Groundwork for Stability and Growth 
 
The rapid growth of University C’s TNE operations in Country V triggered 
warning bells within the University (University C TNE Project Team 
2013b). As the focus group participants noted, there were obvious issues 
with ‘weakening academic integrity, pressure of an increased workload 
on academic staff, tighter quality expectations of host governments, 
socio-political considerations and TEQSA initiatives’ – issues that were 
quoted by the Vice-Chancellor when he commissioned a new TNE 
project team in August 2011 to examine the University’s TNE operations 
and develop a TNE model that would address these concerns and 
comprehensively review the ‘capacity, cost and delivery of TNE’ 
(University C TNE Project Team 2013b). The set up of the project team 
underscored the University’s commitment to institutionalizing a 
sustainable TNE value chain. 
 
The participants noted that in the past, the University focused only on 
providing materials, approving OP lecturers, set examinations and 
moderate OP marking – ‘but pretty much hands-off’ (CF2). The delivery 
of the programs was ‘a function of the partners’ (CF2). This state of 
affairs led to the gradual creep in the growth of the afore-mentioned 
issues. The Vice-Chancellor expressed alarm that if the current TNE 
operations proceeded without change, ‘reputational damage will occur’, 
arising from ‘loss of confidence by the Country V authorities, staff 
pressure and stress, student dissatisfaction and failed accreditation’ and 
a ‘significant revenue stream will be diluted or lost’ (University C TNE 
Project Team 2013b, 4). 
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CF2 explained that the project team was, in relation to TNE, to ‘research 
what the rationale of … the University should be’, ‘what do we want it to 
be moving forward’, and ‘how can we get our TNE enterprise to be more 
closely aligned to our new strategic plan’. Ultimately, the University 
aimed for ‘closer engagement between the University and the delivery of 
our courses’, and this closer engagement is driven by the need for 
ensuring high academic quality, and equivalence of academic outcomes 
between onshore and offshore deliveries.  
 
The new TNE project team was tasked, inter alia to research the 
suitability of different TNE business delivery models (CF2). The task 
included building various cost scenarios (resulting in different profitability 
levels of operations) involving corresponding investments in TNE 
safeguards (University C TNE Project Team 2013b). CF2 intimated that 
all the existing TNE operations will be subject to a review after the TNE 
project team tables its recommendations. There might be a re-
negotiation of the terms of the TNE collaborations. However, CF2 does 
not anticipate that the University will ‘ditch the existing partnership that’s 
tried and proven for another model’. He seems to advocate a pragmatic 
approach to re-negotiation. CF2 confirmed that both partners in Country 
V indicated willingness to also review the programs delivered in their 
respective operations – towards rationalizing programs amidst a highly 
competitive market place both within each TNE operation (recall the 
substitute programs of other university partners) as well as in the open 
market. 
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4.3.4.4 University D 
 
The telephone interview with the highly experienced senior academic 
(DF1) revealed that his University, a Group of Eight university, no longer 
runs any TNE program. It last delivered TNE programs out of three SEA 
countries and one out of a non-SEA country. While this telephone 
interview is lean on details and is not corroborated, it has been 
documented in Appendix K (Themes, Concepts and Stories from 
University D Telephone Interview) for information and possible 
comparison with the views at the other three universities. 
 
4.3.5 Cross-case Analysis of Theoretical Construct 
 
After investigating each university individually, a cross-case analysis is 
conducted to determine consensus among these universities on the 
validity of the theoretical construct for TNE business delivery. Note 
however, that the single case analysis of University D was too thin on 
details, and lack corroboration to ascertain the collective views of staff of 
the University. University D will therefore not be included in the cross-
case analysis. 
 
4.3.5.1 Snapshots of Universities 
 
University A has been in TNE since the early 1980s, and has very 
established TNE operations. The University has a mature infrastructure 
for TNE management, e.g., TNE team, strategic planning and staff 
support. It’s financial returns from TNE equals that of the average of ATN 
universities, but is not high considering the proportion of TNE students 
serviced. 
 
University B had also been operating TNE for a long time, but have 
recently discovered various weaknesses in the delivery of a number of 
TNE operations. The University was at the time of the focus group, 
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rationalizing its TNE operations and setting up formal processes for due 
diligence and management of TNE. While its financial returns were 
commensurate with the proportion of TNE students, its volume of 
revenue had fallen steeply. This was the result of the University’s TNE 
rationalisation exercises. Its TNE revenue proportion is below the 
‘Others’ classification of Australian public universities. 
 
University C is relatively new in TNE, but has grown to be one of the 
largest TNE operators. Its TNE student population growth has been 
rapid, and has thus triggered various rectification, formalisation and 
review initiatives within the University. Its financial returns, at 24% is 
considered very high, compared to the peer classification’s average of 
9%. 
 
The observations in Sections 4.3.4 for the individual universities have 
been tabulated below to provide a comparison across the universities. 
 
No. Construct Element Uni 
A 
Uni 
B 
Uni 
C 
Remarks 
1 Presence of formal 
TNE decision 
process 
Y Y Y 
 
2 University Characteristics 
a Category university Y N Y  
b Size of university Y N N  
c Resources Y Y Y  
d Strategic TNE Agenda Y Y Y University C observed subsequently 
e TNE experience Y Y Y  
f TNE growth rate N Y Y  
3A TNE Value Chain Primary Activities 
a Student recruitment Y Y Y  
b Staff recruitment Y Y Y  
c Curriculum devt Y Y Y  
d Teaching and 
assessment Y Y Y 
 
e Career placement and 
alumni relations N N Y 
 
3B TNE Value Chain Support Activities 
a University 
infrastructure Y N Y 
Due to level of involvement 
b Acad support/student 
services Y N Y 
Due to level of involvement 
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c Admin/prof services Y Y Y  
d Acad staff support Y ? Y  
e Intermediate activity Y Y Y  
4 Impact of Environment 
a Suppliers Y Y Y  
b Buyers Y Y Y  
c New entrants Y N N  
d Substitutes Y Y Y  
e Industry rivals Y Y Y  
f Regulations Y Y Y  
 
Table 4.8   Extent of Validation of Theoretical Construct 
(Y – Yes; N – No; ? – Possibly; NR – Not referenced) 
 
4.3.5.2 University TNE Decision-making Processes and Characteristics 
 
The three focus groups clearly indicate the presence of formal decision-
making processes for TNE approval and management.  
 
The participating universities provided varied (or did not provide any) 
responses in terms of the influence of university characteristics on TNE 
decision-making. The category of university appears an important factor 
for Universities A and C, while the size of university seems to be 
important only for University A. University resources, unsurprisingly is a 
core consideration for all three universities in their TNE decision-making 
process. 
 
Focus groups of Universities A and B demonstrated clear commitments 
to a strategic agenda to drive their TNE operations. While this was not 
discussed in detail by the University C focus group, it was intimated by 
CF2 that there were University discussions on ‘how can we get our TNE 
enterprise to be more closely aligned to our new strategic plan’. 
Subsequent secondary data analysis discovered a well-developed 
internationalisation agenda embedded in the University’s 2012-2017 
Strategic Plan, labelled  ‘internationalisation as a whole-of-university 
enterprise’, and elaborated on its website clearly specifying its TNE 
approach and philosophy (University C 2012).  
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All three University participants considered TNE experience as an 
important antecedent for successful TNE delivery. TNE growth rate was 
considered an important factor in TNE decisions at Universities B and C, 
but not in University A. 
 
4.3.5.3 Value Chain Activities 
 
All four primary TNE processes of student recruitment, staff recruitment, 
curriculum development, and teaching and assessment were considered 
core processes for TNE across Universities A, B and C. Universities A 
and C reiterated the importance of academic staff support as a core TNE 
process, unlike University B.  
 
Alumni relations were considered highly visible at only University C. The 
other universities did not mention these processes as core to TNE. There 
was no mention of post-graduation career placement services at any of 
the university focus groups. These post-graduation activities can be 
considered non-core or non-mission critical for the running of TNE 
operations. 
 
It is interesting to note that Universities A and C demonstrated the 
importance of university infrastructure and academic support/student 
services, while Universities B did not. The acknowledgement of the 
importance of these two TNE support functions at Universities A and C 
could be due to their higher level of offshore involvement, compared to 
University B, where ‘we allowed the operations to run differently’ (BF3), 
and ‘we don’t know how business is run … we just listen to the partner’ 
(BF1). 
 
Administrative and professional services, and intermediate activities were 
clearly core TNE processes for all universities which participated in the 
focus groups. 
 218 
 
4.3.5.4 TNE Operating Environment 
 
There was ample evidence for the impact of the external environment 
(Porter five-forces model) on TNE decisions, except for ‘new entrants’. 
The reason for the lack of attention on ‘new entrants’ at Universities B 
and C was likely due to the accent on their respective TNE stories which 
revolved around university TNE processes rather than the external 
market  environment, and their high reliance on the OP for marketing and 
recruitment of students. 
 
4.3.6 Focus Group Findings and Modification of the Value Chain for 
TNE Investigation 
 
The above cross-case analysis provided evidence of the presence of 
formal decision-making processes for the approval and management of 
TNE operations as envisaged in the theoretical construct. All a priori 
value chain primary processes identified in the TNE value chain model of 
Section 2.7.3.4 were evidenced in all three universities, except the post-
graduation primary activities of career placement and alumni relations. 
 
Post-graduation activities, viz., career placement and alumni relations, 
were flagged by all universities as non-mission critical. This trend reflects 
Weisbrod et al.’s description of such activities as part of the university’s 
mission goods; as opposed to the revenue goods that are required for 
the sustainability of higher education operations (Weisbrod, Ballou and 
Asch 2008).  
 
This finding also confirms Mazzarol’s (Mazzarol 1997, 304-307) 
conclusion that while ‘brand equity/identity’ were important in promoting 
the university offshore, and ‘while most recognised the importance of 
alumni, few were able to demonstrate significant use of their alumni for 
development purposes’. He advised that ‘institutions consider the 
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integration of their alumni into their broader marketing strategies’. It is 
obvious that the focus group universities have not heeded Mazzarol’s 
counsel. 
 
In considering the TNE value chain support activities, the 
academic/professional services and intermediate activities were 
evidenced in all three universities. The other three value chain support 
activities were detected in Universities A and C, but were insufficiently 
evidenced in University B. 
 
The analysis of the universities’ characteristics relevant to TNE decision-
making identified university resources, university TNE strategic agenda 
and TNE experience as important considerations in all three universities. 
The category of university and TNE growth rate seems to be important 
for two universities, while the size of university important only to 
University A, the largest of the three universities. 
 
The impact of the environment (i.e., the Porter five-forces, plus 
government regulation) was clearly evidenced in all three universities’ 
TNE decisions, with the exception of ‘new entrants’ which is only 
evidenced in University A. 
 
In view of the above findings, the value chain for TNE of Section 2.7.3.4 
is thence refined to exclude Career Placement and Alumni Relations. 
The refined value chain is displayed below. 
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 (UP)   University infrastructure   (OP) 
(UP)  Academic support/student services   (OP)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
 (UP)   Admin/professional services  (OP)                                                                                                                           
(UP)   Academic staff support   (OP) 
                                                                                                                                                          Parents          
 (UP)  Intermediate activity (including QAA)  (OP)                                  Employers                
   (UP)                                                                                       Community                                                                              
Staff                                                                                                                                 Country                            
Recruit-            (UP)                               (UP)                               (UP)                                                                                          
ment                                                                                                                                                           
   (OP)       Curriculum Devt            Teaching                           Assessment                                                                           
   (UP)                                                                                                                                                   
 Student            (OP)          (OP)              (OP)             
 Recruit-                                                                                                                        
 ment  
   (OP)                                                                                                                     
(Abbreviations : UP for University Partner; OP for Offshore Partner)  
Fig. 4.5   TNE Value Chain Version 2 
 
The focus groups have thus provided sufficient evidence for the support 
of the theoretical construct in general. The theoretical construct, together 
with the refined TNE value chain will therefore be adopted for use in the 
in-depth case studies. 
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4.4 Evaluation of the Theories of the Firm 
 
The focus group discussions were analysed to determine if one or more 
of the three theories of the firm were demonstrated in the universities’ 
TNE decision-making. To enable this analysis, a NVivo coding 
framework (Table 4.9 below) was developed, drawing from Table 3.9 
(Theoretical Reflectors Targeted in TNE Organisations).  
 
Note that the focus group analyses were aimed at evidencing the 
practice of one or more of the three theories in TNE model selection 
decisions, and not to explore causality (Section 3.6.3). Hence, the focus 
group coding framework was designed to detect only the presence of the 
reflectors of the theories, and the analyses were not designed to explore 
the propositions. These propositions will be explored through the in-
depth semi-structured interviews, the second phase of the study where 
more detailed interrogation will be undertaken on informants with 
Strategic, managerial and academic accountabilities. 
 
The resulting coding framework captures the key distinguishing reflectors 
of each of the theories. As presented in the Venn diagram of Section 
2.6.5.1, there are common reflectors, e.g., cost economisation rationale 
and information asymmetry assumption that cut across all three theories. 
The incomplete contracting and asset specificity assumptions are 
common to both TCE and PRT, while ex ante incentives alignment is a 
common assumption of PRT and AT. 
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No. Reflectors of 
Theories 
 
Proposed Codes (in vivo codes in full italics) 
Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 Code 4 Code 5 
A TCE Reflectors 
Cost eco-
nomisation 
(THE-CEc) 
Information 
asymmetry 
(THE-InA) 
Incomplete 
contracting 
(THE-InC) 
Asset 
specificity 
(THE-ASp) 
Behavioral 
uncertainty 
(TCE-BeU) 
Environ-
mental 
uncertainty 
(TCE-EnU) 
Risk 
neutrality 
(TCE-RNu) 
Transaction 
costs  
(TCE-TrC) 
Transaction 
frequency 
(TCE-Frq) 
Gover-
nance 
structure 
(TCE-GvS) 
B PRT Reflectors 
Cost eco-
nomisation 
(THE-CEc) 
Information 
asymmetry 
(THE-InA) 
Incomplete 
contracting 
(THE-InC) 
Asset 
specificity 
(THE-ASp) 
Ex ante 
incentives 
alignment 
(THE-EAI) 
Gover-
nance 
environ-
ment   
(PRT-GvE) 
Property 
rights  
(PRT-PrR) 
Residual 
control 
rights 
concentra-
tion    
(PRT-RCR) 
Value 
dissipation 
(PRT-VeD) 
Resolution 
via 
negotiation/ 
unilateral 
decision 
(PRT-Res) 
C AT Reflectors 
Cost eco-
nomisation 
(THE-CEc) 
Information 
asymmetry 
(THE-InA) 
Ex ante 
incentives 
alignment 
(THE-EAI) 
Risk 
aversion 
differences 
(AT-RAv) 
Adverse 
selection 
(AT-AdS) 
Moral 
hazard  
(AT-MHz) 
Agent 
incentivisa-
tion       
(AT-AIn) 
Agent’s 
bond cost 
with 
principal 
(AT-ABC) 
  
 
Table 4.9   Coding Framework for TNE Theory Evaluation 
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4.4.1 Single Case Analyses of Plausibility of Theories  
 
The focus group discussions of Universities A, B and C as presented in 
Section 4.3.4 will be interpreted in turn to identify reflectors of each of the 
three theories of the firm. The telephone interview transcript of University 
D TNE discussion was too thin on details to enable any meaningful 
analysis, and will thus be excluded. The plausibility of the theories 
applying in each university is discussed at the end of each of the three 
university case studies below. 
 
4.4.1.1 University A 
 
As discussed previously in Section 4.3.4.1, University A is a large multi-
campus ATN university delivering TNE programs to more than 7,400 
students offshore in 2015.  
 
4.4.1.1.1 TCE 
 
This section investigates the participants’ responses with regards to 
reflectors of TCE as they relate to the University’s TNE decisions. 
 
a) Cost Economisation 
 
The early franchised TNE model of University A was considered ‘very 
labour-intensive’ in terms of sending onshore staff to TNE locations to 
teach (AF3). Onshore staff sometimes taught up to 27 hours per unit in 
TNE locations (AF6), a practice that is ‘not sustainable’ (AF1). The 
University made deliberate moves to reduce this commitment, and 
succeeded in most jurisdictions to eliminate this commitment altogether, 
except in Country O where local regulations require the University to 
conduct at least one-third of the required teaching hours (AF3). This 
elimination and reduction of teaching hours (‘less physical presence 
offshore’ – AF5) was enabled by the outsourcing of teaching 
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responsibilities to University-approved offshore OP lecturers, adopting a 
moderation role, and leveraging on teaching technologies such as 
oLecture, an online teaching platform. 
 
The University further reduced its offshore investments by leveraging on 
its OPs’ physical infrastructure (AF4), and thus also reducing its offshore 
tax exposure (AF5). AF1 remarked that OPs ‘add value’ through the 
University’s outsourcing of TNE functions.  
 
Although the University put various cost economisation measures and 
processes in place, and reiterated the need for financial sustainability 
(AF1), the participants did not emphasise any profit maximisation motive 
for the University’s TNE operations. 
 
While the University considered various ways to reduce resource 
commitments in franchised programs, it also deliberately set up branch 
campuses in two countries – despite these attracting ‘enormous set-up 
costs’ (AF2). This strategy seems to contradict the cost reduction 
approach in dealing with franchised programs. On closer scrutiny, the 
branch campus strategy is really an extension of the cost economisation 
approach through greater control of the TNE operations (AF6). At least in 
the case of the Country T branch campus, the unanimous rationale for its 
set-up was one of ‘giving back’ to the host country in the form of host 
country capacity-building (AF1, AF5).  
 
We can surmise that while the University advocated cost economisation, 
it did not demonstrate any profit maximisation inclination. This supports 
the assumption of cost economisation that underpins all three theories of 
the firm. AF6 summed this up rather crudely by saying that ‘the greatest 
savings - the University will catch up with, and other things will flash and 
then die’. 
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b) Information Asymmetry 
 
The focus group discussions demonstrated an obvious concern for 
information asymmetry. At least one terminated TNE operation was due 
to ‘teaching facilities that weren’t what we expected’ – a situation that 
was not discovered at the onset of the operations (AF4). AF4 also 
complained that information about student performance and offshore 
lecturer teaching preparations were not easily accessible due to the 
reduced face-to-face contact.  
 
AF1 emphasised the need to require the ‘partner to drive the market 
research’ to enable the University to ascertain ‘market demand’. The 
participants concur that information about potential OP stability (AF1), 
TNE experience (AF1), reputation (AF1, AF6) and financial viability (AF5) 
are needed to enable the University to make informed TNE decisions. 
Finally, at least two separate surveys were conducted as part of annual 
reviews of TNE operations to ensure the integrity of information and to 
inform planning for the following year (AF1). 
 
c) Incomplete Contracting 
 
AF1 reported that all TNE operations were governed by one of two 
different types of legally-enforced contracts, viz., the generic (for 
franchised programs) and the joint-venture agreements (for branch 
campus operations). The discussions highlighted a number of instances 
where these contracts did not anticipate administrative gaps (AF1), 
student ‘leakages’ to other programs (AF2), and payment modes by OPs 
to the University (AF6). It is clear that TNE contracts committed by 
University A are incomplete with respect to these TNE issues. 
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d) Asset Specificity 
 
The foregoing discussions in Section 4.3.4 indicate the high value the 
University places on its OPs for undertaking part of the functions of the 
TNE value chain, e.g., teaching, assessment, providing physical 
infrastructure and marketing. While valuable, these functions and 
infrastructure can easily service any other university partner. Quoting the 
example of the teaching function, AF4 remarked that ‘offshore lecturers 
also have experience teaching in other international programs for other 
international universities’, and hence ‘this makes them really strong 
lecturers’. Even on the part of OPs, the University observes that various 
health service providers can provide the necessary physical 
infrastructure for the running of the University’s health-related programs 
(AF5). However, asset specificity is definitely observed in the set up of 
branch campuses. These investments attract ‘enormous set-up costs’ 
(AF2), and are ‘much more risky’ (AF1). 
 
e) Behavioural and Environmental Uncertainty 
 
Behavioural uncertainty is observed mostly in franchised programs. OP 
performance in academic delivery (AF1, AF4) and student recruitment 
(AF2), which translates into TNE financial viability (AF5), were the oft-
quoted reasons for TNE termination. These could be traced to the 
vagaries of the OP behaviour (‘the partners have now changed and we 
need to change as well’ – AF5), and the occasional high turnover of OP 
staff (‘I have some concerns that as a unit coordinator, … I’m dealing 
with a local lecturer who may not be the same one that I had last 
semester’ – AF2). This led AF6 to conclude that ‘it’s much less 
partnership and it’s a lot more policing’ – a very apt description of the 
need to look out for behavioural uncertainty in franchised operations. The 
branch campuses on the other hand, would demonstrate less 
behavioural uncertainty due to the direct control that the University 
exercises over the operations (AF6). And indeed, all participants 
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concluded that the University’s current preference for branch campus 
operations was due to a need for more control (‘over time as the quality 
becomes more and more important, I think we felt that we need more 
and more control’ – AF6). 
 
Environmental uncertainty is clearly a concern when the University is 
considering both franchised and branch campus models. These 
concerns arise from regulatory developments (AF1), growing competition 
(AF3), market substitutes (AF5), and fluctuating exchange rates (AF6). 
The University’s TNE business delivery modelling evolved over time in 
response to these environmental impacts on existing programs (AF5). 
This is amply reflected in the exhaustive due diligence processes for 
potential TNE ventures, which includes environmental scanning at 
national and regional levels (AF1). 
 
f) Transaction Costs 
 
Throughout the focus group discussion, all participants commented on 
various transaction costs. These costs arise from pre-operating due 
diligence information seeking (AF1), contract drafting and negotiation 
(AF1), designing administrative and quality safeguards (AF1, AF3), 
cross-border monitoring and coordination (AF2, AF4, AF6), 
measurement and benchmarking (AF1). Reference was also made to the 
University’s slow pace of investments in online capabilities to support 
TNE operations (AF6), and mal-adaptation due to increased competition 
(AF5, AF6). Transaction costs are evident in University A’s TNE 
decision-making processes. 
 
g) Frequency of Transactions 
 
While the modified TNE Value Chain for TNE (Figure 2.14) was a 
simplified version of Hutaibat’s (Hutaibat 2011) value chain for higher 
education administration, it is still a high transaction frequency value 
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chain of activities. In fact, the engagements with students lasts the entire 
duration of the student’s program of study, where knowledge and skills 
are co-created between (mainly) the academic staff of the university and 
the student. These activities are described by AF1, when he reported 
that ‘we look at enrolments by unit, trend analysis for three years, pass 
rate compared between home campus and the partner, … their teaching 
and learning, their facilities … two different surveys ... and then, we look 
at marketing opportunities … administrative issues’. 
 
University A used to be highly involved in teaching offshore, as AF3 
quoted, up to ‘one-third of the course’. AF3 also remarked that ‘that’s a 
very labour-intensive model’, and that ‘we are now moving away from it’ 
through the University’s campus model. Note however, that this value 
chain activity of teaching still remains to be executed howbeit by the OP. 
AF2 complained about ‘always have(ing) to try to measure and monitor 
the education of my students offshore’. AF2 also rued the fact that ‘you 
have to contact administration staff at the faculty level before you 
manage to get in touch with the local lecturer’. The teaching load might 
have been transferred to the OP, but in some instances, this workload 
might have even increased as demonstrated in AF2’s case.  
 
In comparison with TNE, AF6 remarked that articulation (i.e., the 
arrangement where offshore students are transferred onshore through 
recognition of prior host country tertiary credits) is clearly favoured 
because ‘it’s easier’, ‘quicker’ and ‘virtually no risk at all’ (AF6). On the 
other hand, while commenting on branch campus operations, AF1 noted 
that TNE is a ‘more complicated process’, and concluded that ‘delivering 
face-to-face in country, I think … Australian universities not really geared 
towards that type of activity’. 
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4.4.1.1.2 PRT 
 
The foregoing analysis within TCE on cost economisation, information 
asymmetry, incomplete contracting and asset specificity provided 
sufficient evidence of these reflectors, which are also shared with PRT. 
This section investigates the remaining reflectors of PRT as they relate to 
the University’s TNE decisions. 
 
a) Ex ante Incentives Alignment 
 
Attention is now directed to one reflector that is shared with AT, viz., ex 
ante incentives alignment. There is obvious evidence that the University 
employs legally-enforceable contracts, and that various criteria are 
considered prior to signing up new, or renewing existing TNE ventures 
(AF1). However, ex ante incentives alignment does not seem to have 
been discussed in detail. While the participants are confident about the 
University’s own incentives for TNE involvement (e.g., commercial 
sustainability, branding, networking, and the nobler rationale of ‘giving 
back’ and capacity building; Section 4.3.4.1.1), there was almost no 
mention of the OP’s incentives to enter into TNE contracts.  
 
AF4 made a passing mention that everyone knows about the University’s 
good reputation, and that ‘partners can also … provide’ the University’s 
degrees’ – implying that the University’s branding and degrees are 
desirable to the OP. Apart from this sole reference to OP incentives, it 
can be inferred that OPs are also concerned about TNE profitability 
through the University’s own concerns about TNE viability and 
sustainability (as discussed previously under TCE in Section 4.4.1.1.1).  
 
The focus group discussions seem to overwhelmingly project the 
University’s own motivation for, and concerns with TNE, to the exclusion 
of the OP’s voice. AF6 even went on to say that the University’s 
approach to OPs is more policing than partnership. While this focus 
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group does not clearly spell out the OP’s incentives for participating in 
TNE, it cannot be concluded that ex ante incentives alignment does not 
influence the selection of TNE governance structures.  
 
b) Efficient Governance Environment for Contract Enforcement 
 
PRT assumes that property rights are exercised effectively and efficiently 
within environments which are characterised by mature governance 
arrangements, e.g., established regulations, enforcement infrastructure 
and informal rules of conduct (Section 2.6.3). The focus group 
recognised the impact of regulations (both offshore and onshore) on TNE 
operations (AF5, AF6). 
 
There was consensus that the TNE operations of the University are 
subject to both sending country (e.g., AUQA/TEQSA and Acts of 
Parliament) (AF5), and host country (e.g., host government regulations 
and general laws) governance (AF2). AF4 confirms that host government 
regulations ‘affects the way that we teach’, while AF5 described AUQA’s 
2008 new audit approach as a ‘trigger’ for the review and closure of a 
number of the University’s TNE operations. Host countries are ‘tightening 
regulations’, with some of them even dictating the minimum number of 
hours of teaching per unit (AF4). AF5 rued Country O’s legal 
environment which limited fees chargeable, governed taxation, regulated 
profit repatriation and prescribed teaching models. The participant also 
added that the increasingly tightened regulatory environments required 
the University to exercise more control, thus favouring the Direct Model 
of the branch campus. AF1 emphasised licencing and compliance as key 
issues in deciding on TNE ventures, while AF6 remarked that more 
compliance lead to ‘increased cost of the program’. Although these 
remarks indicate a recognition of the influence of the governance 
environment on TNE decisions, they also reflect a resistance to the 
constraining effects of these regulatory impositions. 
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AF5 confirms the now standard University practice of investigating the 
regulatory environment during due diligence of new TNE projects (‘what 
are the rules around governance of the operation’, and to ‘conform with 
what’s allowed’) as the host regulatory environment matures, having 
seen that these environments ‘were at a different stage that it is now’. 
The University is also committed to the broader ‘compliance in marketing 
and finance as well (as) with QA issues’ (AF6).  
 
These developments point to the University’s appreciation of mature 
regulatory environments to assure compliance in all aspects of the TNE 
operations, a prerequisite for the application of PRT. 
 
c) Establish, Transfer and Maintain Property Rights 
 
Property rights comprise both clearly delimited rights within contracts, as 
well as residual rights exercisable by the owners of valuable resources 
(Section 2.6.3). These rights were amply demonstrated within University 
A’s TNE operations. The participants largely agree with clearly assigning 
control over teaching resources (AF3, AF4), teaching staff (AF1, AF4, 
AF5), facilities and physical infrastructure (AF1, AF4) between the 
partners. The University value the OPs’ familiarity and expertise over 
marketing (AF3), licensing (AF1) and conducting business (AF6) in the 
host country. It is also aware of the value of its own brand reputation 
(AF4), intellectual property rights over its teaching materials (AF3), and 
the perceived high value of its English language teacher graduates 
(AF5).   
 
AF1 emphasised the need for the University to conduct thorough due 
diligence prior to commencing TNE operations because of financial risks 
and the University’s name was ‘on the gate’ – indicating a deep concern 
for the viability of the venture. It was interesting to note AF6’s assertion 
that some TNE ventures were more policing than partnership – providing 
evidence of the University’s exercise of its residual rights. This 
 232 
observation might support PRT’s prediction that residual control rights 
are concentrated in the party that has the most to gain and lose in the 
collaboration. 
 
d) Rent-seeking Externality Concerns 
 
AF4’s comment on the deployment of OP lecturers who were also 
teaching in other universities’ TNE programs reveals possible value 
dissipation (rent-seeking externality) through the sharing of the 
University’s intellectual property. The existence of student leakage to 
other university programs, although thought to be small (AF5) is also 
another possible value dissipation (as part of PRT) from the University’s 
TNE collaboration. 
 
e) Resolution of Externalities 
 
The annual and triennial reviews instituted by the University have been 
described as very comprehensive audit exercises, involving two 
independent surveys (AF1). AF1 describes how the University and the 
OP will then discuss shortfalls in performance and compliance, and 
negotiate improvements for the following year. This demonstrates a 
mutually-agreed resolution of collaboration issues between two partners 
that appreciate each other’s property rights. On the other hand, the 
University’s set up of a branch campus in Country V through the 
absorption of three previous TNE operations and the termination of two 
others speaks of the University’s unilateral approach in TNE problem 
resolution (AF1). This unilateral approach demonstrates the University’s 
recognition of its strong residual rights of control vis-à-vis the OP’s rights. 
 
4.4.1.1.3 AT 
 
The foregoing analysis of TCE (Section 4.4.1.1.1) and PRT (Section 
4.4.1.1.2) provided support for the common reflectors of costs 
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economisation and information asymmetry, which also applies to AT. Ex 
ante incentives alignment was noted to be weakly supported. This 
section now turns to the remaining AT reflectors potentially impacting the 
University’s TNE decisions. 
 
a) Differences in Risk Aversion 
 
One of the rationales for managing a business as a principal-agent 
collaboration is the differences in risk aversion between the two parties 
(Section 2.6.4). It is obvious that the University exhibits some measure of 
risk consciousness – through its mature TNE due diligence and review 
processes (AF1, AF5). Several participants indicated the University’s 
concern over commercial and reputational risks (AF3, AF5, AF6). The 
University has clearly instituted various policies and processes as a 
result of its concern over the risk of having to rely on an offshore partner 
to deliver its programs (AF1). 
 
b) Complete Contracting 
 
While the university’s current TNE operations reflect incomplete 
contracting (as discussed under TCE in Section 4.4.1.1.1c), their 
previous TNE operations were managed for many years under perceived 
complete contracting conditions. This was premised upon the perceived 
capability of the OP to undertake the offshore delivery with minimal 
University intervention (AF3). 
 
It was only when the University have ‘run a program for a few years’ and 
‘have come with the experience’ (AF5), that the University realised that it 
‘need(ed) more and more control’ (AF6). The realisation that the 
partnership contracts were insufficient to assure quality came about 
when the University had to prepare for the AUQA Cycle 2 audits starting 
2008. Moreover, the new business delivery model, ‘a branch campus is 
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more complex to set up’, and therefore needed more robust scrutiny 
(AF1). 
 
c) Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard 
 
University A definitely encountered adverse selection and moral hazard 
in its TNE ventures, as can be observed in their Country Y venture where 
the OP failed in providing suitable teaching facilities (AF4), in the poor 
academic quality of delivery at several other ventures (AF5), and where 
some TNE ventures were speculated to have failed due to the nature of 
the ‘partner’ (AF2). AF2 elaborated on the ‘partner’ by emphasizing that 
OP ‘credibility’ is a criterion for partner selection, while participants AF1, 
AF5 and AF6 identified ‘reputation’ of the OP as an important criterion. In 
retrospect, AF1 also believed that ‘stability, (and) experience in delivering 
(TNE)’ were prerequisites in new OP selection. Moral hazard is also 
observed in the difficulty of University unit coordinators in monitoring 
offshore lecturers, within an environment of high staff turnovers, and 
especially following University policy to reduce staff travel commitments 
(AF2). To minimise adverse selection, the University developed 
comprehensive due diligence processes involving multiple layers of 
University sign-offs (AF1). To reduce moral hazard, the University 
instituted grading moderation (AF2), and highly robust annual and 
triennial reviews (AF1). Ultimately, to reduce agency problems dealing 
with OPs, the University favours the Direct Model presented by branch 
campuses – as advocated by AF5 (‘in the case of Country V it’s good’ 
because the University ‘makes all the academic decisions’). 
 
d) Agent’s Economic Incentives 
 
The OP is inferred to incur bonding cost while complying with the 
University’s policy requirement for annual and triennial reviews. While 
necessary for the smooth running of the TNE programs, OPs’ teaching 
staff obligation to work closely with University unit coordinators is 
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observed to be an imposition on the OP teaching staff (‘he in turn follows 
instruction from me’ - AF2).  
 
Drawing from previous discussions on ex ante incentives alignment 
(Section 4.4.1.1.2a), the focus group observed little on the OP’s (i.e., 
agent’s) incentivisation for participating in the TNE venture. However, 
inferring from the University’s own concerns for financial sustainability in 
a private sector venture (Section 4.3.4.1.1), it is highly plausible that the 
OP also shares this concern, and invariably also driven by profit. 
 
4.4.1.1.4 Findings on the Application of the Three Theories of the Firm in 
University A’s TNE Decisions 
 
The foregoing analysis on possible TCE application in Section 4.4.1.1.1 
provided evidence that all eight reflectors of TCE find support in 
University A’s preferred branch campus (Direct Model) TNE operations. 
The preference for the branch campus model is due mainly to the need 
for more control of the operations, a classic TCE vertical integration shift, 
accompanied by investments in asset-specific branch campuses. It can 
thus be concluded that TCE is a possible driver in University A’s 
preference for a vertical integration into the branch campus model. 
 
The analysis of PRT reflectors (Section 4.4.1.1.2) in University A’s TNE 
decisions shows up weak support for PRT. This is because of weak 
demonstration of ex ante incentives alignment, and the lack of asset 
specificity within the franchised (Outsourced Model) programs. Note 
however that ex ante incentives alignment has not been ruled out 
altogether, while asset specificity is observed in the University’s branch 
campus operations. Hence, PRT cannot be ruled out of the University’s 
preference for branch campuses. 
 
While an investigation into agency issues (in Section 4.4.1.1.3) would 
have been better served through engagements with both principal (i.e., 
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the University) and agent (i.e., the OP), the above analysis provides 
sufficient support for all the AT reflectors in the University’s franchised 
operations. The University was noted to have considered agency 
concerns in running its franchised operations (Outsourced Model). AT is 
not supported in the University’s decision to run the branch campuses. 
 
4.4.1.2 University B 
 
The vignettes described in University B’s TNE experience (Section 
4.3.4.2) provided rich data for analysing the demonstration or otherwise 
of the theories of the firm in the University’s TNE decisions. These 
stories are contextualised against a period of rapid TNE growth. BF3 
remarked that ‘the offshore has been growing at a faster rate than the 
onshore’. This period of rapid growth was followed by a season of TNE 
dismantling when the new Vice-Chancellor applied the brakes as he 
restructured the University’s TNE operations in response to the ‘licensed’ 
program debacle and the AUQA/TEQSA audit. BF3 described how the 
University ‘started closing down a lot of the offshore stuff ready for 
AUQA/TEQSA … to hide a lot of the problems’. 
 
The period of rapid TNE growth saw a University with low TNE 
experience and resources leveraging successfully through its OPs. 
Participant BF1 remarked that ‘we don’t know how business is run … we 
just listen to the partner’. 
 
The lessons learnt from the many TNE terminations led to the 
restructuring in the University’s TNE capabilities, the development of 
more robust processes and policies, and the crafting of more favourable 
contracts. 
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4.4.1.2.1 TCE 
 
This section investigates the reflectors attributed to TCE, as they relate 
to the University’s TNE decisions. 
 
a) Cost Economisation 
 
Cost economisation was clearly observed in the University’s use of the 
‘licensed’ programs at countries V, S, W and Z through the licensing of 
its second year units. BF2 noted that this model was a cost-effective 
means (for both the University and its OPs) to compete with industry 
rivals because it incurred ‘less administration … less travel … less 
marking’, while BF1 remarked that ‘there is a possibility of cutting cost’. 
After the discovery of this violation of academic rules, the University 
terminated the Country V operation, and re-negotiated the delivery at 
Countries S, W and Z. The renegotiation enabled the ‘licensed’ units to 
be run as OP units which are approved by the respective countries’ 
regulatory authorities – thereby perpetuating the cost economisation 
rationale.  
 
Although the introduction of the workload management system was 
premised on equity, it also pointed to a cost economisation approach 
post the rapid TNE growth period. While BF3 argued that the University 
wanted ‘to make it fair and equitable’, he also commented that the 
University ‘was right in making the decision’ to address the ‘double 
dipping’ by academics engaged in TNE delivery. Further, BF1 
emphasised that the University could ‘cut the organisational cost’ through 
reducing the number of majors offered offshore in future TNE 
endeavours. 
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b) Information Asymmetry 
 
The University leveraged heavily on the resources of its OPs (‘we don’t 
know how business is run … we just listen to the partner’ – BF1) during 
the rapid TNE growth period; it did not have a mature TNE delivery 
infrastructure to undertake the core activities of the TNE value chain 
(‘we’ve gone out and sold something to market that we can’t deliver’ – 
BF3). In its haste to grow, the University’s due diligence process was 
compromised (‘we’ve never done any proper due diligence’ – BF3), and 
in some cases, were not even conducted – as reported by BF3. BF3 
continued that in the past, when potential OPs promised ‘this number of 
students … make this amount of money’, the ‘University jumped at it’. For 
instance, the University was not aware over many years that the 
‘licensed’ units (in Countries V, S, W and Z) and its bilingual program (in 
Country O) violated academic regulations, and also did not ‘know who 
the (second-year ‘licensed’ program) students are’ (BF1). It was also 
unaware of the deteriorating academic standards of its Country Q 
students until an annual audit picked up this weakness (BF5).  
 
In agreeing to deliver its Business programs in Country V, the University 
did not realise that its OP was also delivering another Australian 
Business program that was ‘easier to get into … do it faster … come out 
with a double degree … it’s cheaper’, putting its program at a 
disadvantage in that ‘highly competitive marketplace’ (BF3). 
 
c) Incomplete Contracting 
 
Considering the rush to market by a poorly-equipped (in terms of TNE 
management) University, there is ample evidence of incomplete 
contracting both during and after the rapid TNE growth period. The 
‘licensed’ programs and the altered Country X delivery are two prime 
examples of the poor coverage of TNE contracts (Sections 4.3.4.2.1 and 
4.3.4.2.5). The lack of detail addressing advanced standing in contracts 
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was also flagged by BF1, saying ‘you’ve got to have a separate 
agreement; a separate negotiation; a separate arrangement’. BF1 
ventured to say that there was in some cases, ‘no management contract’, 
and that ‘nobody follows … nobody look at it’ (referring to TNE 
contracts). The focus group consensus was that the University had failed 
to protect its own interests and short-changed itself in drafting the 
contracts. However, drawing from the lessons of the past, BF1 believes 
that the University can rely on comprehensive contracts for successful 
TNE delivery in the future.  
 
BF3 sums up incomplete contracting in University B well in saying that 
‘that’s not in the contract … that’s part of the process’, referring to both 
the past as well as what’s practiced in the present. 
 
d) Asset Specificity 
 
There does not seem to be much investment by the University or its OPs 
in partnership-specific assets either during or after the rapid TNE growth 
phase. This is probably due to the delivery of unsophisticated ‘chalk-and-
talk’ programmes, which do not require heavy investments in 
infrastructure, specialised skills sets, or branding (BF5).  
 
The closest to an asset-specific investment observed is the need for ‘the 
amount of laboratories’ for the ‘personal trainer’ program (BF4). These 
cannot be said to potentially incur the classic TCE safeguarding costs 
because the University’s programs are not unique. There was however 
discussion on the high cost of investments while exploring plausible 
future business delivery models, e.g., the ‘managed’ campus (BF5). 
 
e) Behavioural and Environmental Uncertainties 
 
Uncertainties attributed to partner behaviour can be observed in the 
misrepresentation of the ‘licensed’ program by the OPs, the failure of the 
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Country X OP to undertake teaching responsibilities, and the discovery of 
weak management at the Country Q TNE operation (Section 4.3.4.2). 
BF3 maintains that even after a formal 27-step service checklist had 
been developed, the University still does not have a fool-proof system for 
assuring OP compliance. 
 
The false starts at Countries T, R and Y provide evidence of the vagaries 
of the operating environment, and their impact on the viability of the TNE 
operations (Section 4.3.4.2). The Country Q OP’s resorting to admitting 
low performing students also points to unforeseen environmental 
(business) forces driving the behaviour of the OP. These forces may 
come in the form of non-availability of qualified teaching staff (or 
suppliers; as in Country X), limited access to qualified students (or 
buyers; as in Country Q), industry rivalry (or substitutes; as in the false 
starts in Countries T, R and Y) and government regulations (as in 
Country V ‘licensed’ programs) (Section 4.3.4.2). 
 
f) Transaction Costs 
 
Concern for transaction costs of ex ante partner screening (BF1, BF3), 
contract negotiation and drafting (BF1, BF3), monitoring and 
safeguarding (BF5), communication (BF2, BF5), and adaptation (BF3) 
were clearly evident in University B’s TNE experience. These were 
demonstrated through the poor OP screening in Countries Q, T, R and Y, 
the poorly constructed contracts that were ‘too much in their favour’ 
(BF1), and the moral hazards identified at Countries X and Q. 
 
There were also opportunity costs associated with failure to identify 
viable partners (i.e., the false starts), mal-adaptations (viz., the three-
semester scheduling problem and the academic staff resistance to the 
new workload management system), and ex post loss of productivity 
arising from adjustments in efforts (i.e., addressing the ‘licensed’ units) 
(Section 4.3.4.2). 
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g) Frequency of Transactions 
 
As observed in the case of University A, TNE is a high transaction 
frequency value chain of activities that lasts the entire duration of a 
student life cycle. This is in contrast with goods production and 
distribution, where there might or might not be any after-sales servicing.  
 
BF3 spoke about the impact of Country V’s new legislation that would 
‘make a foreign provider teach over 54% of the course’. Adding tension 
to the University is the pressure of delivering degrees in a shorter 
duration in order to capture students in the highly competitive market 
environment. One of the OPs senior managers ‘always talked about … 
it’s reputation, it’s price, and it’s speed that you can get the degree’.  
 
To compound the high transaction frequency, the University has had to 
roll out a trimester delivery offshore while it’s onshore study schedule 
remains a two-semester timetable (BF3). BF3 complained that ‘we’re 
delivering a trimester model when all of our systems and processes are 
set up for two semesters’. BF1 added that ‘we can’t cope’, ‘basically the 
faculties cannot cope … because staff work three semesters and no 
holidays’. BF1 further reported that sometimes results are not out when 
the next teaching period starts. 
 
BF3 remarked that TEQSA ‘instead of doing two-year audits, for 
offshore, it may build in a 12-month’ audit. This is confirmed by 
subsequent data analysis of TEQSA’s website (TEQSA 2015a); TEQSA 
requires all Australian higher education institutions to provide annual 
reports on their performance to maintain their registration. 
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4.4.1.2.2 PRT 
 
In the previous Section on TCE, the common reflectors for TCE and 
PRT, viz., cost economisation, information asymmetry and incomplete 
contracting were identified in the University’s TNE delivery model 
decisions. There was however no evidence of any need for asset-specific 
investments in the University’s TNE operations. This section explores the 
remaining PRT reflectors as they relate to the University’s TNE 
decisions. 
 
a) Ex Ante Incentives Alignment 
 
University B’s TNE motivation has been described as mostly 
commercially driven. The TNE operations at Countries O and Q, the 
‘licensed’ programs at Countries V, S, W and Z, and the false starts at 
Countries T, R and Y demonstrate ex ante alignment of commercial-
driven interests between the University and its OPs (Section 4.3.4.2). 
The University’s Country X TNE operation exhibits signs of an alignment 
of strategic (and not commercial) interests, amidst poor financial returns. 
 
The concession provided to the OP to deliver the ‘licensed’ programs 
and which generated about A$1 million revenue for the University seem 
to indicate the possibility of an ex ante alignment of incentives between 
the University and the OP (Section 4.3.4.2.6). 
 
New TNE ventures such as the re-negotiation of the ‘licensed’ programs 
were premised on an alignment of commercial interests, where the 
University traded low licensing fees to the OP for international access, as 
confirmed by BF2’s admission that ‘it enables us to have access to 
markets that we wouldn’t have otherwise’.  
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b) Efficient Governance Environment for Contract Enforcement 
 
The efficient enforcement of TNE contracts relies on both sending 
country and host country regulatory environments. While Country V’s 
regulatory authorities did not pick up the suspect ‘licensed’ program, the 
University’s preparation for its AUQA/TEQSA audit did (Section 
4.3.4.2.5). The same can be noted of the termination of Country O’s 4+4 
program (Section 4.3.4.2.2).  
 
There was a conspicuous absence of concern over the legality of the 
Country Q TNE operation (Section 4.3.4.2.3). This is set against the 
context of the grey area of TNE operation within the country’s regulatory 
environment which does not currently recognise TNE as legitimate within 
its borders.  
 
The above observations seem to reflect a lack of concern by the 
University for an efficient governance environment that is required for 
PRT-driven decisions.  
 
c) Establish, Transfer and Maintain Property Rights 
 
The University and its OPs have clearly engaged in the establishment, 
transfer and maintenance of their respective property rights through the 
articulation arrangements negotiated as part of the Country O TNE 
program, and the delivery of the ‘licensed’ programs (both prior to, and 
after the re-negotiations).  
 
This OP management approach suggested by BF2 (‘legalistic’) and BF1 
(‘my hen … lay the eggs for me’) seem to reflect a strong-handed 
approach to governance through the exercise of the University’s residual 
rights of control and unilateral decisions in conflict resolution (Section 
4.3.4.2.6).  
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The examples of contract breaches in Section 4.3.4.2.6 reveal how real 
and intense market pressures impose on Universities, and demonstrate 
the exercise of residual control rights by the OP arising from their control 
of the market. There is also evidence of the exercise of residual control 
rights by the lead OP in the re-negotiation for the ‘licensed’ programs, 
leading to highly favourable licensing fees for the lead OP. 
 
d) Rent-seeking Externality Concerns 
 
Shirking and failure to fulfil TNE promises by the OP in Country X are 
obvious externalities identified by the University (Section 4.3.4.2.1). 
However, the University seems to be rather cavalier about this externality 
despite acknowledgement that the operation was ‘not as profitable’ 
(BF3). This was intimated to be possibly due to the University’s strategic 
agenda for this operation, referencing the VC’s direct involvement (BF3). 
 
The Country V OP’s misrepresentation of the ‘licensed’ units as 
University B’s units was a clear case of the OP distorting information, 
while the re-negotiated ‘licensed’ units (where the University was seen to 
have given in to the OP on the licensing fee) was intimated by BF1 to be 
a case of value dissipation. 
 
e) Resolution of Externalities 
 
At Country X, there was no attempt by the University to correct the OP’s 
shirking (Section 4.3.4.2.1). This was attributed to the University taking a 
strategic approach in Country X.  
 
In contrast, the University exercised its residual control rights in the 
Country V ‘licensed’ program disconnect through a unilateral termination 
of the program, while taking a more conciliatory re-negotiation process 
with regards to the same problem in Countries S, W and Z (BF1). The 
former was due mainly to a fallout between the University and its OP, as 
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reported in personal communication with BF1 and BF2 (BF1 and BF3 
2013); this is despite an annual income exceeding A$1 million from the 
Country V TNE operation. The latter was due to the considerable size of 
the TNE partnership with the lead OP operating in three countries, and 
hence providing evidence of the exercise of the residual control rights of 
the OP. 
 
4.4.1.2.3 AT 
 
Cost economisation, information asymmetry and ex ante alignment of 
incentives were evidenced earlier (Sections 4.4.1.2.1 and 4.4.1.2.2), and 
they form part of the reflectors for AT in the TNE decision-making 
process. This section explores the remaining AT reflectors as they relate 
to the University’s TNE decisions. 
 
a) Differences in Risk Aversion 
 
In the early TNE operations, low-risk aversion was observed, based on 
the University’s comfort in, and reliance on its OPs (‘we don’t know how 
business is run … we just listen to the partner’ – BF1). The discovery of 
major issues in these operations led to the University adopting a more 
risk averse approach to TNE decision-making. This is demonstrated in 
the termination of the Country V ‘licensed’ TNE operation, and the re-
negotiation of the Countries S, W and Z ‘licensed’ operations – upon 
discovery of the non-compliant status of the ‘licensed’ programs (Section 
4.3.4.2.5). The University’s risk aversion was also demonstrated in the 
termination of the Country Q TNE operation (Section 4.3.4.2.3), the set 
up of a 27-step TNE service checklist, the engagement of external 
consultants for TNE due diligence (BF3), and the greater scrutiny of TNE 
contracts (BF1). 
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b) Complete Contracting 
 
Recognizing its lack of resources, the University had relied heavily on its 
OPs in the early TNE operations as its contracts seemed to be serving 
their purpose (‘we were now managing as per the contract’ – BF3). It was 
comfortably delivering its TNE programs and was even experiencing 
rapid growth (‘the offshore has been growing at a faster rate than the 
onshore’; ‘the University went into this massive expansion and it all 
sounded good’ – BF3), until it started to prepare for its AUQA/TEQSA 
audit. The preparation led to the discovery of poorly constructed 
contracts (‘the agreement is too much in their favour and it’s too much 
financially and academically  - now causing other problems’ – BF1), and 
precipitated the closure of several TNE operations (‘we started closing 
down a lot of the offshore stuff ready for AUQA … to hide a lot of the 
problems that would have been very open’ – BF3).  
 
BF3 emphasised that the University has emerged wiser from its poorly 
set up and managed TNE operations, and now has ‘thrown out that 
previous thinking’. BF3 further noted that the University is ‘now managing 
… as per the contract … which was the easier way from a legalistic 
perspective’. BF1, who is a senior executive and confidant of the Vice-
Chancellor, is of the opinion that future contractual relationships can be 
tightly governed through detailed and comprehensive contracts. He 
however also added that he expected the OPs to ‘be very close’ to the 
University and to ‘listen to me’, indicating a recognition of the 
incompleteness of TNE contracting. 
 
c) Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard 
 
There were ample cases of adverse selection by the University, e.g., the 
appointment of OPs that were responsible for the false starts (Section 
4.3.4.2.4). BF3 also remarked that the University had on more than one 
occasion failed to conduct proper due diligence on the OP, and ‘jumped 
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at’ TNE opportunities when the OPs promised the University the potential 
to ‘make this amount of money’ (BF3). 
 
The misrepresentation of the ‘licensed’ units as University B units by the 
Country B OP (Section 4.3.4.2.5), shirking by Country X OP (Section 
4.3.4.2.1), and the alleged plagiarism detected in Country Z TNE 
operation (BF1) were instances of moral hazard encountered by the 
University. 
 
d) Agent’s Economic Incentives 
 
Revisiting Country O’s TNE operations, it was obvious that the OP’s TNE 
interest was financial in nature, as confirmed by BF1 and BF5. The OPs’ 
motivation to deliver the ‘licensed’ programs (‘it was money’ – BF3; ‘A$1 
million a year’ – BF2), as well as that of the OPs for the false starts was 
also revenue-driven (‘too greedy’ – BF5; ‘they will do anything which 
market will cause them to do because they’re only judged by numbers, 
by dollars, by bottomline’ – BF1). The only TNE operation that did not 
specifically identify the OP’s incentive was the Country X operation, 
although it could be anticipated that it was financial, given the nature of 
the OP as a commercial airline (Section 4.3.4.2.1). 
 
4.4.1.2.4 Findings on the Application of the Three Theories of the Firm in 
University B’s TNE Decisions 
 
University B used the franchised business delivery model for all its TNE 
programs. This choice reflected the University’s reliance on its OPs’ 
expertise and resources. All TCE reflectors as discussed in Section 
4.4.1.2.1 were identified in University B’s TNE experience with the 
exception of asset-specific investments, a key reflector for TCE-driven 
governance decisions. Therefore the choice of the franchised model (a 
hybrid governance model) cannot be exclusively attributed to 
considerations of TCE. 
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Based on discussions in Section 4.4.1.2.2 on PRT reflectors, the 
University did not clearly value its property rights nor the conditions 
required for the exercise of PRT in its TNE decisions. This is 
demonstrated in the University’s low level of concern for the governance 
environments in which it operates TNE, and in its seemingly ambivalent 
approach to OP conflict resolution. There was also no concern for asset 
specificity in the OP relationships. 
 
The AT reflectors discussed in Section 4.4.1.2.3 provide strong evidence 
for AT as a driving motivation for University B’s TNE business delivery 
model decisions, both prior to, and after the restructuring of the 
University’s TNE infrastructure. 
 
4.4.1.3 University C 
 
Focus group discussions at University C revolved around the V2 TNE 
operation in Country V because of the large number of students. These 
discussions naturally gravitated to two key actions the University took to 
address the ‘happy problem’ of ‘very phenomenal growth’ (Section 
4.3.4.3.2), viz., the set up of a host country office (HCO) and the 
commissioning of a TNE project team to review the ‘cost, capacity and 
delivery of TNE’. These stories (Section 4.3.4.3) provided rich data to 
analyse the University’s underlying motivations in considering TNE 
business delivery models. 
 
4.4.1.3.1 TCE 
 
This section investigates the possible impact of TCE reflectors on the 
University’s TNE decisions. 
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a) Cost Economisation 
 
Cost economisation by the University is observed through the 
University’s reliance on the OP’s ‘well-oiled machinery’ of sales, while 
cost economisation by the OP was demonstrated through its clever use 
of teaching space by its two subsidiary institutions to cater to full-time 
and part-time (working adult) students respectively (CF2). The University 
reinforced its inclination to cost economisation in its White Paper, quoting 
a comprehensive review of ‘cost, capacity and delivery of TNE’ 
(University C TNE Project Team 2013b, 4). 
 
b) Information Asymmetry 
 
Information asymmetry was best observed in the creep of operational 
issues (e.g., delivery scheduling, the blurring between lectures and 
tutorials, the management of large cohorts, the multiple in-term tests, and 
OP lecturer appointment and management), and the University’s 
dependence on the OP for offshore marketing in two new geographical 
markets (Section 4.3.4.3). The TNE project team set up was also an 
effort to overcome previous lapses in researching and understanding the 
host country TNE industry (‘there’s been different structures but probably 
a gap for the teaching and learning aspects of what’s happening on the 
ground’ – CF2). 
 
c) Incomplete Contracting 
 
CF2 observed that in the past, when the student numbers at the 
University’s TNE operations were small and manageable, the University 
took a ‘hands-off’ approach, and that the delivery of the programs was a 
‘function of the partners’. There seemed to be a comfortable reliance on 
the OPs’ capability and capacity to deliver according to agreed terms. 
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As the University’s TNE operations, particularly at V2 grew, CF2 made 
the observation that certain processes ‘evolved’ from the standard 
agreement, e.g., the large classes with their accompanying logistical 
issues. There was some evidence of incomplete contracting, e.g., the 
three-semester schedule which ‘evolved’ unrestricted by contract over 
time, creep in operational issues, the lecture/tutorial class delivery, and 
the University’s unilateral set up of its HCO (Section 4.3.4.3). 
 
d) Asset Specificity 
 
Like in many commercial partnerships, and especially so for the 
knowledge industry, asset specific investments are clearly a feature of 
this University’s TNE governance arrangements. The University’s TNE 
administration (comprising its on-campus liaison team and its HCO) and 
the OP’s ‘well-oiled’ sales team (CF2) are clear examples. The HCO’s 
new marketing material approval capability is also indicative of the 
University’s leverage on newly internalised specific marketing resources.  
 
e) Behavioural and Environmental Uncertainties 
 
The antecedent of behavioural uncertainty was experienced by the 
University through the OP’s response to market imperatives, e.g., the V1 
TNE operation’s ‘block teaching’ solution (Section 4.3.4.3.1), and the 
variability of OP-University staff interactions at V2 (Section 4.3.4.3.2). It 
also responded to environmental uncertainties through the set up of the 
University’s HCO to get closer to the market – for ‘closer engagement’ 
(CF2). 
 
When the University’s TNE operations were small, the University was 
comfortable with the ‘hands-off’ approach to franchised TNE delivery. 
This risk neutrality was quickly replaced by heightened risk aversion 
when the ‘very phenomenal growth’ looked more like a ‘very large beast’ 
(CF2) in the form of seemingly intractable operational difficulties that 
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threatened the University’s reputation and revenue stream (University C 
TNE Project Team 2013a). 
 
f) Transaction Costs 
 
While the V2 story told of large revenues, it also highlighted many hidden 
transaction costs, e.g., the costs of mal-adaptation in managing the 
three-semester schedule, the cost of monitoring OP class sizes, and 
finally the cost of establishing a HCO for communication, monitoring and 
safeguarding (Sections 4.3.4.3.2 and 4.3.4.3.3). The White Paper also 
explored a number of reduced profitability scenarios that were necessary 
to quality-assure sustainable TNE operations (University C TNE Project 
Team 2013b, 46). 
 
g) Frequency of Transactions 
 
As in Universities A and B, University C is not immune to the high 
transaction frequency TNE value chain. University C also faced the tight 
trimester conundrum, where CF2 remarked ‘it’s never a good time for 
staff to go on leave’, and ‘it’s not enough time to turnaround’ results.  
 
CF1 revealed added transactional complications with two of their TNE 
operations where translation into foreign languages was required. CF1’s 
academic leadership role also uncovered the vagaries of dealing with 
offshore lecturers where CF1 doesn’t ‘know for sure which (lecturers) are 
teaching what units until one or two weeks before semester start’. 
 
CF2 explained the scale of the TNE transactional volume through the 
numbers of key stakeholders (‘at minimum 7,000 players in this game’) 
involved in one TNE operation in Country V alone. He described how 73 
University unit coordinators have to be matched with a pool of 144 
offshore lecturers, administered by administrators in both the University 
and OP, servicing about 6,000 students. The operations in V2 had to 
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have two graduation ceremonies a year due to the sheer volume of 
graduands. 
 
The TEQSA requirement to demonstrate equivalence between offshore 
and onshore programs was also quoted by CF2 as a challenge. As he 
said ‘I think it would be very hard to demonstrate equivalence in the way 
we have been delivering in the past’. 
 
4.4.1.3.2 PRT 
 
The preceding Section has evidenced cost economisation as a desired 
outcome of the University’s TNE operations, the occurrence of 
information asymmetry and incomplete contracting, and the University’s 
concerns over asset specificity. This section now turns to the 
consideration of the remaining PRT reflectors that may have impacted 
the University’s TNE decisions. 
 
a) Ex ante Incentives Alignment 
 
In reflecting on the Country V TNE operational issues, CF2 explained 
that ‘it’s a partnership that requires negotiation ... (and) as long as both 
partners are open in terms of what’s possible, what isn’t ... and for the 
things that are not possible, maybe have a plan that you can work 
towards ... I think that’s the important thing ... as long as there is 
understanding and communication, it should be fine’. This sums up the 
University’s approach towards ex ante incentives alignment with its OPs. 
 
University C also exhibited quick reflexes in developing new TNE models 
to address operational problems, e.g., setting up the HCO in Country V 
(Section 4.3.4.3.3). Its TNE experience in countries T, V and N probably 
provided the organisational knowledge to negotiate for exclusive 
branding at its new TNE initiative in Country X (CF2). Although exclusive 
branding was attained, the University seemed to have slipped up in 
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allowing the OP to mark examinations, a function that the University 
traditionally retains for quality assurance reasons (CF1, CF2). The 
Country X arrangements illustrate the varied interests of collaborative 
partners in negotiating ex ante incentives alignment. 
 
The University has also wizened up and ‘all of the agreements would 
have to be re-negotiated when we have a new model which outlines how 
we are going to proceed ... so any of the current agreements which are 
not consistent with the decision will be re-negotiated with the partners’ 
(CF2). 
 
b) Efficient Governance Environment for Contract Enforcement 
 
The acknowledgement of, and close compliance with host country and 
sending country regulations is amply evidenced in all the University’s 
TNE operations, e.g., the V1 Accounting ‘block teaching’ (to meet 
professional accreditation), the V2 mandatory day classes for 
international students (to meet Country V’s regulatory requirements), and 
the Vice-Chancellor’s instruction for the TNE project team to anticipate 
‘tighter quality expectations of host governments … and TEQSA 
imperatives’ (University C TNE Project Team 2013b, 3).  
 
c) Establish, Transfer and Maintain Property Rights 
 
Both the University and the OPs understand and value their respective 
property rights, as well as appreciate each other’s property rights. This 
can be observed in the University’s focus on its own branding at Country 
X, its closely guarded teaching material development, and its control over 
its awards (Section 4.3.4.3.1). The OP at V2 on the other hand, trades on 
its own international brand, retains control over its highly effective sales 
team, manages highly efficient facilities, and coordinates a team of more 
than 140 lecturers (Section 4.3.4.3.2).  
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Although there is a possibility of re-negotiation of the terms of the TNE 
collaborations following the tabling of the TNE team’s report, CF2 does 
not anticipate that the University will ‘ditch the existing partnership that’s 
tried and proven for another model’. This pragmatic approach to re-
negotiation indicates a willingness to resolve mal-adaptations through 
negotiation.  
 
Due to the strength of the V2 OP’s business in Country V, it had 
exercised some residual control rights over teaching schedules and 
pedagogy (i.e., combined lecture-tutorial classes) (Section 4.3.4.3.2). 
The University exercised similar rights when it unilaterally set up the 
HCO, and internalised several OP functions, e.g., the management of 
Student Service Officers (SSO) (Section 4.3.4.3.3). This unilateral 
decision to set up the HCO also demonstrated partner problem 
resolution, and reflects the University’s confidence in its brand and 
resources. 
 
d) Rent-seeking Externality Concerns 
 
Value dissipation was observed both ways. The OP at V2 obviously 
gained operational efficiency by delivering competing programs from 
several university partners (Section 4.3.4.3.2), while the University 
maximised its onshore student flows through its Country V branding and 
new HCO onshore recruitment KPI (Section 4.3.4.3.2). 
 
4.4.1.3.3 AT 
 
The common reflectors of cost economisation, information asymmetry 
and ex ante incentives alignment have been demonstrated in 4.4.1.3.1 
and 4.4.1.3.2. The remaining AT reflectors will now be investigated to 
determine their impact on the University’s TNE decisions. 
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a) Differences in Risk Aversion 
 
The University’s concern over risks attendant in TNE operations stems 
from its mandate to ensure equivalence in the experiences of both 
onshore and offshore international students (as per TEQSA 
requirements), and its priority to maintain ‘reputation (and) trust’ (CF2) 
within the jurisdictions where it delivers its TNE programs. 
 
Its concerns for TNE risks were heightened when its V2 TNE operations 
in Country V grew rapidly over a short period of time, which resulted in a 
proliferation of logistical difficulties and threats to academic quality. 
These developments resulted in the set up of the HCO and the TNE 
project review, two exercises that obviously incurred significant costs. In 
CF2’s words, ‘the cost will go up, but … quality has a price’. 
 
The focus group discussion seems to indicate that the V2 OP (by now, 
the largest of the University’s OPs) has a bigger appetite for risk than the 
University. This is observed from CF1’s description of the OP’s foray into 
Country O using the University-branded English proficiency program; 
Country O being a country with relatively opaque TNE regulations. CF2 
further noted the University’s readiness to enter Country P on the back of 
V2 OP’s aggressive marketing efforts (‘next stop is Country P’ – CF2). 
The V2 OP’s move to expand into additional prime real estate space in 
the centre of the city also pointed to a higher risk appetite (CF2). 
 
b) Complete Contracting 
 
As discussed under TCE, the University was observed to have been 
comfortable with the contractual framework while its TNE operations 
were small and manageable (Section 4.4.1.3.1c). The phenomenal 
growth of its V2 TNE operations in Country V triggered various actions by 
the University to address the ‘capacity, cost and delivery’ of its TNE 
operations – through the set up of a HCO, and the commissioning of a 
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TNE project team to review its TNE delivery. Its previous TNE contracts 
were now found to be wanting, and CF2 remarked that a re-negotiation 
of all TNE contracts was imminent. 
 
c) Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard 
 
It is clear that all the University’s TNE operations are franchised business 
delivery models, which rely on good agency relations. Adverse selection 
as observed in the failed TNE at Country N was due to the partner’s 
inability to manage language issues in delivery (Section 4.3.4.3). It is 
also observed in the University’s appointment of a new OP in Country V 
although it already was working with an existing, howbeit poorly 
performing OP in the V1 TNE operation. 
 
The story of V2 highlighted many examples of moral hazard, e.g., the 
creep in operational problems, the difficulty in ensuring OP teaching staff 
interaction with University unit coordinators, and the competing, 
substitute programs delivered by the OP. The University addressed 
these problems through the set up of an in-country HCO (Sections 
4.3.4.3.2 and 4.3.4.3.3). 
 
d) Agent’s Economic Incentives 
 
One of the many recommendations of the White Paper (Section 
4.4.1.3.1a) was the proposal to introduce a quality enhancement levy on 
students which will be applied to fund the appointment of 12 full-time 
academic staff and various ‘teaching and learning expertise’ at the HCO 
(University C TNE Project Team 2013b, 21). This is one example of the 
incentivisation of the agent to elicit behaviour that will advance the 
principal’s interests. The initial latitude provided by the University to the 
V2 OP in adopting the three-semester delivery schedule and the lecture-
tutorial classes are other observations of agent incentivisation for 
achieving the principal’s objectives. 
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The V2 OP was observed to have invested in bonding with the University 
through the provision of access to the OP’s regional marketing network 
for student recruitment, and the joint marketing in the two non-SEA 
countries (CF2). 
 
4.4.1.3.4 Findings on the Application of the Three Theories of the Firm in 
University C’s TNE Decisions 
 
The discussion on TCE reflectors in Section 4.4.1.3.1 showed that the 
University’s initial franchised business delivery model was an Outsourced 
Model that was ‘hands-off’, giving the OP much latitude in delivering the 
programs. The emergence of operational problems associated with rapid 
growth of student numbers triggered changes that modified the 
franchised arrangement, resulting in the internalizing of quality-related 
processes at the HCO in-country, e.g., approval of OP lecturers, 
academic staff support, and approval of marketing collaterals. The 
resulting model, which is a Direct Model, is neither a market structure 
(where the University engages the market directly from Australia) nor a 
hierarchy (under the University’s full ownership and control), but a hybrid 
structure that has moved closer to the hierarchy (post-restructure). 
 
The discussion in Section 4.4.1.3.2 on PRT reflectors demonstrated the 
high value both partners place on their respective property rights, and 
evidenced actions based on the exercise of their respective residual 
decision rights. There is thus sufficient support for PRT as a possible 
driver for the University’s choice of governance models, both before and 
after the set up of the HCO. 
 
The observations on AT reflectors in Section 4.4.1.3.3 indicate that the 
University could have developed its franchised TNE operations in the 
past based upon AT considerations. It is obvious that the University was 
more conscious of the low level of supervision and control over its TNE 
 258 
operations after it discovered the numerous logistical and quality issues 
accompanying the rapid growth of its V2 operations. It is subsequently 
more inclined to exert its property rights, and/or to minimise transaction 
costs in moving the TNE business delivery model towards a more tightly 
controlled franchised business delivery model. 
 
4.4.2 Cross-case Analysis of Plausibility of Theories 
 
After analysing individual universities, a cross-case study is made to 
compare and contrast the plausibility of the three theories of the firm on 
these universities’ TNE business delivery model decision-making 
processes. If found plausible, the theories will be tested against the 
propositional framework of Section 3.7.5 within two in-depth case studies 
as part of the second phase of this two-phase research process (Section 
3.7.5.7). 
 
The following cross-case analysis also point out what have emerged as 
unique tipping points in each of the Universities’ TNE journeys. 
 
4.4.2.1 Snapshots of Universities 
 
As discussed previously in Section 4.3.4.1, University A has a well-
developed portfolio of TNE operations. Its TNE initiatives started in the 
early 1980s. The University clearly learnt from its many previous TNE 
ventures to migrate from the early franchised programs to predominantly 
branch campus operations. This migration points to the classic TCE 
vertical integration shift. This shift is presumably due to the ‘labour 
intensive’ (AF3) nature of the franchised programs which were ‘not 
sustainable’ (AF1), the desire for ‘more control’ (AF5), heightened risk 
aversion (considering ‘our name at the gate’, AF1), and the need for 
relationship-specific investments (AF3). There was also weak evidence 
for PRT in the vertical integration shift. The University’s previous reliance 
on the franchised model seems to be underpinned by AT. 
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University B is a story of how a new Vice-Chancellor initiated a review of 
TNE operations, leading to a wrenching rationalisation of TNE 
operations. This rationalisation exercise resulted in a drastic shrinking of 
the TNE student population. A long-practiced pseudo TNE model, the 
‘licensed program’, which did not meet academic requirements, was 
discontinued at one TNE location, and modified for compliant delivery at 
three other locations.  
 
This University reflects the practice of AT more than the other theories 
due to the strong influence of the OPs in the TNE operations. Both TCE 
and PRT were not found to be sufficiently substantiated in the 
University’s TNE business delivery model decisions due to the absence 
of any relationship-specific investment, the lack of concern over the 
operating environment, and the seemingly cavalier attitude to conflict 
resolution. The noticeable drift (post-restructure) towards a collaborative 
model characterised by a higher degree of control (‘the hen laying eggs’ 
analogy of BF1) by the University reflects the University’s heightened risk 
aversion. The post-restructure franchised business delivery model 
continue to be driven by AT considerations. These observations were 
made possible by the rich discussion on TNE contracts.  
 
Pre-restructure, University B’s TNE business delivery model could be 
described as a ‘listen-to-partner’ franchised model, while the post-
restructure business model described as a ‘legalistic’ franchised model. 
This shift within the hybrid range of governance is observed to be a move 
from a more market-inclined model to a more hierarchy-inclined model.  
 
University C focus group provided rich insight into how the University 
reacted speedily to a TNE operation that was growing rapidly (CF1). 
Prior to the proactive decisions on the new HCO and TNE project team, 
the University seemed comfortable with its remotely-supervised 
franchised model, possibly underpinned by AT considerations. The 
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proactive decisions demonstrated the value of each partner’s property 
rights as acknowledged by the University and the OP – through the 
leverage of these rights, as well as the exercise of their residual rights of 
control within the collaboration. The post-restructure franchised model, 
which is characterised by in situ supervision by the HCO, could possibly 
be driven by either PRT and/or TCE considerations. 
 
The lean data from the University D informant did not provide sufficient 
basis for any meaningful consideration of the theoretical orientation of 
the University in making previous TNE business delivery model 
decisions. 
 
The single case findings are summarised in the table below to compare 
across the three universities. 
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No. Reflectors of Theories Uni 
A 
Uni 
B 
Uni 
C 
Remarks 
1 TCE Reflectors 
a Cost economisation Y Y Y  
b Information asymmetry Y Y Y  
c Incomplete contracting Y Y Y  
d Asset specificity Y N Y  
e Behavioural uncertainty Y Y Y  
f Environ uncertainty Y Y Y  
g Transaction costs Y Y Y  
h Transaction frequency Y Y Y  
i Governance structure Y Y Y  
2 PRT Reflectors 
a Cost economisation Y Y Y  
b Information asymmetry Y Y Y  
c Incomplete contracting Y Y Y  
d Asset specificity Y N Y  
e Ex ante incentives 
alignment ? Y Y 
Weakly supported at 
University A 
f Governance environ Y N Y  
g Property rights Y Y Y  
h Rent-seeking concerns Y Y Y  
i Ex post resolution Y ? Y  
3 AT Reflectors 
a Cost economisation Y Y Y  
b Information asymmetry Y Y Y  
c Ex ante incentives 
alignment ? Y Y 
Weakly supported at 
University A 
d Complete contracting Y Y Y  
e Risk aversion Y Y Y  
f Adverse selection Y Y Y  
g Moral hazard Y Y Y  
h Agent incentivisation Y Y Y  
 
Table 4.10   Identification of Theories of the Firm Demonstrated 
(Y – Yes; N – No; ? – Possibly; NR – Not referenced) 
 
4.4.2.2 Impact of Tipping Points on TNE Business Delivery Model 
Decisions 
 
All three universities experienced a distinct tipping point (Gladwell 2002; 
Grodzins 1957) distinctively impacting deployment of their TNE business 
delivery models, and by extension, their approach to, and preference for 
certain TNE delivery models. The influence of distinct tipping points on 
governance models is not unexpected, as argued by Kay ‘that modes of 
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coordination are influenced by the nature and timing of the decisions 
involved in the resource allocation process’ (Kay 1998, 2). 
 
Prior to its tipping point, University A deployed only Outsourced models 
(viz., franchised operations). AF6 rued the lack of control over FPs, and 
emphasised that ‘we want more and more control over the quality, and 
the way that they do that is they move’ towards the IBC model. AF6 
clarified that ‘the problem being the early days no one was thinking about 
this sort of side of it (i.e., higher levels of control) … everyone was 
thinking about that side (i.e., lower levels of control in FPs), and that’s 
what happened, but over time as the quality becomes more and more 
important, I think we felt that we needed more and more control. And so 
we moved to the other side’. After its tipping point, the University’s 
preferred model was a Direct model (i.e., the branch campus) which 
provided high levels of control over the teaching delivery, while retaining 
several Outsourced models (i.e., franchised operations) for specific 
purposes. Subsequent secondary data analysis on the set up of 
University A’s country T international branch campus traced the 
University’s shift in model preference to the effecting of an amendment to 
the Act of State Parliament regulating its set up and operation (Murray 
2011a, 17). This amendment set the stage for the University to embrace 
the IBC model from that point on. 
 
University B operated weakly supervised (or ‘just listen to the partner’) 
franchised operations (Outsourced model) prior to its tipping point, but 
shifted to what it considered to be a tightly-controlled, but still an 
Outsourced model of ‘legalistic’ franchised operations (BF3). BF3 
described how ‘the University went into this massive expansion and it all 
sounded good’. This expansion was driven mainly by the University’s 
partners, as BF1 explained ‘we don’t know how business is run … we 
just listen to the partner’. The University later discovered numerous 
problems, including serious non-compliance with both AUQA and 
overseas regulations (Section 4.3.4.2.5) – when it was in the process of 
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preparing for the 2008 AUQA Cycle 2 audit (‘we started closing down a 
lot of the offshore stuff ready for AUQA … to hide a lot of the problems 
that would have been very open’ – BF3). BF1 explained that ‘all 
problems boil down to the tension … between the market pressure and 
academic pressure ... in the last ten years, we seem to yield a little bit too 
much to the market pressure ... maybe too much to the point that there 
will be no quality at all’.  
 
At the time of the focus group discussions, BF3 reported that ‘we’ve just 
gone through the clean-up phase’, referring to the closure of several TNE 
operations. This clean-up was also accompanied by the setting up of 
‘proper due diligence’, and a more proactive TNE initiation where ‘instead 
of them coming to us, we will go out and we’ve already made this 
recommendation, that the University puts money together to go out and 
use someone … who could specialise in … looking at the country … the 
regulatory requirements or changes within that country ... the best model 
for that country ... the partner and how and why are they structured … 
and then you try and match someone with our values to their values 
...(that) they’re not only in it for the money, not for profit’ (BF3). Apart 
from instituting proactive business development and ‘mission critical’ due 
diligence, the University also formalised a new 27-step service checklist 
to manage the ‘massive’ implementation – since ‘we were very good at 
signing the contracts but we’re not very good at the implementation’ 
(BF3). 
 
Similar to University B, University C made the shift from a remotely-
monitored form of ‘pretty much hands-off’ franchised operation (r-FP) 
(Outsourced Model) to what it considered an in situ monitored form of 
franchised operation (i-FP) (Direct Model) with high levels of control over 
the operations and the OP. The University responded to its ‘very 
phenomenal’ growth at the V2 TNE operations by reviewing the 
‘capacity, cost and delivery’ of its TNE operations because ‘the number 
of students … (that had grown) astronomically’ (CF1) had ‘evolved into a 
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very large beast’ (CF2), and was potentially threatening the credibility 
and revenue streams of the University (University C TNE Project Team 
2013b). The urgency of the ‘very phenomenal’ growth was so urgent that 
the host country office (HCO) at Country V, one of the first 
recommendations of the TNE review team, was set up even before the 
report (i.e., White Paper) was published – ‘to ensure that quality is not 
compromised with its growth’ (CF2). The resulting White Paper also had 
wide-ranging impact on all aspects of its TNE operations, including a 
review of TNE contracts to bring them to ‘ensure consistency’ with the 
new model (CF2). 
 
4.4.2.3 Plausibility of the Theories of the Firm in Driving TNE Business 
Delivery Model Decisions 
 
As summarised in Table 4.10, all three theories of the firm found support 
in the decisions of Universities A and C to utilise either the Direct or 
Outsourced Models for TNE delivery (also see Table 4.11 below). 
University B seems to be particularly driven by AT in its TNE business 
model decisions. TCE and PRT were not sufficiently supported in the 
decisions of University B.  
 
The focus group discussions uncovered an interesting phenomenon, viz., 
that all three Universities experienced fairly well-defined tipping points 
(Gladwell 2002; Grodzins 1957) during their respective TNE journeys. 
University A’s tipping point was when the University started its first 
branch campus, while University B’s was characterised by the new VC’s 
TNE review which coincided with internal audits to prepare for an 
external AUQA audit. University A’s tipping point demonstrated the 
University’s strategic decision-making when confronted with a major TNE 
opportunity, while University B was a story of proactive governance. 
University C’s tipping point was triggered by the discovery of serious 
problems arising from the phenomenal growth of one of its TNE 
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operations, and demonstrated a reactionary approach to a potentially 
damaging operational threat. 
 
It was interesting to observe that different theories seem to be at play 
during different periods of the Universities’ TNE involvement, and 
specifically before and after their TNE tipping points. This can be 
attributed to the Universities’ growing organisational knowledge of, and 
experience in TNE, and the impact of the external industry environment. 
 
All three theories of the firm have been reported by the focus groups to, 
in some extent, possibly underpin the Universities’ TNE decisions at 
different periods of their TNE operations, as summarised in Table 4.11. 
The in-depth interviews will thus test for the impact of these theories on 
the longevity of specific TNE business delivery models. 
 
No. Univer
-sity 
In Relation 
to Tipping 
Point 
Type of TNE Business 
Delivery Model 
Direct/ 
Outsourced 
Possible 
Rationale for 
Model 
Selection 
1 A 
Before Franchised (remote oversight) (r-FP) O AT 
After 
Franchised (remote 
oversight) (r-FP) O AT 
Collaborative IBC 
(c-IBC)  D 
TCE (or 
weak PRT) 
2 B 
Before Franchised (‘listen-to-partner’) (r-FP) O AT 
After Franchised (‘legalistic’) (r-FP) D AT 
3 C 
Before Franchised (remote oversight) (r-FP) O AT 
After Franchised (in situ oversight) (i-FP) D PRT or TCE 
 
Table 4.11   University Theoretical Perspectives in Deploying TNE  
      Business Delivery Models 
 
4.4.2.4 Potential for Rival Theory 
 
University B’s Country X TNE initiation, and the closure of one of Country 
V’s TNE operations were clear demonstrations of the new Vice-
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Chancellor’s active involvement in the University’s TNE operations 
(Section 4.3.4.2.5). The revamp of the University’s TNE operations 
through the new Vice-Chancellor’s direct appointees also points to the 
influence of senior University management in TNE decisions. 
Interestingly, these direct interventions provide some evidence for a rival 
theory, viz., the Upper Echelon Theory which ascribes organisational 
outcomes to the characteristics and leadership styles of senior decision-
makers (Hambrick and Mason 1984). 
 
There was however, no evidence of this rival theory in the other 
universities’ TNE operations. Further, there was no evidence in any of 
the three focus groups for profit maximisation, a key assumption of the 
Resource-based View (Kim and Mahoney 2005, 224). 
 
4.5 Refined Propositional Framework for Case Study Evaluation 
 
The focus group exercise provided rich description of the operation of 
TNEs at three different Australian government-funded universities. The 
exercise was designed to test the validity of the theoretical TNE decision 
construct, confirm the importance of components of the TNE value chain, 
and evaluate the plausibility of each of the three theories of the firm in 
TNE business delivery model decisions. 
 
4.5.1 Focus Group Findings 
 
The three universities currently have codified TNE start-up processes, 
including clear due diligence processes. All three universities recognise 
the merits of both the Direct Model as well as the Outsourced Model of 
TNE delivery, and are inclined towards the Direct Model for better control 
of the operations. While there is an inclination towards the Direct Model, 
the universities also acknowledge the high costs and greater risks 
associated with this Model. The three universities have had about 20 to 
30 years of TNE experience each. Early forays into TNE were marked by 
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unplanned initiatives, poor due diligence, and weak governance. These 
early experiences provided the base for organisational learning and 
codification of various TNE processes. Current due diligence processes 
incorporated market surveys, environmental scanning and internal 
capacity mapping.  
 
Organisational learning at University A was observed to have plausibly 
influenced its TNE decision process from one that is AT-motivated to one 
that is both AT- and TCE-motivated. Both universities B and C were 
observed to have been driven by AT in their past TNE business delivery 
models. University B is observed to continue to be driven by AT 
considerations in its current TNE operations, while University C possibly 
driven by TCE and/or PRT considerations for its current TNE operations.  
 
While the Resource-based View can possibly be discounted as a 
motivation for these universities’ TNE business delivery model decisions, 
there is some evidence that the Upper Echelon Theory might have some 
traction in two TNE operations at University B.  
 
The focus group observations have prima facie addressed the first 
research question, and partially, the second research question on the 
criteria that these universities use in deciding between the Direct Model 
and Outsourced Model. 
 
4.5.2 Testing of Propositions Based on Theories of the Firm 
 
The next phase of the research will take the study deeper through further 
secondary data analysis and in-depth interviews to explore the research 
questions more thoroughly. Building on focus group data, the in-depth 
interviews will be directed at three different university staff perspectives 
(viz., strategic and planning, management, and academic) within the two 
universities selected in Section 3.7.4.2. These interviews will be 
 268 
complemented by secondary data analysis as part of data triangulation 
for the assurance of validity. 
 
The focus group analyses of Universities A and C disclosed the 
occurrence of tipping points during the course of the universities’ TNE 
journeys. University A’s tipping point was the period when it first 
commenced branch campus operations in Country T; from then on, the 
University was more inclined to operate branch campuses, although still 
entertaining small franchised operations. University C’s tipping point was 
when it discovered serious operational issues arising from the 
unprecedented growth of one of its Country V TNE operations. These 
operational issues threatened the credibility and TNE revenue of the 
University, and led to the set up of a host country office (HCO) to better 
monitor its Country V TNE operations, and the commissioning of a TNE 
project team to review its entire TNE infrastructure. 
 
The propositional framework developed in Section 3.7.5 is therefore 
adapted in Table 4.12, to accommodate these Universities’ tipping points 
vis-à-vis their TNE business delivery models; viz., their decisions pre- 
and post-tipping points.  
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No. Business 
Delivery Model 
Outcome 
Theoretical Antecedents Operating Environment 
1 
Direct (pre-
tipping point) 
TCE 
a) High asset specificity 
b) High level of behavioral uncertainty 
c) High transaction frequency 
High level of business 
and legal-political 
uncertainty 
PRT 
a) Mission critical resources controlled by 
the university 
b) Risk of opportunism is high 
c) Information asymmetry is high 
High level of maturity of 
socio-legal-political 
environment 
Direct (post-
tipping point) 
AT 
a) High costs of search and/or monitoring 
b) Low university risk aversion for TNE 
activity 
c) Low incentive alignment 
Low level of maturity of 
legal-political 
environment 
2 
Outsourced 
(pre-tipping 
point) 
TCE 
a) Low asset specificity 
b) Low level of behavioral uncertainty 
c) Low transaction frequency 
Low level of business 
and legal-political 
uncertainty 
PRT 
a) Mission critical resources controlled by 
the OP 
b) Risk of opportunism is low 
c) Information asymmetry is low 
High level of maturity of 
socio-legal-political 
environment 
Outsourced 
(post-tipping 
point) 
AT 
a) Low costs of search and/or monitoring 
b) High university risk aversion for TNE 
activity 
c) High incentive alignment 
High level of maturity of 
legal-political 
environment 
 
Table 4.12   Refined Propositional Framework for TNE Delivery  
     Model Selection 
 
4.5.3 Coding Framework for Testing of Propositions 
 
A coding framework has been developed to guide the extraction of 
valuable information, stories, themes, concepts and reflectors. This 
framework has been modified from Table 4.9. Each of the three theories 
will be tested using the propositional framework of Table 4.12, 
comprising three defining propositions for each theory. 
 
While the focus group studies were designed to test for the Universities’ 
possible theoretical perspectives on TNE organisation, the in-depth semi-
structured interviews were more specifically focused on examining the 
extent to which each of the three theories of the firm drives the 
Universities’ TNE business delivery model selection (research question 
2), and influences the longevity of the TNE operations (research question 
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3). In addition to testing the propositions, there is a need to ensure that 
all reflectors of each theory (Table 4.10) are also demonstrated in the 
TNE practices of each university. This is part of the study’s triangulation 
of data and concepts, and assurance of rigor. 
 
The focus group study has ascertained that all reflectors of TCE have 
been observed in the TNE operations of Universities A and C. The 
interview analyses will thus focus on the reflectors represented by the 
four defining propositions for TCE, viz., asset specificity, behavioural 
uncertainty, frequency of transactions, and environmental uncertainty 
(Table 4.13). 
 
Testing of PRT in the focus group of University A showed that all PRT 
reflectors are sufficiently observed in the University’s TNE operations, 
except ex ante incentives alignment – which was not sufficiently 
demonstrated. The interview analysis of University A will thus test all the 
propositions of Table 4.12, plus the presence of ex ante incentives 
alignment. 
 
All PRT reflectors in the focus group study of University C were 
demonstrated. The interview analysis will thus focus solely on the four 
PRT propositions in Table 4.12. 
 
The focus group study of University A demonstrated the presence of all 
AT reflectors, except ex ante incentives alignment – which was weakly 
supported, possibly due to the lack of insight of the informants with 
regards to OP (offshore provider) perspectives. This is a critical reflector, 
which was identified as the basis of one of the propositions of AT, viz., 
the level of incentives alignment (Table 4.12). On the other hand, the 
focus group study of University C indicated the presence of all AT 
reflectors. Hence, the interview analyses of both universities will focus 
solely on the four AT propositions (Table 4.12). 
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As in the focus group data collection, these codes were identified through 
an analysis of the three areas of university characteristics, value chain 
activities and the operating environment, in keeping with the theoretical 
construct developed (see Table 3.9). The coding framework of Table 
4.13 will form the basis for axial and selective coding (See Section 
3.7.8.2). 
 
No. Reflectors 
of Theories 
University Codes Utilised 
Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 Code 4 Code 5 
A TCE Reflectors 
A 
Asset 
specificity 
(TCE-
ASpA) 
[4.4.1.1.1d] 
Behavioral 
uncertainty 
(TCE-
BeUA) 
[4.4.1.1.1e] 
Transaction 
frequency 
(TCE-FrTA) 
 
[4.4.1.1.1g] 
Bus-legal-
political 
uncertainty 
(TCE-EnUA) 
[4.4.1.1.1e] 
Transaction 
costs (TCE-
TrCA) 
 
[4.4.1.1.1f] 
C 
Asset 
specificity 
(TCE-
ASpC) 
[4.4.1.3.1d] 
Behavioral 
uncertainty 
(TCE-
BeUC) 
[4.4.1.3.1e] 
Transaction 
frequency 
(TCE-FrTC) 
 
[4.4.1.3.1g] 
Bus-legal-
political 
uncertainty 
(TCE-EnUC) 
[4.4.1.3.1e] 
Transaction 
costs (TCE-
TrCC) 
 
[4.4.1.3.1f] 
B PRT Reflectors 
A 
Mission-
critical 
resources 
(PRT-
MCRA) 
[4.4.1.1.2c] 
Opportu-
nism  
(PRT-
OppA) 
 
[4.4.1.1.2d] 
Information 
asymmetry 
(PRT-InAA) 
 
 
[4.4.1.1.1b] 
Ex ante 
incentives 
alignment 
(THE-EAIA) 
 
[4.4.1.1.2a] 
Socio-legal-
political 
maturity 
(PRT-
GvEA) 
[4.4.1.1.2b] 
C 
Mission-
critical 
resources 
(PRT-
MCRC) 
[4.4.1.3.2c] 
Opportu-
nism  
(PRT-
OppC) 
 
[4.4.1.3.2d] 
Information 
asymmetry 
(PRT-InAC) 
 
 
[4.4.1.3.1b] 
Socio-legal-
political 
maturity 
(PRT-GvEC) 
 
[4.4.1.3.2b] 
 
C AT Reflectors 
A 
Search/ 
Monitoring 
Costs 
(AT-CosA) 
[4.4.1.1.3c] 
University 
Risk 
aversion 
(AT-RAvA) 
[4.4.1.1.3a] 
Ex ante 
incentives 
alignment 
(THE-EAIA) 
[4.4.1.1.2a] 
Legal-
political 
maturity (AT-
LPMA) 
[4.4.1.1.2b] 
 
C 
Search/ 
Monitoring 
Costs 
(AT-CosC) 
[4.4.1.3.3c] 
University 
Risk 
aversion 
(AT-RAvC) 
[4.4.1.3.3a] 
Ex ante 
incentives 
alignment 
(THE-EAIC) 
[4.4.1.3.2a] 
Legal-
political 
maturity  
(AT-LPMC) 
[4.4.1.3.2b] 
 
 
Table 4.13   Coding Framework for Interview Analyses 
(with each reflector referenced according to the sub-sections in Section 4.4.1) 
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4.5.4 Focus Group Knowledge Gaps 
 
The secondary data analysis and in-depth interviews will also seek to 
clarify questions, and fill in gaps arising from the focus group study. 
These questions and gaps are classified below. 
 
No. Component of 
Construct 
Question or Knowledge Gap 
1 University 
Characteristics 
a) Is the type and size of university key factors in TNE 
business delivery model selection? 
b) Is the university’s TNE growth rate a key factor in TNE 
business delivery model selection? 
2 TNE Environment a) Are new entrants one of the key factors in TNE business 
delivery model selection? 
b) Do differences in host country regulatory environments have 
any impact on TNE business delivery model selection? 
3 Value Chain 
Activities 
a) Are academic support/student services mission-critical 
processes in TNE delivery? 
b) Are career placement and alumni relations mission-critical 
processes in TNE delivery? 
c) How comprehensive are commercial contracts in governing 
TNE collaborations? 
4 Operating periods a) Investigate the nature of each University’s TNE tipping point 
experience. 
5 Follow-up questions 
on University A 
a) To clarify the nature of the university’s branch campuses, 
e.g., ownership and reporting lines. 
b) Update TNE developments since the focus group study. 
c) To clarify the nature of employment of IBC staff – are they 
‘partner staff’ as quoted by participant AF4 (Section 
4.3.4.1.2)? 
6 Follow-up questions 
on University C 
a) To enquire about the impact of the University’s TNE review 
project on current TNE operations. 
b) To explore TNE perspectives from staff with strategic and 
planning, and academic responsibilities. 
c) Update TNE developments since the focus group study. 
 
Table 4.14   Questions and Gaps from Focus Group Study  
 
4.5.5 Semi-structured Interview Question Guide 
 
The above objectives have been encapsulated in a series of semi-
structured interview questions posed across the Direct Model-
Outsourced Model dichotomy, and repeated for both current and 
terminated TNE operations. Not all questions will be applicable to 
university staff of each of the three areas of responsibilities (viz., 
strategic and planning, management, and academic). For example, 
academic staff are not expected to be privy to the corporate and financial 
nature of the TNE operations, while senior executives will likely be 
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unable to comment in-depth on academic processes. These questions 
are reproduced in Appendix F. They are part of the in-depth interview 
aide memoire to guide both the researcher and the interviewee. 
 
4.6 Chapter 4 Conclusions 
 
This chapter completes the focus group study, the first phase of the two-
phase research investigation (Section 3.7.5.7). As expected, the focus 
group study confirmed the construct validity of the TNE Decision Model 
Construct as presented in Fig. 3.2 (Section 3.7.3). However, the Value 
Chain for TNE have had to be refined in light of findings from the focus 
groups, and presented for use in the next phase of the study as Fig. 4.6 
(Section 4.3.6).  
 
The focus groups were also designed to evaluate the plausibility of each 
of the three theories of the firm in driving business delivery model 
decisions in each of the three universities’ TNE operations. The study 
identified unique tipping points in the TNE journey of each of the three 
universities studied. In the process, the study also discovered that 
different theories potentially motivate different delivery model decisions 
that were taken before and after these tipping points.  
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Chapter 5  Qualitative Case Study Analyses 
 
The focus group study provided evidence for supporting the TNE 
decision model construct, and identifying key value chain activities that 
are core to TNE operations (Section 4.5.1). It also evidenced the 
possible theoretical drivers (amongst the three theories of the firm) for 
each of the three focus group universities.  
 
Anchored on a constructivist research paradigm to elicit rich data and 
enable in-depth understanding of the TNE experience of each University 
and across the two Universities respectively, this chapter completes the 
two-phase research study through the corroboration of secondary data 
and in-depth interview analyses. 
 
Following the focus group analyses, there were however, a few elements 
of the construct that still require further corroboration and clarification. 
These include university characteristics, TNE operating environment, 
selected value chain activities, operating periods and specific focus 
group study gaps in Universities A and C (Table 4.14). 
 
The secondary data analysis of Section 5.2 investigated university 
characteristics, TNE operating environments and operating periods 
through an analysis of the positioning and performance of Universities A 
and C within Australian public universities, and the operating 
environments within which Universities A and C deliver TNE programs. 
 
The analyses of in-depth, semi-structured interviews of executives 
responsible for TNE at Universities A and C scrutinised these informants’ 
re-constructions of the respective University’s TNE experience. Their 
perspectives of these lived TNE experiences provide the lens to 
investigate the theories of the firm that may have driven these 
Universities’ TNE decisions and fill in the remaining gaps of the focus 
group study (Appendices I and J), while also exploring perspectives on 
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university characteristics, value chain activities, TNE operating 
environments and operating periods. This analysis will take the form of 
single case studies of Universities A and C (Section 5.4), followed by a 
cross-case study of both Universities (Chapter 6). 
 
Informed by focus group findings, the following Section (Section 5.1) 
outlines a priori expectations of the plausibility of one or more theories of 
the firm driving each University’s TNE decisions before and after each 
University’s TNE tipping point. The multiple case study of Chapter 6 will 
test these expectations. 
 
5.1 A Priori Expectations for University Choice of TNE Models 
 
Building on the focus group studies, an a priori set of expectations is 
formulated for each university, based on the propositions laid out in 
Table 4.12. These expectations will later (in the case studies) be 
compared to the empirically-generated cases of the universities’ 
theoretical drivers for selecting the TNE business delivery models. This 
comparison exercise is part of the pattern-matching analytic technique 
described in Section 3.7.8.3. 
 
5.1.1 Possible Theoretical Drivers for University A 
 
The focus group studies (Table 4.11) indicated that AT was the possible 
theoretical driver for franchised TNE operations both before and after the 
University’s tipping point. The collaborative branch campus (c-IBC) was 
observed to be driven by TCE, or possibly PRT. 
 
5.1.1.1 AT as Driver for the Outsourced Business Delivery Model 
 
Franchised operations are classified as Outsourced Models. They 
usually offer a small number of programs to small student populations 
(AF5 : ‘if it’s a very narrow opportunity … for one discipline, it’s more 
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likely going to be a twinning program’). These small operations may be 
considered low risk operations, as alluded to by AF1 and AF5. 
 
The focus group study showed that the University has developed very 
robust and comprehensive due diligence and monitoring infrastructure, 
through its long experience in the delivery of TNE. It is expected that the 
University will, compared with other less experienced universities, incur 
lower costs assessing the suitability of potential OPs, and monitoring the 
performance of appointed OPs for franchised operations (AF1).  
 
It’s comprehensive contracts, coupled with the robust due diligence and 
monitoring infrastructure, has also led some focus group participants 
(AF1 : ‘contract drawn up … we don’t just start courses that are 
unviable’; ‘spell it out, step by step … what’s required … risk … financial 
… quality assurance … facilities … legal’; ‘triennial … reviews … which 
are more comprehensive’; AF5 : ‘do a complete assessment’; AF6 : ‘a lot 
more policing’; ‘we need more control’) to rely on contractual agreements 
for assurance of OP performance (complete contracting within a mature 
legal-political environment). 
 
The OPs for franchised operations are usually driven by the opportunity 
to make a profit from the collaboration. While the University is expected 
to also insist on financial sustainability, it sometimes will have other 
strategic objectives, such as branding and onshore student transfers (as 
demonstrated by the focus group study). The franchised operation will 
come to fruition when the partners can find an alignment of their 
incentives through the collaboration. 
 
The University’s tipping point in 1999 was characterised by the change in 
the Act of State Parliament permitting it to operate offshore campuses. 
This tipping point is not expected to impact the University’s approach to 
franchised TNE operations. The University’s preference for the 
Outsourced Model (represented by the franchised model) is expected 
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therefore, to hold for TNE operations initiated both before and after the 
tipping point.  
 
TCE is not expected to underpin the University’s selection of the 
franchised model because of the absence of any need for investing in 
relationship-specific assets. This may be observed in the highly asset-
light nature of the usually small franchised operations. 
 
Franchised operations are typically remotely monitored, and hence 
vulnerable to opportunistic behaviours, amidst an environment of 
heightened information asymmetry. Under PRT, such conditions will 
usually lead to a direct mode of governance (i.e., IBC). The University’s 
choice of the Outsourced Model, represented by franchised operations, 
cannot therefore be underpinned by PRT considerations. 
 
5.1.1.2 TCE as Alternative Driver for the Direct Business Delivery 
Model 
 
The choice of the Direct Model, as represented by the IBC, is only 
applicable after the 1999 tipping point. In fact, the tipping point was the 
result of the University’s endeavour in setting up its first IBC.  
 
IBCs are high investment ventures that are also very risky (AF1 : ‘it’s 
much more risky’; AF5 : ‘big investment’). There is a need for high levels 
of investment in relationship-specific assets, e.g., buildings, equipment, 
laboratories and licensing. If the level of behavioural uncertainty on the 
part of the OP is very high, transaction frequency is high, and the 
uncertainty in the business/legal-political environment is very high, but 
the rewards are sufficiently high (low transaction costs), the traditional 
TCE approach will result in the classic vertical integration, using the 
wholly-controlled IBC. 
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Universities A and C have been found to avoid internalizing the TNE 
operation (through a wholly-controlled IBC) because of the high 
transaction costs and high risks. However, University A resorted to a 
hybrid governance model that is inclined towards higher levels of control, 
viz., the collaborative IBC (c-IBC). This inclination is all the more 
attractive when the level of behavioural uncertainty on the part of the OP 
is moderate, and when the business and/or legal-political environment 
(within which the TNE operation is run) is seen by the University as 
moderately unfamiliar.  
 
The University’s choice of c-IBCs (a Direct Model) has been observed to 
be accompanied by high asset specificity, moderate behavioural 
uncertainty (mitigated by long running relationships and high trust levels), 
high transaction frequency (necessitating close scrutiny), and amidst 
some measure of business/legal-political uncertainty. Under such 
circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the University’s 
approach has been underpinned by TCE considerations. 
 
5.1.1.3 PRT as Alternative Driver for the Direct Business Delivery 
Model 
 
PRT can be an underpinning driver for the selection of certain 
governance models by universities, when there is an environment of 
information asymmetry and high levels of concern over opportunism by 
the OP, but also characterised by high levels of maturity in the legal-
political infrastructure. As discussed in Section 5.1.1.1, PRT is unlikely to 
drive Outsourced Models of TNE operation. Could PRT underpin 
University A’s preference for Direct Models? 
 
TNE operations are typically characterised by vulnerability to 
opportunism and information asymmetry because of the large distances 
between the University and the TNE operations, and the differences in 
legal and cultural practices (AF1 : ‘what type of operations work in that 
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country’; AF5 : ‘often regulations would prohibit us doing it on our own’; 
‘we look at political and economic risks in that country’). According to 
PRT, it is therefore crucial that the University has control over the TNE’s 
mission-critical resources, and that this control can be upheld by formal 
legal rules and/or customary conventions in the jurisdiction of operation 
(for the TNE operation to succeed). This type of governance model is 
inclined towards the hierarchy (w-IBC), or at least towards a highly 
controlled hybrid governance model (c-IBC), both being Direct Models. If 
it can be demonstrated that the university has control over most of the 
mission-critical resources of the TNE operation, within a sufficiently 
mature legal-political environment, PRT can be said to have underpinned 
that model selection. 
 
5.1.2 Possible Theoretical Drivers for University C 
 
Similar to the focus group study of University A, the focus group study of 
University C indicate that AT possibly underpins the University’s 
selection of the franchised (remote oversight) model (r-FP) (Outsourced 
Model) prior to its tipping point, while PRT or TCE underpin the selection 
of the franchised (in situ oversight) model (i-FP) after its tipping point.  
 
It is worth noting that the TNE tipping point for University C was triggered 
by a phenomenal increase in its TNE student population the year before. 
It led to the set up of a team to review and strengthen its TNE 
infrastructure. The resulting White Paper is interesting in that there is a 
good balance between the upholding of high academic standards of 
delivery, and the aspiration for the protection of a ‘significant revenue 
stream’ as demonstrated by the financial projection scenarios considered 
(University C TNE Project Team 2013a, 4). The report underscores the 
University’s priority for high quality TNE operations that deliver healthy 
financial returns – an indication of the University’s preference for strong 
alignment of incentives with the OP. 
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Referring to Section 4.4.2.2, the focus group study of University C 
revealed that the franchised TNE operations can be classified as 
franchised with remote oversight (r-FP), and franchised with in situ 
oversight (i-FP). While the r-FP model remains an Outsourced Model, the 
i-FP model can be considered a Direct Model due to the enhanced 
control over the TNE operation and OP.  
 
5.1.2.1 AT as Driver for the Outsourced Business Delivery Model 
 
Participant CF2 rued the fact that the University did not have sufficiently 
robust due diligence processes (‘I am sure somebody would do some 
due diligence, but it just wasn’t a formal process’), and that decisions on 
TNE start-ups were executed at the ‘Chancellery level’. He also 
remarked that there was insufficient ‘consistency’ in the processes and 
policies governing TNE administration. This perspective reflects an 
environment of perceived low search and monitoring costs. 
 
The termination of the small Country N bi-lingual TNE operation due to 
quality and delivery issues seems to reflect some measure of risk 
aversion on the part of the University, although that jurisdiction has very 
stringent and possibly archaic regulations governing TNE.  
 
The two focus group participants also hinted at the discovery of 
misalignment of incentives in this TNE operation. CF1 commented that 
‘they all had to be translated’; CF2 agreed, saying ‘bi-lingual is always 
difficult’. It was obvious, from the fact that the bi-lingual TNE operation 
lasted eight years, that there was an acceptable level of incentive 
alignment at the onset. 
 
The above circumstances seem to provide support for AT as a driver for 
the University’s choice of the r-FP model, an Outsourced Model. 
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The small Country N r-FP operation was an asset-light mode of delivery 
which does not require much relationship-specific investment, thus 
negating TCE as a driver. There was insufficient information on the 
control of mission-critical resources by the University, and thus no clear 
conclusions can be drawn about PRT as a driver for this mode of 
delivery.  
 
5.1.2.2 PRT as Alternative Driver for the Direct Business Delivery 
Model 
 
The Direct Model adopted by University C in Country V was the i-FP  
model. The in situ monitoring of the operations and the OP seems to 
indicate the University’s concern over possible opportunism, amidst 
some measure of information asymmetry (CF2 : ‘we are likely to teachout 
if we do not feel that the partners are on the same page as us’). It was 
also clear that the University retained control over many mission-critical 
resources, e.g., academic faculty that was employed by the OP (CF2 : 
‘greater engagement and academic oversight’). Given that the local 
jurisdiction of the Country V TNE operation is very mature and stringent, 
the choice of an in situ monitored franchise, a hybrid governance model 
(Direct Model) fits well with PRT thinking. 
 
In view of the high risk aversion of the University and high incentives 
alignment between the partners, it is not likely that AT underpinned any 
Direct Model selection. 
 
5.1.2.3 TCE as Alternative Driver for the Direct Business Delivery 
Model 
 
It is worth noting that the i-FP mode of delivery at V2 in Country V was 
initiated in 2013, about five years after the TNE operation commenced. 
The host country office (HCO) was established as an in situ monitor in 
response to the phenomenal growth of the operations. This University 
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response reflects the increased transaction frequency, and some 
concerns over the OP’s capabilities and capacity to serve a large student 
population. 
 
Running a HCO obviously involves investing in relationship-specific 
assets such as office space, equipment and specialised staffing. The use 
of a HCO is a hybrid governance strategy, that allows the University 
greater oversight and control, but avoids the high costs of vertical 
integration. 
 
Given the high level of maturity of the business/legal-political 
environment in Country V, the University’s Direct Model choice of the i-
FP mode of delivery can be attributed to TCE considerations. 
 
5.2 Secondary Data Analyses 
 
This Section investigates the Australian public university TNE sector 
through a secondary data survey of these universities’ TNE performance, 
and of the nature of the operating environments within which such TNE 
programs operate. The secondary data analyses aim to provide data 
triangulation to corroborate the findings of both the focus groups and in-
depth interviews of Universities A and C. 
 
These analyses were based on data obtained from publicly available 
sources, viz., the universities’ annual reports, the Australian Department 
of Education and Training reports, AUQA reports, TEQSA reports and 
other authenticated sources. TEQSA was contacted to request access to 
the archived AUQA audit reports (AUQA 2011a). In the course of the 
data collection, freedom of information requests have had to also be 
made for access to Australian tertiary institutions’ International Education 
Activity Profiles quoted in the TEQSA 2016 – 2017 annual report 
(TEQSA 2017b); these were duly provided with some redaction (TEQSA 
2017a). 
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5.2.1 The Australian Public University TNE Sector 
 
Both Universities A and C focus groups recognised the influence of ‘type 
of university’ on TNE decisions, while only University A focus group 
reflected on the impact of university size on TNE operations (Section 
4.3.5.2). This section explores the TNE student populations and 
revenues of Australian public universities to assess if university type and 
size might indicate trends in TNE activity and preference for TNE 
business delivery model. 
 
The tabulation of the total student population of Australian public 
universities involved in TNE (Table 5.1) shows that TNE activity (both 
IBCs and other TNE forms) is concentrated in the smaller universities. 
 
No. Type of 
TNE Model 
Total Student Population in 2015 
1st Quartile 
(14,592–28,461) 
2nd Quartile 
(28,462-42,331) 
3rd Quartile 
(42,332-56,201) 
4th Quartile 
(56,202-70,071) 
1 Branch 
Campus 
Victoria (27,138) 
Murdoch (23,241) 
JCU (21,616) 
SUT (37,141) 
Newcastle (35,416) 
UoW (31,687) 
Curtin (50,648) Monash (70,071) 
RMIT (60,086) 
2 Others ECU (26,937) 
UWA (25,133) 
Flinders (24,334) 
Murdoch (23,241) 
Canberra (17,020) 
FedU (15,118) 
SCU (14,592) 
CSU (40,095) 
SUT (37,141) 
LaTrobe (35,718) 
UTas (32,149) 
UoW (31,687) 
UniSA (31,485) 
Griffith (46,017) 
Curtin (50,648) 
Monash (70,071) 
RMIT (60,086) 
 
Table 5.1   Size of Australian Public Universities Engaged in TNE  
      (Department of Education and Training 2015a) 
 
The next tabulation (Table 5.2) compares the universities’ student 
populations and TNE revenue for 2015. The tabulation seems to indicate 
that universities within the ATN, IRU and Others categories have the 
highest TNE student populations. While these categories also have 
correspondingly higher onshore international students, the G8 
universities record the highest onshore international student populations 
but the second-lowest offshore international students. It is also not 
surprising that the RUN universities operate only Outsourced Models of 
TNE, having the lowest TNE student populations. 
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In terms of TNE revenue as a proportion of total revenue, the IRU 
universities average the highest at 9%. This is followed by the ATN 
universities at 7%, and the RUN and Others at 6%. The G8 universities 
average the lowest at 4%. 
 
No. University TNE/ 
Total 
Revenue 
(%) 
Student Proportion Type of 
TNE 
Model 
Onshore/ 
Total 
(%) 
Offshore/ 
Total 
(%) 
Offshore/ 
Interna-
tional (%) 
A ATN 7% avg 19% 9% 26%  
1 RMIT University 10% 19% 26% 59% B, O 
2 Curtin University 4% 16% 15% 48% B, O 
3 University of South Australia NA 16% 13% 19% O 
B G8 4% avg 25% 3% 9%  
1 Monash University 1% 22% 15% 40% B, O 
2 University of Western Australia 7% 15% 4% 21% O 
C IRU 9% avg 15% 9% 32%  
1 The University of Newcastle 2% 10% 5% 32% B 
2 La Trobe University 9% 19% 3% 16% O 
3 Murdoch University 24% 8% 34% 80% B, O 
4 Flinders University 9% 11% 8% 41% O 
5 James Cook University 8% 16% 13% 45% B 
6 Griffith University 3% 17% 2% 11% O 
D RUN 6% avg 18% 2% 8%  
1 Southern Cross University 9% 10% 4% 29% O 
2 Federation University Australia 3% 39% 9% 18% O 
E Others 6% avg 15% 6% 22%  
1 Charles Sturt University 8% 14% 5% 25% O 
2 The University of Wollongong 7% 18% 23% 56% B, O 
3 Swinburne University of Technology 1% 14% 10% 41% B, O 
4 Victoria University 13% 17% 19% 53% O 
5 Edith Cowan University 3% 14% 2% 12% O 
6 University of Tasmania NA 12% 5% 28% O 
7 University of Canberra 7% 19% 5% 19% O 
Abbreviations :  
1) B (international branch campus); O (business delivery models other than 
international branch campuses, e.g., franchised programs) 
2) ATN (Australian Technology Network) G8 (Group of Eight); IRU (Innovative 
Research Universities); RUN (Regional Universities Network); Others (Other 
universities not categorised elsewhere) 
3) Revenue averages could not be computed due to some missing university data 
 
Table 5.2   Profiles of TNE at Australian Public Universities 
(extracted from the universities’ annual reports) 
 
Table 5.3 below tracked the commencement of Australian IBCs within 
the three academic governance periods discussed in Section 5.2.2.1.2. 
All Australian IBCs were continuing in 2019, except for the short-lived 
UNSW Singapore IBC that was aborted within four months of 
commencement (Burton 2017).  
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It is noteworthy that Monash University has the largest number of IBCs, 
i.e., one each in Malaysia, South Africa and the PRC. Garrett et. al 
recorded two IBCs each for RMIT University and Curtin University in 
2017 (Garrett et al. 2017), but subsequent secondary data surveys 
showed that Curtin University runs four IBCs located in Malaysia, 
Singapore, the UAE and Mauritius (Curtin University 2019). 
 
No. Australian Public University IBC Location Year Commenced 
Pre-2000 
1 University of Wollongong UAE 1993 
2 University of Technology Sydney PRC 1994 
3 Monash University Malaysia 1998 
4 Curtin University Malaysia 1999 
2000-2011 (AUQA period) 
5 Swinburne University of Technology Malaysia 2000 
6 Monash University South Africa 2001 
7 RMIT University Vietnam/HCMC 2001 
8 University of Newcastle Singapore 2002 
9 James Cook University Singapore 2003 
10 RMIT University Vietnam/Hanoi 2004 
11 UNSW Singapore 2007 
12 Murdoch University UAE 2007 
13 Curtin University Singapore 2008 
Post-2011 (TEQSA period) 
13 Monash University PRC 2012 
 
Table 5.3   Commencement of Australian Public University IBCs 
(Garrett et al. 2017) 
 
5.2.2 Comparative Country Operating Environments 
 
The focus group study highlighted the importance of the operating 
environment for TNE. For example, BF3 noted that ‘the first thing you’re 
going to have to look at is well, what’s the regulatory environment in the 
country, and what’s the regulatory environment within Australia ... and 
then develop your model in relation to that’. 
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5.2.2.1 The Australian Operating Environment 
 
This Section surveys the Australian university TNE sector with regards to 
legislative developments and the national regulatory framework 
governing university TNE operations. 
 
5.2.2.1.1 The Australian Higher Education Legislative Environment 
 
The Australian public university sector has gone through a number of 
critical legislative transformations. Some of these transformations have 
had the effect of circumscribing and influencing the trajectory of 
Australian university TNE activity. 
 
One of the most impactful is what is known as the Dawkins Revolution, 
which brought about the Higher Education Funding Act 1988 (Wells, 
Marginson and Norton 2013). John Dawkins, the Australian Minister for 
Employment, Education and Training (1987 – 1991) was described as 
having ‘turned … local focuses into international outlooks, vice-
chancellors into corporate leaders … (and) remodelled higher education 
and how it was funded in only a few years’ (Wells, Marginson and Norton 
2013). This reform introduced, for the first time, income-contingent loans 
for Australian students to partially fund their university education, and 
encouraged the growth of full-fee paying international student enrolments 
– both argued as ‘the two main mechanisms for the significant 
marketisation of Australian higher education’ (Moodie 2008, 2). It also 
transformed the colleges of advanced education into universities, thereby 
increasing the number of university places. This reform led to an 
expansion of university student enrolments and a proliferation of TNE 
activity (Section 2.3).  
 
The next major review of Australian higher education was led by 
Roderick West AM in 1997 to inform on funding of teaching and 
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research, and resourcing the higher education sector to ‘meet Australia’s 
economic and social needs over the following two decades’ (Department 
of Education and Training 2015b, 14). Of the West Review’s 38 
recommendations, the most notable were ‘a gradual move towards a 
‘student-centred’ approach, with a lifetime tertiary learning entitlement, a 
demand-driven funding system, access to government grants and 
income-contingent loans for students at both public and private 
providers, and the deregulation of public university fees’ (Ibid., 15). 
Although the government did not ‘make a formal response to the West 
Review’, many of the recommendations were re-considered in 
subsequent reviews and ‘the government established a new national 
quality agency, the Australian Universities Quality Agency’ (AUQA) (Ibid., 
15). 
 
While there were ‘occasional piecemeal changes’ to legislation affecting 
higher education, the next ‘historic transformation of Australian higher 
education’ after the Dawkins Revolution was the reforms introduced in 
2003 by the Federal Education Minister Brendan Nelson (Gilbert 2003). 
These reforms sought to ensure that ‘no Australian should be denied 
access to a university education because of a genuine inability to pay for 
it’, and to improve the ‘capacity of Australian universities to match their 
international competitors’, through a ‘mixture of ‘user pays’ and public 
funding’. The Nelson Reforms also deregulated university tuition fees, 
allowing universities to ‘increase their fees up to 30% more than the 
HECS (Higher Education Contribution Scheme) loans that fund the 
private contribution by students to their higher education’ (Davidson 
2003). 
 
The Nelson Reforms reflected the ruling government’s view that ‘there 
was no case for increased public funds to expand the sector ... partly 
because they believed or hoped that any increase in domestic university 
training would come from young people paying full fees, but also 
because they were not convinced that there was a need for more 
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university graduates’ (Birrell and Edwards 2009, 5). Later, the Bradley 
Review, which was initiated by the Prime Minister Julia Gillard in 2008, 
provided an alternative view, and is ‘a crucial milestone in the recent 
history of the Australian higher education sector’ that called for a higher 
university participation rate of 40% of the 25-34 year olds cohort by 2020 
(from 29% in 2008), especially from the under-represented groups, e.g., 
those with low socio-economic status (Ibid., 4), recommended a demand-
driven, de-regulated funding model, and advocated the strengthening of 
the promotion and regulation of onshore international student enrolment 
(Ibid.). While acknowledging the achievements and global leadership of 
Australian universities in attracting international students, the Review 
warned of threats to the viability and sustainability of the sector going 
forward (Bradley et al. 2008, 91). It recommended a ‘whole-of-
government’ approach to the promotion of Australian higher education 
overseas and the ‘movement of regulation of the (international education) 
industry to an independent body’, i.e., from AUQA to TEQSA (Ibid., xv). 
 
5.2.2.1.2 The Australian Regulatory Environment 
 
The Australian regulatory environment governing higher education can 
be divided into three periods, viz., pre-2000, 2000 – 2011, and post-2011 
(Bentley, Henderson and Lim 2017, 340). Pre-2000, universities were 
responsible for the quality of their own TNE programs as self-accrediting 
institutions, under the ‘broad oversight of State governments’ (Ibid.). The 
period 2000 – 2011 saw Australian universities come under the purview 
of the Australian Universities Quality Agency (AUQA) and were audited 
on the basis of ‘fit for purpose’, where universities were required to ‘prove 
to AUQA that they had in place quality assurance systems to safeguard 
the standards that they had defined’ (Ibid.). Post-2011, Australian 
universities were regulated by the Tertiary Education Quality and 
Standards Agency (TEQSA), which possessed more legislative power 
compared to AUQA. 
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The West Review brought about the set up of AUQA in 2000 
(Department of Education and Training 2015b). AUQA is ‘an 
independent, not-for-profit national agency that promotes, audits, and 
reports on quality assurance in Australian higher education’ (AUQA 
2011b). It was set up by the Ministerial Council on Education, Training 
and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA) in March 2000 (Ibid.). AUQA conducted 
two rounds of audits across Australian universities before being replaced 
by the TEQSA in 2011. It did not however complete its second cycle 
audits. While the first cycle audits were based on a single theme, the 
second cycle required two themes, one of which must be 
Internationalisation if the university audited had TNE operations (Office of 
Strategy & Planning University A 2019).  
 
Bentley et. al (2017) reported that ‘the inability of some institutions to 
address their shortcomings as found in round one of the AUQA audit led, 
for example, to the closure of many of their offshore programmes and 
partnerships’. This was confirmed by AF5 (‘that it (AUQA Cycle 2) was a 
trigger but it was, … the way I see it is that … actually, a lot of people 
wanted to do something about some of its programs and it provided 
opportunity to those people to say ‘see, we’ve got to do something now’ 
... so actually that was the trigger … the fact that AUQA was coming 
later’), AF6 (‘and quite a few of the terminations happened leading up to 
the AUQA of 2008 ... so it was the period of 2006-2007 where really, a 
decision was made at Country A … what do we want to keep, and what 
do we want to get rid of’), and BF3 (‘we started closing down a lot of the 
offshore stuff ready for AUQA to hide a lot of the problems that would 
have been very open’). 
 
While AUQA had been commended for being ‘instrumental in monitoring 
quality’, there were deficiencies, inter alia, in the lack of ‘quantifiable 
results’, absence of focus on the ‘student experience’, absence of 
‘reward for quality’, ‘university complacency’, lack of ‘comparable 
academic standards’, and AUQA’s inability to sanction (Shah, Nair and 
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Wilson 2011, 480-482). The Bradley Review (Section 5.2.2.1.1) was the 
impetus for the set up of TEQSA, replacing AUQA with a regulatory body 
that has legislative clout to sanction non-compliant behaviour, including 
de-registration of the program or institution.  
 
Three basic principles guide TEQSA’s regulatory framework, viz., 
regulatory necessity, reflection of risk, and proportionate regulation 
(TEQSA 2015b, 8). In the early years of TEQSA, the standard of audits 
was based on minimal threshold standards and universities 
demonstrating equivalence of student experience across all its delivery 
locations (Ibid.). ‘TEQSA now are stating that the administration and the 
academic governance has to be exactly the same for offshore as it is for 
onshore’ (BF3). AF5 also reiterated this, i.e., ‘that’s the whole point, 
that’s why we have to approve the lecturers who are engaged offshore - 
is to make sure that they meet the same kind of standards that we would 
expect for onshore lecturers’. Further, instead of conducting three-year 
audits like AUQA, ‘they’ve just released this new information … instead 
of them doing three-year audits for the offshore, it may build in a 12-
month’ audit (BF3). 
 
Recent research indicated that ‘an overly compliance-based approach to 
the threshold standards by providers themselves in their self-
accreditation, may detrimentally affect the beneficial elements of TNE ... 
self-accreditation requires a carefully nuanced understanding to take 
account of cultural and contextual factors, particularly in a franchising 
model’ (Bentley, Henderson and Lim 2017, 347). This high cost of 
compliance has been reported in University C’s first TEQSA university 
re-registration process which required the University to evidence 
compliance with TEQSA’s 102 threshold standards. This exercise was 
‘an arduous and complex ten-month process that resulted in a one 
hundred and thirty three page application document with more than five 
hundred and thirty pieces of individual evidence to support the claims’ 
(Holloway et al. 2013, 2). 
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As TEQSA reached out to regulatory bodies of other jurisdictions and 
developed mutual assistance agreements, it consciously moved ‘away 
from Principles of Equivalence’ to one where it required the provider to 
be ‘accountable for the course of study’ and that the provider verifies its 
continuing compliance ‘with the standards in the Higher Education 
Standards Framework that relate to the specific arrangement’ (Bentley, 
Henderson and Lim 2017, 341).  
 
Recognizing the importance of international education as Australia’s 
‘third largest export’, TEQSA took a proactive stance in supporting and 
enhancing ‘Australia’s international competitiveness in higher education 
regardless of location of delivery’ through its four-year International 
Engagement Strategy 2016 – 2020 (TEQSA 2016). The Plan’s principal 
objectives are ‘quality assuring Australian transnational higher education, 
supporting Australian transnational higher education activity and 
innovation, and building networks and collaborating to ensure quality’ 
(Ibid.). This proactive stance is reflected in Mok’s observation that 
countries that promote TNE ‘do not necessarily result in the retreat of the 
state from the market but rather a reassertion of the role of the state 
under changing social and economic circumstances’ (2008, 149). BF3 
noted this changing sector sentiment where ‘they (an ATN category 
university) shut it all down and have now since started to open it back up 
through the reasons that we’ve talked about – getting brand and being 
able to compete’, after the university rationalised its TNE operations 
during the 2008 AUQA audits.  
 
5.2.2.2 The Offshore Operating Environment 
 
By virtue of its cross-border delivery, TNE operations are also subject to 
host country regulations. Bentley et. al noted that ‘the challenges facing 
the exporting countries, in this case Australia, remain significant in the 
face of the differences in the political, legislative and cultural 
 292 
environments of their partners’ (2017, 347). All three focus group 
Universities were cognisant of the need to assess both risks and returns 
of new TNE initiatives. AF5 described University A’s recently established 
due diligence process that analyses ‘at a national level, and you study 
why do you think it might be a good opportunity ... what is the risk in that 
... we look at the political and economic risk in that country ... what’s 
happening in the higher education sector ... the existing provision, the 
planned provision, what are the demographics, what are the rules around 
governance of the operation, what are the taxation rules ... I mean, 
everything ... you’d have to do a complete assessment around all of 
those things’. The next level of assessment centres on whether the 
opportunity is limited to one or two disciplines such as ‘engineering 
programs or business programs’, or ‘how many of the faculties are likely 
to benefit from this activity … is it a kind of comprehensive opportunity, or 
is it a very narrow opportunity ... and that’s probably what helps 
determine whether it might be a branch campus or a twinning program’ 
(AF5).  
 
University B senior executives also share similar perspectives on 
assessing prospective TNE initiatives, ‘instead of them coming to us, we 
will go out and we’ve already made this recommendation, that the 
University puts money together to go out and use someone … who could 
specialise in … looking at the country … the regulatory requirements or 
changes within that country ... the best model for that country ... the 
partner and how and why are they structured … and then you try and 
match someone with our values to their values ...(that) they’re not only in 
it for the money, not for profit’ (BF3). BF1 added that the University would 
consider ‘meeting the needs of national interests, economic and social 
because you don’t want to go where there is no relationship with the 
Australia ... so, you’ve got to target the key countries of the world which 
Australia will need or must work with, for example militarily, socially, 
culturally … so, education is serving the community ... that our graduates 
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through those partnerships will be able to work with those people in 
those countries which are key to us’. 
 
This section discusses the nature of TNE host country environments as 
they relate to business delivery model selection motivated by different 
theories of the firm. It will also explore the countries’ comparative risks 
and attractiveness for investment. 
 
5.2.2.2.1 Operating Environments in Theories of the Firm 
 
TCE assumes the incompleteness of contracts arising from bounded 
rationality and opportunism (Section 2.6.2). Bounded rationality is 
accented in environments of high uncertainty, leading to adaptation 
problems (Fig. 2.3; Section 2.6.2). Opportunism in turn is the result of an 
environment lacking in trust and where an opportunity for profit 
exploitation is present. The propositional framework (Section 4.5.2) 
therefore predicts that the Direct Model of TNE business delivery will be 
selected under high levels of business and legal-political uncertainty 
when the university uses the TCE lens. However, the hybrid governance 
structures which have been identified in Universities A and C, ‘require 
governance to monitor and discipline their interactions’ (Klein and Sykuta 
2010, 176). 
 
PRT on the other hand, is focused on ex ante incentives alignment and 
hence, institutional arrangements, where ownership configurations 
emerge to manage different transaction costs (Section 2.6.3). Property 
rights refer to sanctioned behaviours of economic actors in deploying 
valuable resources for productive endeavours; these behaviours 
circumscribed by both formal legal institutions and non-formal social 
conventions. The propositional framework of Section 4.5.2 predicts that 
the university uses the PRT approach in its TNE business delivery model 
selection when the socio-legal-political operating environment is marked 
by high levels of maturity. 
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In using the AT lens, the university assumes complete contracting 
(Section 2.6.4), and selects the Outsourced Model within legal-political 
operating environments that are highly mature. Similar to PRT, ‘the 
success of the markets rests heavily upon the presence of strong 
regulatory institutions (Mok 2008, 150). The selection of the Outsourced 
Model also assumes that search costs are low, reflecting a more 
transparent operating environment. Further, considerations of moral 
hazard requires an environment of high trust and mutual respect (Section 
2.6.4). 
 
5.2.2.2.2 Host Country Regulatory Regimes 
 
All three theories of the firm operate within different environmental 
assumptions as discussed in the preceding section. An analysis of the 
theoretical drivers influencing the two Universities’ TNE business delivery 
model selections will require locating each TNE operation within its 
operating environment, as AF5 acknowledged, ‘often regulations would 
prohibit us doing it on our own because, as a foreign provider, the 
regulations in many countries … foreign providers are different stand 
alone; are different from regulations for a joint foreign provider, (or) joint 
local-foreign provider’. As an example, ‘the Country O government 
strongly regulates foreign provisions, and Country Q is another really 
good example, where it doesn’t yet allow any foreign provision in their 
country ... so it has a huge impact on what we do ... not only on whether 
to do something but also, if we do it, how we do it’ (AF5). BF3 added that 
‘legislative changes that have been made in Country V are moving 
Country V to an elite higher education’. 
 
Mok provides a useful construct to locate the Universities’ TNE 
operations (2008). His construct (below) categorises the host countries 
as a market accelerationist state, a market facilitator state, an 
interventionist state or a market coordinator state, depending on the level 
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of state and civil regulations (2008, 153). In his study of three host 
countries (viz., T, V and P), he locates countries T and V in the market 
accelerationist state quadrant, while country P as a market facilitator 
state.  
 
  
Table 5.4   Varieties of Regulatory Regimes (Mok 2008, 153)  
 
In a study of Country U, it was reported that the Country ‘had hosted 
TNE providers since the late 1990s and had grown its private higher 
education enrolments from 5,250 to 18,000 students between 2000 and 
2014 (Timol and Kinser 2017, 8). However, the sector encountered 
serious capacity constraints, and deteriorating quality and employability. 
The new government of 2014 closed down its Ministry of Tertiary 
Education, and tertiary education was again subsumed under the 
Ministry of Education. Following Mok’s classification, Country U can be 
considered to have moved from a market facilitator state to a market 
coordinator state. 
 
Similar to Australia’s TEQSA, Country X’s regulatory authority is 
committed to the promotion of the Country’s TNE sector, including 
liberalizing its immigration requirements for international students, 
evidencing a market accelerationist state for TNE (Country X 
Government 2018). 
 
It was reported that ‘all four modes of (WTO GATS; Table 2.1) delivery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State Regulation Civil Regulation 
Strong (organized) Weak (spontaneous) 
Strong (centralized) Cell 1 
Authoritarian liberalism 
Market accelerationist state 
State-corporatist regulatory regime 
Cell 3 
State socialism 
Interventionist state 
Command-and-control regulatory 
regime 
Weak (decentralized) Cell 2 
Economic liberalism 
Market facilitator state 
Civil society regulatory regime 
Cell 4 
Market socialism 
Market coordinator state 
(Coordinated) Market regulatory regime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suppliers 
• Faculty 
• Administrators 
• Part-time faculty 
Industry competitors 
Rivalry among higher 
education institutions 
Extent of complements 
 
Potential entrants 
• New institutions 
• International 
institutions 
• Duplicate offering from 
existing players 
Buyerss 
• Students 
• Parents 
• Industry 
Government 
• Provider of information 
• Funding to institutions 
• Funding to students 
• Purchase of research 
Substitutes 
• Online degree 
universities 
• New for-profit offerings 
• Training and seminar 
companies 
• Corporate universities 
• Distance, open and e-
learning 
1 
6 
5 4 3 
2 
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for education service (limited to technical, natural sciences and 
technology, business administration and business studies, economics, 
accounting, international law and language training fields) are allowed in 
Country Y’ (Nguyen and Penfold 2012). Its regulations pertaining to TNE 
however, have been noted to be ‘complex, ambiguous, opaque and 
poorly implemented and monitored ... many overseas providers drown 
within the layers of regulation and the government hierarchy and find it 
difficult to comply with all requirements as a result … leav(ing) students 
in jeopardy and potentially sends millions of dollars of investment in 
education to other locations’ (Nguyen and Shillabeer 2013, 5). Its 
national accrediting body is also reported to be non-independent of the 
government (Nguyen, Evers and Marshall 2017, 485). Country Y can 
thus be located as an interventionist state.  
 
Although 64 transnational higher education institutions were approved in 
Country O by June 2015, ‘the selection criteria used by the MOE 
(Ministry of Education) to grant approval for the establishment of TNEs 
are not openly available’ (He 2016a, 79). Further, the ‘MOE only 
sporadically publicised its general principles for selecting and approving 
TNEs … universities that want to establish TNEs in Country O cannot 
properly self-evaluate and estimate the likelihood of being selected and 
approved’ (Sun, 2004). The strong state regulation but weak civil 
regulation relegates Country O to an interventionist state. 
 
Country N’s TNE recognition framework as at 2015 is based on the 
‘territorial principle’ where the Country does not recognise TNE awards 
delivered on its soil or Country N awards delivered offshore; its TNE 
regulatory environment is tightly controlled by the Ministry of Education, 
and hence locates the Country as an interventionist state with strong 
state regulation but weak civil regulation (Ohmori 2015, 13). 
 
Although Country R had enacted the Higher Education Bill in 2012 to 
‘make it easier for foreign institutions to set up on a non-profit basis in 
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collaboration with local universities’, it has yet to see any takers (Nurdiani 
and Sharma 2013), and up to July 2017 the Government is still 
‘developing the regulations’ and the Bill has not come into force yet 
(Smith 2017). A senior executive of a Group of Eight university with 
interests in Country R remarked that ‘no physical presence is planned for 
Country R … (and) in a restrictive regulatory environment, more flexible, 
fluid, innovative and ‘win-win’ partnership models are required’ (Nurdiani 
and Sharma 2013). Country R can be considered an interventionist state. 
 
According to findings from the British Council (2013), Country W, among 
others, ‘host foreign institutions without any formal regulatory structure’ 
(Bosire and Amimo 2017, 146). While Country H needs private sector 
involvement in building its higher education capacity, it does not have the 
regulatory framework to quality assure and regulate this activity (Win 
2015). The opening of the economy in Country H to international trade in 
2012 provided the impetus for private sector participation in education, 
and in 2016 there were six UK universities operating TNE in the Country, 
growing to 14 in 2018 (Noble Solutions 2018). Countries W and H are 
thus unclassified due to the absence of regulations governing TNE. 
 
The Countries where Universities A and C are operating in, and 
discussed in the in-depth interviews are classified below according to 
Mok’s regulatory regime construct to reflect the level of regulatory control 
over TNE operations. 
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No. Regulatory Regime Country 
1 Market accelerationist state T, V, X 
2 Market facilitator state P 
3 Interventionist state N, O, R, Y 
4 Market coordinator state U 
5 Unclassified H, W 
 
Table 5.5   Host Country Regulatory Regimes of Universities A and 
C TNE Operations 
 
5.2.2.2.3 Country Risk Comparisons 
 
Country risk is one of the key considerations of the Universities studied, 
especially in the set up of IBCs where it is ‘a much riskier model … it’s 
financially much more risky’ (AF1). For instance, University A reviews its 
TNE risk profiles ‘when the contract’s re-negotiated or there’s a change 
in the market that we know about’ (AF1). Informant CI11 reported that 
University C now considers sovereign risks in its due diligence of TNE 
start-ups. These country risk and attrativeness comsiderations have 
become important, for instance to University C since it has ‘become a 
multinational; it is operating in different countries’ (CI10). 
 
There are currently no country risk assessments directly related to TNE 
investments. Hence, a proxy is needed, and this is found in Coface’s 
annual country risk assessment map of 2015, which is the closest to the 
focus group study of 2013. Coface is a credit guarantee corporation that 
operates in about 200 countries, e.g., managing ‘public guarantees on 
behalf of the French state’ (Coface 2019). It was reported in Forbes that 
this risk rating ‘claims to remove the central conflict within the “big three” 
agencies (viz., Moody, Standard and Poor and Fitch), namely that they 
take money from the very clients that they rate’ (Laurent 2009). 
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Fig. 5.1   Country Risk Assessment Map – Second Quarter 2015  
  (Coface 2015) 
 
The Coface map of 160 countries, comparing the ‘average credit risk on 
a country’s businesses’ is based on ‘macroeconomic, financial and 
political data’ that have been collected over a period of 70 years (Coface 
2015). The 2015 country risk assessment map is referenced (above) to 
determine the relative risks presented by the eleven TNE countries 
covered in the case studies of Universities A and C. 
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The Coface 2015 risk ratings, in ascending order, are : 
 
Coface Risk Ratings 
A1 A2 A3 A4 B C D E 
Very Low Low Quite 
Acceptable 
Acceptable Significant High Very High Extreme 
 
Table 5.6   Coface Risk Ratings Map 
 
Based on the above country risk assessment map, the eleven TNE 
countries’ risk ratings indicate that countries N, V, P, T, U, X, R and O 
have acceptable to very low country risk ratings (Table 5.7). Country Y 
has a significant risk profile, while Country H has a very high risk rating.  
 
No. Country Coface Risk Level (A1 to D)  
for Quarter 2 of 2015 
1 Country N A1 
2 Country V A1 
3 Country P A1 
4 Country T A2 
5 Country U A3 
6 Country X A3 
7 Country R A4 
8 Country O A4 
9 Country Y B 
10 Country W B 
11 Country H D 
 
Table 5.7   TNE Country Risk Classifications based on the Coface  
   Country Risk Assessment Map of Second Quarter 2015 
 
5.2.2.2.4 Comparative Country Attractiveness for Investment 
 
As the Universities grew in experience initiating and managing TNE 
operations, they developed more sophisticated, formal due diligence 
processes to also assess the attractiveness of new ventures (AF1, CF2). 
These new ventures include emerging markets that universities consider 
for first mover advantage entry (CI11). This section explores a proxy 
index for the assessment of country attractiveness for investment, the 
Venture Capital and Private Equity Country Attractiveness Index 
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developed jointly by the IESE Business School and Emlyon Business 
School (Groh et al. 2015). 
 
The developers explained that ‘to find prime investment opportunities, 
investors generally look several years down the road and focus on 
specific factors like: economic activity (GDP, inflation, unemployment 
rate); size and liquidity of capital markets; taxation; investor protection 
and corporate governance; the human and social environment (including 
human capital, labour market policies and crime); and entrepreneurial 
culture and opportunities (including innovation capacity, the ease of 
doing business and the development of high-tech industries)’ (Groh et al. 
2015). The index is based on these six factors across selected countries, 
differentiating their relative attractiveness for investment on a ranking of 
1 to 125.  
 
The focus groups demonstrated that many of these factors are 
considered by the Universities, e.g., government policies and regulations 
(AF1, AF5, BF1, BF3, CF2), legal framework (AF1, BF1, BF3), exchange 
rates (AF6), business environment and competition (AF3, AF5, BF2, 
BF3, CF2), internet bandwidth (AF1, AF6), socio-cultural preferences 
(AF6, BF5, CF1, CF2), and immigration policies (BF3, CF2). As an 
example, ‘the Country W Government provided the opportunity through 
University B’s OP, offer(ing) us the opportunity of a managed campus, 
because … we were one of the first movers into the Country’ (BF3), 
demonstrating the importance of recognizing and taking advantage of 
emerging opportunities. 
 
Ten of the eleven TNE countries studied were found in the Groh et. al 
ranking, and represented in the figure below. Only Country H was not 
listed in the index. 
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The index developers also generated a change-in-rank map (below) that 
provides investors with a guide on countries to ‘observe’ (because of 
decreasing attractiveness), ‘increase exposure’ (because they are highly 
attractive), ‘stay alert’ to (due to increasing attractiveness), and ‘avoid’ 
(because they are unattractive) (Groh et al. 2016).  
 
 
Fig. 5.3   Current Ranks and Rank Changes Between Index Version 
2012 and 2016 (Groh et al. 2016) 
 
The above map provides a guide to the changes in attractiveness of four 
of the eleven TNE Countries studied in the focus groups, recommending 
‘increasing exposure’ to Countries T, U and X, while ‘observing’ Country 
Fig. 5.2   TNE Countries in the 2015 Venture Capital & Private Equity 
Country Attractiveness Index (6th Edition) (Groh et al. 2015)  
Country     W  U     Y     R     X          O T      VNP 
Index                           55      51           43           37           29                     18   13              6   5   4 
26	
	
Historic	comparison	and	allocation	recommendations	
In	order	to	demonstrate	shifts	in	the	VC	and	PE	country	attractiveness,	we	perform	comparison	of	the	2012	
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financial	and	economic	crises	on	others.	However,	instead	of	discussing	individual	countries	here	in	length,	
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detailed	country	profiles	and	additional	analytic	tools.	
It	 should	be	 stressed	 that	according	 to	 the	methodology	of	 the	 index	 calculation,	 every	 country’s	 score	 is	
calculated	 relative	 to	 all	 other	 sample	 countries.	 This	 means	 that	 those	 countries	 which	 gained	 or	 lost	
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capital	resources.	
	
Exhibit	2:	Current	Ranks	and	Rank	Changes	Between	Index	Version	2012	and	2016	
Exhibit	2	allows	valuable	insights	interpreting	the	four	quadrants	of	the	graph.	Obviously,	all	countries	on	the	
left	hand	side	of	the	exhibit	should	be	carefully	observed	by	investors,	 in	particular	the	lower	their	current	
rank.	It	seems	reasonable	to	recommend	to	investors	avoidance	of	the	countries	in	the	lower	left	quadrant.	
Contrarily,	w 	see	the	 mising	development	 f	 e	countries	 to	the	right	hand	side	of	 the	ordinate.	The	
countries	in	the	right	upper	quadrant	can	be	considered	highly	attractive	investment	hosts.	The	lower	right	
corner	groups	the	countries	with	increasing	but	yet	moderate	levels	of	attractiveness.	The	further	down	we	
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W. The other six countries’ attractiveness did not change within the 
period of study. 
 
5.3 In-depth Semi-structured Interviews 
 
The in-depth semi-structured interview transcripts of the two Universities 
were reviewed and coded into their constituent themes, concepts and 
stories, and which will be analysed in Section 5.4 as singles cases, and 
Chapter 6 in a cross-case study. This section briefly summarises these 
themes, concepts and stories, while Appendices I and J describe them in 
detail. 
 
The interviews accessed informants from three areas of responsibilities, 
viz., strategic, managerial and academic. As presented in Section 5.4.1, 
there were eight strategic informants, six managerial informants and six 
academics from across central, divisional and offshore offices of 
University A. University C was represented by three strategic informants, 
and four each of managerial and academic informants, also from across 
central, divisional and offshore offices (Section 5.4.2). 
 
The original list of prospective informants was much longer. However, a 
number of informants declined to be interviewed or did not respond to the 
request. A few informants were not on the original list, but referred by 
other informants. All informants had been very helpful, some making the 
effort to follow up on the interview by sending additional information. 
 
The interviews which took place in Australia between May 11 and May 
17, 2018 were grueling, as some consecutive interviews were held in 
different campuses which were located at a considerable distance from 
each other. The offshore interviews were held on June 5 and 6, 2018, 
while the telephone interviews held between May 23 and June 28, 2018. 
While the face-to-face interviews were physically taxing, the telephone 
interviews encountered some minor technical difficulties, viz., poor 
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teleconferencing quality and intermittent loss of recording quality (despite 
the use of two audio recorders). Although telephone interviews are 
generally considered difficult and of lower quality than face-to-face 
interviews, Cachia and Millward (Cachia and Millward 2011) argues that, 
if conducted well, the telephone interview may in some circumstances 
(e.g., semi-structured interviews) be able to deliver better quality data – 
in what they describe as ‘methodological strengths’ as oppoed to the 
generally accepted ‘convenience’ of telephone interviews (Ibid., 270). 
The provision of pre-interview research study background and interview 
questions, and the use of an aide memoire in the present study helped in 
ensuring data integrity. It is also worthy of note that any disadvantage of 
missing visual cues might be minimal due to the non-technical nature of 
the phenomenon of study. Finally, Farooq and de Villiers argues that the 
notion that telephone interviews are inferior to face-to-face interviews is 
unfounded, and that telephone interviews provide ‘a more balanced 
distribution of power’ between the interviewer and the interviewee, and ‘a 
greater level of anonymity and privacy’ (Farooq and Villiers 2017, 292). 
 
The interviews were guided by an aide memoire (Appendix F). However, 
there were occasions when the questions were suspended temporarily 
where the informant discussed key topics of interest relevant to the study 
in detail. There were also occasions where the interviewer had to skip 
topics when it was obvious that the informant was not conversant with 
certain topics, e.g., strategic university decision questions posed to 
managers and academics. There was also a need to constantly process 
and cross-check the information provided by the informants for factual 
inaccuracies, conflicting evidence, embellishments and anomalies. 
Identifying disconfirming evidence, intervening conditions and rival 
theories was another parallel endeavor. Most of the main themes, 
concepts and stories met saturation point before the interviews were 
completed. 
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The transcription of the interviews was obviously a very time-consuming 
endeavor, in spite of the deployment of online auto-transcription software 
(which had to be manually checked for accuracy) and outsourcing to 
transcribers. Due to the manageable number of informants, Microsoft 
Excel was used in the coding process (Section 3.7.6). Microsoft Excel 
was deployed because it allowed the data to be presented as one large 
table, enabling quick scans across all informant views. 
 
At the onset, it is useful to point out some important discoveries about 
the TNE business delivery models practiced by the two Universities, 
which led to a modification of Table 2.4 (TNE Framework for 
Organisational Economics Research) for application to these two 
Universities. 
 
The TNE Framework developed in Section 2.5.5 classified the w-IBC, 
multinational university and c-IBC as Direct Models, while FPs, 
Partnership Programs and Joint HEI/provider as Outsourced Models. 
The interviews provided in-depth insights into the two Universities’ TNE 
operations, uncovering the c-IBC that featured in situ oversight (ic-IBC) 
at University A (Section App I 5.4). They also provided further evidence 
of the in situ monitored FP (i-FP) (first identified in Section 4.4.2.2) at 
University C’s Country V TNE operation (Section App J 2.3), 
distinguishing it from most other FPs that are usually remotely-monitored 
(r-FP). The involvement of both the University and the OP in IBCs (i.e., 
ic-IBC) and FPs (i.e., i-FP) mean that they are hybrid governance 
models, unlike the w-IBC which is a hierarchy. The full control that the 
Universities exercise over the ic-IBC (Section App I 2.6 and Section App 
I 5.4) and i-FP (Section App J 2.3) locates them as Direct Models, similar 
to the w-IBC. Only the r-FP is classified as an Outsourced Model due to 
the full reliance on the OP for host country delivery (Section App I 9.2 
and Section App J 6.3). For the purposes of the case studies, Table 2.4 
has been modified as shown in Table App I.4 (University A), Table App 
J.2 (University C) and Table 6.6 (Universities A and C). 
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5.3.1 Themes, Concepts and Stories from University A 
 
Interviews on University A’s TNE journey provided a very rich tapestry of 
insights that stretches from the University’s first TNE operation in 1986 to 
2018. The TNE stories start with the University’s early TNE operations in 
1986 to 1998 in countries P and V. The serendipitous Country T TNE 
start-up was then explored in depth because it triggered a tipping point in 
the University’s TNE history that set it on a journey to establish branch 
campuses. The next section then discusses the impact of the Australian 
regulatory environment and its Business School international 
accreditation exercise on its TNE operations.  
 
These were followed by an important discussion on the University’s 
quest to become a global university. This quest influenced the evolution 
of the University’s TNE operations in Country V into a second branch 
campus operation, the transmutation of a Country U franchised program 
operation (FP) into the third branch campus, and the serendipitous set-
up of the University’s fourth and latest branch campus in Country X. 
 
This section also explores the future of FPs within the University’s larger 
global university aspiration, and ends with a detailed study of the 
University’s current TNE value chain activities. 
 
5.3.2 Themes, Concepts and Stories from University C 
 
University C is a small Australian university that has punched above its 
weight in the TNE sector. With a student population of more than 23,000 
students, it has almost 8,000 TNE students (Section 4.3.4.3). Its TNE 
history has not been very long, starting around the early 1990s. It has 
however, experienced phenomenal growth in its Country V TNE 
operations – causing a distinct tipping point in its TNE journey. This 
tipping point resulted in the set up of a host country office (HCO) in 
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Country V to manage the large numbers of TNE students, as well as 
driven a comprehensive, University-wide TNE review that produced a 
White Paper to guide its future TNE trajectory. 
 
The themes, concepts and stories that emerged from the interview 
transcripts provided rich insights of University staff as they recall the 
early years of the University’s TNE journey, the Country V TNE 
experiences that triggered the tipping point, the potentially reputation-
wracking swap of offshore partners (OP) in Country X, and the 
University’s plans for the future. These are followed by rich descriptions 
of the University’s current TNE value chain activities and the influence of 
the operating environment on TNE performance. The detailed themes, 
concepts and stories relating to University C’s TNE journey are captured 
in Appendix J. 
 
5.4 Single-case Studies 
 
This section is a study of the individual University’s TNE experience, and 
represents an in-depth extension of the focus group studies of these 
Universities. It seeks to close the gap on key missing TNE aspects and 
corroborate findings from the focus group analyses, and address the 
study’s research questions, viz., University motivations for TNE business 
delivery model selection and the plausibility of selected theories of the 
firm driving these decisions. Informed by the focus group findings, the 
case study investigations have been refined to incorporate the impact of 
each University’s TNE tipping point experience. 
 
The Guimon eclectic paradigm analysis of multinational universities will 
be deployed as a framework to investigate the first research question, 
i.e., the criteria these Universities use in selecting between the Direct 
and Outsourced Models of TNE business delivery (Section 2.6.5.3). Its 
construct is relevant to the current study because of its focus on 
university motivations for TNE and the scope of University activities, viz., 
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the three roles (or, missions) of teaching, research and community 
engagement (2016, 222). ‘Role’ is used instead of ‘mission’ in this study 
to prevent any confusion with ‘mission’ in Weisbrod et. al’s revenue good 
– mission good concept (2008). 
 
The age of each of the Universities’ TNE operations will be studied using 
the Deller and Conroy three-year breakeven (business survival) and five-
year ‘fair rate of return’ (business longevity) firm longevities, and the 
Falck Age-related Firm Liabilities construct (Sections 2.7.4.3 and 
2.7.4.4). The analysis of TNE longevity aims to address the third 
research question on whether the longevity of TNE operations are 
influenced by decisions driven by the theories of the firm. 
 
Finally, the TNE experiences of the informants have been analysed to 
identify reflectors of the three theories of the firm in possibly driving TNE 
decisions. Drawing from the focus group studies, different theories of the 
firm were identified as possible drivers of TNE before and after the 
Universities’ TNE tipping points as represented in the table below. 
 
No. Univer
-sity 
In Relation 
to Tipping 
Point 
Type of TNE Business 
Delivery Model 
Direct/ 
Outsourced 
Possible 
Rationale for 
Model 
Selection 
1 A 
Before Franchised (remote supervision) (r-FP) O AT 
After 
Franchised (remote 
supervision) (r-FP) O AT 
Collaborative IBC 
(c-IBC) D 
TCE (or 
weak PRT) 
2 C 
Before Franchised (remote supervision) (r-FP) O AT 
After 
Franchised (remote 
oversight) (r-FP) O AT 
Franchised (in situ 
oversight) (i-FP) D PRT or TCE 
 
Table 5.8   Universities A and C Theoretical Perspectives in  
     Deploying TNE Business Delivery Models 
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5.4.1 Case Study of University A 
 
Interviews on University A’s TNE journey provided a very rich tapestry of 
insights that stretches from the University’s first TNE operation in 1986 to 
2018. The TNE stories start with the University’s early TNE operations in 
1986 to 1999 in countries P and V. The serendipitous Country T TNE 
start-up was then explored in depth because it triggered a tipping point in 
the University’s TNE history that set it on a journey to establish branch 
campuses. The start of regulatory tightening in Australian higher 
education through AUQA coincided with the tipping point. The impact of 
the Australian regulatory environment and the University’s Business 
School international accreditation (codenamed BSA) exercise on its TNE 
operations were important influences on the University’s TNE 
experience.  
 
The interviews revealed a gradual development of the University’s 
strategic direction which embraced a growing international dimension, 
leading to the recent aspiration to become a global university. This quest 
influenced the evolution of the University’s TNE operations in Country V 
into a second branch campus operation, the transmutation of a Country 
U franchised program operation (FP) into the third branch campus, and 
the serendipitous set-up of the University’s fourth and latest branch 
campus in Country X. 
 
While the preference for the branch campus model was clearly 
articulated, informants indicated that FPs were also part of the 
University’s mix of TNE business delivery models to fulfil selected 
purposes.  
 
The in-depth interviews identified 33 TNE operations beginning from the 
first FP in 1986 (Table 5.11). These operations comprised 24 terminated 
FPs, 3 surviving FPs, one re-started FP and four branch campuses. The 
terminated FPs were located in eleven countries, while the existing TNE 
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operations were located in seven countries. The four branch campuses 
in four different countries were considered the flagships due to their size 
and branch campus status. 
 
A total of 20 informants were interviewed. There were eight informants 
with strategic roles, six informants with managerial roles and six in 
academic roles. Four of the six academics also held managerial roles in 
TNE. There was a good spread of central, divisional and offshore 
informants, including an ex-staff who is now working in University C. 
 
Four of the eight informants with strategic responsibilities had prior 
private sector work experience. They had between two and twenty years 
of TNE experience each, with four of them chalking up more than ten 
years each. 
 
Five of the six managers had prior private sector work experience. The 
majority (i.e., five) of them also had more than ten years of TNE 
experience. Only one had two years of TNE exposure. 
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No. Role ID Experience Organisational 
Entity 
Area 
Private TNE 
A Strategic 
1 Strategic AI5 Y 3 Office of the Provost Central 
2 Strategic AI11 Y 15 
Financial and 
Commercial 
Central 
3 Strategic AI6 Y 20 Strategy and Planning Central 
4 Strategic AI10  4 International Office Central 
5 
Strategic 
AI1 Y 15 
International Business 
Development 
Central 
6 
Strategic 
AI3  23 
Faculty of Commerce 
and Law 
Division 
7 Strategic AI2  2 Faculty of Humanities Division 
8 Strategic AI16  7 Offshore campus Offshore 
B Managerial 
1 Managerial AI7 Y 24 
International Recruitment 
and Student Services 
Central 
2 Managerial AI9 Y 17 
International Recruitment 
and Student Services 
Central 
3 Managerial AI20 Y 22 Humanities International Division 
4 Managerial AI19 Y 5 
Faculty of Commerce 
and Law 
Division 
5 Managerial AI15 Y 10 Offshore campus Offshore 
6 
Managerial 
AI17  15 
International Office, 
University C (formerly 
University A UBSI) 
Universi-
ty C 
C Academic 
1 
Academic/ 
Managerial 
AI4 Y 15 
Faculty of Commerce 
and Law 
Division 
2 Academic AI8 Y 15 
Faculty of Commerce 
and Law 
Division 
3 
Academic/ 
Managerial 
AI12 Y 14 
Faculty of Commerce 
and Law 
Division 
4 
Academic/ 
Managerial 
AI13  17 
Faculty of Commerce 
and Law 
Division 
5 
Academic/ 
Managerial  
AI14  17 
Faculty of Commerce 
and Law 
Division 
6 Academic AI18 Y 7 
Faculty of Commerce 
and Law 
Division 
 
Table 5.9   Profiles of University A Informants 
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Four of the six academics had prior private sector work experience. The 
majority of them (i.e, five) had more than 14 years of TNE experience, 
with only one having seven years of TNE experience. 
 
This Section explores the perspectives of University informants on TNE 
motivations, TNE longevity and reflectors of theories that might possibly 
drive TNE business delivery model selection. The analysis starts from 
the University’s first remotely-monitored FP (r-FP) operation in 1986 to 
the recent most in situ monitored collaborative branch campus (ic-IBC). It 
traces the University’s experience with early pre-tipping point r-FPs to the 
tipping point TSW ic-IBC, and thence to the impact of Australian 
regulatory imposts, the University’s prestigious international 
accreditation, the University’s Global University strategic aspiration, the 
Country V TNE evolution, the Country U TNE transmutation, the Country 
X ic-IBC start up and current r-FPs. It ends with an exploration of the 
University’s TNE value chain activities.  
 
It was natural that the informants had commented more liberally on the 
more recent TNE operations compared to those in the distant past; 
however, many of them also made useful generic comments about those 
early operations. 
 
5.4.1.1 University A Criteria for TNE Business Delivery Model Selection 
 
The Guimon tabulation of multinational university motives (Section 
2.6.5.3) is a fitting construct to track University A’s TNE history from 
running r-FPs in 1986 to articulating a Global University comprising an 
international network of ‘mini University As’ (AI14) in 2017. 
 
Before the tipping point, the University’s TNE operations were all r-FPs 
which were focussed largely on income generation (AI1, AI10), and 
secondarily to promote onshore international student enrolments through 
its r-FP presence and branding (AI3, AI19). The University was noted to 
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have been on a quest to ‘try and partner with as many partners as 
possible; to get as many students as possible’ (AI6). Further, ‘the 
University’s strategic direction is … to get a brand out there, to get as 
many students from overseas to’ the University’s home campus (AI7).  
 
University 
Role 
Ref 
Tipping 
Point 
TNE 
Model 
TNE Motivations 
Market-seeking Resource-seeking Efficiency-seeking 
Teaching Pre r-FP Develop as many r-
FPs as possible for 
income and leverage 
on r-FPs for onshore 
enrolments and 
income 
Engage OP expertise 
and resources to 
reach more students 
at lower costs 
Not applicable 
Post r-FP Develop financially 
sustainable r-FPs for 
specific purposes and 
leverage on r-FPs for 
onshore enrolments 
and income  
Engage OP expertise 
and resources to 
reach more students 
at lower costs 
Not applicable. Some r-
FPs continue to be 
managed by faculties 
ic-IBC Develop campuses in 
multiple countries for 
TNE income and 
leverage on 
campuses for 
onshore enrolments 
and income 
Engage OP expertise 
and resources to 
reach more students 
at lower costs 
Leverage on OP 
efficiencies and the 
University’s hub-and-
spokes TNE 
administration 
Research Pre r-FP Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Post r-FP Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
ic-IBC Gain access to 
international research 
projects through ic-
IBCs and their PVCs  
Outsource foreign 
researchers and 
funding, and 
collaborate with 
foreign entities 
Leverage on the 
University’s research 
and ic-IBC networks for 
efficiency 
Community 
Engage-
ment 
Pre r-FP Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Post r-FP Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
ic-IBC Connect with 
governments and 
private sectors to 
contribute to capacity- 
and nation-building 
Outsource to OPs for 
funding and 
participation 
Not identified 
 
Table 5.10   Criteria for University A TNE Models Across Its Three  
Roles (adapted from Guimon 2016, 222) 
 
The University’s modus operandi is to outsource campus infrastructure 
and as many TNE functions as possible to its OPs because it was 
cheaper for the OPs to undertake (AI11). There was however, no 
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structured international network of r-FPs to enable any efficiency gains 
from the numerous r-FP operations. 
 
Post-tipping point, the University’s Global University vision and approach 
called for the delivery of research and community engagement at all its 
ic-IBCs (AI10); these two roles complement teaching and are formalised 
in ic-IBC OP contracts (AI10, AI15). The University sought to tap into its 
international presence to promote research and leverage on international 
expertise for research (AI9). The ic-IBCs also provided an opportunity for 
the University to participate in capacity- and nation-building efforts within 
the host Countries (AI1, AI2, AI9). These research and community 
engagement activities were driven by the University’s on-site PVCs (AI8, 
AI15), and seed-funded at several locations, viz., VCS, XCD and UCM 
(AI5, AI6). 
 
The post-tipping point r-FPs were not required to be involved in research 
and community engagement. 
 
5.4.1.2 Longevity of University A TNE Operations 
 
The ages of the University’s TNE operations were tracked with reference 
to its tipping point and several other watershed events, viz., AUQA Cycle 
1 (2000 – 2007), AUQA Cycle 2 (2008 – 2011), TEQSA (from 2012) and 
BSA accreditation (from 2016). See Table 5.11.  
 
Eight r-FPs were identified as beginning prior to the University’s tipping 
point, viz., PHS, POL, VMI, VBP, VSH, VSI, VIF and TLK. The remaining 
24 TNE operations, comprising  21 r-FPs and 3 ic-IBCs commenced after 
the tipping point. 
 
It was interesting to note that all the pre-tipping point r-FPs lasted more 
than the five-year reasonable rate of return business longevity  
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1 PHS                r-FP            X    
2 POL                 r-FP      X         
3 PCI                    r-FP X           
4 PHK                      r-FP X         
5 PHM                      r-FP X         
6 RBI                   r-FP  X           
7 RPN                    r-FP X            
8 KPU                    r-FP X           
9 VMI           r-FP          X           
10 VBP                 r-FP     X          
11 VSH                 r-FP    X           
12 VSI                 r-FP    X           
13 VIF                 r-FP    X           
14 VIP                 r-FP X              
15 VCA                    r-FP  X          
16 VCS                           ic-IBC     
17 TLK                   r-FP      X       
18 TSW                      ic-IBC          
19 TMC                      r-FP    X      
20 TIP                       r-FP  X       
21 LIB                    r-FP  X          
22 LBH                    r-FP  X          
23 WSL                        r-FP        
24 WIC                 r-FP X              
25 JSH                     r-FP   X        
26 YUE                    r-FP  X          
27 YSR                          r-FP      
28 UCT                         r-FP      X 
29 UCM                            Ic-IBC    
30 ONJ                            r-FP    
31 ODB1                  r-FP  X            
32 ODB2                              r-FP  
33 XCD                            ic-IBC    
Abbreviations X Year of termination of TNE operation 1999 Tipping point year when first IBC started 
  r-FP Franchised operation with remote oversight 2000 AUQA Cycle 1 audits commenced 
  ic-IBC Collaborative international branch campus 2008 AUQA Cycle 2 Audits 
   with in situ oversight   2012 Start of TEQSA operations 
  ODB1 First ODB TNE operation   2016 BSA accreditation of University A’s UBS 
ODB2 Second ODB TNE operation 
Table 5.11   Duration of University A TNE Operations 
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benchmark. They ranged from nine to 26 years before termination, with a 
median of 13.5 years. 
 
Five of these eight r-FPs were terminated within the 2007 – 2009 period 
corresponding to the AUQA Cycle 2 audits, while two terminated within 
the 2010 – 2012 period corresponding to the start of TEQSA. The 
longest running r-FP, PHS had to be terminated in 2015, just before 
University A received its BSA accreditation. 
 
The 1999 tipping point was significant because the University applied to 
change its founding Act of (State) Parliament to enable it to set up IBCs 
offshore. It also coincided with the start of the tightening of Australian 
higher education regulations through AUQA, and later TEQSA. 
 
There were two significant TNE initiations in 2008 corresponding to 
AUQA Cycle 2, viz., the VCS c-IBC and UCT franchise; VCS is still 
operating, while the UCT franchise was converted into a c-IBC in 2018. 
The University’s BSA accreditation in 2014 - 2016 was also another 
watershed event, where a number of TNE operations involving the 
Business School were terminated to comply with BSA requirements (AI3, 
AI12). BSA impacted mainly the Business School, not the whole 
University. 
 
While all except one of the University’s TNE operations survived the 
three-year breakeven business survival benchmark, 12 operations (all r-
FPs and all post-tipping point) did not survive beyond the five-year 
reasonable rate of return business longevity benchmark (Section 
2.7.4.3). This contrasts against the University’s pre-tipping point r-FPs 
which lasted at least nine years before termination. Seven of these post-
tipping point terminations corresponded to AUQA Cycle 2 (i.e., within 
2007 – 2009). Three were terminated within 2010 – 2012, corresponding 
to the centralisation of TNE administration and the introduction of 
workload management, where TNE work was drawn into and paid as 
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part of staff workload (AI8, AI12). The remaining two did not last beyond 
three years.  
 
The University’s post-tipping point TNE operations ranged from two 
years to 14 years in age, with a median of only five years. This contrasts 
unfavourably with pre-tipping point r-FPs, possibly because of the 
increased regulatory and accreditation scrutiny imposed after the tipping 
point. 
 
The University did not start another ic-IBC after TSW until another eight 
years later – with VCS. It took another ten years before the next ic-IBC 
was set up (i.e., XCD). The UCM ic-IBC was converted from a 14-year 
old r-FP (UCT) one year later. The start of XCD and UCM in quick 
succession could be due to the University’s Global University vision 
which was formally articulated in 2017. 
 
The University’s TNE operations that were discussed in the interviews 
were analysed using Falck’s age-related firm liabilities to identify reasons 
for failure or potentials for failure due to newness, adolescence, 
obsolescence or senescence (Section 2.7.4.4). 
 
The PHS r-FP was the longest running of the University’s TNE 
operations at 26 years before it was terminated due to the OP’s 
resistance to BSA compliance. In the same Country, POL was 
terminated after 14 years because of changing student preferences. 
 
In Country V, all four r-FPs (viz., VMI, VBP, VSH and VSI) were 
terminated after 9 – 22 years of operation because the University wanted 
to consolidate its Country V TNE operations to enable ‘easier 
management’ and ‘better control’ (AI6). In Country T, the University 
collaborated with the TMC OP for 10 years before terminating the r-FP 
due to ‘poor quality’ delivery (AI12). 
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Although the UCT r-FP was terminated after 14 years, it was 
transmutated into an ic-IBC (UCM) because the University wanted to 
position its brand more strategically to access the regional market (AI17). 
 
No. TNE 
Operation 
Age-related Liability Informant Perspective 
1 PHS Senescence due to 
inflexibility 
PHS ‘wouldn’t budge’ on BSA 
requirements (AI) 
2 POL Failure at adolescence 
due to rejection by 
students 
Shift in student preferences (AI1) 
caused low financial returns (AI17) 
3 VMI Obsolescence due to 
value propositions 
The University wanted to ‘consolidate’ 
for ‘easier management’ and ‘better 
control’ (AI6) 
4 VBP Obsolescence due to 
value propositions 
5 VSH Obsolescence due to 
value propositions 
6 VSI Obsolescence due to 
value propositions 
7 VCS Potential obsolescence 
due to value 
propositions 
VCS ‘has an identity crisis at the 
moment’ (AI20); ‘is losing its way’ 
(AI12)  
8 TSW Potential senescence 
due to inflexibility 
Regulations ‘changed dramatically’  
making ‘it more difficult for on-shore 
campuses’ (AI20) 
9 TMC Failure at adolescence 
due to rejection by 
supplier 
A ‘poor quality provider’ (AI12) 
10 WSL Potential failure at 
adolescence due to 
rejection by supplier 
‘A lot of effort was put in place … to try 
and change’ (AI7) 
11 UCT Obsolescence due to 
value propositions 
To provide ‘access to new markets’ 
(AI17) 
12 XCD Potential failure due to 
newness (inefficiency for 
competition) 
‘It’s a flooded market .. we’re unknown 
in X’ (AI12); ‘the numbers are very, 
very poor’ (AI7) 
 
Table 5.12   Age-related TNE Liabilities for University A TNE  
     Operations 
 
An analysis of the remaining TNE operations indicate that some of them 
may be exposed to potential threats of failure. The TSW ic-IBC is seen to 
be affected by ‘dramatic’ changes in the regulatory environment (AI20) 
and therefore vulnerable to senescence due to inflexibility. The VCS ic-
IBC was observed to have lost its way (AI12), and facing an ‘identity 
crisis’ (AI20), being possibly vulnerable to obsolescence due to slowness 
in adjusting its value proposition. 
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In the case of the WSL r-FP, the reportedly high maintenance costs in 
managing the OP and its students (AI7) may expose it to University 
consolidation arising from opportunity costs, as demonstrated by the 
termination of PHS (AI2). For the XCD ic-IBC, it risks being terminated 
for want of students (AI7, AI12). 
 
5.4.1.3 Analysis of University A Reflectors of the Theories of the Firm 
 
The reflectors analysed for University A will follow the propositional 
framework of Table 4.12, and compared against a priori expectations 
formulated in Section 5.1.1. 
 
5.4.1.3.1 Transaction Cost Economics 
 
Following Williamson’s discriminating alignment hypothesis discussed in 
Section 2.6.2, the four reflectors of asset specificity, behavioural 
uncertainty, transaction frequency and environmental uncertainty will be 
investigated (Section 4.5.3) to test the University’s possible TCE-driven 
motivations for TNE model selection. 
 
a) Asset Specificity 
 
Investments in TNE-specific assets in pre-tipping point TNE operations 
(which were all r-FPs) were observed to be low compared to post-tipping 
point TNE operations which feature both ic-IBCs and r-FPs. The 
difference lies in the higher levels of delivery quality required by the 
University and regulatory bodies post-tipping point. 
 
(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
As expected, the University’s pre-tipping point TNE operations were 
asset-light (AI11). These early TNE operations were all r-FPs that were 
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initiated by the faculties, and largely by the University’s ‘entrepreneurial’ 
Business School, UBS (AI18). The University was reported to ‘try and 
partner with as many partners as possible, to get as many students as 
possible’ (AI6), driven by opportunities for ‘academics to earn extra’ 
(AI17). This rush to set up r-FPs was within a lax operating environment 
of ‘a lot less compliance’ (AI17).  
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) AI3 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN Uni TNE infrastructure concentrated in UBS, including  
   UBSI 
TMC Uni branding 
b) AI6 GEN Uni provide IP; moderate assessments 
2 Managerial Role 
a) AI7 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN r-FP OPs vary in admissions, teaching and marking  
   responsibilities 
b) AI17 GEN OP ‘poor examination processes’ 
UCT Uni visiting teaching staff 
c) AI19 GEN Uni reputation 
GEN teachouts costly and time-consuming 
d) AI20 GEN r-FP Uni vary in extent of offshore teaching 
3 Academic Role 
a) AI8 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN Uni staff visits beneficial 
b) AI12 UCT OP institute better than govt University 
UCT OP provide internships to every graduate 
c) AI13 UCT OP institute ‘one of the better’ with ‘good staff’ 
d) AI14 GEN r-FP OPs do marketing, all local hire staff 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   GEN – generic comments;   Govt - government 
 
Table 5.13   University A Informant Perspectives on TNE-specific  
Assets (Pre-tipping Point) 
 
The majority of r-FPs were not academic institutions but commercial 
organisations with no customised education facilities and processes 
(AI17). For instance, some offshore partners (OP) were found to have 
‘poor examination processes’ (AI17).  
 
The early r-FPs were invariably supported by visiting University teaching 
staff, who provide teaching, OP teaching staff training, student 
consultations and alumni relations (AI8), which can be considered 
somewhat investment-specific in the TCE sense because of the 
specialised nature of these services. There was also recognition for the 
University’s offshore branding (AI3) and IP (AI6) as valuable investment-
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specific assets in TNE. Teachouts which usually follow r-FP terminations 
are specialised processes that can be costly and time-consuming (AI19). 
However, OP responsibilities in student admissions, teaching and 
marking are not considered investment-specific assets as they can easily 
be redeployed to support other university programs (AI7). 
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
The University’s first branch campus, TSW is a unique defining TNE 
operation for the University because it required a change of the 
University’s State government statute (Leadership Case Studies, 2011) 
and resulted in the set up of the University’s only TNE equity joint 
venture to date (AI4). TSW is operated by a joint-venture holding 
company with equity initially contributed by the host State government 
and private investors (AI9). Although the University did not invest in the 
initial equity of the company, it re-invested its royalty income into its 
share of equity in the company (AI19). The operation was initiated by a 
private investor from the host Country, who promised to provide land, 
and fund the construction of the campus infrastructure and operating 
capital (Ibid.). Ultimately, the host State government provided State land 
and funded most of the initial costs of set up (AI2, AI8). The initial and 
continuing investments were large because the University programs 
included Engineering programs (AI6) to meet the industry needs of the 
region (AI8). The host State government’s motivation for the set up of the 
University was for capacity-building (AI8), supporting the city status of 
the town (AI6) and contribution to the local State economy (AI8). 
 
The joint-venture company held the licence of the University (AI1), but 
the University had full control over academic issues and key 
administrative appointments’ through its sole on-site representative, its 
Pro-Vice Chancellor (PVC) (Leadership Case Studies 2011, 20), 
justifying the ic-IBC label. 
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AI1 argued that there was no potential for holdup because the host 
Country partners could easily ‘find another partner’, while the University 
will encounter a ‘problem’ in the event of a termination. However, the 
potential for a termination seems extremely remote, and any termination 
would likely hurt both parties. This is because of the equity participation 
of the partners, and the depth of the relationship which resulted in the 
trialling of unit coordination (a tightly-held University academic process) 
at the ic-IBC and the development of the ic-IBC’s own units and 
programs (AI19). The ic-IBC is also active in  research and community 
engagement (AI2). AI17 commented that this TNE operation is ‘the most 
genuine extension of University A’, while AI18 observed that the 
University and the OP are ‘fully engaged’. 
 
The VCS ic-IBC, the second branch campus is another defining 
operation because of its contrasting modus operandi, i.e., its ownership, 
licencing and management is solely by the OP (AI1), although the 
campus is branded exclusively as ‘University A Country V’ (AI15). The 
University however, had absolute academic control (AI1), and governs 
the ic-IBC through key joint governance entities (e.g., academic board 
and research committee (AI15)) and an on-site PVC (AI15). The OP 
invested heavily in ‘well-developed systems and processes’ and 
‘technology’ (AI15). 
 
While the VCS ic-IBC started off as a hands-off r-FP (from a 
consolidation of several r-FPs, AI9) focussed solely on teaching for profit, 
the University later appointed an on-site PVC to be the ‘eyes on the 
ground’ (AI15). A renewed contract subsequently required the partners to 
jointly fund research, an impost on an OP which was traditionally ‘not 
aligned to research’, and resulting in the hire of more full-time academic 
staff (AI15). The OP was also seen to have invested in a journal and 
symposia dedicated to teaching and learning, howbeit across its many 
other university partner TNE operations in several countries (AI10). 
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The collaboration is observed to be highly intertwined, in view of the OP’s 
University-specific investments in the campus infrastructure, buildings 
and staff hire (AI17), and the University’s trialling of unit coordination by 
OP teaching staff (AI15). Further, the joint governance entities (AI15), 
joint commitment to research (AI9, AI15) and long partnership (AI16) 
contributed to the sense that the ic-IBC ‘plays to each other’s strengths’ 
(AI16), and represents a ‘smaller scale version’ of University A (CI15). 
 
The University’s third branch campus, XCD has features that are a 
combination of TSW and VCS. While the University has been given a 
‘corporate vehicle’ that owned the operating licence like TSW (AI9), its 
infrastructure is fully funded (AI10), and its operation fully managed by its 
OP like VCS (AI11). Started serendipitously as a result of the initial pull-
out of University C from the market, the University relied on the OP for 
start up due to an acknowledgement that it does not have the local 
knowledge to manage in this new market (AI11). Interestingly, the OP 
sought a new university partner to make use of its TNE infrastructure 
after University C did not renew its contract (WS 2018). 
 
Like the former two ic-IBCs, the University stationed a PVC to oversee its 
operation (AI6) and provided the IP and quality assurance in an asset-
light investment arrangement (AI11). This operation however, followed a 
northern hemisphere education calendar which required many study 
periods which were different from the University’s and hence demand 
higher resourcing of the University’s TNE support infrastructure (AI7). 
 
Although the University was seen to have the ‘highest ranking in Country 
X’ among its Australian peers (AI20), its brand recognition was still in its 
infancy in Country X and need time to be established (AI9). 
 
The newest branch campus, UCM is also an ic-IBC which was recently 
converted from a r-FP, like VCS. Even while a r-FP (UCT), the 
University’s programs were delivered out of highly commended teaching 
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infrastructure that was considered better than other host Country 
government universities (AI12) and delivered by ‘good staff’ in whom the 
OP invested training, e.g., PhD training (AI17). It was reported to have a 
‘quite strong research arm’ (AI13). Its OP was known to have invested in 
the partnership for capacity-building (AI8), while the OP’s parent 
company, a large conglomerate invested in a six-month graduate 
internship program for its alumni (AI12).  
 
Generally, the University prefers the branch ‘campus over small TNE’ 
operations, but would invariably go for ‘asset-light’ investments (AI1), 
where the OP puts up the physical infrastructure (AI11). All its ic-IBCs 
are required to have the same ‘campus look and feel’ (AI6, CI7, CI9), and 
be led by its appointed PVC who is part of the University’s ‘senior 
executive team’ (AI2). 
 
In line with its recently articulated mission to be a Global University with 
multiple campuses (AI1) like ‘mini University As’ (AI14) across the world, 
the University insists on the delivery of teaching, research and 
community engagement at its ic-IBCs (AI5, AI6), the preferred model for 
its Global University network. This requires key resources from both the 
University and its OPs that the University builds into its new OP contracts 
(AI16), as a ‘price of doing business’ in TNE (AI5). It includes PVCs with 
research and community engagement KPIs (AI8) and the proactive 
seeding of research at its ic-IBCs in Countries V, X and U (AI5, AI6). The 
University also encourages the OPs to provide ‘input into new courses’ 
(AI9) and is currently trialling unit coordination by OP teaching staff at 
two ic-IBCs (AI14, AI19). AI2 expressed the hope that the University and 
its ic-IBC OPs would be able to ‘moderate each other’ in the future. 
 
The University’s post-tipping point TNE administration has grown to be 
more sophisticated (AI19) and comprised due diligence by specialists 
(AI18), well-developed risk management (AI5), online learning systems 
(AI13), TNE quality assurance processes (AI1) and restructured onshore 
 325 
TNE hub-and-spokes organisation (AI19, AI20). AI7 commented that it 
would be difficult to replace its IAO hub staff because of their specialist 
skills and experience. The ic-IBC OPs are also well-resourced 
organisations who provide campus facilities (AI4, AI11), teaching and 
administration staff (AI11, AI17) and host country expertise (AI5). 
 
The University is observed to have invested in investment-specific assets 
in the form of IP, branding, specialist visiting teaching staff and teachout 
processes that are specific to its TNE operations prior to its TNE tipping 
point. There were no equivalent asset specific investments on the part of 
OPs in the early r-FP operations. 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) LCS TSW Land developer propose to provide land,  
   campus and approvals 
TSW IBC needed change in Statute 
TSW Town’s city status through University presence 
TSW Uni to have full control over academic and key  
   administrative appointments  
 
b) AI1 GEN Uni prefers campus model over small TNEs 
GEN ic-IBC is asset-light 
GEN ic-IBC campus look and feel for ‘comparable  
   campus experience’ 
GEN Global Uni approach; multiple campuses 
TSW Govt can ‘find another partner’; Uni ‘problem’ in  
   termination 
TSW Joint-venture (JV) holds local licence 
VCS Uni has ‘absolute academic control’ 
VCS OP holds local licence; responsible for land,  
   facilities, infrastructure, human resources 
VCS OP ‘aren’t naturally aligned to research’ 
 
c) AI2 GEN PVC in senior executive team 
GEN Uni and OP ‘moderating each other’ aspiration 
TSW ‘very strong research arm’; ‘research and  
   community development’ in contract 
TSW OP’s ‘bequeathed land’ 
 
d) AI3 TSW research active due to full-time teaching staff  
e) AI5 GEN Uni relies on OP host country expertise 
GEN Uni has more well-developed risk management  
   approaches now 
GEN Global uni research and community 
engagement  
   roles 
GEN research ‘price of doing business’ 
 
f) AI6 GEN OP required to do research and community  
   engagement by contract 
GEN ic-IBC ‘look and feel’ of campus 
TSW OP has capacity-building interests 
TSW, XCD OP engineering facilities cost more 
GEN r-FP OP poor  
   quality facilities 
g) AI10 GEN Uni seeding research resources in V, X and U 
VCS OP’s TandL symposium and journal investment 
XCD Govt requirement for infrastructure provider 
GEN r-FP Uni IP 
GEN r-FP OP capital  
   investments 
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h) AI11 GEN ic-IBC infrastructure by OP; cheaper than Uni  
   investment 
GEN ic-IBC IP and quality assurance by Uni 
GEN OP classrooms, labs, library, internet access,  
   computer software 
XCD Uni have no local expertise in ‘new market’ 
XCD Uni invest in IP and QA; asset-light model 
XCD OP invest in infrastructure and people 
GEN r-FPs require  
   less investments  
   than ic-IBCs 
 
i) AI16 GEN Uni key resources : research and community  
   engagement 
VCS OP admin staff services Uni and OP programs 
VCS OP’s ‘well-developed systems and processes … 
and  
   market reach’ 
VCS Uni and OP ‘plays to each other’s strengths’ 
VCS Uni and OP in partnership for a long time 
VCS PVC ‘to increase our engagement with industry’ 
 
2 Managerial Role 
a) WS XCD OP looking for uni to make use of facilities  
b) AI7 GEN IAO staff difficult to replace due to experience 
GEN ic-IBC custom-designed campus 
GEN r-FP uses OP’s  
   own infrastructure 
c) AI9 GEN comparable campus and facilities 
GEN Global uni ‘input into new courses’ 
TSW Uni had no initial equity 
TSW joint-venture holding company 
TSW OP pay for research infra 
VCS Uni and OP to fund research by contract 
XCD Uni brand being established; not sure it extends  
   to the region 
XCD Uni given ‘corporate vehicle … to hire people’ 
 
d) AI15 GEN Uni key resources : teaching facilities, student  
   support services 
VCS Uni benefit from OP’s systems, processes and  
   local regulatory knowledge 
VCS Uni trialling OP unit coordination for expertise 
and  
   economic (AI4) reasons 
VCS Uni ‘putting a lot of resources in research’ 
VCS Uni PVC ‘eyes on the ground’ 
VCS Uni and OP joint governance entities 
VCS Uni and OP joint research committee set up 
VCS OP uses Uni content exclusively for Uni program 
VCS OP has ‘well-developed systems and processes’ 
VCS OP ‘huge resources dumped into … technology’ 
VCS OP employed 5 full-time and 70 part-time 
lecturers 
VCS OP full-time lecturers required for research 
VCS a ‘smaller scale’ version of home campus 
 
e) AI17 GEN OP must employ ‘suitably qualified staff’ on-site 
TSW ‘the most genuine extension of Uni A’ 
UCM OP upskill its own teaching staff 
XCD Uni responsible for QA, staff appointment 
XCD OP responsible for infra, buildings, staff hiring 
 
f) AI19 GEN Uni TNE ‘well-developed processes’ 
TSW Uni reinvested royalty in equity 
TSW JV develop own units and courses; trialling unit  
   coordination 
 
g) AI20 GEN Uni set up hub-and-spokes TNE administration 
XCD Uni have highest ranking in Country X 
XCD needs to establish its identity; ‘can’t just be  
   another campus there’ 
 
3 Academic Role 
a) AI4 GEN OP ‘bricks and mortar … a huge part’ of TNE 
TSW Uni has equity in JV 
 
b) AI8 GEN PVC research and community engagement KPIs 
TSW Govt wanted institution for capacity-building 
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TSW Govt provided land, campus and start-up capital 
UCM OP has capacity-building interests 
c) AI12 TSW contribute to State’s economy  
d) AI13 GEN Uni’s systems, e.g., oLecture and Grade Centre  
UCM has ‘quite strong research arm’ 
GEN r-FP not  
   required to do  
   research 
e) AI14 GEN Global uni – mini Uni As  
f) AI18 GEN Uni due diligence by specialists in strategy,  
   finance, operations, risk management 
TSW Uni and OP fully engaged 
 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University; GEN – generic comments; Govt – government  
    LCS – Leadership Case Studies (Leadership Case Studies 2011) 
    WS – Personal discussion with former University C Dean  
 International (2018) 
 
Table 5.14   University A Informant Perspectives on TNE-specific  
Assets (Post-tipping Point) 
 
Post-tipping point, both the University and its ic-IBC OPs were seen to 
have acquired investment-specific assets. While the University invested 
in its IP, brand, TNE-specific systems, processes and organisation, and 
research and community engagement resources, the OP invested in 
customised physical infrastructure. Licensing of the TNE operations was 
all held by the OPs except for TSW where it was jointly held, and XCD 
where it was held by the University. The only operation where the 
University held equity is in TSW. The replacement of University C by 
University A in the XCD ic-IBC demonstrated the absence of holdup by 
the OP’s infrastructure investment.  
 
There was no difference in asset specificity for r-FP arrangements before 
and after the tipping point. OPs of r-FPs are also not required to 
undertake research and community engagement. 
 
b) Behavioural Uncertainty 
 
Universities encounter difficulties in measuring and evaluating the 
performance of OPs due to distance and costs (Section App I 10.5). 
They ideally need to be able to appoint ‘somebody that they can trust 
and is relatively risk-free’ (AI14). The difference between the University’s 
pre-tipping point and post-tipping point experiences in monitoring its OPs 
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lies in the difference in level of regulatory controls (AI17), its response to 
these controls (AI19) and the characteristics of its OPs (AI9). 
 
(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
The pre-tipping point operating environment was characterised by lower 
levels of regulation; AUQA commenced only in 2000 (Section 5.2.2.1.2). 
The performance of TNE operations were benchmarked mainly against 
the University’s own internal quality standards (AI10) and existing 
education regulations (both Australian and in the host country) that were 
not specifically crafted for TNE (Section 5.2.2). 
 
Early TNE operations were invariably motivated by profit for both the 
University and its OPs (Table App I.1). In the case of the University, 
these ventures were initiated and managed by the faculties to generate 
income for the faculties and its participating staff (AI17, AI18). Some host 
country operating environments saw the set up of ‘dodgy players … 
issuing fake degrees’ (AI15). AI9 described the Country V industry as ‘a 
shambles ... they had so many fly-by-night operators offering courses in 
shopping malls … and all sorts of weird places and … non-accredited’. 
The regulatory authorities in Country V responded very quickly by 
introducing ‘new sets of regulations’ in 2011 (AI15, AI17).  
 
The University was also responsible for the poor performance of some of 
their OPs because these early operations were ‘largely hands-off’ (AI10) 
and the OPs were allowed to ‘run them at their own way’ (AI20). It did not 
help that some OPs were running ‘substitute’ programs (AI2) from 
several partner universities ‘like a supermarket’ (AI3). At one stage, the 
University had ‘lots of different partners, with lots of different standards’ 
in Country V (AI9), and was losing ‘line of sight with too many 
partnerships’ (AI6). 
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To monitor and assure quality delivery, the University adopted a ‘more 
prescriptive type of relationship … the University would prescribe that 
this must be done, and this must be done, and follow this’ (AI15). It 
employed offshore teaching visits by its own faculty (Section App I 6.1.3), 
quarterly and annual reporting (AI20), student surveys and staff 
evaluations (AI12). 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) AI2 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN OP running ‘substitute’ programs in P 
b) AI3 GEN OP programs ‘like a supermarket’ in P 
GEN r-FPs considered more risky 
c) AI6 GEN Uni ‘losing line of sight with too many parterships’ 
GEN Uni terminated a A$7 million TNE operation 
GEN Uni viewed TNE ‘through a different lens of quality’ 
GEN Uni has no on-site representative to monitor r-FPs 
GEN OP some academic delivery ‘not at appropriate  
   standards’ 
d) AI10 GEN Uni TNE benchmarked against internal and current  
   Australian standards 
GEN early r-FPs ‘largely hands-off’ 
GEN risk of ‘operator not delivering your IP properly …’ 
GEN OP poor performance ‘can damage the brand’ 
2 Managerial Role 
a) AI7 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN Uni terminated ‘non-performing programs’ 
GEN r-FP OP have conflict of interest with multiple partners 
b) AI9 GEN ‘a shambles … fly-by-night’ operators in V 
GEN Uni ‘lots of different partners, lots of different standards’ 
GEN OP characteristics before and after tipping point 
GEN OP that ignore ‘red flags’ need to be terminated 
c) AI15 VCS Uni monitors through joint governance entities 
VCS OP resisted but finally acquiesced to research 
VCS OP teaching staff trialling unit coordination 
d) AI17 TSW the ‘most genuine extension of Uni A’ 
e) AI19 GEN Uni focus on quality lead to BSA accreditation 
TSW own ‘a couple of their courses’; trialling unit coordination 
f) AI20 GEN Uni allowed OPs to ‘run them at their own way’ 
3 Academic Role 
a) AI4 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN Uni ‘some push back … Uni more mature’ 
GEN OP non-compliance ‘tends to be individual staff’ 
GEN OP teaching staff teaching in a foreign language;  
   ‘distance … can’t confirm compliance’ 
GEN OP teaching staff want to teach ‘classes every 5 weeks’ 
b) AI12 GEN Uni deployed frequent teaching visits pre-tipping point 
c) AI13 GEN Uni deployed frequent teaching visits pre-tipping point 
GEN OP ‘sceptical entry’ of students 
GEN OP ‘woeful’ pass rates 
d) AI14 GEN somebody ‘that they can trust and is relatively risk-free’ 
GEN r-FPs considered a ‘crap shoot’ 
e) AI18 GEN Uni TNE motivation by entrepreneurial staff 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.15   University A Informant Perspectives on Behavioural  
Uncertainty (Pre-tipping Point) 
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It is insightful to note the rationale for the termination of these early TNE 
operations. The majority of them were due to quality and comparability 
issues (Table App I.2), i.e., the ‘operator not delivering your IP properly, 
… using staff that are not properly equipped to deliver the IP, … (and) 
they won’t deliver the IP in the style that you would want it delivered 
because obviously their costs, space and methods of delivery are not 
yours’ (AI10). Some of the academic delivery was ‘not at appropriate 
standards’ (AI6), some OPs admitted students with ‘sceptical entry’ 
qualifications (AI13) and some deployed poor quality faculty (AI6). These 
poor quality deliveries resulted in ‘woeful’ pass rates (AI13) and ‘pose 
significant risks to the University in as much as it can damage the brand 
… because the degrees are being marketed … as University A degrees’ 
(AI10). 
 
AI4, an academic reported that sometimes the non-compliance ‘tends not 
to be the partners, it tends to be individual staff who might be teaching in 
the unit’. An example was reported about the OP teaching staff teaching 
in a foreign language and was warned to use English; AI4 admitted that 
‘there’s distance … so you can't confirm compliance’. On another 
occasion, AI4 noted an OP teaching staff casually commenting that the 
unit was going to be taught as ‘a block of classes every 5 weeks instead 
of 12 weeks’, contravening the standard mode of delivery. 
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
Post-tipping point, the TNE sector encountered increasing scrutiny and 
regulation by governments (Section 5.2.2). In Australia, AUQA initiated 
audits of universities in 2000, and added Internationalisation in its second 
cycle audits commencing 2008. While the commencement of AUQA 
audits had no impact on the University’s TNE terminations, a total of 
thirteen TNE operations were terminated within the 2007 – 2009 period 
corresponding to the start of the AUQA Cycle 2 audits. TEQSA took over 
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from AUQA in 2012, with regulatory powers, including sanctioning and 
de-registering providers. Four TNE operations were terminated by the 
University within the 2011 - 2013 period. Other governments also 
tightened up on TNE operations, e.g., Country V’s new regulations 
exercised by the DQF from 2011 onwards (AI15). By the time DQF was 
set up, only one TNE operation remained of the eight that the University 
operated in Country V. TEQSA was the main reason for the University 
insisting on ‘absolute academic control‘ of TNE operations (AI16), a non-
negotiable that resulted in ‘some push back (against the OP) by the 
University on that (a contract negotiation) because I think the University 
is more mature in its processes around managing those things’ (AI4). 
 
Post-tipping point and especially after AUQA commenced, the University 
prioritised ‘quality’ and ‘pursue(d) accreditation’ (AI19), resulting in the 
termination of ‘non-performing programs’ (AI7), leaving ‘a few quality 
OPs’ (AI19) that are ‘easier to manage’ (AI6) and ‘control’ (AI2). The 
University viewed TNE operations ‘through a different lens of quality, we 
didn’t find those acceptable anymore … so, we terminated some of 
those’ (AI6).  
 
OPs that continuously ignore ‘red flags’ in reviews such as student 
satisfaction surveys, and demonstrate no ‘buy-in’ to improve, ‘you’ve got 
to terminate’ (AI9). The University had let lapse the TMC FP contract 
because it was a ‘poor quality provider’ (AI12); this is despite the 
operation contributing ‘a major stream of students (to the home campus) 
for a long, long time … (and) very commercially successful’ (AI3). The 
University even terminated a lucrative A$7 million operation that failed to 
‘manage the entry requirements and enrolments’, sending a ‘clear 
message … (that) if they didn't guarantee quality in terms of the quality of 
the students and performance that they would be gone’ (AI6).  
 
The University’s focus on quality (AI19) brought about its accreditation by 
the BSA, a prestigious international business school accreditation, which 
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required ‘assurance of learning’, ‘faculty sufficiency’ and partner 
equivalence (AI3). Some OPs were under ‘a lot of pressure’ to employ 
BSA-accredited teaching staff (AI13), while some ‘wouldn’t budge’ on 
these BSA requirements and were terminated in what AI3 described as a 
‘real catalyst for cutting ties with PHS’. 
 
The University’s Global University aspiration added more requirements 
on OPs, especially the operators of ic-IBCs (‘we require a lot more’ – 
AI11). These included involvement in, and funding of research and 
community engagement (AI5, AI9, AI10). 
 
In TSW, the land developer who initiated the venture was reported to 
have been furtively motivated by the benefit of ‘residential housing 
development’ within the vicinity of the University campus (AI12), a 
suspicion shared by AI9. The operation seemed to be somewhat 
adversely affected by high staff turnover (AI7) which resulted from low 
staff remuneration, paradoxically a TSW OP operational advantage (AI9). 
TSW on the whole is considered the most mature of the campuses 
(AI10) and the ‘most genuine extension of University A’ (AI17), where 
TSW staff are ‘fully engaged with (University A) colleagues’ (AI18). It was 
also reported that TSW undertakes a lot more research now, and there 
was more community engagement undertaken compared to the home 
campus (AI9). It is given a ‘higher level of autonomy’ (AI8), resulting in 
their owning ‘a couple of their courses’ and trialling unit coordination by 
OP teaching staff (AI19). 
 
There were occasions of resistance by the VCS OP to University 
requirements, where the DVCI had to push ‘pretty hard’ (AI1). The OP 
also resisted the imposition of research involvement, presumably due to 
ownership of IP, but gave in through a renewed contract (AI15). Although 
the OP also operates other campuses with ‘a whole raft of partners’ 
(AI16), it runs an exclusive University A campus in Country V. It is 
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interesting to note that the University allowed the OP to run the OP’s own 
Diploma feeders at the exclusive University A campus (AI15). 
 
This OP has been collaborating with the University over a long period of 
time across several operations (AI3), and the partners have developed a 
high level of trust (AI14, AI16), providing the platform for the trialling of 
unit coordination by OP teaching staff (AI15). The VCS operation is 
quality-assured through joint governance entities (AI15), a University 
appointed on-site PVC, ‘well-developed systems and processes’ and the 
University’s ‘absolute academic control’ (AI16). 
 
The University’s relationship with the OP of the UCT r-FP, which later 
became an ic-IBC (UCM), is ‘long-standing’ (AI6) and ‘mature’ (AI2), 
having built trust between the partners over an extended period of 
collaboration (AI14). The stability and high quality delivery at these 
operations can be attributed to the OP’s motivation primarily for capacity-
building (AI8), ‘corporate business responsibility’ (AI6), ‘social 
responsibility for their country’ (AI7), ‘sense of society and … developing 
the community’ (AI1), and nation-building (AI3). UCM was known to be 
‘quite research active … due to the commitment of the leadership team 
there, rather than the impact of University A’ (AI12). 
 
XCD is a very new TNE operation. The OP operating XCD had ‘promised 
very high numbers’ which did not eventuate (AI7). It was also relied on to 
provide market research for a new University post-graduate program, but 
the research was found to be unreliable (AI14). Many of the study 
periods at XCD were not in sync with the University’s and hence caused 
‘a bit of friction’ (AI7); AI7 described the OP as ‘very strong’. 
 
The University continues to operate r-FPs for various reasons, e.g., 
‘community-building’ at the YSR r-FP (AI11). However, these operations 
are considered more risky (AI3, AI6), and AI14 considered them a ‘crap 
shoot’ because ‘there’s no guarantee that at the end it’s going to be 
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successful’. In some operations, the OP might resist the University’s 
suggestions because they conflict with the OP’s other university partners 
(AI7). Further, the University does not have any on-site representative to 
safeguard its interests, unlike the ic-IBCs’ PVCs (AI6). 
 
Behavioural uncertainty is thus evidenced in both r-FPs and ic-IBCs 
before and after the tipping point.  
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) AI1 VCS Uni DVCI had to push ‘pretty hard’ 
UCT/UCM OP ‘sense of society and … developing 
community’ 
 
b) AI2 GEN fewer OPs easier to ‘control’ 
UCT/UCM ‘mature’ 
 
c) AI3 GEN Uni BSA ‘assurance of learning’, ‘faculty  
   sufficiency’ and partner equivalence 
GEN some OPs ‘wouldn’t budge’ on BSA  
   requirements; a ‘real catalyst for cutting ties with  
   PHS’ 
VCS OP has been collaborating with Uni over a long  
   period of time across several operations 
UCT/UCM OP ‘nation-building’ 
TMC ‘a major stream  
   of students … very  
   commercially  
   successful’ 
 
d) AI5 GEN ic-IBC OP need to be in research and 
community  
   engagement 
 
e) AI6 GEN Uni viewed TNE ‘through a different lens of  
   quality’ 
GEN fewer OPs ‘easier to manage’ 
UCT/UCM ‘long standing’ 
UC/UCM OP ‘corporate business responsibility’ 
GEN r-FP OP  
   employed poor  
   quality faculty 
GEN Uni has no on- 
   site representative  
   to monitor r-FPs 
GEN r-FPs  
   considered more  
   risky 
f) AI10 GEN OP need to be in research and community  
   engagement 
TSW considered the most mature of ic-IBC campuses 
 
g) AI11 GEN Uni BSA ‘we require a lot more’ YSR for ‘community- 
   building’ 
h) AI16 GEN Uni ‘absolute academic control’ 
VCS Uni and OP developed high trust levels 
VCS Uni PVC and ‘well-developed systems and  
   processes’ 
VCS OP operates with ’a whole raft of partners’ 
 
2 Managerial Role 
a) AI7 TSW OP high staff turnover due to low remuneration 
UCT/UCM OP ‘social responsibility for their country’ 
XCD OP ‘promised very high numbers’ – did not 
eventuate 
XCD study period not in sync; OP ‘very strong’ 
 
b) AI9 GEN ic-IBC OP need to be in research and 
community  
   engagement 
GEN OP that ignore ‘red flags’ need to be terminated 
TSW OP low cost an advantage 
TSW more research now; more community  
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   engagement compared to home campus 
c) AI15 GEN ‘dodgy players … issuing fake degrees’ in V 
VCS Uni monitors through joint governance entities 
VCS OP resisted but finally acquiesced to research 
VCS OP teaching staff trialling unit coordination 
 
d) AI17 TSW the ‘most genuine extension of Uni A’  
e) AI19 GEN Uni focus on quality lead to BSA accreditation 
TSW own ‘a couple of their courses’; trialling unit 
coordination 
 
f) AI20 GEN Uni used quarterly and annual reporting to 
monitor  
   TNE 
 
3 Academic Role 
a) AI4 UCT/UCM Uni and OP built trust over long period 
XCD OP market research unreliable 
 
b) AI8 TSW OP given a ‘higher level of autonomy’ 
UCT/UCM OP capacity-building 
 
c) AI12 GEN Uni student surveys and staff evaluations to  
   monitor TNE 
TSW OP ‘residential housing development’ 
UCT/UCM OP ‘research active due to … leadership  
   team’ 
TMC OP a ‘poor  
   quality provider’ 
 
d) AI13 GEN OP under ‘a lot of pressure’ to hire BSA-
accredited staff 
 
e) AI14 VCS Uni and OP developed high trust levels  
f) AI18 TSW OP staff ‘fully engaged with colleagues’  
Abbreviations :   Uni – University; GEN – generic comments; Govt – Government  
 
Table 5.16   University A Informant Perspectives on Behavioural  
Uncertainty (Post-tipping Point) 
 
c) Transaction Frequency 
 
Following discussions in 5.4.1.3.1b above, the lax regulatory 
environment prior to the University’s tipping point meant that the TNE 
business transactions by the University and its OPs are fewer compared 
to post-tipping point.  
 
(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
Although there was ‘a lot less (regulatory) compliance’  before the tipping 
point (AI17), the University had ‘too many partners’ (AI4), ‘too many 
franchising, twinning arrangements’, operating at ‘lots of different 
standards’ (AI9) which meant ‘a huge amount of work’, e.g., at one time 
there were ‘38 units that have been offered over 300 times a year’ (AI4). 
It was ‘busy work, it doesn't strain your brain, it just takes a lot of time' 
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(AI4). This state of affairs was driven by the University’s objective to ‘try 
and partner with as many partners as possible; to get as many students 
as possible’ at that time (AI6). All of these r-FP operations required 
frequent visits by University teaching staff (AI12, AI13).  
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) AI6  GEN Uni ‘try and partner with as many partners as possible; to  
   get as many students as possible’ 
2 Managerial Role 
a) AI7 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN Uni more than 40 staff to manage TNE 
b) AI9 GEN ‘too many franchising, twinning arrangements’ operating  
   at ‘lots of different standards’  
c) AI17 GEN up to 28 offshore study periods at the peak 
GEN ‘a lot less compliance’ pre-tipping 
d) AI20 GEN Uni administered r-FPs through UBSI 
3 Academic Role 
a) AI4 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN Uni had ‘too many partners’; ‘a huge amount of work’ 
GEN Uni ’38 units … offered over 300 times a year’; ‘busy  
   work, it doesn’t strain your brain; it just takes a lot of time’ 
b) AI12 GEN Uni needed to visit OPs frequently 
c) AI13 GEN Uni needed to visit OPs frequently 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.17   University A Informant Perspectives on Transaction  
Frequency (Pre-tipping Point) 
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
The poor delivery and outcomes arising from some of the pre-tipping 
point r-FPs, and the new imposts of TEQSA and BSA prompted the 
University to require absolute control over its TNE value chain activities 
(‘we controlled absolutely everything’ - AI19). These imposts included 
monitoring activities to maintain equivalence between delivery locations 
(AI3), ensure OP teaching staff are BSA-recognised (AI13) and comply 
with TEQSA’s ‘campus reviews’ (AI1). 
 
The ic-IBCs are distinguished from the r-FPs by the presence of on-site 
PVCs, but ‘the same labour is involved’ in operating these modes of 
delivery (AI7). These basic activities involve a ‘large number’ of 
processes (AI5). The University used to administer these TNE activities 
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through the International office of its Business School (UBS), UBSI 
because the majority of TNE programs were from the UBS (AI20). At that 
time, UBSI had in excess of 40 staff to manage its TNE programs (AI7), 
being responsible for TNE administration, quality assurance, compliance 
and oversight of academic delivery (AI20). The University later re-
structured its TNE administration into a hub-and-spokes model, around 
an International Administration Office (IAO) hub which services four 
faculties (spokes) and liaises with the OPs (AI20). The UBSI, which is the 
predecessor of the IAO, transferred a lot of work to the schools and the 
ic-IBCs (AI7).  
 
The unit coordinators who are responsible for individual units are 
reported to be responsible for the most labour-intensive processes, i.e., 
academic processes, which include the vetting and approval of OP 
teaching staff (AI8), preparation of study unit outlines (AI7), writing 
assessments (e.g., mid-semester tests and assignments) and 
examinations (AI11, AI19), marking of assessments and examination 
scripts (AI7, AI12), moderation of offshore marking (AI19), and OP 
teaching staff orientation, training (AI13) and liaison (AI8). Unit 
coordination work was reported to have ‘no low or peak time … it’s 
always peak’ (AI12). 
 
Some ic-IBC OPs, e.g., VCS have invested in ‘well-developed systems 
and processes’ to cope with the large number of TNE processes (AI15); 
these enabled them to ‘respond to enquiries rapidly’ (AI16). The OP also 
invested in a ‘careers officer’ to provide student (AI16) and alumni (AI8) 
support, while the University appointed the on-site PVC to enable OP 
staff to ‘seek answers’ quickly (AI15). The PVCs allow the University’s 
senior executive team to be ‘very much in the room’ through weekly 
meetings ‘by video link’ (AI2). The ic-IBCs also feature joint governance 
entities like joint academic boards, joint academic councils, joint 
management committees (AI15). 
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The frequency of TNE operations is also influenced by the number of 
study periods delivered offshore (which numbered 28 at the peak) (AI7), 
the number of delivery locations (AI12) and the frequency of OP teaching 
staff turnover (AI8).  
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) AI1 GEN Uni comply with TEQSA’s ‘campus reviews’  
b) AI2 VCS Senior Executive ‘very much in the room’ with  
   PVC 
 
c) AI3 GEN Uni maintain equivalence across delivery locations 
d) AI5 GEN Uni ‘large number’ of processes 
GEN Uni imposed research & community  
   engagement on ic-IBCs as part of Global University 
 
e) AI6 TSW has more community engagement than home  
   campus 
 
f) AI11 GEN Uni unit coordinators write assessments and exams 
g) AI16 GEN OPs ‘respond to enquiries rapidly’ 
VCS OP ‘careers officer’ provide student support 
 
2 Managerial Role 
a) AI7 GEN Uni transferred a lot of work to the schools and ic-IBC 
GEN Uni unit coordinators prepare study unit outlines 
GEN Uni unit coordinators mark assessments 
GEN ‘the same labour is involved’ 
b) AI9 GEN Uni unit coordinators moderate offshore marking 
c) AI15 VCS Uni-OP joint governance entities 
VCS OP staff can ‘seek answers’ quickly from on-site  
   PVC 
VCS ‘well-developed systems and processes’ 
 
d) AI19 GEN Uni ‘we controlled absolutely everything’ 
GEN Uni unit coordinators write assessments and  
   exams 
GEN Uni unit coordinators mark exam scripts 
 
e) AI20 GEN Uni TNE admin, QA, compliance and oversight of TNE 
GEN Uni hub-and-spokes model services four faculties 
3 Academic Role 
a) AI8 GEN Uni unit coordinator work the most labour- 
   intensive, including vetting and approval of OP  
   teaching staff 
GEN Uni unit coordinators liaise with OP teaching  
   staff 
VCS OP ‘careers officer’ provide alumni support 
 
b) AI12 GEN Uni unit coordinators work ‘no low or peak time … it’s always peak’ 
c) AI13 GEN Uni ensure OP teaching staff are BSA- 
   accredited 
GEN Uni unit coordinators training and orientation of  
   OP staff 
 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University; GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.18   University A Informant Perspectives on Transaction  
Frequency (Post-tipping Point) 
 
Finally, the University’s Global University aspiration imposed research 
and community engagement onto its ic-IBC operations (AI5, AI10). TSW 
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was reported to have been involved in more community engagement 
than the home campus (AI6). 
 
While the TNE processes were fewer before tipping point, it was more 
voluminous. Post-tipping point, there were more TNE processes 
corresponding to the increased regulatory and compliance requirements, 
although they relate to fewer TNE operations. 
 
d) Business and Legal-political Uncertainty 
 
The TNE operating environments before and after tipping point were 
quite different, mainly due to changes in regulation within Australian 
higher education and in some host countries. The trend has been for 
tightening of regulations to curb non-genuine TNE operations. 
 
(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
As discussed in 5.4.1.3.1b above, pre-tipping point TNE host country 
environments were reported to feature ‘a lot less compliance’ (AI17). 
Country V was reported to have ‘over a thousand players’ in those early 
years of TNE  (AI15), some of which were ‘fly-by-night’ operators (AI6). 
 
The University’s Country P r-FPs were only one of many other university 
offerings delivered within each OP, and were described as 
indistinguishable baked bean brands on a supermarket shelf (AI3). There 
was invariably intense competition (AI6) amidst these ‘substitutes’ (AI2). 
AI2 related how PHS had to be terminated because there was no growth 
despite ‘a number of years’ of trying to ‘increase the number of students’. 
In the case of POL, a shift in student preferences led to falling student 
numbers, and ultimately closure (AI1). The University continued with 
small research projects with Country P’s local universities thereafter 
(AI2). 
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The University also initiated numerous r-FPs in Country V, but all of them 
except VCS, were terminated. Unlike in Country P, these terminations 
were not due to the impact of the host country business environment, but 
to a deliberate consolidation as a response to the AUQA Cycle 2 audits  
(Section App I 6.0). It resulted in ‘better control over quality, a uniform 
experience for students instead of four different experiences’ delivered 
by the four remaining r-FPs (AI9). The AUQA Cycle 2 audits helped 
ensure ‘comparability of student experience’ (AI19) ‘around the world’ 
(AI11), but led to many Australian universities ‘downsizing their 
transnational because a lot of universities did have too many partners 
and we were included in that’ (AI9). 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) AI1 
No Direct 
Model 
POL change in student preferences caused falling numbers 
b) AI2 PHS ‘a number of years’ trying to ‘increase the number’ 
GEN Uni continued with research partnerships in P 
GEN OP delivered ‘substitutes’ 
c) AI3 GEN baked beans brand on a supermarket shelf 
e) AI6 GEN ‘fly-by-night’ operators 
GEN intense competition 
g) AI11 GEN comparability ‘around the world’ 
2 Managerial Role 
b) AI9 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN Uni had ‘better control over quality, a uniform experience  
   for students instead of four different experiences’ 
c) AI15 GEN ‘over a thousand players’ in V 
d) AI17 GEN ‘a lot less compliance’ pre-tipping 
e) AI19 GEN AUQA Cycle 2 helped ensure ‘comparability of student  
   experience’ 
GEN ‘downsizing their transnational … too many partners’ 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   GEN – generic comments;   Govt - government 
 
Table 5.19   University A Informant Perspectives on Business and  
Legal-political Uncertainty (Pre-tipping Point) 
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
The initial market segments targeted by TSW were children of 
employees within the oil and gas industry (OGI), students from a 
neighbouring country and other domestic students (AI2, AI12, AI14). The 
students from the OGI and neighbouring country did not eventuate (AI12, 
AI17). Although the participation of the State government assured 
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stability (Leadership Case Studies 2011), the ic-IBC was up against the 
Country’s ‘tightly regulated’ and ‘somewhat more … opaque’ Federal 
level higher education regulations (AI11). AI11 explained that ‘political 
influence around the regulation and what it means in terms of the 
operations of the campus can often change very quickly and without real 
explanation or justification’. As an example, ‘Country T requirements 
changed dramatically in the last couple of years, and they made it more 
difficult for on-shore campuses’, noting a policy that required IBCs to 
recruit a minimum number of international students as a prerequisite for 
the retention of their operating licence (AI11). On the 2018 change of 
Federal government in Country T, AI9 was hopeful that TSW’s large 
3,500-student ic-IBC should buffer it against any adverse impact since 
TSW serves ‘quite a big need in that region’. 
 
Country V’s ‘regulatory environment is clear and you know where you 
stand’ (AI9); ‘what they say is what they mean’ (AI16), providing ‘stability 
of the local system’ (AI17). Responding to ‘dodgy players … issuing fake 
degrees’ (AI15) and the ‘many fly-by-night operators’, the Country V 
government quickly enacted very stringent regulations governing the 
delivery of private education in 2011, which brought about a ‘change in 
the whole landscape in education’ (AI15). These ‘pretty tight’ (AI2), 
‘pretty stringent’ (AI3) regulations kept non-genuine operators out of the 
industry (AI15), but also restricted the existing providers from some 
sections of the market (AI16). Recent changes to Country V’s 
immigration laws discouraged the entry of international students, 
triggering AI1’s comment that the ‘vagaries of the Country V government 
policies … have hurt us a lot … (and) limited its (ic-IBC) growth’ through 
‘policies around international students'. 
 
The set up of another three government-funded universities in Country V 
also increased the competition, and TNE ‘numbers are declining 
significantly’ (AI12). The VCS seems to be ‘losing its way’ (AI12) and 
facing ‘an identity crisis at the moment … (and) really needs to think 
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seriously about why it’s there, and what it’s offering to the Country V 
people as well as the internationals that come in’ (AI20). This has 
probably triggered the OP to plan for a campus re-location in ‘trying to 
climb back’ (AI15), confirming AI3’s belief that the University needs OPs 
who understood the operating environment. 
 
Country X is considered ‘unchartered territory’ (AI1) and a ‘crowded 
market’ (AI12) which exposed the University to ‘high risks of failure’ (AI1, 
AI9). AI11 commented that the University would not have entered the 
market had it not been for the agency of the OP because it was a 
‘completely new market’. Given the unknowns and high risks, two 
University managers questioned if any due diligence of this venture had 
been done (‘we didn’t do that for X’ – AI20), or ‘whether we adhere to 
what the reports come out’ (AI7). 
 
The first intake in January 2018 had ‘been quiet to start with as expected’ 
(AI20). AI9 attributed the small intake to the newness of the University 
brand (‘still establishing our brand ... it’s going to take some time’) and 
that the January intake was ‘not a traditionally big uptake of new 
students’ (AI9); ‘Country X’s high school finishes at a different time ... 
northern hemisphere ... their biggest intake is in September’ (AI7). The 
University ‘probably have the highest ranking of all the universities there 
… we just need to keep driving the rankings, and say, we’re quality, 
we're quality, we’re quality, we’re global, we’re great programs, great 
research, QS (Quacquarelli Symonds World University Rankings), 
ARWU (Academic Ranking of World Universities) … I think that … has to 
be a very strong message because the programs we’re offering is offered 
in every other location as well by most other institutions’ (AI20). AI9 
thinks that ‘we have got a good brand’ but doubted that the brand 
‘extends to the MM region’. 
 
The Country X operating environment ‘could be a challenge in particular 
ways ... around the law … around a whole range of different social issues 
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and how it affects us’ (AI2), e.g., the Country is ‘one of the more 
challenging locations … for any university ... because … (it is) different to 
Australia ... all the support for LGBT and stuff like that’ (AI17). Similarly, 
AI19 commented that ‘one of the issues that we have in most of the 
locations is around homosexuality … for University A ethics and for 
University A policies and University A procedures’. 
 
In the case of Country U, the partners are known to have 'a nation-
building’ aspiration (AI3), and ‘the government is actually looking forward 
to more such opportunities of collaboration because that’s what industry 
and the public wants’. The University and its OP ‘work closely with the 
government’, and hence the ‘relationship with the government is clear’ 
(AI1). The resulting operation ‘appears to be less volatile ... we don’t 
seem to have the same sort of shifts as with the others’, contributing to 
the ic-IBC’s being perceived as having the ‘lowest risk’ among the 
University’s ic-IBCs (AI1).  
 
The r-FP at Country W seems to face student issues of a ‘cultural 
nature’, including tardiness in adhering to academic deadlines and 
perception of plagiarism (AI7). These challenges were ‘a cost factor, time 
factor and people get frustrated’ trying to rectify the resulting problems, 
e.g., back-dating enrolments. The students also ‘didn’t see it as 
plagiarism’, and ‘so a lot of effort was put in place from University A to try 
and change … the whole notion of plagiarism’. 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) LCS TSW State govt assured stability  
b) AI1 VCS ‘vagaries of the Country V govt policies … hurt  
   us a lot … limited its growth … policies around  
   international students’ 
XCD Uni and OP ‘work closely with the govt’;  
   ‘relationship with the govt is clear’ 
XCD ‘unchartered territory’; high risk of failure 
XCD ‘appears to be less volatile’; ‘lowest risk’ 
 
c) AI2 TSW children of oil & gas industry employees did not  
   Eventuate 
VCS regulations in V ‘pretty tight’ 
XCD ‘could be a challenge in particular ways’ 
 
d) AI3 GEN Uni needs OPs that understand operating   
 344 
   environment 
VCS regulations in V ‘pretty stringent’ 
XCD OP ‘nation-building’ aspiration; ‘govt is actually  
   looking forward to more such opportunities’ 
e) AI11 TSW ‘tightly regulated’, ‘somewhat more … opaque’ 
TSW ‘political influence around the regulation …’ 
TSW ‘Country T requirements changed dramatically  
   … more difficult for onshore campuses’ 
XCD Uni would not have entered the ‘completely new  
   market’ alone  
 
f) AI16 VCS ‘what they say is what they mean’ 
VCS regulations kept operators from some sections of  
   the market 
 
2 Managerial Role 
a) AI7 XCD ‘whether we adhere to … the reports’ 
XCD ‘their biggest intake is in September’ 
XCD ‘one of the more challenging locations’ 
WSL Uni faced  
   issues of a ‘cultural  
   nature’; ‘a cost  
   factor, time factor  
   and people get  
   frustrated’ 
WSL ‘didn’t see it as  
   plagiarism’ 
b) AI9 TSW ‘quite a big need in that region’ 
VCS ‘regulatory environment is clear and you know  
   where you stand’ 
XCD high risk of failure 
XCD ‘still establishing our brand’ 
XCD ‘not a traditionally big uptake of new students’ 
XCD ‘one of the issues … homosexuality’ 
 
c) AI15 GEN ‘dodgy players … issuing fake degrees’ in V 
GEN ‘many fly-by-night operators’ in V 
GEN ‘a change in the whole landscape of education’  
   in V; kept non-genuine operators out of country 
VCS ‘trying to climb back’ 
 
d) AI17 VCS ‘stability of the local system’  
e) AI19 XCD Uni ‘have got a good brand’ but doubted if it  
   ‘extends to the MM region’ 
 
f) AI20 VCS ‘an identity crisis at the moment’ 
XCD Uni ‘have the highest ranking’ 
XCD Uni ’we didn’t do that for X’ 
XCD ‘been quiet to start with as expected’ 
 
3 Academic Role 
a) AI12 TSW students from neighbouring country 
VCS TNE ‘numbers are declining significantly’ 
VCS ‘losing its way’ 
XCD ‘crowded market’ 
 
b) AI14 TSW domestic students  
Abbreviations :   Uni – University; GEN – generic comments; Govt – Government  
    LCS – Leadership Case Studies (Leadership Case Studies 2011) 
     
Table 5.20   University A Informant Perspectives on Business and  
Legal-political Uncertainty (Post-tipping Point) 
 
The interviews identified high levels of business and legal-political 
uncertainties both before and after the tipping point, except at Countries 
U and O. The lower environmental uncertainties in Country U is 
attributed to the close relationship between the OP’s holding company, 
one of the four largest conglomerates in the Country, which has strong 
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political connections. There was insufficient observation on Country O’s 
operating environment to make any conclusion. 
 
5.4.1.3.2 Property Rights Theory 
 
As discussed in Section 4.5.3, University A’s TNE operations will be 
tested for control of mission-critical resources, risk of opportunism, ex 
ante alignment of incentives, information asymmetry and maturity of the 
socio-legal-political environment. 
 
a) Control of Mission-critical Resources 
 
University A’s TNE portfolio was large and complex, comprising a total of 
33 TNE operations since 1986 (AI4). It is still large but more structured 
and strategic (AI1). Informants enumerate the following as key resources 
for successful TNE delivery : University brand equity (AI19), contract 
management (AI11), student recruitment and engagement (AI19), 
teaching facilities (AI15), student support facilities (AI15), career 
placement and alumni relations (AI12) and research and community 
engagement (AI16). This section will explore the use and transfer of 
mission-critical resources between the University and its OPs.  
 
(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
The University’s r-FPs operated within lax regulatory environments which 
did not require close scrutiny and hence high resource commitments 
(Section 5.4.1.3.1b above). The University was observed to have 
provided its IP for OP delivery (AI6), organised teaching visits to support 
OP delivery (AI8) and quality-assured the programs through moderation 
of assessments (AI6). The OPs leverage on the University’s reputation 
(AI3, AI19) in marketing the r-FP programs, and delivered some teaching 
through host country teaching staff (AI14). These operations were 
initiated and managed largely by the faculties in a decentralised fashion, 
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resulting in highly variable admissions standards, teaching and marking 
responsibilities (AI7, AI20), and sometimes ‘poor examination processes’ 
(AI17). Many teachouts resulting from terminations were found to be 
costly and time-consuming (AI19).  
 
On the part of the University, its TNE administration infrastructure was 
concentrated in the International Office of its Business School (UBSI) 
simply because the bulk of TNE students were enrolled in Business 
programs (AI3). At one point, it employed more than 40 staff to manage 
31 TNE operations (AI7). 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) AI3 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN Uni TNE infrastructure concentrated in UBS, including  
   UBSI 
TMC branding 
b) AI6 GEN Uni provide IP; moderate assessments 
2 Managerial Role 
a) AI7 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN r-FP OPs vary in admissions, teaching and marking  
   Responsibilities 
GEN Uni employed 40 staff to manage 31 operations 
b) AI17 GEN OP ‘poor examination processes’ 
UCT Uni visiting teaching staff 
c) AI19 GEN Uni reputation 
GEN teachouts costly and time-consuming 
d) AI20 GEN r-FP Uni vary in extent of offshore teaching 
3 Academic Role 
a) AI8 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN Uni staff visits beneficial 
b) AI12 UCT OP institute better than govt university 
UCT OP provide internships to every graduate 
c) AI13 UCT OP institute ‘one of the better’ with ‘good staff’ 
d) AI14 GEN r-FP OPs do marketing, all local hire staff 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   GEN – generic comments;   Govt - government 
 
Table 5.21   University A Informant Perspectives on Control of  
Mission-critical Resources (Pre-tipping Point) 
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
The post-tipping point TNE operating environment was more tightly 
regulated both by Australian and host country regulators (Section 
5.4.1.3.1b above). In response, the University restructured its TNE 
administration infrastructure, converting the UBSI into the IAO, making it 
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a hub for liaison between the faculties (i.e., the spokes) and the OPs 
(‘the hub-and-spokes’ model) (AI19, AI20). Many of the UBSI’s functions 
were transferred to the faculties and OPs, leaving the IAO with only three 
staff to manage fewer functions that are mainly coordination and 
‘policing’ (AI7). AI7 asserted that it would be difficult to replace these 
three highly experienced staff should they resign their positions. 
 
The University’s large number of TNE processes (AI5) were ‘well-
developed processes’ (AI7) that catered to both ic-IBCs and r-FPs. It was 
reported that the ‘same labour is involved’ in servicing the two post-
tipping point TNE models (AI7). These common resources include ‘very 
tight due diligence’ (AI1) undertaken by specialists in ‘strategy, finance, 
operations and risk management’ (AI5, AI18). These comprehensive due 
diligence processes have sometimes taken 18 months to complete (AI1). 
 
The hub-and-spokes model handles the bulk of the University’s TNE 
operations, including managing and supporting unit coordinators (AI12), 
training of OP teaching staff (AI13), administering quarterly and annual 
reporting (AI20), supporting TEQSA reviews (AI1), and ensuring BSA 
compliance (AI3). These often ‘very labour intensive’ processes (AI4, 
AI12) are benchmarked against detailed infrastructure and operating 
standards specified in TNE contracts (AI19). 
 
To support the ic-IBCs, the University appointed on-site PVCs who are 
the ‘eyes on the ground’ (AI15) and function as ‘relationship manager(s)’ 
(AI6). They also have research and community engagement KPIs to fulfil 
(AI6, AI8). The University provided seed funding to kick-start research at 
the VCS, XCD and UCM ic-IBCs (AI5, AI6), acknowledging research is 
the ‘price of doing business’ (AI5). 
 
Physical infrastructure, or ‘bricks and mortar … are a huge part’ of TNE 
operations (AI4), and constitute a large investment (‘the cost of the 
investment and infrastructure ... that’s not a small amount either’ - AI11). 
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The University cannot provide offshore infrastructure (AI5, AI14) due to 
its asset-light TNE policy (AI1). This resource is invariably the OPs’ (both 
r-FP and ic-IBC OPs), and includes classrooms, laboratories, library, 
internet access and computer software (AI11). These investments are 
thought to be cheaper for the OP to undertake (AI11). The ic-IBCs are 
required to replicate the ‘look and feel’ (AI6) of University A’s home 
campus to deliver a ‘comparable experience’ for the students (AI1). No 
such requirement is expected of its r-FPs. The provision of offshore 
physical campuses that have ‘comparable campus and facilities’ (AI9) by 
the OPs provide the University with an opportunity to grow its ‘brand 
presence’ (AI5) and proliferate ‘mini University As’ (AI14) as part of its 
Global University aspiration (AI1). These custom-designed campuses 
confer prestige in some communities and contribute to better student 
recruitment performance (AI15). 
 
In the case of TSW, the OP provided the land, buildings and facilities 
exclusively for University A (AI2, AI8, AI9). Similarly, the XCD OP 
provided leased space for the exclusive delivery of University A 
programs (AI17). The VCS OP leased space exclusively for University 
A’s campus (AI15), but also delivered its own Diploma feeder programs 
within the campus (AI16). While the UCM OP also used part of its 
campus to host the University’s programs exclusively, it also hosted its 
own degree programs and the programs of two other Australian 
institutions (UCM 2019). The UCM campus is reported to be better than 
that of the government university’s (AI12). The r-FPs are all hosted within 
the OPs’ campuses, all of them being academic institutions (AI7). 
 
While the University holds some equity in TSW, it does not do so in the 
other ic-IBCs (AI19). The licence to operate is held exclusively by the 
University only in XCD – by regulation (AI9). For TSW, the licence is held 
by the joint-venture company that includes the University (AI1, AI9). The 
operating licences of VCS and UCM are held by the respective OPs (AI1, 
AI12), which might explain the less exclusive nature of these ic-IBC 
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program offerings. The operating licences at all r-FPs are held by the 
OPs (AI1). 
 
In most TNE operations, the University’s IP and brand are considered 
critical resources (AI7) for the recruitment of both onshore and offshore 
students (AI6). However, the University’s brand, while considered the 
highest ranking among Australian universities in Country X, is new to the 
market there and will therefore need time to translate into higher student 
enrolments (AI20). 
 
In line with its asset-light approach, the University is gradually phasing 
out offshore teaching by its onshore teaching staff (AI20), leaving only 
some light-touch offshore teaching at selected r-FPs, e.g., WSL and YSR 
(AI20). Teaching is now undertaken wholly by the OP teaching staff 
because  they can ‘employ people much more cheaply than the 
University here’ (AI11). With the ‘costly’ BSA accreditation (AI11), OPs 
are required to ensure that their teaching staff are ‘faculty sufficient’ (AI3, 
AI17). This requirement has placed the OPs ‘under a lot of pressure’, but 
also assured the University of quality teaching staff hires (AI13). Some r-
FP OPs like the PHS OP ‘wouldn’t budge’ on the BSA requirements 
because of their business delivery models, and therefore had to be let go 
(AI12). 
 
Although the marking of examinations was once a tightly controlled 
academic process, it is now outsourced to the TSW, UCM and XCD OPs 
(AI7). Unit coordination, another critical academic process is also being 
trialled at TSW and VCS by OP teaching staff (AI15, AI19) – to take 
advantage of the availability of host country expertise (AI15) and lower 
cost (AI4). The level of trust and confidence in TSW is so high that the 
University was comfortable with the development of the ic-IBC’s own 
courses and units (AI19) – responsibilities to ‘input into new courses’ that 
AI9 expected of OPs that are part of the University’s Global University 
network. However, the University retains ‘absolute academic control’ of 
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all TNE operations through its ‘very tight due diligence’ (AI1) and ‘well-
developed processes’ (AI7). 
 
The recruitment and support of students are responsibilities undertaken 
by the OPs, for both r-FPs and ic-IBCs (AI5, AI15). For some other 
processes, the University allowed the OPs to ‘capital-leverage central 
capabilities by not having to replicate those’, e.g., administration of 
student surveys, and ‘use our teams rather than having their own 
strategy area, their own research area, their own risk management area’ 
(AI6).  
 
In line with its Global University aspiration, the University has added 
research and community engagement as part of its ic-IBC deliverables, 
requiring the participating OPs to commit to these deliverables (AI5). To 
date, TSW has proven to be a ‘very strong research arm’ of the 
University (AI2), while UCM was reported to have invested in upgrading 
its teaching staff to PhD, resulting in a ‘quite strong … research arm’ 
(AI1). As a consequence of a recent contract renewal, the VCS OP has 
also been required to fund research and community engagement jointly 
with the University (AI9). It has since then, organised teaching and 
learning symposia, published a teaching and learning journal and 
established a joint research committee with the University (AI15). 
 
In view of the higher requirements of the University’s Global University 
aspiration, it was not surprising that the University prefers the ‘campus 
over small TNE’ (AI1) and a prospective OP will necessarily have to be ‘a 
partner of substance. ... an organisation with resources’ (AI1). These OP 
resources include the OP’s systems, processes and local regulatory 
knowledge (AI15). The University must equally be sufficiently resourced 
to be able to run TNE successfully, as AI19 concluded that ‘we can do 
this because we’re a big university … if we were not a big university, we 
wouldn’t have the resources to do it’. 
 
 351 
Amidst the variability of TNE operations, there were some high quality r-
FP OPs, e.g., the UCT OP which operated a campus that was described 
as ‘even better than the government university in Country U’ (AI12), with 
‘good staff’ (AI13). Its parent company, a large conglomerate developed 
an internship program for UCT’s graduates (AI12). 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) LCS TSW Land developer proposed to provide land,  
   campus and approvals 
TSW IBC needed change in Statute 
TSW Town’s city status through University presence 
TSW Uni to have full control over academic and key  
   administrative appointments  
 
b) AI1 GEN Uni ‘very tight due diligence’ up to 18 months 
GEN Uni prefers campus model over small TNEs 
GEN Uni subject to 5-yearly TEQSA reviews 
GEN Uni built teachout costs into contracts 
GEN ic-IBC is asset-light 
GEN ic-IBC campus look and feel for ‘comparable  
   campus experience’ 
GEN ic-IBC OP owned or leased 
GEN Global Uni approach; multiple campuses 
TSW Govt can ‘find another partner’; Uni ‘problem’ in  
   termination 
TSW Joint-venture (JV) holds local licence 
VCS Uni has ‘absolute academic control’ 
VCS OP holds local licence; responsible for land,  
   facilities, infrastructure, human resources 
VCS OP ‘aren’t naturally aligned to research’ 
UCM Uni control  
   academic matters 
UCM PVC on-site  
   supervision 
UCM OP provide  
   facilities and  
   marketing 
c) AI2 GEN PVC in senior executive team 
GEN Uni and OP ‘moderating each other’ aspiration 
TSW ‘very strong research arm’; ‘research and  
   community development’ in contract 
TSW OP’s ‘bequeathed land’ 
 
d) AI3 GEN BSA ‘faculty sufficiency’ 
TSW research active due to full-time teaching staff 
 
e) AI5 GEN Uni no infrastructure role 
GEN Uni relies on OP host country expertise 
GEN Uni ‘large number of processes’ 
GEN Uni has more well-developed risk management  
   approaches now 
GEN ic-IBC Uni seed-fund research 
GEN ic-IBC OP has to have good industrial relations 
GEN ic-IBC run through joint entities specified in  
   contract 
GEN Global uni brand presence 
GEN Global uni research and community  
   engagement roles 
GEN PVC community engagement role 
GEN research ‘price of doing business’ 
WSL a faculty-level  
   collaboration  
   through UIO 
f) AI6 GEN Uni reputation yields offshore and onshore  
   students 
GEN Uni willing to terminate A$7/annum OP due to  
   poor admissions and delivery 
GEN OP required to do research and community  
   engagement by contract 
GEN ic-IBC need ‘quality facilities in the right location’ 
GEN ic-IBC ‘look and feel’ of campus 
GEN r-FP OP poor  
   quality facilities 
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GEN ic-IBC Uni incentivise research 
GEN ic-IBC PVC a relationship manager 
GEN OP can ‘capital-leverage central capabilities’ 
TSW OP has capacity-building interests 
VCS OP ‘getting a slice of the revenues’ for Uni’s IP 
TSW, XCD OP engineering facilities cost more 
g) AI10 GEN Global uni ‘do more than teaching’ 
GEN Uni proper academic structure rather than profit- 
   making 
GEN Uni seeding research resources in V, X and U 
VCS OP’s T and L symposium and journal investment 
XCD Govt requirement for infrastructure provider 
GEN r-FP Uni IP 
GEN r-FP OP capital  
   investments 
GEN r-FP OP may  
   damage Uni brand 
h) AI11 GEN Uni key resources : contract management 
GEN BSA a ‘costly’ commitment 
GEN ic-IBC infrastructure by OP; cheaper than Uni  
   investment 
GEN ic-IBC IP and QA by Uni 
GEN Uni shift r-FP to ic-IBC due to higher ranking 
GEN OP classrooms, labs, library, internet access,  
   computer software 
GEN OP ‘employ people much more cheaply’ 
XCD Uni have no local expertise in ‘new market’ 
XCD Uni invest in IP and QA; asset-light model 
XCD OP invest in infrastructure and people 
GEN r-FPs require  
   less investments  
   than ic-IBCs 
UCM conversion is  
   about branding 
i) AI16 GEN Uni key resources : research and community  
   engagement 
VCS OP admin staff services Uni and OP programs 
VCS OP’s ‘well-developed systems and processes …  
   and market reach’ 
VCS Uni and OP ‘plays to each other’s strengths’ 
VCS Uni and OP in partnership for a long time 
VCS using OP’s systems and processes 
VCS PVC ‘to increase our engagement with industry’ 
 
j) AI17 XCD infrastructure, staff by OP 
XCD Uni responsible for QA, staff appointment 
XCD OP responsible for infra, buildings, staff hiring 
WSL Uni access to  
   students 
2 Managerial Role 
a) WS XCD OP looking for uni to make use of facilities  
b) AI4 GEN Uni ‘gotten better’ at selecting partners 
GEN Uni academic processes very labour intensive 
GEN OP ‘bricks and mortar … a huge part’ of TNE 
GEN OP non-compliance usually with teaching staff 
GEN OP ‘deliver the program much more cheaply’ 
GEN comparability ‘easier said than done’ 
TSW Uni has equity in JV 
 
c) AI7 GEN UBSI had 40 staff to manage 31 operations 
GEN IAO has 3 staff and fewer functions compared to  
   UBSI predecessor; ‘policing’ OP function 
GEN IAO staff difficult to replace due to experience 
GEN ‘same labour is involved’ for ic-IBC and r-FP 
GEN ic-IBC custom-designed campus 
GEN ic-IBCs ‘taken on a lot more responsibilities’ 
XCD different study periods a resource issue 
TSW, UCM, XCD OPs allowed to mark all  
   assessments and exams 
GEN r-FP uses OP’s  
   own infrastructure 
WSL UIO ‘a lot of  
   effort’ managing 
d) AI9 GEN comparable campus and facilities 
GEN Global uni ‘input into new courses’ 
TSW Uni had no initial equity 
TSW joint-venture holding company 
TSW started in temporary premises 
TSW OP pay for research infra 
VCS Uni and OP to fund research by contract 
VCS early consolidation a better managed campus 
XCD Uni long process of approval 
XCD Uni brand being established; not sure it extends  
   to the region 
GEN r-FPs ‘non- 
   accredited’ 
UCM Uni reported  
   ‘material change’ to  
   TEQSA 
 
 353 
XCD Uni given ‘corporate vehicle … to hire people’ 
e) AI15 GEN Uni key resources : teaching facilities, student  
   support services 
VCS Uni benefit from OP’s systems, processes and  
   local regulatory knowledge 
VCS Uni trialling OP unit coordination for expertise  
   and economic (AI4) reasons 
VCS Uni ‘putting a lot of resources in research’ 
VCS Uni PVC ‘eyes on the ground’ 
VCS Uni and OP draw on long business relationship 
VCS Uni and OP joint governance entities 
VCS Uni and OP joint research committee set up 
VCS OP uses Uni content exclusively for Uni program 
VCS OP has ‘well-developed systems and processes’ 
VCS OP ‘huge resources dumped into … technology’ 
VCS OP employed 5 full-time and 70 part-time  
   lecturers 
VCS OP full-time lecturers required for research 
VCS OP employs ‘faculty-sufficient’ staff from local  
   uni who also do research 
VCS a ‘smaller scale’ version of home campus 
VCS campus confers prestige 
 
f) AI17 GEN Uni lost working adult students due to loss of  
   Country V r-FP OPs  
GEN OP must employ ‘suitably qualified staff’ on-site 
TSW ‘the most genuine extension of Uni A’ 
UCM OP upskill its own teaching staff 
 
g) AI19 GEN Uni TNE ‘well-developed processes’ 
GEN Uni key processes : student recruitment and  
   engagement, branding 
GEN TNE contracts specify detailed infrastructure;  
   standards ‘all dictated, all defined in our contracts’ 
GEN BSA processes for comparability 
GEN IAO a single contact between Uni and OP 
TSW Uni reinvested royalty in equity 
TSW JV develop own units and courses; trialling unit  
   coordination 
VCS OP relocating campus 
VCS OP teaching infrastructure ‘very structured, very  
   detailed’ 
XCD OP will have free-standing campus for  
   comparable campus experience 
 
h) AI20 GEN Uni set up hub-and-spokes TNE administration 
GEN Uni account for all TNE costs now 
GEN UBSI the predecessor of IAO  
GEN OP ‘regular checks’ needed, including quarterly  
   and annual reports 
XCD Uni have highest ranking in Country X 
XCD needs to establish its identity; ‘can’t just be  
   another campus there’ 
GEN UNi sends  
   teaching staff to  
   YSR and WSL 
GEN r-FPs ‘look very  
   similar to’ ic-IBCs 
3 Academic Role 
a) AI8 GEN PVC research and community engagement KPIs 
GEN Uni lack alumni office 
GEN Uni staff visits beneficial 
TSW CM wanted institution for capacity-building 
TSW Govt provided land, campus and start-up capital 
UCM OP has capacity-building interests 
 
b) AI12 GEN Uni unit coordinators’ role ‘very intense’ 
GEN Uni monitor teaching staff and student surveys 
GEN Uni key resources : career placement and  
   alumni relations 
GEN BSA OPs ‘wouldn’t budge’ 
GEN ic-IBC OP feeders accredited 
TSW contribute to State’s economy 
VCS sessionals lack research motivation 
 
c) AI13 GEN Uni’s systems, e.g., oLecture and Grade Centre  GEN r-FP not  
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GEN Uni unit coordinators train OP teaching staff 
GEN BSA largely impacted UBS 
GEN BSA restricted OPs 
GEN BSA OPs under ‘a lot of pressure’ on teaching  
   staff 
GEN BSA tight vetting enable outsourcing OP staff 
   required to do  
   research 
UCM has ‘quite  
  strong research   
  arm’ 
d) AI14 GEN Global uni – mini Uni As 
GEN Uni cannot provide offshore infrastructure 
GEN r-FPs serviced by Uni staff 
VCS OP’s ‘collaborative campus’ 
VCS lost working adult students due to location 
XCD Uni relied on faulty OP market research 
 
e) AI18 GEN Uni due diligence by specialists in strategy,  
   finance, operations, risk management 
TSW Uni and OP fully engaged 
 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University; GEN – generic comments; Govt – Government  
    LCS – Leadership Case Studies (Leadership Case Studies 2011) 
    WS – Personal discussion with former University C Dean  
 International (2018) 
 
Table 5.22   University A Informant Perspectives on Control of  
Mission-critical Resources (Post-tipping Point) 
 
The table below summarises the mission-critical resources for both the 
University and its OPs. OP resources that are not under the control of the 
University are highlighted in bold italics. 
 
Pre-tipping point, the University’s r-FPs were initiated and managed 
largely by the faculties, especially UBS (AI7). These operations, which 
were run within a lax regulatory environment, required only rudimentary 
processes and infrastructure – and were marked by highly variable 
admissions standards, teaching and marking standards (AI7, AI20). The 
number of operations grew to a large number (up to 31), requiring about 
40 University staff to administer (AI7). 
 
The OPs were mostly non-academic institutions which did not have 
customised campus facilities to deliver the TNE programs (Table 5.11). 
They relied on the reputation of the University to market the programs 
(AI3, AI19).  
 
The University essentially provided the IP for OP delivery (AI6) in a 
‘hands-off’ manner (AI10), supported the OPs through teaching visits  
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No. Partner Mission-critical Resources 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 University 
a) Pre-tipping 
(r-FP) 
No Direct Model 
i) decentralised TNE approval 
ii) IP/curriculum 
iii) unit coordinators 
iv) fly-in-fly-out faculty 
v) onshore decentralised TNE 
administration 
vi) quality assurance 
vii) brand/reputation 
viii) regulatory compliance 
b) Post-tipping 
(ic-IBC and 
r-FP) 
i) centralised TNE approval 
ii) statutory approval to run 
branch campuses 
iii) licence (only for XCD) 
iv) IP/curriculum 
v) unit coordinators 
vi) on-site PVC (teaching, 
research and community 
engagement) 
vii) joint Uni-OP governance 
entities 
viii) onshore hub-and-spokes 
TNE administration 
ix) online learning 
x) quality assurance 
xi) brand/reputation 
xii) central administrative 
infrastructure that OP 
outsources 
xiii) regulatory compliance 
i) centralised TNE approval 
ii) IP/curriculum 
iii) unit coordinators 
iv) onshore hub-and-spokes TNE 
administration 
v) online learning 
vi) quality assurance 
vii) brand/reputation 
viii) central administrative 
infrastructure that OP 
outsources 
ix) regulatory compliance 
2 OP 
a) Pre-tipping 
(r-FP) 
No Direct Model 
i) OP campus facilities 
ii) OP-held licence 
iii) marketing 
iv) support teaching staff 
v) quality assurance 
vi) student services 
vii) local knowledge 
viii) regulatory compliance 
b) Post-tipping 
(ic-IBC and 
r-FP) 
i) University A branded 
campus 
ii) OP-held licence (except 
XCD) 
iii) joint Uni-OP governance 
entities 
iv) marketing 
v) teaching staff 
vi) research and community 
engagement infrastructure 
vii) curriculum development 
being trialled 
viii) quality assurance 
ix) student services 
x) local knowledge 
xi) regulatory compliance 
xii) career placement and 
alumni relations 
i) OP campus facilities 
ii) OP-held licence 
iii) marketing 
iv) support teaching staff 
v) quality assurance 
vi) student services 
vii) local knowledge  
viii) regulatory compliance 
 
Table 5.23   Mission-critical Resources controlled by University A  
and its OPs 
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(AI8) and quality-assured the marking of assessments through 
moderation (AI6). The OPs were allowed to ‘run them at their own way’ 
(AI20). Some OPs were running ‘substitute’ programs (AI2) from several 
partner universities ‘like a supermarket’ (AI3). This resulted in ‘lots of 
different partners, with lots of different standards’ in Country V (AI9), and 
the University was losing ‘line of sight with too many partnerships’ (AI6). 
 
The pre-tipping point r-FP operations were benchmarked against the 
University’s own academic standards and existing Australian and host 
country regulations, which were minimal. 
 
Post-tipping point, the TNE environment was characterised by tightening 
regulations in Australia and some host countries (Section 5.4.1.3.2e). 
The University responded by tightening and centralizing its due diligence 
and approval processes (AI5, AI18), and setting up ‘well-developed 
systems and processes’ (AI16).  
 
These processes were rolled out through a hub-and-spokes 
administration model that acted as a liaison between the faculties and 
the OPs (AI19, AI20). Coupled with the on-site PVCs at the ic-IBCs, the 
University acquired ‘absolute academic control’ over its TNE operations 
(AI16). The new TNE administration structure also transferred a number 
of responsibilities to the faculties and the OPs (AI7). AI7 commented that 
‘the same labour is involved ... operationally, we’re still providing the 
same thing, same functionality regardless’ for both r-FPs and ic-IBCs. 
However, ‘the big difference between these (i.e., r-FPs) and these (i.e., 
ic-IBCs) is that we have a Pro Vice-Chancellor, who is a University A 
staff member who works at that campus and is the head of that campus’ 
(AI6). The PVCs were ‘relationship manager(s)’ who had responsibilities 
for teaching, research and community engagement at the ic-IBC 
locations (AI6, AI8). Further, the OPs were also able to ‘capital-leverage 
central capabilities by not having to replicate those’, e.g., administration 
of student surveys, and ‘use our teams rather than having their own 
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strategy area, their own research area, their own risk management area’ 
(AI6).  
 
The University have had long collaborations with three of its ic-IBC OPs 
(viz., TSW, VCS and UCM). This long association was the basis for the 
delegation of examination marking to TSW and UCM (AI7) and the 
trialling of unit coordination at TSW and VCS (AI15, AI19). TSW was also 
allowed to developed its own courses and units (AI19). 
 
As the University cannot invest in offshore infrastructure, it relies on the 
OPs to provide the campus facilities, some of which are owned, e.g., 
TSW and UCT/UCM (AI2, AI8) and some leased, e.g., VCS and XCD 
(AI15, AI17). It was interesting to note that the VCS and UCT/UCM OPs 
were also running their own academic programs on the same campus 
with the concurrence of the University (AI16, AI12). 
 
With the exception of XCD and TSW, the host country operating licenses 
of all r-FPs and ic-IBCs are held by the respective OPs (AI1, AI12). In 
XCD, the University is required by regulation to hold the operating 
licence, while the joint-venture held the TSW operating licence (AI1, AI9). 
The University’s brand and IP are critical resources that the OPs rely on 
for student recruitment, and the University rely on for onshore 
international student recruitment (AI7). 
 
The University now requires all its ic-IBCs to commit to research and 
community engagement, in addition to teaching (AI5) as part of its Global 
University vision (AI1). The commitment across the OPs vary from highly 
committed at TSW and UCM (AI2, AI1), to reluctant commitment at VCS 
(AI15) and untested commitment at XCD (AI1). To kickstart research, the 
University has had to provide seed funding at VCS, UCM and XCD (AI5, 
AI6). 
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Given the tightened regulatory conditions, the University’s Global 
University vision and its BSA accreditation, it comes as no surprise that 
an ic-IBC OP will necessarily have to be ‘a partner of substance. ... an 
organisation with resources, and ... of substance’ (AI1). Equally, ‘we can 
do this because we’re a big university ... if we were not a big university, 
we wouldn’t have the resources to do it’ (AI19). 
 
Apart from the ic-IBCs’ on-site PVCs and the trialling of unit coordination, 
the administration of r-FPs is similar to that for ic-IBC (AI7). Although the 
r-FP OPs provide teaching and learning facilities, they are not required to 
develop the same ‘look and feel’ of the home campus, like the ic-IBCs 
(AI6). Post-tipping point, all the University’s r-FPs OPs are academic 
institutions (Table 5.11). The University still retained light-touch teaching 
visits to some r-FPs, e.g., WSL and YSR (AI11). 
 
b) Risk of Opportunism 
 
The potential for opportunism exists in an environment lacking in trust 
and with a potential for profitable exploitation (Section 2.6.2). These 
possibilities are very real in TNE because OPs (and the University) are 
‘motivated by profits and returns to shareholders’ as a ‘commercial 
organisation’ (AI2). AI9 pulled no punches in saying ‘let’s not beat around 
the bush … they will say and they might mean it; I am sure they do mean 
it that they are about education and stuff like that and they have to be for 
their business models, they have to be focused on that because that’s 
what they are delivering ... (but) at the end of the day, they have to 
appease their shareholders’. The profit motivation can result in poor 
delivery practice and even malpractices such as ‘degree mills setting up 
in unregulated areas’ (CI10) and ‘dodgy players … issuing fake degrees’ 
(AI15).  
 
There were concerns with the ‘operator not delivering your IP properly, 
the risk of them using staff that are not properly equipped to deliver the 
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IP, the risk that they won’t deliver the IP in the style that you would want 
it delivered because obviously their costs, space and methods of delivery 
are not yours’ (AI10). There were also concerns with poor quality 
students admitted (AI6, AI13), poor quality facilities (AI6), accreditation of 
feeder institutions and the courses that they can offer (AI12). 
 
(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
Some OPs deliver a multiplicity of university partner programs ‘like a 
supermarket’ (AI3). These ‘substitute’ programs (AI2) are likened to 
baked beans brands on a supermarket shelf and prevent the University 
from developing ‘its own brand’ (AI3). The University was itself 
collaborating with four different OPs in Country V at one time, such that 
‘each one is doing a different thing’ (AI15), resulting in ‘four different 
experiences’ for the students (AI9). 
 
There were instances where OP teaching staff had taught in their host 
country native language instead of English and delivered classes in 
unapproved delivery modes, presumably to save on costs (‘as a block of 
classes every 5 weeks instead of 12 weeks’ – AI4).  
 
These opportunistic behaviours can be detected and rectified through 
regular monitoring of TNE operations, e.g., ‘quarterly reports’ and ‘annual 
reports’ (AI20). These reports focus on ‘pass rates, retention rates, 
student enrolment, … student enrolment trends, student feedback on 
facilities, student feedback on teaching and learning’ (AI9), student 
satisfaction surveys, teaching staff evaluations (AI12), and moderation of 
marking (AI3). The University’s International Administration Office (IAO) 
was also required to ‘police the (TNE) situation’ for any violation of 
policies and procedures (AI7). 
 
On the part of the University, it also strives to promote ‘onshore transfers’ 
through its TNE operations to grow its onshore international student 
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enrolments, because ‘the main source of our revenue is our onshore 
activities at this campus’ (AI6). The University has seen ‘a lot of student 
transfers’, including ‘a major stream of students for a long, long time’ 
coming from its TMC operations (AI3). The University TNE operations 
contribute to ‘building new markets’ for the University’s programs (AI3). 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) AI2 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN OP ‘motivated by profits and returns to shareholders’ 
GEN OP ‘substitute’ programs 
b) AI3 GEN Uni moderate OP teaching staff marking 
GEN Uni ‘a lot of student transfers’; ‘a major stream of  
   students for a long, long time’ 
GEN OP ‘like a supermarket’; ‘baked beans on shelf’; prevent   
   Uni from developing ‘its own brand’ 
c) AI6 GEN Uni promote ‘onshore transfers’; ‘the main source of our  
   revenue is our onshore activities at this campus’ 
GEN OP poor quality students admitted; poor quality facilities 
d) AI10 GEN OP ‘not delivering your IP properly’ 
VCS ‘degree mills setting up in unregulated areas’ 
2 Managerial Role 
a) AI7 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN Uni IAO ‘police the situation’ 
b) AI9 GEN Uni review reports focus on ‘pass rates, retention rates,  
   … student enrolment trends, student feedback’ 
GEN OP ‘have to appease their shareholders’ 
VCS OPs ‘four different experiences’ for the students 
c) AI15 VCS OPs ‘each one is doing a different thing’ 
VCS ‘dodgy players … issuing fake degrees’ 
d) AI20 GEN Uni uses ‘quarterly reports’ and annual reports’ 
3 Academic Role 
a) AI4 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN OP teaching staff taught in non-English medium 
GEN OP teaching staff attempting to use unapproved delivery  
   modes 
b) AI12 GEN Uni concerns with accreditation of OP feeder institutions 
GEN Uni student satisfaction surveys, teaching staff  
   evaluations 
c) AI13 GEN OP poor quality students admitted 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   GEN – generic comments;   Govt - government 
 
Table 5.24   University A Informant Perspectives on Risk of  
Opportunism (Pre-tipping Point) 
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
Opportunism was clearly identified in the TSW land developer’s interest 
in ‘residential housing development’ in the vicinity of the TSW campus 
(AI12). These ‘land development objectives’ were also detected by AI9. 
However, the other partner, the State government is ‘not a company 
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that’s out for money and … they want to build research infrastructure; 
they want to be enhancing the possibility of research … so they see it as 
a benefit’ (AI10). They have been observed to be ‘altruistic … not share 
price’ focussed (AI4), ‘less focussed on money’ (AI2) and have capacity-
building interests for the region (AI8). TSW is now known to be a ‘very 
strong research arm of the University’ (AI2), and ‘have a research culture 
… a Dean of Research … a research office’, which are all funded by the 
‘partner’. It is contributing ‘more than money … rather than just traditional 
offshore campus for the generation of revenue’ (AI9), and ‘a lot more 
research’ (AI17). On community engagement, AI6 observed that TSW is 
highly engaged with the local community, and believes that ‘they do more 
than we do here’. 
 
Although the VCS OP holds the operating licence of the University A 
campus in Country V (AI1), it also delivers its own Diploma programs 
alongside the University’s as ‘seamless’ feeders to the University’s 
degree programs (AI16). The University seems to be comfortable with 
these feeders as a quid pro quo for the OP running its campus, as 
demonstrated by the same arrangements with this OP over a long period 
of time across several operations (AI3). The long partnership developed 
a high level of trust between the partners (AI14, AI16). The high trust 
level resulted in the trialling of TNE unit coordination by OP teaching staff 
(AI15).  
 
The recent VCS OP contract renewal was a test of the OP’s commitment 
to the University’s Global University aspiration when the University 
required the OP to engage in research and community engagement. 
Although reluctant for the previous ten years, the OP acceded to the 
incorporation of these commitments in the new contract (AI10); they were 
‘built into the contract … they have to honour it … there’s an investment 
agreement’ (AI6). The partners agreed to set up a joint research 
committee in mid-2018 so that ‘together with University A, we can move 
it in that one direction' (AI15). The challenge in initiating research at VCS 
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would probably come from the reluctance of sessional teaching staff to 
participate (AI8, AI12). However, the OP recognised that ‘all these three 
things (viz., teaching, research and community engagement) are … what 
the university strongly focus on … that’s why we are very involved in that 
process right now’, and have invested in organizing teaching and 
learning symposia and publishing a teaching and learning journal (AI15). 
 
Although the VCS OP invested in a ‘careers officer’ to support students 
(AI16), there was no evidence of its involvement in alumni relations, 
which AI2 thinks ‘we can do better’, especially in light of the University’s 
Global University aspiration. 
 
The VCS operation is quality-assured through joint governance entities 
(AI15), a University appointed on-site PVC, ‘well-developed systems and 
processes’ and the University’s ‘absolute academic control’ (AI16). AI19 
described the teaching infrastructure as 'very structured, very detailed … 
we know exactly … (if) they (viz., students) are having a comparable 
experience’. 
 
The UCM OP’s motivation for the collaboration was ‘very much almost 
humanitarian … capacity building … in Country U’, resulting in a ‘very 
good driver ... politically, economically, socially … very important campus 
stakeholder in Country U’ (AI12). The ‘humanitarian’ drive arose out of 
the OP’s concern for ‘the high level of unemployment and low skill in 
Country U’. The operation was considered ‘quite research active … due 
to the commitment of the leadership team there, rather than the impact of 
University A … (and) very much determined by the culture that exists at 
that campus’. While the OP’s motivation is in good alignment with the 
University, there seems to be some potential for opportunism in the 
delivery of vocational programs from two other Australian partners and 
the OP’s own certificate, diploma and degree programs at the same 
campus (UCM 2019). 
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XCD is a new ic-IBC operation that started in early 2018. There seems to 
be ‘a bit of friction there (with the OP), in finetuning units … because X’s 
gone completely different study periods to the others’ (AI7); AI7 also 
described the OP as ‘very strong’, alluding to its influence on the 
operation. It has also exhibited some signs of resistance to the impost of 
research although it is clearly a contractual commitment (AI1). This 
behavior was anticipated by AI17, arguing that ‘once the operations 
commence, then I think the partner wields a bit more power in terms of 
making amendments or deeds of variation to the contract’. 
 
The r-FPs present ‘a much higher risk’ as a result of the OP having to 
‘deal with … 25 - 30 different sets of universities’ (AI3). For example, 
‘You might kind of say ‘Look! We want you to introduce this policy’, and 
then they would say ‘No, that it doesn’t fit with what we are doing with 
Middlesex and Sheffield Hallam, and Wollongong; so no, we are not 
doing it’. Further, these r-FPs are run ‘largely hands-off’ because ‘you are 
giving control over your IP largely to a different operator’ (AI10).  In the 
case of the WSL r-FP, the IAO encountered persistent tardiness in 
meeting deadline and occurrences of plagiarism, and had to expend a lot 
of effort in rectifying records and educating the OP administration staff 
(AI7). 
 
The r-FP terminations over the years have been observed to be due to 
poor quality students admitted (AI13), poor ‘quality facilities … (and) 
teaching staff’ (AI6), poor quality students and academic results (AI6), 
‘issues with strategic alignment and quality’ (AI5), and ‘viability in terms 
of numbers of students, and … quality of students’ (AI4). AI14 noted that 
the ‘major problem from University A’s perspective is that franchised 
arrangements create potentials for quality issues’, and are hence 
‘avoided’ (AI3). The University still operates r-FPs for specific purposes, 
but have been ‘conformed … more to University A policy and 
procedures’, e.g., ‘getting students to enrol directly with us, to pay 
directly to us’ (AI20). 
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AI13 commented that ‘it will be a lot less risky for us to exercise greater 
control and set up branch campuses’. AI2 is of the view that the ‘much 
closer operational engagement with our branch campuses’ can confer 
‘more control … more integration’ with the home campus. Similarly, AI7 
asserted that the University has ‘got more control and say over the way 
things are done (in an ic-IBC, compared with a r-FP) ... whereas when 
you are working with a partner you are one of many universities’. The risk 
of opportunism is mitigated through the appointment of on-site PVCs as 
the University’s ‘eyes on the ground’ (AI15), and joint entities (e.g., joint 
boards, joint management committees) (AI5) – ‘ensuring that we’re 
meeting our targets and our KPIs ... ensuring that we can react … in the 
instances where we’re not meeting our KPIs … (and) stretching people to 
meet targets’ (AI6). 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) AI1 VCS OP holds operating licence 
XCD OP reluctant to do research 
 
b) AI2 GEN Uni ‘we can do better’ at alumni relations 
GEN IBC ‘much closer operational engagement’ 
TSW OP State govt ‘less focussed on money’ 
TSW ‘very strong research arm of the University’;  
   ‘have a research culture … a Dean of Research’; all  
   funded by State govt 
 
c) AI3 VCS OP has been running its programs in Uni  
   campuses over a long period of time 
GEN r-FPs ‘a much  
   higher risk’ 
d) AI5 VCS Uni-OP joint entities GEN r-FPs ‘issues  
   with strategic  
   alignment and  
   quality’ 
e) AI6 GEN Uni ‘meeting our targets and our KPIs’ 
TSW ‘they do more than we do here’ 
VCS OP ‘built into the contract … they have to honour  
   it … there’s an investment agreement’ 
GEN r-FPs poor  
   ‘quality facilities …  
   teaching staff’ 
GEN r-FPs poor  
  quality students and   
  academic results 
f) AI10 TSW OP State govt ‘not a company that’s out for  
   money … build research infrastructure’ 
VCS OP acceded to research and community  
   engagement impost in renewed contract 
GEN r-FPs ‘largely 
hands-off’ 
g) AI16 VCS Uni has on-site PVC; ‘absolute academic control’ 
VCS Uni and OP developed trust over long period 
VCS OP delivers its own programs in VCS campus 
VCS OP invested in ‘careers officer’ 
 
2 Managerial Role 
a) AI7 GEN Uni has ‘got more control’ of IBC 
XCD Uni-OP ‘a bit of friction there, in finetuning units’;  
   OP ‘very strong’ 
GEN r-FP ‘one of  
   many universities’ 
b) AI9 TSW OP State govt ‘more than money … rather than   
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   just traditional offshore campus for the generation of  
   revenue’ 
TSW OP developer ‘land development objectives’ 
c) AI15 VCS Uni trialling unit coordination by OP staff 
VCS Uni PVC ‘eyes on the ground’ 
VCS Uni-OP joint governance entities 
VCS Uni and OP agreed to set up a joint research  
   Committee 
VCS OP ‘all these three things are … what the Uni  
   strongly focus on’ 
VCS OP organised teaching and learning symposia  
   and published T&L journal 
 
d) AI17 GEN OP ‘wields more power’ 
TSW ‘a lot more research’ 
WSL Uni had to  
   rectify and educate 
e) AI19 VCS OP ‘very structured, very detailed … comparable  
   experience’ 
 
f) AI20  GEN r-FPs  
 ‘conformed …  
 more to Uni A policy’ 
3 Academic Role 
a) AI4 TSW OP State govt ‘altruistic … not share price’ 
VCS Uni and OP developed trust over long period 
GEN r-FPs ‘viability  
  in terms of numbers  
  … and … quality 
b) AI8 TSW OP State govt wants capacity building for region 
VCS OP teaching staff reluctant to do research 
 
c) AI12 TSW OP developer ‘residential housing development’ 
VCS OP teaching staff reluctant to do research 
UCT/UCM OP ‘very much almost humanitarian’ due  
   to ‘the high level of unemployment and low skill’ 
UCU/UCM ‘quite research active … due to the  
   commitment of the leadership team there’ 
 
d) AI13 GEN IBC ‘less risky’; ‘greater control’ GEN r-FPs poor  
   quality students 
e) AI14  GEN r-FPs ‘ 
   potentials for  
   quality issues’ 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University; GEN – generic comments; Govt – Government  
 
Table 5.25   University A Informant Perspectives on Risk of  
Opportunism (Post-tipping Point) 
 
The risk of opportunism was high for all r-FPs before and after the tipping 
point by virtue of the lower University involvement. After the tipping point, 
the ic-IBCs also exhibited opportunism, except for UCT/UCM – and 
which required the appointment of on-site PVCs to help monitor and 
mitigate. 
 
c) Information Asymmetry 
 
Pre-tipping point, the University’s TNE requirements were less stringent. 
They consist of making ‘sure that you understand all the local drivers like 
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government policy, financial, economic, all those things that could impact 
the success of the program, (including) the competitive landscape’ 
(AI20). After starting, monitoring was ‘a process of … ensuring that we’re 
meeting our targets and our KPIs ... ensuring that we can react … in the 
instances where we’re not meeting our KPIs … (and) stretching people to 
meet targets’ (AI6). 
 
Post-tipping point, the University’s TNE standards were further 
circumscribed by AUQA (and later TEQSA), BSA accreditation and 
enhanced host country regulations. They reflect concerns around 
comparability of ‘students’ experience, students’ satisfaction, and 
students’ grade outcomes’ (AI19), arising from the ‘operator not 
delivering your IP properly, the risk of them using staff that are not 
properly equipped to deliver the IP, the risk that they won’t deliver the IP 
in the style that you would want it delivered because obviously their 
costs, space and methods of delivery are not yours’ (AI10). The ultimate 
concern is with the risk that poor quality outcomes ‘can damage the 
brand … because the degrees are being marketed … as University A 
degrees’ (AI10). 
 
(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
Pre-tipping point r-FPs were operating within an environment of ‘a lot 
less compliance’ (AI17), driven mainly by entrepreneurial academics who 
were benefiting financially from starting r-FPs ‘with as many partners as 
possible, to get as many students as possible’. (Section App I 1.4). The 
majority of these terminations were attributed to poor quality delivery and 
outcomes (Section App I 1.5), including deliveries which were ‘not at 
appropriate standards’ (AI6), ‘woeful’ pass rates (AI13) and ‘poor exam 
processes’ (AI17). In the case of PHS, the University was reported to 
have sold its programs ‘too cheap’ (AI19). With the exception of one, all 
r-FPs lasted more than five years. It is thus surprising that these 
operations were allowed to continue for such a long time. This state of 
 367 
affairs may be attributed to information asymmetry because ‘you can’t 
confirm compliance’ (AI4) due to the distance and the environment of ‘a 
lot less compliance’ (AI17). 
 
In the past, there is really no one r-FP delivery model (‘franchised 
programs … each model is different … so, it’s really hard to put them all 
in one basket, and say this is how they operated, and this is good and 
that was bad’ – AI20). There was even variation between faculties, e.g., 
the extent of offshore teaching by faculty staff (AI20). There seems to be 
a tacit concurrence within the University ‘to allow them (i.e., the OPs) to 
run them at their way’ (AI20). Moreover, these r-FPs were run ‘largely 
hands-off’ because ‘you are giving control over your IP largely to a 
different operator’ (AI10). The University thus risked losing ‘line of sight 
with too many partnerships’ (AI6).  
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) AI6  GEN Uni ‘line of sight with too many partnerships’ 
GEN Uni ‘select few … principal quality partnerships’ 
GEN OP delivery ‘not at appropriate standards’ 
b) AI10 GEN r-FP ‘largely hands-off’; ‘giving control over your IP  
   largely to a different operator’ 
2 Managerial Role 
a) AI17  GEN OP ‘poor exam processes’ 
GEN r-FPs in ‘a lot less compliance’ 
b) AI19 PHS Uni sold programs ‘too cheap’ 
c) AI20 GEN Uni ‘to allow them to run them at their way’ 
GEN Uni ‘getting students to enrol directly with us, to pay  
   directly to us’ 
GEN r-FP ‘each model is different’ 
GEN r-FP variation in offshore teaching 
3 Academic Role 
a) AI4 No Direct 
Model 
GEN Uni ‘you can’t confirm compliance’ 
b) AI12 GEN OP ‘a multitude of small ones’ 
c) AI13 GEN OP ‘woeful’ pass rates 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   GEN – generic comments;   Govt - government 
 
Table 5.26   University A Informant Perspectives on Information  
Asymmetry (Pre-tipping Point) 
 
The University addressed the poor quality deliveries and outcomes by 
reducing ‘the number of partners because we had a multitude of small 
ones’ which were not performing (AI12). It retained a ‘select few … 
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principal quality partnerships’ to ‘consolidate’ its r-FP operations for 
‘easier management’ and ‘better control’ (AI6). The remaining r-FPs were 
‘conformed … more to University A policy and procedures’, e.g., ‘getting 
students to enrol directly with us, to pay directly to us’ (AI20). 
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
The early years of TNE ‘matured’ UBS (AI18), and changed its focus to 
one that prioritised ‘quality’ and ‘pursue accreditation’ (AI19). These 
resulted in the culling of ‘non-performing programs’ (AI7) to ‘a few quality 
OPs’ (AI19) that are ‘easier to manage’ (AI6) and ‘control’ (AI2). As the 
University viewed TNE operations ‘through a different lens of quality, we 
didn’t find those acceptable anymore … so, we terminated some of 
those’ (AI6). The University now asks if a potential TNE operation is 
‘strategic for our region?’, and is part of the University’s ‘Global 
University’ agenda (AI18). Central to TNE quality assurance is the 
aspiration for comparable ‘students’ experience, students’ satisfaction, 
and students’ grade outcomes’ (AI19). 
 
Despite the focus on strategic aspirations, information asymmetry 
remains a concern. In the case of TSW, the land developer that 
approached the University to initiate the ic-IBC had his own interest in 
‘residential housing development’ (AI12) or ‘land development objectives’ 
(AI9) for the land surrounding the campus. Although he promised to 
provide land for the campus, the land was ultimately bequeathed by the 
State government (Leadership Case Studies 2011). This ic-IBC turned 
out well, becoming ‘the most genuine extension of University A’ (AI17). 
Transparency was enhanced through the appointment of a PVC and 
Deputy PVC on-site to be responsible for the vetting of all key 
administrative and teaching positions, and the establishment of a joint 
Council (AI1). The ic-IBC fully subscribed to the University’s focus on all 
three roles of teaching, research and community engagement due to the 
State government’s own priority for ‘nation-building’ (AI3). 
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The University acknowledged its dependence on its OPs for local host 
country knowledge (AI5, AI11). In the case of VCS, it relied on its OP to 
select its campus location in the suburbs which did not have good public 
transportation linkage (AI14). This resulted in the loss of working adult 
students who required easy access to their campus location. The OP 
was in the midst of planning a re-location to rectify this weakness during 
the interviews (AI17).  
 
The VCS OP was also reluctant to be involved in research because they 
‘aren’t naturally aligned to research’ (AI1) and they had concerns relating 
to the ownership of research outputs (AI15). The OP however 
acquiesced in the recent contract renewal, ‘starting now to recognise that 
to be a university campus, it needs to do more than teaching’ (AI10). The 
on-site PVC has been tasked to ‘establish the research program … and 
to increase our engagement with industry, and that’s both from a 
research point of view … and also … internships, work placements, 
guest lectures, all of those things in terms of benefits of industry 
engagement’ (AI16). A joint research committee was to be set up by mid-
2018 so that ‘together with University A, we can move it in that one 
direction' (AI15). 
 
UCM was converted to an ic-IBC from a r-FP after 14 years of 
collaboration (AI5) and building trust through time (AI14). Due to the 
OP’s ‘nation-building’ focus (AI3), there was close alignment with the 
University’s Global University aspirations. The operation ‘appears to be 
less volatile ... we don’t seem to have the same sort of shifts as with the 
others’. This contributes to the perception that the ic-IBC has the ‘lowest 
risk’ among the University’s ic-IBCs.  
 
At the University however, there seems to be differences in perceptions 
of UCM - AI6 who has strategic responsibilities, claimed that it does not 
engage in any research, but AI12 who works closely with the ic-IBC 
 370 
reported that it is ‘quite research active’. Its research endeavors seem to 
have a life of their own ‘due to the commitment of the leadership team 
there, rather than the impact of University A’ and was ‘very much 
determined by the culture that exists at that campus’ (AI12). This 
demonstrates the impact of a close working arrangement on accurate 
partner perception. 
 
The University’s participation in XCD seems to have divided its staff. 
AI12 claimed that ‘99% of people … are against X … it’s a flooded 
market ... we’re unknown in X ... why starting up TNE when it’s a flooded 
market? … so, there’s lots of opposition’. AI12 added that the decision 
‘almost smells like … one of the decisions of the past', where 
‘agreements were signed over drinks and dinner, KPI-driven for numbers 
only’. Sharing the views of the schools, AI7 related that ‘we were 
promised very high numbers from the partner, that has not eventuated ... 
a lot of the schools turning round and saying ‘I told you so; I told you so’’.  
 
Some staff questioned the due diligence on XCD (AI20) or ‘whether we 
adhere to what the reports come out’ (AI7). AI20 also doubted the 
conduct or quality of the market survey since there was no attempt at 
‘differentiating from the other programs there’ but ‘we decided to continue 
with the same programs University C was offering … does that make 
sense that we’re offering the exact same courses that University C is 
offering, and they’re staying there?’. This reliance on the OP’s in-country 
expertise (AI5) is because ‘we would have little idea of what to do … how 
much to charge students, how to market to students, and how to deal 
with the local economy … we just don’t have the expertise’ (AI11). 
 
While AI12 commented that ‘clearly I think it's a political decision that 
outweighs the financial value at this point in time ... maybe it's a longer 
term strategy that the rest of us are missing’. 
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AI7 reported that that ‘there is a bit of friction there (with the XCD OP), in 
finetuning units … because X’s gone completely different study periods 
to the others’, and the OP is ‘very strong’. In AI7’s view, these 
complications could have been better handled if the University decision-
makers have paid ‘enough attention’ and listened ‘to people who are in 
the know’, e.g., on the topic of ‘study periods’. AI7 also remarked that 
‘we’re happy to sign off contracts where we have these (senior decision-
makers at the faculties) saying we’ll go ahead with it without asking 
relevant questions … drill down … how are we going to resource this?’. 
 
Although research has been incorporated in the XCD relationship, AI1 
expects some resistance from the OP 'similar in X (to Country V)'. 
Further, AI20 remarked that it ‘really needs to establish what is the 
identity … you can’t just be another campus there’. AI12 also made the 
same comparison, identifying ‘how we position ourselves on what is the 
value’ of the ic-IBC’s deliverables in Country X. 
 
For the WSL r-FP, information asymmetry seems to come from cultural 
and business perceptions, e.g., tardiness of OP processes and 
perception of plagiarism (AI7). For most r-FPs, information asymmetry 
can potentially arise from having to ‘deal with … 25 - 30 different sets of 
universities’ (AI3). For example, ‘You might kind of say ‘Look! We want 
you to introduce this policy’, and then they would say ‘No, that it doesn’t 
fit with what we are doing with Middlesex and Sheffield Hallam, and 
Wollongong; so no, we are not doing it’ (AI3). 
 
More generally, the OP’s teaching staff (for both r-FPs and ic-IBCs) 
employment arrangement also have an influence on how much they 
engage the University’s unit coordinators. Full-time OP teaching staff, 
e.g., in TSW, are ‘less likely to engage with you because … they have 
their employment, that’s their job’, while the majority of VCS teaching 
staff who are part-timers would ‘proactively engage with me ... I suspect  
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No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) AI1 TSW Uni appointed PVC and DPVC; joint Council 
VCS OP ‘aren’t naturally aligned to research’ 
XCD Uni expects resistance from OP on research 
 
b) AI2 GEN OP fewer are easier to ‘control’  
c) AI3 TSW OP ‘nation building’ 
UCT/UCM has nation building focus; ‘less volatile’  
   and ‘lowest risk’ 
GEN OP ‘deal with  
   … 25-30 different  
   sets of universities’ 
GEN OP ‘doesn’t fit  
   with … Middlesex’ 
d) AI5 GEN Uni depends on OP for host country knowledge 
UCM UCT r-FP converted to ic-IBC after 14 years 
XCD Uni reliance on OP’s in-country expertise 
 
e) AI6 GEN Uni viewed TNE ‘through a different lens’ 
GEN OP fewer are ‘easier to manage’ 
UCM does not engage in research 
 
f) AI10 VCS OP TNE is ‘more than teaching’  
g) AI11 GEN Uni depends on OP for host country knowledge 
XCD Uni ‘just don’t have the expertise’ 
 
h) AI16 VCS Uni PVC tasked to ‘establish … research … 
increase our engagement’ 
 
2 Managerial Role 
a) AI7 XCD Uni ‘whether we adhere to … the reports’ 
XCD Uni ‘a bit of friction … in fine tuning units’ 
XCD Uni should listen ‘to people … in the know’ 
XCD OP ‘very high numbers … has not eventuated’ 
XCD OP ‘very strong’ 
WSL OP tardy  
   process and  
   plagiarism 
b) AI9 TSW OP developer ‘land development objectives’  
c) AI15 VCS Uni-OP joint research committee 
VCS OP concerns on ownership of research outputs 
 
d) AI17 GEN Uni culled ‘non-performing programs’ 
TSW ‘the most genuine extension of Uni A’ 
VCS OP planning campus re-location out of suburbs 
 
e) AI19 GEN Uni UBS priority on ‘quality’ and ‘pursue  
   accreditation’ 
GEN Uni retained a’a few quality OPs’ 
GEN Uni comparable ‘students’ experience, students’  
   satisfaction and students’ grade outcomes’ 
 
f) AI20 XCD Uni due diligence questioned 
XCD Uni ‘offering the exact same courses’ 
XCD ‘can’t just be another campus there’ 
 
3 Academic Role 
a) AI4 GEN OP teaching staff did not comply with standards  
b) AI8 TSW OP staff ‘less likely to engage with you’ 
VCS OP staff ‘proactively engage with me’ 
 
c) AI12 TSW OP developer ‘residential housing development’ 
UCM ‘quite research active’; ‘commitment of the  
   leadership team’ 
XCD Uni ‘99% of people … are against X’; ‘almost  
   smells like … one of the decisions of the past’ 
XCD Uni ‘it’s a political decision’ 
XCD Uni ‘what is the value?’ 
 
d) AI14 VCS Uni relied on OP for selecting campus location 
UCT/UCM trust built up through time 
 
e) AI18 GEN Uni ‘matured’ UBS 
GEN Uni ‘strategic for our region?’ and ‘Global Uni’? 
 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University; GEN – generic comments; Govt – Government  
 
Table 5.27   University A Informant Perspectives on Information  
Asymmetry (Post-tipping Point) 
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the ones who are doing it on a part-time basis probably recognise the 
precarious nature of their employment’ (AI8). AI4 demonstrated this 
difficulty through the examples of the OP teaching staff who taught in a 
non-English medium of instruction and the other who decided to change 
the teaching mode without consultation with the unit coordinator. 
 
Information asymmetry was observed to be high for r-FPs both before 
and after the tipping point, possibly due to the lower University 
involvement and the lack of an on-site presence. The University’s longer-
running ic-IBCs, viz., TSW, VCS and UCM, were seen to exhibit less 
information asymmetry, partly due to the long association and the 
presence of an on-site PVC as the University’s ‘eyes on the ground’ 
(AI15). There still seems to be a high level of information asymmetry at 
XCD, possibly due to the newness of the collaboration. 
 
d) Incentives Alignment 
 
Although the University’s OPs were consistent in their motivations for 
TNE participation both before and after the tipping point, the University’s 
TNE objectives changed over time. Later OPs had to conform to the 
University’s demands in order to collaborate. 
 
(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
As discussed in Section 5.4.1.3.1a, the early r-FPs were initiated and 
managed largely by highly entrepreneurial University staff under lax 
regulatory conditions. It was an environment ‘that provided opportunities 
to academics to earn extra’, where they were ‘paid to travel … for every 
exam paper … for every unit outline’; ‘a great model for academics to 
make more money’ (AI17). Academics were reported to have been paid 
‘excessively’, and ‘some academics were earning more from the offshore 
teaching operation than they were from their regular academic activities’ 
(AI17).  
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These entrepreneurial forays were ‘very profitable venture(s)’ (AI13) 
which brought in ‘significant revenue’ (AI3). The University’s motivation 
was clearly ‘income generation’ (AI10) and ‘financial for all of them’ (AI1). 
In fact, a number of r-FPs, e.g., PHS and POL were terminated because 
of insufficient ‘financial returns’, and incurring ‘opportunity costs’ (AI2).  
 
The University also leveraged on its r-FPs to increase its onshore 
international student enrolments (AI3, AI19) through ‘building new 
markets’ (AI3) and growing its reputation and profile in r-FP countries 
(AI19). The VMI, VBP, VSH and VSI r-FPs were considered good 
feeders for onshore enrolments (AI16).  
 
It was clear that the OPs, being mostly commercial organisations were 
motivated by profit, as AI9 asserted ‘let’s not beat around the bush … 
they will say and they might mean it; I am sure they do mean it that they 
are about education and stuff like that and they have to be for their 
business models, they have to be focused on that because that’s what 
they are delivering ... (but) at the end of the day, they have to appease 
their shareholders’. The not-for-profits, like the professional/trade 
associations of Country V provided training to their members in addition 
to pursuing financial returns (AI1, AI17). When the University terminated 
its PHS r-FP, the OP was reported to be 'disappointed that we were 
pulling out because they were losing more than we were' (AI2). 
 
The rapidly growing r-FPs encountered many quality issues, i.e., a 
number of r-FPs were ‘not at appropriate standards’ (AI6), e.g., low 
quality students admitted with ‘sceptical entry’ qualifications, ‘woeful’ 
pass rates (AI13), and poor examination processes (AI17). These quality 
issues began to impact on the University’s reputation (AI2, AI19), 
causing the University (and more specifically, the UBS) to re-examine its 
quality assurance processes (AI19) as well as financial models (AI7, 
AI17) for TNE. This resulted in the termination of a number of poorly 
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performing r-FPs (AI1, AI7), and retention of a ‘select few … principal 
quality partnerships’ to ‘consolidate’ its r-FP operations for ‘easier 
management’ and ‘better control’ (AI6). It was interesting to note that all 
the pre-tipping point r-FPs had very long business operations, ranging 
from ten years (VSH) to 26 years (PHS), evidencing good alignment of 
interests (Table 5.11). 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) AI1 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN Uni r-FPs ‘financial for all of them’ 
GEN Uni terminate poorly performing r-FPs 
GEN OP professional associations provide training for  
   members 
b) AI2 GEN r-FPs’ quality issues impact Uni reputation 
PHS Uni terminated due to low financial returns, opportunity  
   Costs 
PHS OP ‘were losing more than we were’ 
POL Uni terminated due to low financial returns 
c) AI3 GEN Uni r-FPs increase Uni onshore enrolments 
GEN r-FPs ‘significant revenue’ 
GEN Uni r-FPs ‘building new markets’ 
d) AI6 GEN Uni ‘select few … principal quality partnerships’ 
GEN OP fewer are ‘easier to manage’; ‘better control’ 
GEN OP ‘not at appropriate standards’ 
e) AI10 GEN Uni r-FPs ‘income generation’ 
f) AI16 GEN Uni onshore feeders : VMI, VBP, VSH, VSI 
2 Managerial Role 
a) AI7 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN Uni re-examine financial models 
GEN Uni terminate poorly performing r-FPs 
b) AI9 GEN OP ‘appease their shareholders’ 
c) AI17 GEN Uni ‘academics to earn extra’; ‘academics paid  
   excessively’ 
GEN Uni re-examine financial models 
GEN OP professional associations provide training for  
   Members 
GEN OP poor examination processes 
d) AI19 GEN Uni r-FPs increase Uni onshore enrolments 
GEN Uni r-FPs growing reputation and profile 
GEN Uni re-examine quality assurance processes 
GEN r-FPs’ quality issues impact Uni reputation 
3 Academic Role 
a) AI13  GEN Uni r-FPs were ‘very profitable ventures’ 
GEN OP ‘sceptical entry’ qualifications; ‘woeful’ pass rates 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   GEN – generic comments;   Govt - government 
 
Table 5.28   University A Informant Perspectives on Incentives  
Alignment (Pre-tipping Point) 
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(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
Post-tipping point, the University’s priority shifted gradually towards non-
monetary objectives, while ensuring all TNE operations ‘make a return … 
in a fixed period of time’ (AI1). AI14 reported that ‘there’s pressure to 
make sure that our offshore locations are breaking even, certainly … the 
University wouldn’t stomach for very long  … huge losses in offshore 
locations’. 
 
The non-monetary objectives were influenced by both internal and 
external factors. The external factors include the impact of AUQA (from 
2000), AUQA Cycle 2 (from 2008), TEQSA (from 2012) and the BSA 
accreditation (from 2016). Interestingly, five out of the six pre-tipping 
point r-FPs were terminated within the 2008 – 2010 period, 
corresponding to the AUQA Cycle 2 audits (Table 5.11). A total of fifteen 
r-FPs were terminated within that period, including eight that were short-
lived (i.e., five years old or less). 
 
Internally, the University brought its decentralised TNE workload into a 
centralised workload management model in 2011 (AI7) for more 
equitable sharing of revenue and costs (AI11). More strategically, the 
University’s own strategic priorities changed from treating r-FPs merely 
‘as little side appendages that are out there doing their own thing’ to 
viewing all its TNE operations as ‘part of the network of University A’ 
(AI9), or part of the University’s Global University network of ‘mini 
University As’ (AI14).  
 
While the University ‘expects to make money out of all of these 
operations; otherwise there’s no reason to be there ... but it isn’t the 
defining factor ... it was much more our brand, our reputation, our global 
footprint’. The global footprint is expected to grow the brand presence of 
the University, and thus provide ‘opportunities for recruiting students’ 
(AI5). AI8 explained that ‘having these campuses and building brand in 
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those locations will … assist in building our reputational capital in those 
regions which improves our rankings on the QS (QS World University 
Rankings) and THE (Times Higher Education World University Rankings) 
surveys … which again lifts our status globally which in return stimulates 
student demand, both onshore international and at those campus 
locations and the ones that are outsourced (FPs)’.  
 
The Global University aspiration requires all its ic-IBCs to deliver all three 
roles of teaching, research and community engagement (AI10), including 
the hosting of staff and student exchanges (AI6). All these endeavours 
are underpinned by strict adherence to ‘our quality and TEQSA quality … 
total deal breakers’ in all recent TNE contracts (AI1). 
 
In presenting to the University Council on the proposed TSW ic-IBC, the 
DVCI asserted that ‘the greatest risk would be in not securing the 
University’s long-term future in Country T’ through TSW (Leadership 
Case Studies 2011, 4). The University benefited from the joint venture 
because the ic-IBC was ‘largely run by the State Government’ (AI19) and 
subsidised by the State Government (AI2). AI5 also observed that the ic-
IBC receives ‘government funding for development’. The ic-IBC was 
actively involved in research (AI2) and community engagement (AI6). 
While the State government benefited through capacity-building in the 
northern region and the hosting town gained city status (Ibid., 3), the land 
developer benefited from ‘residential housing development’ in the vicinity 
of the University (AI12). 
 
The VCS ic-IBC was a consolidation of four other r-FPs, providing the 
University with ‘easier management’ and ‘better control’ of academic 
delivery (AI6), ‘diversification of revenue streams, reputation building and 
global positioning’ (AI6). The OP was at that time looking for a university 
partner to help it expand into the AA region (AI3). As a long-term partner 
of the University, the OP adopted a proven delivery model which 
included delivering its own Diploma feeder programs within the 
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University’s campus (AI16) – ‘it’s business model is taking universities’ 
IP, teaching it, and getting a slice of the revenues’ (AI6). As a 
‘commercial organisation’, the OP was ‘motivated by profits and returns 
to shareholders’ (AI2). Although reluctant, the OP finally acquiesced to 
support research and community engagement in the recent contract 
renewal (AI10, AI15, AI16), perhaps convinced that research can lend 
much prestige, prevents the ic-IBC looking ‘shallow’, ‘builds … reputation 
… gives stronger credibility in the market as a university’ (AI6), and 
promote the University’s reputation and ultimately result in better ic-IBC 
student enrolments (AI15). 
 
The motivation for starting the UCT r-FP was ‘definitely revenue’ (AI17). 
Although UCT OP was concerned about the ‘financial aspect’ of the r-FP, 
it was primarily driven by ‘corporate business responsibility’ (AI6), ‘social 
responsibility for their country’ (AI7), ‘developing the community’ (AI1) 
and ‘nation-building’ (AI3). 
 
The conversion of the UCT r-FP into the UCM ic-IBC was for a ‘strategic 
fit’ with the University’s Global University aspiration, providing ‘access to 
new markets … have the ability to have good access into the AA region’ 
(AI17). It was to be an enabler to ‘foray into that market there ... and … 
attract students from the AA region to come into Country U and study 
there’ (AI13). More broadly, AI10 ‘looked at the Indian Ocean as an area 
where we can have considerable strengths … and by adding in Country 
U, in fact, we have campuses all around the Indian Ocean’. The OP’s 
motivation for TNE had not changed after the conversion. AI13 argued 
that ‘basically it’s the same structure, same staff, there is no change just 
rebranding … its basically the OP institute … just being re-modeled and 
re-branded’. AI11 added that ‘there is no fundamental change in terms of 
the underlying financial and commercial arrangement’. 
 
In the case of XCD, the University had a ‘much more strategic’ focus on 
the MM region (AI1), seeing Country X ‘as a gateway … to attract 
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students from non-traditional markets … from countries Q and L … 
students who may not qualify for a visa for Australia’ (AI17) and hosting 
student mobility (AI17). It also anticipated tapping into ‘potential research 
funding’, being able to network with ‘those corporations that are based in 
X who are potential research partners’ (AI19). Although research has 
been incorporated in the contract, AI1 expects some resistance from the 
OP 'similar in X (to Country V)'. The OP was driven by ‘money, profile 
and reach’ (AI1), and the contracted financials seem to favour the OP 
(AI12); the University ‘don’t get much’ (AI20). 
 
AI3 explained that r-FPs are now avoided ‘from a quality perspective, 
and certainly from a branding perspective’. However, for the University, 
some of the r-FPs serve specific purposes and could possibly become ic-
IBCs, like in Country U (AI5). In fact, there are no strategic plans for r-
FPs, unlike ic-IBCs, and ‘they’ve become part of a bigger machine’, i.e., 
the Global University network (AI6). In WSL, the University was keen on 
‘access to a lot of … Country W students … where if University A … 
didn’t have a presence in Country W, it would slip’. (AI17).  
 
Some of these FPs ‘are important’, e.g., the ‘mature’ YSR FP 
arrangement ‘is important … very much because of the community-
building type status of that particular arrangement rather than 
commercial … and I don’t think it is a big supplier of students here, into 
Australia ... it is sort of an unusual arrangement’ (AI11). The YSR OP’s 
motivation is for ‘upskilling’ staff, while for the University, they are helpful 
in ‘cross-selling’ the University’s ‘leadership programs’ (AI2). On the 
other hand, the TMC r-FP provided ‘a major stream of students for a 
long, long time’ (AI3). 
 
In Country O, the collaborations are a combination of articulation and 
TNE delivery, where upon graduation, ‘they get a Bachelor’s degree from 
their university and a Bachelor’s degree from our university’ (AI19). 
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Although the University ‘don’t make much money … it brings students 
here, to Australia’ (AI11). 
 
Most of the University’s existing TNE operations as at 2018 are long-
running operations ranging from seven years (ONJ) to 19 years (TSW), 
surpassing the ‘reasonable rate of return’ business longevity benchmark 
(Section 2.7.4.3). The only exceptions were the UCM ic-IBC (which was 
converted from the UCT r-FP after 14 years), the XCD ic-IBC which had 
just started in 2018, and ODB r-FP (which as a re-starting of a five-year 
long r-FP that was terminated eight years earlier (Table 5.11). These 
long-running operations attest to the TNE operations’ close alignment of 
interests. 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) AI1 GEN Uni ‘our quality and TEQSA quality’ in contracts 
GEN TNE ‘make a return … in a fixed period of time’ 
XCD ‘much more strategic focus on the MM region’ 
XCD OP resistance to research expected 
XCD OP driven by ‘money, profile and reach’ 
UCT OP ‘developing  
   the community’ 
b) AI2 TSW subsidised by the State government 
TSW actively involved in research 
VCS OP ‘motivated by profits and returns to  
   shareholders’ 
YSR ‘upskilling’ staff;  
   cross-sell programs 
c) AI3 VCS OP looking for a university to help expand in AA GEN r-FPs avoided ‘ 
   from quality  
   perspective’ 
UCT OP ‘nation  
   building’ 
TNC ‘major stream of  
   students’ 
d) AI5 GEN Uni ‘expects to make money’; ‘much more our  
   brand, our reputation, our global footprint’ 
GEN Uni Global Uni ‘for recruiting students’ 
TSW receives ‘government funding for development’ 
GEN r-FPs some  
   could become ic- 
   IBCs 
e) AI6 GEN Uni Global Uni host staff and student exchange 
GEN Uni research prevents ic-IBC looking ‘shallow’ 
TSW actively involved in community engagement 
VCS ‘easier management’; ‘better control’;  
   ‘diversification of revenue streams, reputation  
   building and global positioning’ 
VCS OP ‘getting a slice of the revenues’ 
GEN r-FPs no  
   strategic plans 
UCT OP ‘corporate  
   business  
   responsibility’ 
f) AI10 GEN Uni Global Uni requires all three roles 
VCS OP acquiesced to research and community  
   Engagement 
UCM Uni ‘campuses all around the Indian Ocean’ 
 
g) AI11 GEN Uni centralised workload for more equitable  
   sharing of revenue and costs 
UCM ‘no fundamental change’ 
YSR for community  
   building 
h) AI16 VCS OP delivered its own Diploma on campus 
VCS OP acquiesced to research and community  
   engagement 
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2 Managerial Role 
a) AI7 GEN Uni centralised workload management UCT OP ‘social  
   responsibility’ 
b) AI9 GEN Uni r-FPs ‘not little side appendages … part of  
   network of Uni A’ 
 
c) AI15 VCS research leads to better student enrolments 
VCS OP acquiesced to research and community  
   engagement 
 
d) AI17 UCM conversion a ‘strategic fit’; ‘access into the AA  
   region’ 
XCD ‘students from non-traditional markets’; hosting  
   student mobility 
UCT Uni ‘definitely  
   revenue’ 
WSL Uni ‘access …  
  Country W students’ 
e) AI19 TSW ‘largely run by the State government’ 
XCD Uni ‘potential research funding’; ‘potential  
   research partners’ 
GEN Country O  
   ‘brings students to  
   Australia’ 
f) AI20 XCD Uni ‘don’t get much’  
3 Academic Role 
a) AI8 GEN Uni ‘campuses … building our reputational  
   capital … improves our rankings … stimulates  
   demand’ 
 
b) AI12 TSW OP developer ‘residential housing development’ 
XCD financials seem to favour OP 
 
c) AI13 UCM OP ‘attract students from the AA region’ 
UCM ‘no change, just branding’ 
 
d) AI14 GEN Uni ‘mini Uni As’ 
GEN Uni ‘wouldn’t stomach for very long  … huge 
losses’ 
 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University; GEN – generic comments; Govt – Government  
 
Table 5.29   University A Informant Perspectives on Incentives  
Alignment (Post-tipping Point) 
 
e) Maturity of Socio-legal-political Environment 
 
Like TCE, PRT is also premised on the incompleteness of contracts to 
govern business partnerships. PRT calls for the allocation of property 
rights that requires governance via strong formal legal institutions and 
non-formal social conventions. Further, the ownership of brand name 
and organisational reputation can act as influential implicit ex ante 
arrangements to ensure compliance (Klein and Leffler 1981). 
 
University A’s TNE experience since 1986 demonstrates how the 
evolving operating environments have influenced its TNE decisions, e.g., 
the tightening Australian and Country V higher education and related 
regulations. In some countries, informants view the regulatory regimes as 
highly variable. The University’s improving international rankings also 
influenced its preference for ic-IBCs over r-FPs. The tightening of 
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Australian regulations started right after the tipping point with the launch 
of AUQA in 2000 (Section App I 3.0). This was followed by the AUQA 
Cycle 2 audits (2008) that included Internationalisation as a mandatory 
theme for universities involved in TNE, and then TEQSA (2012) which 
replaced AUQA, having regulatory powers. The University further 
subjected itself to the BSA international accreditation to enhance its 
reputation and prestige (AI13). 
 
The University is observed to be operating within tightly regulated 
environments before and after its TNE tipping point ‘because there is a 
limited tolerance by governments in the countries in which we operate for 
mistakes and for breaches’ (AI5). It typically looks out for ‘the local 
drivers like government policy, financial, economic, all those things that 
could impact the success of the program’ (AI20) and ‘legal risks’ (AI13). 
The preference for better regulated country environments might explain 
the University’s long-term view of TNE participation, as AI1 noted that 
‘even if we were in a contract that’s 10 years long, we’re really looking at 
20, 50 years ahead’. 
 
Some social conventions have also been observed to have impacted the 
University’s TNE decisions, e.g., Country V’s students perceiving VCS as 
being ‘more prestigious’ than other private university programs because 
it has ‘a campus on its own … not easy to get in’ (AI15). 
 
Pre-tipping point, University A’s r-FPs were operating within Countries P, 
T and V. Although Mok classified V as a market accelerationist state, i.e., 
a state that have strong state and civil regulations (Section 5.2.2.2.2), the 
University A interviews seem to indicate that pre-2011, Country V had 
strong civil regulation (‘actively solicited foreign overseas’ institutions – 
CI10) but weak state regulation (AI7) – exhibiting the characteristics of a 
market facilitator state. Prior to 2011, the TNE sector was said to be in ‘a 
shambles ... they had so many fly-by-night operators offering courses in 
shopping malls … and all sorts of weird places and … non-accredited’ 
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(AI19), with ‘a lot of dodgy players … issuing fake degrees’ (AI15). 
Country V responded to this state of affairs by introducing ‘new sets of 
regulations’ in 2011 (AI15, AI17). The Country did not seem to have 
pushed the regional education hub aspiration as much after 2011, 
instead emphasizing quality over GDP share of revenue (Tan 2016). The 
strengthening of state regulations reflected a shift towards a market 
accelerationist state.  Mok’s classification of Country T as a market 
accelerationist state and Country P as a market facilitator state seems to 
hold both before and after tipping point. 
 
Post-tipping point, the University operated TNE in Countries O, R, U, W, 
X and Y, in addition to P, V and T. As discussed in Section 5.2.2.2.2, 
Country X is classified as a market accelerationist state, O, R and Y as 
interventionist states, Country U as a market coordinator state, and 
Country W as unclassified. 
 
In terms of risk, the 2015 Coface Risk Assessment Map categorised P, V 
and T as ‘low risk’ countries, and O, R, U and X as countries with 
‘acceptable risks’ (Section 5.2.2.2.3). Investing in Countries W and Y 
carry ‘significant risk’. The 2015 IESE-Emlyon Country Attractiveness 
Index locates P, V and T within its top 10% of 125 countries surveyed 
(Section 5.2.2.2.4), O and X within the top quartile, and R, U, W and Y 
within the second quartile. The IESE-Emlyon survey also recommended 
investors consider increasing their exposure in Countries T, U and X due 
to improvements in these Countries’ attractiveness. 
 
(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
The University’s quest for ‘building new markets’ (AI3) subjected it to a 
range of host country operating environments, most of which were of ‘a 
lot less compliance’ (AI17). The Australian legislative and regulatory 
environment was then rudimentary with respect to TNE (Section 5.2.2.1). 
A majority of informants reported that the early r-FP terminations 
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occurred post-tipping point when the regulatory environment became 
more stringent (Section App I 1.5). The gradual tightening of regulations 
brought TNE delivery quality into sharp relief, and led the University to 
see TNE operations ‘through a different lens of quality, we didn’t find 
those acceptable anymore … so, we terminated some of those’ (AI6).  
 
These early years of TNE experience ‘matured‘ UBS the lead TNE 
school (AI8) and changed its focus to one that prioritised ‘quality’ and 
‘pursue accreditation’ (AI19). From then on, the University focussed on 
ensuring comparable ‘students’ experience, students’ satisfaction, and 
students’ grade outcomes’ (AI19). Its TNE contracts also incorporated 
specific clauses (AI9) and costs for quality teachouts (AI11).  
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) AI2 
No Direct 
Model 
PHS termination upset alumni 
b) AI3 GEN Uni ‘building new markets’ 
PHS ‘push back from the local community’ 
c) AI6 GEN Uni ‘a different lens of quality’ 
d) AI11 GEN Uni teachout costs in contracts 
2 Managerial Role 
a) AI9 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN Uni teachout clauses in contracts 
b) AI17 GEN environment ‘a lot less compliance’ 
GEN Country V OPs accessed working adult students 
c) AI19 GEN Uni UBS priority on ‘quality’ and ‘pursue  
   accreditation’ 
GEN Uni comparable ‘students’ experience, students’  
   satisfaction and students’ grade outcomes’ 
PHS Uni prevented ‘long term damage’ to reputation 
VCS lost working adult students with move to suburbia 
3 Academic Role 
a) AI8 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN ‘matured’ UBS 
b) AI12 GEN Country V OPs ‘quite well politically connected’ 
PHS termination a ‘tragedy’ 
 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   GEN – generic comments;   Govt - government 
 
Table 5.30   University A Informant Perspectives on Maturity of  
Socio-legal-political Environment (Pre-tipping Point) 
 
In Country P, the termination of PHS was considered a ‘tragedy’ because 
the r-FP was run by ‘professionals in industry’ (AI12). The termination 
was almost derailed because of ‘push back from the local community’ 
(AI3), or more specifically, upset alumni (AI2) – demonstrating the power 
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of social conventions. Close liaison with the remaining students and 
alumni prevented ‘long term damage’ to the University’s reputation 
(AI19). 
 
In Country V, the University’s largely trade and professional association 
OPs were ‘quite well politically connected’, and provided access to a 
large cohort of working adult students (AI17, AI12). It lost access to these 
students when these r-FPs were terminated and the new OP located the 
campus in a suburban location that lacked transport connectivity (AI19).  
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
Starting TSW was considered a significant TNE event because it 
required a change in State government statute and consequently, 
convincing a host of stakeholders from University Council to State 
legislators (Leadership Case Studies 2011). It is the only one equity joint-
venture among the University’s TNE operations (AI9).  
 
The TSW ic-IBC experience demonstrates the difference between the 
host Country’s State and Federal governments’ influence on the 
operation. The ic-IBC obviously enjoys favourable State government 
treatment, including State subsidy (AI2), ‘funding for development’ (AI5) 
and funding of research infrastructure (AI9), as it is ‘largely run by the 
State government’ (AI19). However, the regulatory authorities at Federal 
level were ‘pretty stringent’ (AI3), e.g., fees are tightly regulated and 
increases are permitted only every three years (AI12), leading to a 
regulatory environment that was ‘tightly regulated and somewhat more 
opaque’ (AI11). AI11 explained that the ‘political influence around the 
regulation and what it means in terms of the operations of the campus 
can often change very quickly and without real explanation or 
justification’. This was demonstrated when ‘Country T requirements 
changed dramatically in the last couple of years, and they made it more 
difficult for on-shore campuses’ (AI20). As an example, AI20 noted that 
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the Federal Ministry of Education had recently required all private tertiary 
institutions (including IBCs) to enrol a certain proportion of international 
students in order to be able to retain their approval to recruit international 
students. To meet this requirement, the University had ‘plundered 400 
architecture students to go there’. AI9 does not think that the 2018 
change in Federal Government in Country T will impact TSW because 
the 3,500-student ic-IBC serves ‘quite a big need in that region’. 
 
The tightening of education regulations in Country V post-tipping point 
led to ‘a change in the whole landscape in education’ (AI15), e.g., 
students are ‘finger-printed in and out’ of class to mark their attendance, 
as part of the government’s stringent regulations (AI16). Later, the 
tightening in the host Country immigration reduced the entry of 
international students into the country, and hence threatened this 
important source of students for the ic-IBC (AI1). Although the tightened 
regulations helped prevent students from ‘getting ripped off’ (AI9), the 
‘vagaries of the Country V government policies … have hurt us a lot … 
(and) limited its (ic-IBC) growth’ (AI1), the regulations ‘preferences the 
autonomous (i.e., local host Country) universities’ (AI16), and kept 
providers like VCS out of ‘parts of the market’ (AI16). However, ‘one of 
the advantages of the system here is what they say is what they mean, is 
what they do’, and ‘whilst you might not always be happy with that, you 
know what’s required’. AI9 concurred, remarking that 'the regulatory 
environment is clear and you know where you stand’, resulting in the 
‘stability of the local system’ (AI17). 
 
On social conventions driving TNE behavior, Country V’s TNE operators 
have had to cater to the large working adult student market through 
delivering evening and weekend classes (AI17) and ensuring transport 
connectivity of their campuses (AI19). The VCS OP was in the midst of 
re-locating its suburban campus during the interviews because its lack of 
transport connectivity resulted in the loss of the working adult student 
market (AI19). 
 387 
 
Although Country X was considered ‘unchartered territory’ when the 
University commenced its XCD ic-IBC (AI1), its regulations were ‘clear 
and you know where you stand … the government makes it very clear, 
these are the rules, this is how you register, this is what you will be 
classes as when you register, this is what we are going to do annually … 
they are very clear, very prescriptive’ (AI9). However, the operating 
environment ‘could be a challenge in particular ways ... around the law … 
around a whole range of different social issues and how it affects us’ 
(AI2). As an example, AI17 identified cultural and social limitations 
prescribed by the authorities in Country X, because the Country is ‘one of 
the more challenging locations … for any university ... because … come 
through as different to Australia ... all the support for LGBT and stuff like 
that’. AI19 agreed, saying that ‘one of the issues that we have in most of 
the locations is around homosexuality … for University A ethics and for 
University A policies and University A procedures’. 
 
To date, the University is ‘reasonably comfortable at the moment ... we 
have to see, we have to try it out’ because the ‘political environment … 
legislative frameworks, the business environment, the political social 
environment all have a bearing on what you can or can’t do' (AI2). AI17 
added that ‘you contextualise what you do’. 
 
In terms of risk comparison, AI4 sees Country X has having the highest 
risk for the University, followed by Countries V, U and T. This view of the 
riskiness of Country operating environments did not conform to the 
Coface risk ratings for Countries U and X, but can be understood in 
terms of micro level characteristics and circumstances. Country X was 
considered risky because of its newness (AI13), while Country V for its 
highly competitive environment (‘struggling to find a niche area’ because 
‘there’re so many competitors … so, we’re a very small, very small fish in 
a big sea at the moment’ – AI12). Country U was less risky because 
UCM was anchored by a large conglomerate that was close to the 
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government (AI11). Country T was considered the ‘most stable’ because 
of the direct involvement of and funding by the State government and the 
long partnership (AI4).  
 
Post-tipping point, the University continued to rely on its brand in its TNE 
operations. It relied on its highest international ranking amongst 
Australian universities in Country X to attract students to XCD (AI20). Its 
BSA accreditation was also a leverage to promote the University’s 
prestige offshore and onshore (AI13). 
 
The University have had a ‘very solid relationship’ with the UCT OP for 
about 14 years before converting the r-FP to an ic-IBC (UCM). The OP’s 
‘almost humanitarian reason’ for running the r-FP, i.e., ‘capacity-building’ 
to address the ‘high level of unemployment and low skill in Country U’ 
(AI12) resulted in a ‘very good driver … politically, economically, socially’, 
endearing it to the host Country government (AI13). The University and 
OP ‘work closely with the government’, making the ic-IBC one of the 
University’s ‘lowest risk’ TNE operations (AI1). 
 
The TNE market in Country U is characterised by a healthy demand for 
an international qualification that will give students an ‘edge over others’ 
in both Country U as well as outside the Country (AI13). Students ‘view 
higher education ... a significant investment … so a student wants to look 
at reputation and long term ... want to make sure you recover that money 
and a lot more in a quick period of time’ (AI13). The University’s high 
international ranking and brand profile seem to meet these students’ 
expectations. 
 
The University however had to give in to some host country regulatory 
demands, e.g., the insistence of Country Y regulators for the OP to 
collect student fees rather than for the University to receive the fees 
(AI20). Some host country social conventions were observed to have 
caused a measure of annoyance and required rectification (‘try and 
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change that culture’ – AI7), e.g., the tardiness and interpretation of 
plagiarism at WSL (AI7).  
 
The University’s brand has been observed to play a part in TNE 
decisions, e.g., the difficulty the University encountered in re-starting 
TNE in Country T after its TMC termination because of the ‘difficult 
relationships’ which limited the University’s opportunities (AI1).  
 
All pre-tipping point r-FPs operated in mature and stable socio-legal-
political environments. After the tipping point, the University was 
observed to have continued focusing on mature and stable 
environments, with the exception of WSL and YSR where the 
environment is not considered stable and mature for TNE.  
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) LCS TSW Uni required State statue change for IBC  
b) AI1 VCS regulatory tightening restricted international  
   students 
VCS ‘vagaries of … policies … have hurt us a lot …  
   limited growth’ 
XCD ‘unchartered territory’ 
UCM Uni and OP ‘work closely with government’ 
TMC Uni ‘difficult  
   relationships’ after  
   termination 
c) AI2 TSW enjoyed State subsidy 
XCD Uni ‘reasonably comfortable … have to try it out’ 
XCD environment ‘a challenge in … social issues’ 
 
d) AI3 TSW Federal government ‘pretty stringent’  
e) AI5 TSW enjoyed ‘funding for development’  
f) AI11 TSW ‘tightly regulated and somewhat more opaque’ 
TSW environment ‘can often change very quickly’ 
UCM less risky due to govt-connected OP 
 
g) AI16 VCS students ‘finger-printed in and out’ 
VCS autonomous universities preferenced, and kept  
   Uni out of ‘parts of the market’ 
VCS ‘what they say is what they mean, is what they  
   do’ 
 
2 Managerial Role 
a) AI7  WSL Uni ‘try and  
   change that culture’ 
b) AI9 TSW Uni’s only equity joint-venture 
TSW enjoyed funding of research infrastructure 
TSW recent change in Federal government not  
   expected to impact operation due to size of  
   operation 
VCS regulatory tightening prevented students from  
   ‘getting ripped off’ 
VCS ‘regulatory environment is clear’ 
XCD regulations ‘very clear, very prescriptive’ 
 
c) AI15 VCS ‘change in the whole landscape in education’  
d) AI17 VCS ‘stability of the local system’ 
VCS cater to working adult student market 
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XCD ‘cultural and social limitations’ 
XCD Uni ‘you contextualise what you do’ 
e) AI19 TSW ‘largely run by the State government’ 
VCS transport connectivity important; OP planning re- 
   location out of suburbia 
XCD ‘one of the issues … around homosexuality’ 
 
f) AI20 TSW ‘more difficult for on-shore campuses’ 
TSW Uni ‘plundered 400 architecture students’ to fulfil  
   international student quota 
XCD Uni international ranking attract students 
YSR government  
   required OP to  
   receive fees 
3 Academic Role 
a) AI4 GEN Risk gradation : X>V>U>T (lowest) 
TSW ‘most stable’ due to State government 
 
b) AI12 TSW fees tightly regulated 
VCS risky due to ‘so many competitors’ 
UCM OP’s ‘almost humanitarian reason’ 
 
c) AI13 GEN Uni BSA accreditation provide prestige 
XCD risky due to newness 
UCM OP ‘very good driver’ 
UCM international qualification gives ‘edge over  
   others’ 
UCM ‘recover that money … in a quick period of time’ 
 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University; GEN – generic comments; Govt – Government  
    LCS – Leadership Case Studies (Leadership Case Studies 2011) 
    WS – Personal discussion with former University C Dean  
 International (2018) 
 
Table 5.31   University A Informant Perspectives on Maturity of  
Socio-legal-political Environment (Post-tipping Point) 
 
5.4.1.3.3 Agency Theory 
 
This section explores four reflectors of AT, including ex ante incentives 
alignment which was already analysed in Section 5.4.1.3.2d.  
 
a) Costs of Search and Monitoring 
 
The selection and monitoring of OPs are based on agreed benchmarks. 
The University’s pre-tipping point benchmarks were minimal and mostly 
based on prevailing academic standards. Post-tipping point, the TNE 
sector was gradually circumscribed by an increasing number of 
Australian regulatory frameworks, viz., AUQA (2000), AUQA Cycle 2 
(2008) and TEQSA (2012). TNE operations were also impacted by the 
evolution of host country regulations, and the University’s own external 
BSA accreditation exercise (2016). 
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(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
The pre-tipping point TNE ventures were largely driven by 
entrepreneurial University staff (AI18), as ‘academics would get paid 
extra to teach ... out of load … so there was quite an appetite to have 
programs in different locations, and to be entrepreneurial and … there 
was a direct benefit for the academic staff to be involved and be 
supportive’ (AI17). This entrepreneurial drive coincided with an operating 
environment of ‘a lot less compliance’ (AI17), and spawned as many as 
41 TNE and related operations (AI19). Most of the TNE investigated 
were started opportunistically, ‘it’s been, ‘Hey, this guy walked in 
yesterday; he wants to start … let’s do it'’ (AI20). There seemed to have 
been a drive to ‘try and partner with as many partners as possible; to get 
as many students as possible’ (AI6). There does not seem to have been 
any clearly articulated standard for OP selection (AI18).  
 
The delivery of r-FPs was ‘basically outsourcing something ... providing 
IP through the programs that are being taught … moderating 
assessments’, which translate into the University having ‘a little less 
control’ (AI6). The monitoring of r-FPs was undertaken largely through 
frequent travels by University staff to service the offshore operations 
(AI12, AI13). These offshore travels were designed for ‘intensive’ 
teaching deliveries (AI14), OP staff training (AI8), moderation of 
assessments (AI8, AI17), and building ‘relationships with students’ (AI8). 
AI15 described this model as a ‘more prescriptive type of relationship … 
the University would prescribe that this must be done, and this must be 
done, and follow this’.  
 
In the case of the PHS termination, the University took some trouble over 
‘a number of years’ to help the OP to ‘increase the number of students’ 
but to no avail (AI2). 
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No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) AI2 
No Direct 
Model 
PHS Uni tried to help OP ‘increase the number of students’  
   over ‘a number of years’ 
b) AI6 GEN Uni ‘partner with as many partners as possible’ 
GEN Uni ‘basically outsourcing something … a little less  
   control’ 
2 Managerial Role 
a) AI15 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN Uni ‘more prescriptive type of relationship’ 
b) AI17 GEN Uni ‘academics would get paid extra’ 
GEN environment ‘a lot less compliance’ 
c) AI19 GEN Uni started 41 TNE and related operations 
d) AI20 GEN Uni ‘he wants to start … let’s do it’ 
3 Academic Role 
a) AI8 
No Direct 
Model 
GEN Uni send staff to train OP staff 
GEN Uni send staff to moderate assessments and build 
‘relationships with students’ 
b) AI12 GEN Uni monitor through frequent staff travels 
c) AI13 GEN Uni monitor through frequent staff travels 
d) AI14 GEN Uni ‘intensive’ teaching trips 
e) AI18 GEN Uni has no clearly articulated standard for OP selection 
GEN r-FPs driven by entrepreneurial staff 
 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   GEN – generic comments;   Govt - government 
 
Table 5.32   University A Informant Perspectives on Costs of Search  
and Monitoring (Pre-tipping Point) 
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
As the Australian regulatory environment tightened up, the University’s 
TNE benchmarks for OP selection and monitoring were found to be 
wanting. OPs were found to have poor quality facilities (AI6), poor 
admissions standards (AI13) and poor examination processes (AI17), 
resulting in ‘woeful’ pass rates (AI13) and potential reputational damage 
to the University (AI2, AI19). The University responded by shifting its 
OPs’ focus from merely ‘traditional profit-making’ to developing a ‘proper 
academic structure’ (AI10).  
 
The ‘matured’ UBS (AI18) changed its focus from entrepreneurship to 
one that prioritised ‘quality’ and ‘pursue accreditation’ (AI19). It later 
pursued the prestigious BSA international accreditation, a ‘costly’ (AI11) 
commitment that brought much prestige (AI13) but also higher 
compliance costs (AI11). For the University, ‘our model now is that we 
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develop content, we control content, we moderate content and quality 
from Australia, … we control all academic matters … they (i.e., the OPs) 
control delivery’ (AI19). 
 
As the University progressed, its strategic aspirations evolved and it now 
strives for a Global University with many ‘mini University As’ (AI14) 
around the world to grow its ‘global footprint’ (AI19), branding and 
influence (AI19) as it pursues teaching, research and community 
engagement with distinctive foci in each host country (AI5). This 
aspiration is built into all its newer TNE contracts (AI13), and entails 
increased monitoring of OPs, especially OPs that are reluctant to engage 
in the non-revenue generating activities like research and community 
engagement (AI1, AI15). 
 
The due diligence on prospective OPs was ‘done by the DVCI’s office … 
done centrally ... it’s become much more central’ (AI18). Schools ‘might 
put forward a recommendation of an opportunity, but it will have to go 
through the faculty … it would be determined by central’. The central 
team will ‘have to do their due diligence … that it’s strategic, it’s viable, 
and … make sure you have safeguards … a viable relationship … 
organisations and institutions that have come forward … provide 
evidence of what they’ve done … show what they have achieved with 
other partners’. Specialists in strategy, finance, operations and risk 
management are called upon to undertake due diligence and ‘are 
responsible for making the right choices, and committing to strategic and 
financial … and making sure all the due diligence … contracts … that’s 
absolutely critical ... that they do make the right decisions on behalf of 
the University’ (AI18). It is also critical that there is buy-in from senior 
management, and that decisions are clearly and consistently 
communicated to all involved (‘it makes a huge difference when you’ve 
got buy-in from the very top; from the Vice-Chancellor down … and  … 
really, consistently telling the message to all staff’ – AI9).  
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The approval process, which can take up to 18 months (AI1),  involves 
developing a comprehensive business plan that includes ‘understanding 
the market, understanding the risks, the return … how much we are 
going to gain or lose. ... an exit strategy if we have to go … contracts, so 
all the legal stuff and also understanding who does what’ (AI4).  
 
While the centralisation above applies to all campus arrangements, there 
is evidence that some existing FPs might have been set up via 
memoranda of understanding between the Faculty and the OP. AI13 
mentioned one such FP, where ‘joint PhD programs that we have got 
with Country Q’s Technology University partner … is still through MOUs’. 
AI5 reported that WSL, which commenced in 2001, 'operates at a faculty 
level; not at a uni-to-uni level’. It is likely that these TNE operations are 
legacy operations that were set up prior to the centralisation of TNE 
approvals. This is evidenced by AI20’s description of TEQSA’s 
involvement in the more recent 2006 set up of the YSR FP operation. 
 
To enable the effective management and monitoring of TNE operations 
to meet more stringent standards, the University reviewed its ‘large 
number’ of processes (AI5) and restructured its internal TNE 
administration into a hub-and-spokes model where the IAO hub liaises 
with its four faculty spokes and acts as a conduit between the University 
and its OPs (AI20). This arrangement resulted in shifts of responsibilities 
among these entities, increasing TNE responsibilities at the faculties and 
the TNE operations (AI7, AI20). AI7 noted that ‘the same labour is 
involved ... operationally, we’re still providing the same thing, same 
functionality regardless’ for both r-FPs and ic-IBCs. However, ‘the big 
difference between these (i.e., r-FPs) and these (i.e., ic-IBCs) is that we 
have a Pro Vice-Chancellor, who is a University A staff member who 
works at that campus and is the head of that campus’ (AI6). These PVCs 
attend ‘weekly senior executive team meetings by video link’ (AI1). 
Therefore the running of ic-IBCs ‘is more costly, there are commitments 
around things like the BSA accreditation that you wouldn’t necessarily do 
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if you are doing it just on a commercial basis … around appointment of 
academics, and the like’ (AI11). AI19 reasoned that ‘we can do this 
because we’re a big university ... if we were not a big university, we 
wouldn’t have the resources to do it’. 
 
Although there were strong merits for sending University staff for 
teaching visits, the new ‘well-developed processes’ (AI8, AI19) and BSA-
accreditation of OP staff (AI13) enabled the University to save on such 
costs (AI7).  
 
The increased regulatory imposts, the University’s BSA accreditation and 
its Global University aspiration resulted in the University viewing TNE 
operations ‘through a different lens of quality, we didn’t find those 
acceptable anymore’ (AI6). A number of ‘non-performing programs’ (AI7) 
were terminated, leaving ‘a few quality OPs’ (AI19) that are ‘easier to 
manage’ (AI6) and ‘control’ (AI2). When considering any new TNE 
venture, the University now enquires if it is ‘strategic for our region?’, and 
is part of the University’s ‘Global University’ agenda (AI18).  
 
More specifically, the start-up of the TSW ic-IBC involved a massive 
amount of due diligence, culminating in a change in State government 
statute after one year of effort (Leadership Case Studies 2011). The 
need for monitoring this ic-IBC was relatively less compared to other 
TNE operations because of the tight alignment of interests between the 
partners – the OP pursued capacity-building and nation-building (AI3), 
while the University similarly pursued relationship building and providing 
services for constituents (AI8). The OP has earned the trust of the 
University sufficiently to be permitted to undertake limited unit 
coordination and develop the ic-IBC’s own courses and units (AI19). The 
University’s monitoring efforts were also aided by a ‘pretty stringent’ (AI3) 
and ‘tightly regulated’ operating environment (AI11). 
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Like any other ic-IBC, the VCS is-IBC was monitored by the same 
University hub-and-spokes processes, an on-site PVC who was the 
University’s ‘eyes on the ground’ and various joint entities, e.g., joint 
academic council, joint academic board and joint management 
committee (AI15). To the University’s advantage, the OP ‘always had a 
close relationship with University A’ through other collaborations (AI3), 
and had thus developed ‘trust’ as a result of the long association (AI14, 
AI16). As a TNE provider with ‘a whole raft of partners from around the 
world’ (AI16), the OP had very good internal governance (AI1), was 
known to be ‘really smart when it comes to managing its programs and 
managing its relationships with the industry’ (AI3) and had ‘well-
developed’ systems, processes and technology platforms (AI15). AI5 
also described the OP as a ‘partner who can see … and understand 
those regulatory environments and deal with them effectively’. The 
relationship has matured to the point where the University is comfortable 
trialling unit coordination by the OP teaching staff (AI15).  
 
There were some commendable OPs that shared the University’s ethos 
and academic objectives, e.g., UCT which was described as ‘one of the 
better campuses’ (AI13) that ‘are able to get good staff and the quality of 
students are also really better’. The OP had at the onset also invested in  
the PhD training of their staff (AI13). UCT’s motivation for delivering r-
FPs was for national capacity-building, ‘very much almost humanitarian 
reason for doing it’ out of its concern for ‘the high level of unemployment 
and low skill in Country U’ (AI12).  
 
In the case of the UCM ic-IBC, its conversion from the UCT r-FP after 14 
years of collaboration was not a trivial decision; 'even though we knew 
they’ve been a really good partner for many, many years, it's still not a 
trivial decision to allow them to become a campus … that’s a big deal’ 
(AI3). Similar to the TSW OP, this OP was driven by ‘corporate business 
responsibility’ (AI6) and ‘developing the community’ (AI1), and its 
campus recognised as ‘even better than the government university’ 
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(AI12). This close alignment of interests with the University made 
monitoring easier, although the monitoring of this ic-IBC was subject to 
the same processes as any other ic-IBC, including an on-site PVC (AI1). 
 
The XCD ic-IBC due diligence was a ‘long approval process’ of about 18 
months, although the University considered the proposal for about three-
and-a-half years before embarking on formal due diligence (AI9, AI17). 
Its market survey reported that ‘there’s still a niche for us’ in Country X 
(AI9). The administration of this OP produced ‘a bit of friction’ (AI7) 
because of the ic-IBC’s ‘out-of-sync’ study periods (AI11) and the OP’s 
‘very strong’ character (AI7). AI7 commented that the admin involved for 
the unit controller (or unit coordinator) is phenomenal’. 
 
Some of the University’s r-FPs, e.g., WSL are faculty-level collaborations 
that are administered and monitored via its IAO (AI5); some are 
administered and monitored by the faculties (AI20). The University does 
not deploy on-site PVCs at r-FPs. Some r-FPs continue to feature ‘light 
touch’ University staff visits for teaching and monitoring (AI20). 
Therefore, r-FPs are considered ‘largely hands-off’ (AI10) and hence, 
more risky compared to ic-IBCs (AI13) and avoided ‘from a quality 
perspective, and certainly from a branding perspective’ (AI3).  
 
The enthusiasm and financial benefits of r-FPs led to lower levels of 
search and monitoring before the tipping point. After the tipping point, the 
focus on ic-IBCs drew large amounts of resources to search and 
monitoring towards ensuring comparability of student experience across 
all campuses. The post-tipping point r-FPs continue to be considered 
secondary to ic-IBCs with the result that they consumed less search and 
monitoring attention on the part of the University. 
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No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) LCS TSW Uni required State statute changed  
b) AI1 GEN Uni new TNE can take up to 18 months for  
   Approval 
GEN Uni on-site PVCs attend ‘weekly senior  
   executive team meetings by video link’ 
VCS OP had good internal governance 
UCM OP monitored via on-site PVC 
UCT OP ‘developing  
   the community’ 
c) AI2 GEN OP fewer easier to ‘control’ GEN potential  
 reputational damage 
d) AI3 TSW OP pursued capacity building, nation building 
TSW ‘pretty stringent’ regulations 
VCS OP had ‘close relationship with Uni A’ 
VCS OP ‘really smart … managing its programs’ 
GEN r-FPs avoided  
   from ‘quality and  
   branding  
   perspectives’ 
UCT conversion ‘a  
   big deal’ 
e) AI5 GEN Uni Global Uni with distinctive foci in each host  
   Country 
GEN Uni reviewed its ‘large number’ of processes 
VCS OP ‘understand those regulatory environments’ 
WSL faculty level  
   collaboration 
f) AI6 GEN Uni PVC is the difference between ic-IBC and r- 
   FP 
GEN OP fewer ‘easier to managel’ 
GEN Uni ‘different lens of quality’ 
GEN poor quality  
   facilities 
UCT OP ‘corporate  
   business  
   responsibility’ 
g) AI10 GEN UNi ‘proper academic structure’ GEN r-FPs ‘largely  
   hands-off’ 
h) AI11 GEN Uni BSA a ‘costly’ commitment; higher  
   compliance costs 
GEN Uni ic-IBC ‘more costly’ 
TSW ‘tightly regulated’ 
XCD ‘out-of-sync’ study periods 
 
i) AI16 VCS OP developed ‘trust’ through long association  
   with Uni A 
VCS OP ‘a whole raft of partners from around the  
   world’ 
 
2 Managerial Role 
a) AI7 GEN Uni set up hub-and-spokes model; increased  
   work loads at faculties 
GEN Uni ic-IBC ‘same labour involved’ 
GEN Uni saved costs by relying on OP staff 
GEN Uni terminated ‘non-performing programs’ 
XCD OP ‘a bit of friction’; ‘very strong’ 
XCD Uni unit coordinator work is ‘phenomenal’ 
 
b) AI9 GEN Uni ‘buy-in from the very top’ 
XCD Uni ‘long approval process’ of 18 months 
XCD Uni ‘still a niche for us’ 
 
c) AI15 VCS Uni PVC ‘eyes on the ground’ and joint entities 
VCS OP had ‘well-developed’ infrastructure 
VCS OP trialling unit coordination 
WSL ‘operates at a  
   faculty level’ 
d) AI17 XCD Uni considered for three-and-a-half years GEN poor exam  
   processes 
e) AI19 GEN Uni UBS priority on ‘quality’ and ‘pursue  
   accreditation’ 
GEN Uni ‘we control all academic matters’ 
GEN Uni Global Uni to grow ‘global footprint’,  
   branding and influence 
GEN Uni ic-IBC ‘because we’re a big university’ 
GEN Uni strong merits for sending staff offshore 
GEN OP reduced, leaving ‘a few quality OPs’ 
TSW OP developed units and courses, trialled unit  
   coordination 
GEN potential  
 reputational damage 
f) AI20 GEN Uni set up hub-and-spokes model; increased  GEN r-FPs : some  
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   work loads at faculties    administered by   
   faculties 
GEN r-FPs : some  
   ‘light touch’ visits 
YSR r-FP set up 
3 Academic Role 
a) AI4 GEN Uni comprehensive business plan  
b) AI8 GEN Uni strong merits for sending staff offshore 
TSW Uni pursued services for local constituents 
 
c) AI12 UCT/UCM ‘better than the government university’ UCT OP ‘almost  
humanitarian reason’ 
d) AI13 GEN Uni BSA brought much prestige 
GEN Uni built Global Uni into all new contracts 
GEN Uni some cotracts ‘through MoUs’ 
GEN poor admission  
   standards 
GEN r-FPs more  
   risky than ic-IBCs 
GEN ‘woeful’ pass  
   Rates 
UCT OP ‘one of the  
   better campuses’ 
UCT OP ‘good staff  
   … students better’ 
UCT OP staff PhD  
   training 
e) AI14 GEN Uni ‘mini Uni As’ 
VCS OP developed ‘trust’ through long association  
   with Uni A 
 
f) AI18 GEN Uni ‘matured’ UBS 
GEN Uni due diligence ‘much more central’ through  
   Specialists 
GEN Uni ‘strategic for our region?’ and part of ‘Global  
   University’ agenda 
 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University; GEN – generic comments; Govt – Government  
    LCS – Leadership Case Studies (Leadership Case Studies 2011) 
    WS – Personal discussion with former University C Dean  
 International (2018) 
 
Table 5.33   University A Informant Perspectives on Costs of Search  
and Monitoring (Post-tipping Point) 
 
b) University Risk Aversion 
 
As discussed in Section 5.4.1.3.2e, the 2015 Coface Risk Assessment 
Map categorised the University’s pre-tipping point TNE Countries P, V 
and T as ‘low risk’ countries. The University later expanded its TNE 
footprint to Countries O, R, U, W, X and Y. The Coface risk ratings 
located Countries O, R, U and X within the ‘acceptable risks’ category 
while relegating W and Y as countries that carry ‘significant risks’ 
(Section 5.2.2.2.3). The University’s existing ic-IBCs are thus rated as 
either ‘low risk’ (i.e., V and T) or ‘acceptable risk’ (i.e., U, X), while its 
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current r-FPs are rated ‘acceptable risk’ (i.e., O) or ‘significant risk’ (i.e., 
W and Y). 
 
The informants provided a glimpse into the University’s risk concerns, 
viz., the type of business delivery model (AI6), the operating environment 
(AI6, AI13), University knowledge of the operating environment (AI6), the 
background and experience of the OP (AI6), the phase and size of the 
TNE operation (AI6), and the requirements of regulatory authorities and 
accreditation bodies (AI11).  
 
For ic-IBCs, the view is that ‘naturally as soon as you have an 
organisation branded as University A, then there's a risk, a much greater 
risk of your reputation … (because) your name is on the gate’ (AI2). 
However, the risk of operating an ic-IBC seems to be mitigated by ‘a lot 
more control … over … development of the curriculum, the 
organisational management … appointment of staff … facilities … 
teaching staff … much stronger line management control over those 
operations’, resulting in ‘less (reputational) risk’ due to ‘much closer 
operational engagement with our branch campuses’ (AI2). The r-FPs on 
the other hand are observed to carry ‘a much higher risk’ (AI3) because 
of the ‘largely hands-off’ approach (AI10).  
 
Through its long experience in delivering TNE, the University ‘learnt a lot 
about risk control’ (AI5). Its due diligence processes now ‘measure risk 
quite avidly’ through more well-developed ‘risk management approaches’ 
(AI5). The University was even criticised for being too rigid and ‘need to 
be a bit more creative’ since ‘universities are always low risk-taking … 
from the commercial perspective’ (AI18). 
 
(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
As discussed in Section 5.4.1.3.1a, the University’s pre-tipping point 
experience had been characterised by faculty-driven, income-motivated 
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r-FPs which operate within low compliance regulatory environments. 
These operations were ‘basically outsourcing something ... providing IP 
through the programs that are being taught … moderating assessments’, 
which translate into the University having ‘a little less control’ and 
‘assuming more risk’ (AI6). As the next two examples demonstrate, the 
risk was focused mainly on financial sustainability. 
 
PHS was terminated despite the University extending a helping hand for 
‘a number of years’ to ‘increase the number of students’ (AI2). The r-FP 
generated insufficient ‘financial returns’ and was an ‘opportunity cost’ 
considering the other more profitable operations that required University 
inputs (AI2). The University also risked being unable to develop ‘its own 
brand’ (AI3) amongst a range of ‘substitutes’ (AI2). On termination, ‘the 
alumni … were upset’, resulting in some ‘push back from the local 
community’ (AI2). Paradoxically for the University, there was no 
reputational damage because the r-FP was ‘flying under the radar 
because you are in the supermarket’. Like PHS, the POL r-FP was 
terminated because it ‘lack(ed) student numbers’ and hence generated 
‘low financial returns’ (AI17). 
 
The four Country V r-FPs (viz., VMI, VBP, VSH and VSI) were operating 
profitably, but were terminated as part of a consolidation exercise in 
Country V because of a growing awareness of the need for consistency 
of quality across TNE operations, a requirement of AUQA. The 
consolidation gave the University ‘better control over quality, a uniform 
experience for students instead of four different experiences’ (AI9). AI9 
noted that the changes leading to 2008 had to be accelerated to ensure 
the University complied with AUQA’s Cycle 2 expectations. The 
termination of these r-FPs also resulted in the loss of a large swath of 
working adult students, an important income stream for the University 
(AI17). 
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No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
b) AI2  PHS Uni helped for ‘a number of years’ to ‘increase the  
   number of students’ but to no avail; insufficient ‘financial  
   returns’; an ‘opportunity cost’ 
PHS Uni ‘alumni … were upset’ resulting in ‘push back from  
   the local community’ 
PHS Uni no reputational damage ‘flying under the radar’ 
c) AI3 PHS Uni risked being unable to develop ‘its own brand’ among  
   ‘substitutes’ 
d) AI5  
e) AI6 GEN Uni ‘a little less control’; ‘assuming more risk’ for r-FPs 
2 Managerial Role 
b) AI9  GEN Country V consolidation ‘better control over quality’ 
GEN Country V consolidation accelerated because of AUQA  
   Cycle 2 expectations 
d) AI17 GEN Uni lost working adult student market as a result of  
   Country V consolidation  
POL ‘lack student numbers’; ‘low financial returns’ 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   GEN – generic comments;   Govt - government 
 
Table 5.34   University A Informant Perspectives on University Risk  
Aversion (Pre-tipping Point) 
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
The University had ‘learnt from our own mistakes’ (AI5), and was ‘able to 
draw experience’ to address ‘the pitfalls of governance … risk control … 
handle regulatory in the new environment … quality control’ (AI15). 
Coupled by the emergence of AUQA, and subsequently TEQSA, as well 
as the UBS’s BSA accreditation, the University’s TNE motivation 
morphed into one that is more quality-driven (‘our quality and TEQSA 
quality … total deal breakers’ - AI1). 
 
Internally, the University’s risk management now starts with doing ‘your 
due diligence and primary market research … understand that you are in 
the right market at the right time, with the right courses, (then) you are 
able to exercise a greater degree of confidence’ (AI13). After starting the 
TNE operation, the University relies on ‘quality control … a lot more 
control’ to mitigate risks (AI2). 
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The emergence of AUQA and later, TEQSA brought about a higher 
awareness of TNE risks. The AUQA Cycle 2 audits and the TEQSA set 
up corresponded to seasons of numerous TNE terminations (Table 5.11). 
These quality imposts helped the University view TNE operations 
‘through a different lens of quality, we didn’t find those acceptable 
anymore … so, we terminated some of those’ (AI6). Central to TNE 
quality assurance is the aspiration for comparable ‘students’ experience, 
students’ satisfaction, and students’ grade outcomes’ (AI19). TEQSA 
now requires a re-registration of universities every five years (AI5), and a 
five-yearly ‘campus review (AI1). The University compliance with TEQSA 
requirements and close liaison with TEQSA generated good dividends, 
viz., that the ‘head commissioner of TEQSA raves about the University’ 
(AI1), TEQSA considered the TSW IBC as the ‘gold standard for offshore 
campuses’ (AI11), and the University has been seen as a ‘TNE leader’ 
(AI19).  
 
The University considered that it was ‘a lot less risky for us to exercise 
greater control and set up branch campuses’ (AI13), based on ‘absolute 
academic control ... we control the quality of the programs, what’s 
delivered, what staff to be employed, all of that … that is important to the 
reputation of the University, that is important to the students getting 
quality education, students’ experience’ (AI16). It now has a ‘much closer 
operational engagement with our branch campuses’, resulting in ‘less 
(reputational) risk’ (AI2), and the capacity to sign on long-term contracts 
such that ‘even if we were in a contract that’s 10 years long, we’re really 
looking at 20, 50 years ahead’ (AI1). 
 
The University took a ‘risk averse strategy’ with the set up of TSW 
(Leadership Case Studies 2011, 4). Although the VC initially faced a 
hesitant Council, the plan for ‘minimal financial exposure’ where there is 
no upfront equity investment by the University (AI9) convinced the 
Council to support the ic-IBC (Ibid., 4). The DVCI also added that ‘the 
greatest risk would be in not securing the University’s long-term future in 
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Country T’ (Ibid., 4). This risk averse strategy comprised equity 
participation by the State government (AI9), bequeathed land by the 
State government (Ibid.), campus construction funded by the State 
government, and start-up capital (Ibid.) and development funding (AI5) 
by the State government (AI8). This ic-IBC has proven itself so that the 
University is comfortable with letting it develop its own courses and units, 
as well as trial unit coordination by the OP teaching staff (AI19). With 
respect to the operating environment, although ‘pretty stringent’ (AI3), 
‘can often change very quickly and without real explanation or 
justification’ (AI11). It was interesting to note that the Acting Deputy Vice 
Chancellor International (DVCI), who became the next VC, remarked 
years later, that the IBC would not have been approved if current TNE 
standards and processes were applied (Ibid., 8).  
 
The operating environment in Country V was tightened with the set up of 
the Country DQF regulator in 2011, following a spate of fraudulent TNE 
operations (AI15). The regulatory regime was described as an advantage 
because ‘what they say is what they mean, is what they do’, and ‘whilst 
you might not always be happy with that, you know what’s required’ 
(AI16). AI9 concurred that 'the regulatory environment is clear and you 
know where you stand’, while AI17 noted the ‘stability of the local 
system’. However, the ‘vagaries of Country V policies … have hurt us a 
lot’ and ‘limited its growth’ (AI1). 
 
The start up of the VCS ic-IBC in 2008 was a ‘testing phase for 
everyone, and there is a lot of uncertainty as well’ but the partners were 
able to ‘draw experience’ from their long business relationship to make 
the arrangement work (AI15). It helped that the OP is a highly 
experienced campus operator, whose ‘business model has always been 
teaching and learning’ (AI15). However, the OP’s selection of a suburban 
campus which lacked public transport accessibility resulted in the loss of 
working adult students (AI17); it was planning a re-location at the time of 
the interviews (AI19). 
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Although the OP delivers its own Diploma programs within the VCS 
campus, the University seemed to be comfortable with this arrangement 
because of ‘trust’ developed from their long association (AI14, AI16) and 
close relationship (AI3). 
 
The UCM ic-IBC which was converted from the UCT r-FP was 
considered one of the ‘lowest risk’ among the University’s ic-IBCs (AI1). 
This is because of the OP’s ‘nation-building’ aspiration (AI3) and its 
‘almost humanitarian’ quest for capacity building amidst the Country’s 
‘high level of unemployment and low skill’ (AI12), motivations that endear 
them to the host Country government (AI13). The long association 
between the partners nurtured trust and inspired the conversion from r-
FP to ic-IBC (AI14). 
 
The University entered ‘unchartered territory’ when it commenced its 
XCD ic-IBC (AI1). The market was seen as a ‘crowded market’ (AI12) 
which exposed the University to high risks of failure (AI1, AI9) and 
‘financial is a big part of … risk’ of operating in ‘X … quite a different 
place’ (AI9). The low numbers of students recruited led some staff to 
question the due diligence and market research on this ic-IBC (AI12, 
AI20). However, the University went ahead and relied on the OP which 
was ‘considered to be stable’ (AI14). AI9 is of the view that ‘it is too early 
to tell really and the real litmus test is going to be around September this 
year when we have an intake’. 
 
The r-FPs on the other hand are observed to carry ‘a much higher risk’ 
(AI3) because of the ‘largely hands-off’ approach (AI10) and also 
because ‘when you are working with a partner you are one of many 
universities’ (AI7). For example, ‘You might kind of say ‘Look! We want 
you to introduce this policy’, and then they would say ‘No, that it doesn’t 
fit with what we are doing with Middlesex and Sheffield Hallam, and 
Wollongong; so no, we are not doing it’ (AI7). 
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The University however, retained several r-FPs ‘because they do us no 
harm and they might serve a specific purpose ... and perhaps in the 
fullness of time, they might show the promise to become more of’ an IBC 
like in Country U (AI5). For example, YSR was a ‘community-building 
type … of … arrangement rather than commercial … and I don’t think it is 
a big supplier of students here, into Australia ... it is sort of an unusual 
arrangement’ (AI11). The OP’s motivation for delivering this r-FP is for 
‘upskilling’ staff, while for the University, they are helpful in ‘cross-selling’ 
the University’s ‘leadership programs’ (AI2). The WSL, ONJ and ODB r-
FPs are geared for the recruitment of host Country students for onshore 
study (AI11, AI17). 
 
Additionally, the University deployed a range of ‘different models’ like 
‘campuses, articulation, onshore, offshore … to diversify its risk’ (AI4). 
The ‘profit ... which helps diversify our revenue base which reduces our 
financial risk because we’ve got things in a number of different places’ 
(AI2). 
 
The University’s post-tipping point TNE strategy for both r-FPs and ic-
IBCs called for risk mitigation through ‘simply licensing or franchising to 
someone else and get them to run it’ (AI13), because ‘they carry the risk 
around … employment costs, leases’ (AI6). ‘When you look at overseas 
campuses, your risks around operations are in large part passed on to a 
third party provider ... they are also able to employ people much more 
cheaply than the university here ... the university has employment 
arrangements that mean that it would make it a much more costly 
arrangement even if you are trying to do it overseas ... we don’t have the 
expertise to employ people overseas : the HR, the taxation, all those stuff 
around health and safety and managing the staff overseas’ (AI11). The 
OP ‘would make more but then they are also taking on much more risk 
and much more cost’ (AI9). AI6 supported this view, saying that ‘they 
would need to benefit more to be worth their while’. 
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The r-FPs, both before and after the tipping point, were considered to be 
risky investments because of the University’s hands-off approach. The ic-
IBCs on the other hand are considered less risky due to the University’s 
close involvement through its on-site PVCs and well-developed TNE 
processes. 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) LCS TSW Uni took a ‘risk averse strategy’ 
TSW Uni ‘greatest risk … not securing the Uni’s long- 
   term future in Country T’ 
TSW OP State government bequeathed land, funded  
   campus construction 
TSW Uni DVCI ic-IBC would not have been approved  
   under current standards and processes 
 
b) AI1 GEN Uni ‘total deal breakers’ 
GEN Uni TEQSA five-yearly ‘campus review’ 
GEN Uni ‘TEQSA raves about the Uni’ 
GEN Uni ‘we’re really looking at 20, 50 years ahead’ 
VCS ‘vagaries of Country V policies … hurt us a lot’  
   and ‘limited its growth’ 
XCD Uni entered ‘unchartered territory’ 
XCD Uni exposed to high risks of failure 
UCT/UCM one of the  
   ‘lowest risk’ 
 
c) AI2 GEN Uni ‘a lot more control’ to mitigate risks 
GEN Uni has ‘much closer operational engagement  
   with our branch campuses … less risk’ 
GEN Uni ‘profit … helps diversify our revenue base  
   which reduces our financial risk’ 
YSR Uni ‘upskilling’ 
staff; ‘cross-selling’ 
d) AI3 TSW operating environment ‘pretty stringent’ 
VCS Uni and OP developed ‘trust’ from close  
   relationship 
GEN r-FPs ‘a much  
   higher risk’ 
UCT ‘nation building’ 
e) AI5 GEN Uni ‘learnt from our own mistakes’ 
GEN Uni TEQSA requires re-registration every five  
   Years 
TSW OP State government provided development  
   funding 
GEN r-FPs might  
   become ic-IBCs 
f) AI6 GEN Uni ‘a different lens of quality’ 
GEN OP ‘would need to make more … to be worth  
   their while’ 
GEN OP ‘carry the  
   risk’ 
g) AI10  GEN r-FP ‘largely  
  hands-off’ approach 
h) AI11 GEN Uni ‘gold standard for offshore campuses’ 
GEN Uni ‘risks … passed on to a third party provider’ 
GEN OP ‘employ people much more cheaply’ 
TSW operating environment ‘can often change very  
   quickly’ 
YSR OP ‘community  
   building’ 
WSL r-FP for  
  recruitment onshore 
i) AI16 GEN Uni ‘absolute academic control’ 
VCS regulator ‘what they say is what they mean, is  
   what they do’ 
VCS Uni and OP developed ‘trust’ from long  
   association 
 
2 Managerial Role 
a) AI7  GEN Uni ‘one of  
   many universities’  
   at r-FP 
b) AI9 GEN OP ‘make more but … much more risk … cost’ 
TSW Uni ‘minimal financial exposure’ assured 
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TSW OP State government equity 
VCS ‘regulatory environment is clear’ 
XCD Uni exposed to high risks of failure 
XCD Uni ‘financial is a big part of … risk’; ‘X … quite a  
   different place’ 
XCD ‘too early to really tell’ of performance 
c) AI15 GEN Uni ‘able to draw experience’ from past 
VCS new regulator DQF set up to address fraud 
VCS start up was a ‘testing phase for everyone’ 
VCS OP ‘business model has always been teaching  
   and learning’ 
 
d) AI17 VCS ‘stability of the local system’ 
VCS OP’s suburban campus lost working adult  
   students 
WSL r-FP for  
  recruitment onshore 
e) AI19 GEN Uni comparable ‘students experience, students’  
   satisfaction, students’ grade outcomes’ 
GEN Uni a ‘TNE leader’ 
TSW OP develop units and courses, trialled unit  
   Coordination 
VCS OP planning re-location of campus 
 
f) AI20 XCD low numbers cast doubt on due diligence  
3 Academic Role 
a) AI12 XCD Uni entered ‘crowded market’ 
XCD low numbers cast doubt on due diligence 
UCT OP ‘almost  
   humanitarian’ 
b) AI13 GEN Uni comprehensive due diligence 
GEN Uni ‘a lot less risky … branch campuses’ 
GEN Uni ‘simply  
   licensing or  
   franchising to  
   someone else’ 
UCT OP endeared to  
   government 
c) AI14 GEN Uni used ‘different models’ 
VCS OP runs its own programs on campus 
XCD OP ‘considered to be stable’ 
UCT Uni and OP  
   nurtured trust with  
   long association 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University; GEN – generic comments; Govt – Government  
    LCS – Leadership Case Studies (Leadership Case Studies 2011) 
    WS – Personal discussion with former University C Dean  
 International (2018) 
 
Table 5.35   University A Informant Perspectives on University Risk  
Aversion (Post-tipping Point) 
 
c) Incentives Alignment 
 
As analysed in Section 5.4.1.3.2d, the University’s incentives for TNE 
involvement evolved over time, especially after its TNE tipping point in 
1999.  Its pre-tipping point r-FPs were largely initiated and managed 
decentrally at the faculties, led by entrepreneurial staff who benefited 
‘excessively’ from off-load remuneration (AI17). The University also 
gained from onshore international student enrolments that resulted from 
strong brand presence at the r-FP locations (AI3, AI19). It is noteworthy 
that the pre-tipping point r-FPs had run for long periods before 
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termination, ranging from ten years (VSH) to 26 years (PHS) – providing 
evidence of close alignment of interests. 
 
As regulatory conditions matured post-tipping point, the University was 
confronted with tightening standards of delivery and outcomes.  The 
tightening of standards started with the establishment of AUQA in 2000, 
and continued with AUQA Cycle 2 from 2008 to 2012, TEQSA from 2012 
and the University’s BSA accreditation from 2016) (Table 5.11). The 
University’s own strategic positioning as a Global University from 2017 
also imposed research and community engagement on its ic-IBC OPs (in 
addition to teaching) (AI5, AI10). These quality imposts resulted in the 
termination of numerous r-FPs (AI12), many of which were short-lived 
(i.e., five or less years) (Table 5.11). 
 
On the part of the OPs, many of which are commercial organisations, 
their key incentive for TNE involvement is profit – both before and after 
the University’s TNE tipping point (AI3, AI9, AI20). The trade/professional 
association OPs also benefited from the training of their members (AI1). 
Post-tipping point, the University’s Global University aspiration imposed 
on the ic-IBC OPs the additional roles of research and community 
engagement. While most OPs bought into these additional roles, the 
XCD OP was observed to be reluctant to do so (AI1). Most post-tipping 
point TNE operations were long run, i.e., from seven (ONJ) to 19 years 
(TSW), indicating close incentives alignment. 
 
d) Maturity of Legal-political Environment 
 
Organisations which execute governance decisions from the AT lens 
view contracts as complete (AI3, AI19) and thus rely on strong legal 
environments for enforcement (Kivisto 2011). The following analysis will 
be based on the discussion of Section 5.4.1.3.2e.  
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Although the pre-tipping point r-FPs operated within relative lax 
education regulatory environments, these Countries, viz., P, T and V 
were known to have strong overall state regulations. They are also ‘low 
risk’ countries according to the Coface risk ratings, and within the top 
10% among 125 countries in attractiveness for investment (IESE-Emlyon 
Country Attractiveness Index for 2015). 
 
Although the government policies in these Countries were sometimes 
described as variable (AI1, AI11, AI20), their regulatory environments 
were considered ‘tightly regulated’ (AI11) and stable (AI17). 
 
After the tipping point, the University and its OPs were subjected to 
operating environments that were increasingly tightened, both in 
Australia and in the respective host countries. The University was keenly 
aware that ‘there is a limited tolerance by governments in the countries in 
which we operate for mistakes and for breaches’ (AI5).  
 
The Countries that University A operated in, post-tipping point, were O, 
R, U, W, X and Y, in addition to the pre-tipping point Countries of P, T 
and V. Countries O, R, X and Y have strong state regulations, while U 
and W have weak state regulations with respect to higher education. 
While the highly regulated operating environments may explain the 
University’s long-term approach to TNE (‘even if we were in a contract 
that’s 10 years long, we’re really looking at 20, 50 years ahead’ - AI1), 
Countries U and W seem to go against the grain. In the case of Country 
U, the University is partnered with one of the four largest conglomerates 
in the Country that has close governmental connections (AI3). On the 
other hand, the legacy WSL r-FP has been in operation for the past 17 
years. 
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5.4.1.3.4 Rival Theories 
 
The University A focus group did not evidence any other related 
organisational economics theory driving its TNE decisions. However, the 
in-depth interviews discovered some indications of the practice of Upper 
Echelon Theory (UET). These were observed in the comments on how 
the XCD ic-IBC was started – it was reported that despite ‘lots of 
opposition … at the end of the day, the VC wanted it … so, we moved 
with it (AI7). There was also concern that, despite the market being ‘an 
unknown ... very very new, … financially, (it was) not a good decision’, 
and that ‘we've had some ethical dilemmas … (it) appears to have come 
about because of the relationship … our new PVCI already had with the 
senior people running that … institute’, and ‘based not on the market 
research’ (AI12). AI12, an academic,  concluded that ‘clearly I think it's a 
political decision that outweighs the financial value at this point in time ... 
maybe it's a longer term strategy that the rest of us are missing’. There 
were however, no such views expressed by executives with strategic 
responsibilities. Secondary data analysis of the TSW start-up in 1999 
indicated that this ic-IBC was a ‘top down’ decision (Leadership Case 
Studies 2011, 9), possibly evidencing UET. 
 
While the University A focus group did not indicate any possibility of the 
Resource-based View driving TNE decisions because of the absence of 
any profit maximisation objective on the part of the University, the in-
depth interviews provided mixed views on the application of this theory. 
The University was seen to be driving for an increase in ic-IBC profit 
margins from the 1% - 2% band to 5% (AI2). Additionally, the termination 
of PHS was attributed to insufficient ‘financial returns’ and ‘opportunity 
cost’ (AI2). However, at XCD ‘the financial model is certainly, from what I 
understand, is in favor of X and not us … so it's actually costing us’ 
(AI12). AI20 rued that the University ‘don't get much … it is a very, very 
small percentage; these are our courses … and they are paying the 
business partner, not us‘. Further, the resources that the OPs provide to 
 412 
the University are not considered rare, inimitable or non-substitutable, 
e.g., AI1 remarked that the State government partner of TSW would be 
able to ’find another partner’ to utilise the facilities on termination, while 
the University would find terminations a ‘problem’. AI2 also noted that 
'the building’s a building ... they could potentially find other partners or 
run it themselves or do something else'. 
 
The University’s Global University aspiration and current TNE network 
seem to provide some support for Strategic Nets (Butler and Soontiens 
2015). This is seen in the University’s quest to establish a network of 
multinational universities (AI1), ‘mini University As’ (AI14), each with a 
distinctive focus to serve its host country or region (AI5). 
 
5.4.1.3.5 University A Case Study Findings 
 
The TNE Decision Model construct (Fig. 3.2) identified the possible 
influence of University characteristics, University TNE perspectives and 
TNE operating environments on TNE business delivery model selection. 
Based on this construct, the case study of University A will explore the 
three research questions. The findings relate only to TNE operations that 
were identified and discussed. Some TNE operations were identified but 
were not discussed, and are hence not included in these findings. 
 
a) University A Criteria for TNE Business Delivery Model Selection 
 
This section reviews the University’s motivation for TNE both before and 
after its TNE tipping point using Guimon’s construct for multinational 
universities (Section 2.6.5.3) as it tracks the University’s first r-FP in 1986 
to its current multinational Global University approach. 
 
The University’s early TNE operations were all r-FPs focussed largely on 
income generation for the participating faculties and staff (AI1, AI10), and 
secondarily on onshore international student enrolments through its 
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offshore TNE presence (AI3, AI19). There were no research and 
community engagement activities undertaken by these r-FPs, which were 
initiated and managed substantially by the faculties (AI18, AI19). Under a 
risk averse approach, the University outsourced the delivery of its 
programs to offshore OPs with minimal quality monitoring (AI1, AI10). 
This hands-off TNE delivery was possible courtesy of a lax regulatory 
environment both onshore and offshore (AI17). The University thus 
sought market access and OP expertise and resources for its TNE 
teaching business. Although there were a number of profitable r-FPs, 
there was no structured international network of r-FPs to provide cross-
border efficiency gains. 
 
The set up of the University’s first ic-IBC in 1999 heralded the start of the 
University’s ic-IBC network (Section App I 2.0) and also the tightening of 
legislative and regulatory conditions pertaining to TNE delivery (Section 
5.2.2.1). From then on, resource-seeking took on a more important role, 
endearing the University to more experienced and better resourced OPs 
(‘a partner of substance. ... an organisation with resources, and ... of 
substance’ - AI1).  
 
As the University increased its research and community engagement 
activities in TSW, it gradually developed a multinational university vision 
for a Global University, with many ‘mini University As’ (AI14) in various 
key global locations (Section App I 5.0). All ic-IBCs are now contractually 
required to undertake research and community engagement (AI5, AI10); 
some legacy OP contracts have been renewed to incorporate these 
roles, e.g., VCS (AI15). The University is therefore able to expand its 
international market access through outsourcing OP resources and ic-
IBC network efficiencies to undertake all three roles of teaching, research 
and community engagement. These ic-IBCs are preferred by the 
University over the r-FPs because of the higher level of control (AI3).  
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However, a few r-FPs continue to deliver offshore teaching for various 
strategic reasons, e.g., capacity-building (AI11) and offshore branding to 
promote onshore international student enrolments (AI17). They do not 
undertake research and community engagement. Unlike the ic-IBCs, the 
University does not have strategic plans for its r-FPs (AI6). These r-FPs 
clearly tap into their offshore delivery locations for market access. They 
continue, like their pre-tipping point predecessors, to operate on a largely 
hands-off fashion, relying on the expertise and resources of their 
respective OPs (AI10). There is no indication that these operations 
contribute to cross-border efficiency. 
 
b) Theoretical Drivers for University A’s TNE Business Delivery Model 
Selection 
 
The analysis of reflectors of the three theories (Section 5.4.1.3) were 
analysed based on the propositional framework of Table 4.12. Table 5.36 
below summarises the analyses of Section 5.4.1.3. The TNE operations 
that have been observed to satisfy all the propositions for a particular 
theory are highlighted in grey scale. 
 
There was insufficient data to fully analyse two pre-tipping point r-FPs 
(viz., VIF and TLK), and 14 post-tipping point r-FPs (viz., PCI, PHK, 
PHM, RBI, RPN, KPU, VIF, VIP, VCA, TIP, LIB, LBH, WIC, JSH and 
YUE).  
 
The focus group for University A suggested that AT drives both pre- and 
post-tipping point r-FPs (or Outsourced Models), while TCE and to some 
extent PRT might drive the selection of ic-IBCs (or Direct Models) after 
its TNE tipping point (Table 4.11).  
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(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
The University operated TNE within an environment of low regulatory 
requirements pre-tipping point. It coincided with an aggressive push by 
its highly entrepreneurial business school, UBS to initiate as many r-FPs 
as possible. Its early OPs were mainly non-academic organisations, e.g., 
private companies and professional/trade associations which were driven 
chiefly by profit. Many of these OPs were also collaborating with other 
universities to hedge their risks. The close alignment of financial returns 
between the University and its OPs resulted in the quick start up of many 
r-FPs, and which lasted more than the five-year reasonable rate of return 
period before all of them were eventually terminated.  
 
The lax regulatory environment (AI17) permitted the quick start up of r-
FPs with low TNE-specific asset investments (AI10). The University 
however, had to live with being one of many university partners of its 
OPs (AI2, AI3), and more generally with high OP behavioural 
uncertainties and hence, the potential for higher risks of opportunism 
(AI7). The reliance on OPs to deliver high transaction frequency TNE 
processes resulted in low University control of OP TNE delivery 
infrastructure and quality (AI10, AI20). Further, these distant r-FPs 
introduced high levels of information asymmetry, which were not well 
mitigated through the University’s periodic teaching staff visits (AI4). 
 
It was hence not surprising that the University operated r-FPs, i.e., 
Outsourced Models – in order to risk aversely grow TNE operations 
quickly within a lax regulatory environment by relying on OPs who share 
the University’s pre-tipping point motivation for financial returns. This 
reflects the AT approach to TNE model selection, the approach that had 
been predicted through focus group studies. Low asset specificity 
precluded the TCE approach, while OP control of mission critical 
resources precluded PRT as a driver for pre-tipping point selection of the 
Outsourced Model. 
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A Pre-tipping Point 
1 PHS 26 OM L H H H OP H H H H L H H H 
2 POL 14 OM L H H H OP H H H H L H H H 
3 VMI 22 OM L H H H OP H H H H L H H H 
4 VBP 13 OM L H H H OP H H H H L H H H 
5 VSH 10 OM L H H H OP H H H H L H H H 
6 VSI 9 OM L H H H OP H H H H L H H H 
B Post-tipping Point 
1 WSL 17+ OM L H H H OP H H H L L H H H 
2 TMC 10 OM L H H H OP H H H H L H H H 
3 TLK 15 OM L H H H OP H H H H L H H H 
4 YSR 12+ OM L H H H OP H H H L L H H H 
5 ONJ 7+ OM L H H NR OP H H H H L H H H 
6 ODB1 5 OM L H H NR OP H H H H L H H H 
7 ODB2 3+ OM L H H NR OP H H H H L H H H 
8 UCT 14 OM H L H L UP L L H H L L H H 
9 UCM 1+ DM H H H L UP L L H H H L H L 
10 TSW 19+ DM H H H H UP H L H H H L H H 
11 VCS 11+ DM H H H H UP H L H H H L H H 
12 XCD 1+ DM H H H H UP H H H H H L H H 
Abbreviations  :  L – Low; H – High; UP – University; OP – Offshore Partner; NR – Not Referenced 
      DM – Direct Model; OM – Outsourced Model 
      ODB1 – first r-FP contract terminated;   ODB2 – re-started r-FP 
      Shaded cells indicate fulfilment of all reflectors for one of the theories 
 
Table 5.36   University A Responses to Propositions 
(P – Present; A – Absent; ? – Possibly Present; NR – Not Referenced) 
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
The University’s post-tipping point operations were administered within a 
tightening legislative and regulatory environment, which heightened the 
University’s concerns for quality TNE delivery (AI1). With growing 
experience, the University established well-developed processes (AI19) 
and organisational infrastructure to administer its TNE operations (AI20); 
it also pursued a prestigious Business school accreditation to benchmark 
its standards (AI1, AI19) and lend prestige to its brand (AI7, AI13). 
 
With the exception of the UCT r-FP, the in-depth interviews confirmed 
that all the few remaining post-tipping point r-FPs are observed to have 
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been driven by AT considerations (Table 5.36). This is not surprising 
given the University’s ‘largely hands-off’ approach (AI10) and lower 
strategic priority (AI6) for r-FPs, amidst a higher level of TNE regulation. 
The University’s continued hands-off approach to r-FPs resulted in low 
asset specificity (AI10), thus precluding TCE as a driver for r-FP. Further, 
the continued hands-off reliance on the OP for mission-critical resources 
resulted in lower control of r-FPs (AI20), thus precluding PRT as a driver. 
It seems that the absence of University strategic agenda for the usually 
small enrolment r-FPs over-rode its concerns for control of its OPs’ 
academic responsibilities. 
 
The UCT r-FP seems to be the only anomaly among post-tipping point r-
FPs. Compared to the other r-FPs, the University seemed to have a 
lower risk aversion for UCT (AI2, AI13). The informants’ current 
perspectives of a lower risk aversion might have been influenced by the 
positive experience over the past 14 years of collaboration (AI2, AI6, 
AI12) and the OP’s close host country political connections (AI1, AI13). It 
might not have represented the University’s risk perceptions at the 
inception of the UCT r-FP. The Mok Regulatory Regimes construct 
(Table 5.4) located Country U as a market coordinator state with weak 
civil and state regulations (Table 5.5), while the Coface country risk 
rating considered the Country as having ‘quite acceptable’ investment 
risks (Table 5.7). Given that the University was highly risk averse in low 
risk Countries like P and V, it is highly likely that the University was also 
highly risk averse with respect to Country U at the inception of UCT. If 
so, the University can also be said to have considered AT in selecting an 
Outsourced Model (i.e., r-FP) to operate UCT. 
 
In the case of the ic-IBCs (or Direct Model), two operations conformed to 
TCE considerations, viz., TSW and VCS. The ic-IBC model at XCD 
seems to have been possibly selected under TCE and PRT 
considerations, while the driver for the UCM ic-IBC was unclear. 
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In the cases of TSW, VCS and XCD, there clearly were high levels of 
asset specificity where the OPs were required to reproduce the look and 
feel of the home campus at their respective locations (AI6, AI9), and to 
invest in research and community engagement (AI10, AI13). Further, the 
University trialled the devolvement of its unit coordination to the TSW 
and VCS OPs’ teaching staff (AI19, AI15), and in the case of TSW, 
permitted the ic-IBC to develop its own units and programs (AI19). 
 
Although there were still some concerns over opportunism by the OPs, 
information asymmetery at TSW was observed to be low because of the 
stature and motivation of the OP, a State government (AI2, AI4). There 
was similarly low information asymmetry at VCS, which resulted from the 
University’s long association with this OP and thus, the high trust levels 
developed (AI3, AI14, AI16). The low information asymmetry precluded 
PRT as consideration for the University’s choice of the ic-IBC (i.e., Direct 
Model) for both TSW and VCS. 
 
The cost of search for TSW was high, involving the entire university and 
the State legislature (Section App I 2.1). Monitoring TSW was also a 
costly affair requiring compliance with the University’s own benchmarks, 
its BSA accreditation benchmarks, TEQSA requirements and host 
country regulations (Section App I 10.4). While the cost of search was 
low for VCS, the cost of monitoring was, like for TSW, high (Section App 
I 10.4). For XCD, both the cost of search (AI1, AI2) and monitoring were 
high (Section App I 10.4). However, by virtue of the tight control and 
monitoring infrastructure, the University was less risk averse to these 
three ic-IBCs (compared to r-FPs) (AI3, AI14). Hence, AT could not have 
been the University’s consideration in selecting these ic-IBCs. 
 
In the case of XCD, the PRT considerations differed from the other two 
TCE-driven ic-IBCs (viz., TSW and VCS) in informant perspectives on 
information asymmetry (Table 5.36). The TSW and VCS ic-IBCs have 
been set up based upon perceptions of OPs with high integrity (viz., a 
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State government and an international TNE provider of long University 
association respectively) (AI2, AI3), and hence perception of lower 
information asymmetry. These contrast with the XCD OP, which although 
large, do not have a long history of working with the University and had 
also recently fallen out of another TNE collaboration (AI7). On the face of 
the four PRT propositions, it would seem that PRT could have been a 
driving approach for the selection of the ic-IBC for XCD. However, 
informants also reported that the OP was the partner that had the most to 
gain from the collaboration, and the most to lose in the event of a 
termination (Section App I 10.6), thus negating the influence of the 
University as the controller of mission-critical resources (Section 3.7.5.4). 
The ic-IBC model therefore could not have been selected for XCD based 
on PRT considerations. 
 
Informants reported lower environmental uncertainty for UCM. Their 
positive perspectives on Country U have been noted in (i) above to be 
based on the OP’s national-level economic influence as one of the 
Country’s four largest conglomerates, and its close political connections 
with the host country government. There has been no clear direct 
informant description of the Country’s business and legal-political 
environment during its inception. However, the Mok classification 
highlighted Country U as a market coordinator state with weak civil and 
state regulations, while the Coface risk rating indicated ‘quite acceptable’ 
investment risks. Therefore, the UCM ic-IBC (Direct Model) can be said 
to have possibly been driven by TCE considerations.  
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These theoretical drivers are summarised in the table below.  
 
No. In Relation 
to Tipping 
Point 
Type of TNE Business 
Delivery Model 
Direct/ 
Outsourced 
Possible 
Rationale for 
Model Selection 
1 Before Franchised (remote oversight) (r-FP) OM AT 
2 After 
Franchised (remote 
oversight) (r-FP) OM AT 
Collaborative IBC (in 
situ oversight) (ic-IBC) DM 
TCE (TCE and 
PRT in one case) 
 
Table 5.37   University A Theoretical Perspectives in Deploying TNE  
      Business Delivery Models 
 
c) University A Value Chains 
 
Based on the generic TNE value chain of Fig. 4.6, the University’s pre- 
and post-tipping point TNE value chains are reproduced below. 
 
Pre-tipping point, the University deployed an Outsourced Model (the r-
FP) exclusively. In this model, the University provided its curriculum to 
the OP for delivery, while retaining control over the approval of OP 
teaching staff recruitment, teaching pedagogy and delivery, and student 
assessments. It also provided academic staff support through both its 
onshore TNE administration and its visiting teaching staff. The OP 
delivers the University’s programs as prescribed, through its teaching 
infrastructure, its hired teaching staff and on-site administration. It is also 
fully responsible for student recruitment, student support and campus 
administration. 
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    University infrastructure (OP) 
  Academic support/student services (OP)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
    Admin/professional services (OP)                                                                                                                           
(UP)   Academic staff support   (OP) 
                                                                                                                                                          Parents          
 (UP)  Intermediate activity (including QAA)  (OP)                                  Employers                
   (UP)                                                                                       Community                                                                              
Staff                                                                                                                                 Country                            
Recruit-            (UP)                               (UP)                               (UP)                                                                                          
ment                                                                                                                                                           
   (OP)       Curriculum Devt            Teaching                           Assessment                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                      
 Student              (OP)              (OP)             
 Recruit-                                                                                                                        
 ment  
   (OP)                                                                                                                     
Abbreviations : UP for University Partner; OP for Offshore Partner 
 
Fig. 5.4   University A TNE Outsourced Model Value Chain (Pre- 
tipping Point) 
 
After the tipping point, the University deployed both the Outsourced and 
Direct Models, viz., the r-FP and ic-IBC respectively. The ic-IBC 
operations undertook all three university roles of teaching, research and 
community engagement, while the r-FPs focussed solely on teaching. 
Research and community engagement are mission goods that the 
University delivered in collaboration with its ic-IBC OP only, while 
teaching was a revenue good for both the r-FPs and ic-IBCs.  
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    University infrastructure (OP) 
  Academic support/student services (OP)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
    Admin/professional services (OP)                                                                                                                           
(UP)   Academic staff support   (OP) 
                                                                                                                                                          Parents          
 (UP)  Intermediate activity (including QAA)  (OP)                                  Employers                
   (UP)                                                                                       Community                                                                              
Staff                                                                                                                                 Country                            
Recruit-            (UP)                               (UP)                               (UP)                                                                                          
ment                                                                                                                                                           
   (OP)       Curriculum Devt            Teaching                           Assessment                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                      
 Student              (OP)              (OP)             
 Recruit-                                                                                                                        
 ment  
   (OP)                                                                                                                     
Abbreviations : UP for University Partner; OP for Offshore Partner 
 
Fig. 5.5   University A TNE Outsourced Model Value Chain (Post- 
tipping Point) 
 
The post-tipping point r-FPs operated like the pre-tippng point r-FPs 
because of the University’s lower strategic priority for r-FPs and hands-
off approach to administering these small (in terms of enrolments) TNE 
operations. 
 
The ic-IBCs, by virtue of their teaching, research and community 
engagement roles, and their exclusive positioning as a ‘mini University A’ 
(AI14) required additional value chain activities to quality assure. In 
addition to the r-FP value chain activities, the ic-IBCs also have 
 
(i) contractually-mandated roles of research and community 
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(ii) the presence of the University’s on-site PVC, acting as the 
University’s ‘eyes on the ground’ (AI15) and being responsible for 
teaching, research and community engagement KPIs. The PVCs 
also provided academic support to both OP teaching staff and 
students 
 
 
    University infrastructure (OP) 
(UP)  Academic support/student services   (OP)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
    Admin/professional services (OP)                                                                                                                           
(UP)   Academic staff support   (OP) 
                                                                                                                                                          Parents          
 (UP)  Intermediate activity (including QAA)  (OP)                                  Employers                
   (UP)           (UP)        Managing Research                                         (OP)           Community                                                                              
Staff                                                                                                                                 Country                            
Recruit-  Topic identification Obtaining Funds          Research           Commercialisation 
ment                                                                                                                                                           
   (OP)                                  Managing Teaching                  
  
       (UP)         (UP)  (UP)     
 Student          
 Recruit-     Curriculum Devt         Teaching            Assessment     Alumni 
 ment                                                                                                        Relations                    
   (OP)              (OP) 
        (OP)           (OP)   (OP)           
(UP)   Community Engagement   (OP) 
 
Abbreviations :  UP for University Partner; OP for Offshore Partner 
   Dashed line indicate devolved responsibility at TSW only 
 
Fig. 5.6   University A TNE Direct Model Value Chain (Post-tipping  
Point) 
 
(iii) responsibility for alumni relations, which is largely undertaken by 
the OP 
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For TSW and VCS, the University was trialling the devolvement of unit 
coordination by OP teaching staff. The University also permitted TSW to 
develop its own units and programs, possibly because of the long 
association and familiarity with the OP. 
 
d) The Influence of Theoretical Perspectives on TNE Longevity 
 
The history of the University’s TNE experience was impacted by the 
gradually tightening TNE regulatory environment, starting from its TNE 
tipping point (Section 5.2.2). Under lax regulations, all of the University’s 
pre-tipping point r-FPs enjoyed longer operating periods before 
termination (Table 5.11). These operations lasted between nine and 26 
years before termination. Five of them were terminated within the AUQA 
Cycle 2 period, two within the University’s centralisation of workload 
management period and one corresponding to the University’s BSA 
accreditation. 
 
Post-tipping point, the variation in operational longevity for terminated 
TNE operations was wider, i.e., from two years to 14 years. All were r-
FPs. Three of them lasted less than three years, and were terminated 
around the AUQA Cycle 2 period. Four of them lasted less than the five-
year reasonable rate of return business longevity period (but longer than 
the three-year breakeven business survival period); two were terminated 
around AUQA Cycle 2, while one around the centralisation of workload 
management period. Ten r-FPs lasted more than the five-year period, 
with five terminated around the AUQA Cycle 2 period, three around the 
centralisation of workload period, one prior ro TEQSA and one prior to 
the BSA accreditation.  
 
All the University’s ic-IBCs were still operating at the time of the 
interviews. TSW is the longest running at 19 years, VCS at 11 years, 
XCD at one year, and UCM just started in 2018. It is noteworthy that 
UCM was converted from a r-FP (UCT) after 14 years of collaboration. 
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All pre-tipping point r-FPs lasted more than the five-year business 
longevity period, but nevertheless terminated on quality shortcomings. 
Out of 20 post-tipping point r-FPs, only four remain. Similarly, the 
terminated r-FPs were culled on quality grounds. The large number of 
short-lived r-FPs after the tipping point reflect the tightening TNE 
regulatory environment. 
 
However, on the basis of the distinction between the Outsourced Model 
and the Direct Model, there is no discernible trend in the operational 
longevities of the University’s TNE operations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 426 
5.4.2 Case Study of University C 
 
The University commenced TNE operations in the early 1990s. Early 
TNE ventures were opportunistic and reactive. With experience, the 
University began to be more strategic in partner selection and TNE 
management. One of the University’s Country V TNE operations 
experienced rapid growth, triggering a university-wide TNE review to 
address threats to academic integrity, University reputation and revenue 
streams. This review produced a White Paper for a more deliberate, 
strategic growth of its TNE operations, supporting the University’s 2017 - 
2020 Strategic Plan. It also led to the set up of a host country office 
(HCO) in Country V to manage the large numbers of TNE students there. 
From then on, the mantra has been to set up a HCO in every major TNE 
location, suggesting that high TNE growth rates have driven the 
University to select on-site monitored or Direct Model TNE operations. 
 
Focus group findings indicated that the University earned more than 
A$15 million from TNE in 2015, making up 24% of its annual income of 
A$62 million. This financial performance is considered very high within its 
IRU university group. This group was reported to have derived on 
average 9% of their total 2015 revenue from TNE, the highest among 
Australian universities.  
 
The tabulation of Australian public universities by student population 
(Table 5.1) shows that the majority of Universities with TNE operations 
are within the first and second quartiles of the range. Indeed, CI4 
asserted that ‘we are a small university’, while CI6 commented that 
University C is merely a regional university. According to CI1, the 
University is ‘here (i.e., in TNE) only to the extent to broaden our base ... 
(because) University C was very subject to government funding ... we 
don't have a big foundation ... we have land but we don’t have other 
income ... so, we are very at the vagaries of the government policies 
here ... so (we need) to have other operations … (in) diversifying (our 
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income sources)’. It was also reported that the University encountered 
‘funding pressures ... so basically the Australian government has said to 
all universities, ‘you can't grow your domestic load’ or at least, ‘you can 
but we’re not going to fund you anymore … for growth in your domestic 
load’ … so the options are international onshore or offshore … (and) 
international onshore is sort of, maxed out’ (CI10). While not conclusive, 
these evidence suggest that smaller universities have a greater 
propensity to engage in TNE activities because of funding constraints. 
 
The focus group identified four remaining FP operations (viz., one each 
in Countries T and X, and two in Country V), and one terminated FP 
operation at Country N. However, the in-depth interviews revealed that 
there are three terminated r-FPs (Countries N, T and V), one terminating 
ic-IBC (Country X), one new ic-IBC (Country X) and one running i-FP 
(Country V). The difference between the focus group and interview 
findings was partly due to a mislabelling of the terminated Country X ic-
IBC as a r-FP and new developments occurring since the focus group 
was held. These developments included the termination of Country T r-
FP, one of the Country V r-FPs and the Country X ic-IBC by the time of 
the interviews. Further, the other Country V r-FP became an i-FP, while a 
new ic-IBC was set up in Country X – the only two remaining TNE 
operations at the time of the interviews. 
 
A total of eleven University staff were interviewed. They came from three 
different roles, viz., strategic, managerial and academic roles, and across 
central, schools and offshore divisions. The informants have between 
five and twenty years of TNE experience, with the majority (i.e., eight) of 
them having chalked up more than ten years. Among them, spread 
across the three roles, a majority (i.e., eight) of informants have private 
sector work experience. Three of the four academic staff also have TNE 
managerial experience in the past. The lived experiences transcribed 
from these informants were thus much richer and more accurate 
compared to the focus group insights, which were gathered from one 
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TNE manager and an academic (although they were very experienced 
TNE practitioners). 
 
No. Role ID Experience Organisational 
Entity 
Area 
Private TNE 
A Strategic 
1 Strategic C2  11 Chancellery Central 
2 Strategic C11 Y 20 Chancellery Central 
3 Strategic C10 Y 12 Host country office Central 
B Managerial 
1 Managerial C1 Y 10 School of Communication Division 
2 Managerial C3  12 
Transnational Education 
Office 
Central 
3 Managerial C7 Y 10 Host country office Offshore 
4 Managerial C9 Y 9 Host country office Offshore 
C Academic 
1 Academic/Managerial C8 Y 9 Host country office Offshore 
2 Academic/Managerial C5 Y 5 School of Psychology Division 
3 Academic/Managerial C6 Y 18 School of Engineering Division 
4 Academic C4  11 School of Business Division 
 
Table 5.38   Profiles of University C Informants 
 
This section analyses the perspectives of University C staff with respect 
to TNE motivations, and possible theoretical reflectors driving TNE 
business delivery model decisions and TNE operational longevity. The 
analysis explores informants’ insights on the early years of the 
University’s TNE journey, the Country V TNE experiences that triggered 
the tipping point, the potentially reputation-wracking swap of offshore 
partners (OP) in Country X, and the University’s plans for the future. It 
will also scrutinise the University’s current TNE value chain activities and 
the influence of the operating environments on TNE business delivery 
model selection. 
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5.4.2.1 University C Criteria for TNE Business Delivery Model Selection 
 
CI10 argued that ‘University C has become a multinational’ and that ‘the 
next steps we’re thinking about in terms of our maturity in this space as 
an institution’ is to address the missing ‘governance framework that 
oversees all of transnational education … to tie everything together’. 
Using the Guimon eclectic paradigm construct for multinational 
universities (Section 2.6.5.3), the University’s motivations for TNE 
involvement were identified and tabulated as Table 5.39 below.  
 
University C’s priorities and approach to TNE involvement are observed 
to be strikingly different before and after its TNE tipping point (CF2). The 
TNE tipping point was represented by the university-wide TNE review 
that was triggered by a phenomenal growth of student enrolments at the 
VKP i-FP operation. The review resulted in the promulgation of new 
policies, processes and financial models, and the set up of the Country V 
HCO. The following discussion is based on observations summarised in 
Table 5.37. 
 
Early TNE operations were mostly focussed on teaching for profit. 
Informants reported that after its TNE tipping point, the University now 
has interests in seeing all three university roles (viz., teaching, research 
and community engagement) being undertaken in its TNE operations. 
 
5.4.2.1.1 Pre-tipping Point TNE Teaching Role 
 
The University started its TNE operations in the early 1990s. This was 
following the Dawkins revolution which liberalised university funding 
initiatives (Section 5.2.2.1.1). The liberalisation coincided with the 
starting of the first Australian TNEs in the SS region to satisfy pent-up 
demands (Section 2.1.2.4). University C was seen to be sporadic in its 
TNE involvement where ‘different schools or faculties were doing bits 
and pieces’ of TNE (CI10). These initiatives were described as 
 430 
‘opportunistic’ and ‘reactive’ (CI10), and even ‘experimental’ (CI4). CI6 
reported that ‘a lot of schools would get involved as a source of 
discretionary income’. The means to earn discretionary income was seen 
to be through delivering for-profit university programs of study in markets 
with pent-up demands, and where local host country resources were 
available to enable program delivery.  
 
Before the tipping point, the University’s TNE operations (viz., r-FP and 
ic-IBC) were all primarily teaching endeavours that were motivated by 
offshore TNE teaching royalty income (CI1, CI2, CI7) and by onshore 
international student fee income via host country branding and marketing 
presence (‘a good brand in Country V … we'll also get Country V 
students, or students from a wider area ... coming here (i.e., Australia) as 
international onshore, full-fee paying students and they're the ones who 
bring us significant amounts of money’ - CI5). These early TNE 
operations were aimed at growing TNE student enrolments and fee 
income (‘we wanted to grow’ VSM – CI2) through leveraging on the lower 
cost host country OP resources (CI2, CI6, CI11). An exception to the 
market, resource and efficiency motivations was the NCE r-FP operation 
which was described as ‘experimental’ (CI4). There was no indication of 
efficiency-seeking for teaching via cross-border entities.  
 
The University subsequently brought these decentralised TNE activities 
together for central planning and monitoring (CI3, CI10). This period 
coincided with the Nelson reforms of 2003, where the Australian 
government was of the view that ‘there was no case for increased public 
funds to expand the sector’ (Birrell and Edwards 2009, 5), confirming the 
reports from several informants that the University was adversely 
affected by government funding constraints (CI6, CI10) and decreasing 
domestic student enrolments (CI3). It was during this period that the 
University initiated two key TNE operations, viz., the VSM r-FP and XGI 
ic-IBC. VSM ran for about eleven years before termination, while XGI ran 
the full course of its ten-year contract (Table 5.69). Like previous TNE 
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operations, these were similarly driven by revenue through new market 
capture and delivered offshore largely through the agency of its OPs. 
Both OPs were known to be good partners with satisfactory resources 
and facilities for TNE delivery (CI1, CI3, CI6). There were however no 
cross-border entities to leverage for efficiency benefits (Table 5.37).  
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University 
Role 
Ref 
Tipping 
Point 
TNE 
Model 
TNE Motivations 
Market-seeking Resource-seeking Efficiency-seeking 
Teaching Pre r-FP Grow TNE 
enrolments for TNE 
income and build 
offshore branding for 
onshore enrolments 
and income 
Engage OP expertise 
and resources to 
reach more students 
at lower costs 
Not applicable 
Ic-IBC Grow TNE 
enrolments for TNE 
income and build 
offshore branding for 
onshore enrolments 
and income 
Engage OP expertise 
and resources to 
reach more students 
at lower costs 
Not applicable 
Post i-FP Grow TNE 
enrolments for TNE 
income and build 
offshore branding for 
both TNE and 
onshore enrolments 
and income 
Engage OP expertise 
and resources to 
reach more students 
at lower costs 
Leverage on OP 
efficiencies and HCO 
coordination 
Ic-IBC Grow TNE 
enrolments for TNE 
income and build 
offshore branding for 
both TNE and 
onshore enrolments 
and income 
Engage OP expertise 
and resources to 
reach more students 
at lower costs 
Leverage on OP 
efficiencies and HCO 
coordination 
Research Pre r-FP No activity identified No activity identified No activity identified 
Ic-IBC No activity identified No activity identified No activity identified 
Post i-FP Access research 
projects in host 
country and region 
Tap into government 
and private sector 
research funding, and 
collaborate with 
researchers in host 
country and region 
Leverage on the 
University’s existing 
international research 
networks, VKP OP 
marketing network and 
HCO coordination 
Ic-IBC New HCO in Country 
X to access research 
projects in host 
country and region 
New HCO in Country 
X to tap into 
government and 
private sector 
research funding, and 
collaborate with 
researchers in host 
country and region 
New Country X HCO to 
leverage on the 
University’s existing 
region AA research 
networks, XNV OP 
marketing network and 
HCO coordination 
Community 
Engage-
ment 
Pre r-FP No activity identified No activity identified No activity identified 
Ic-IBC No activity identified No activity identified No activity identified 
Post i-FP Expand University 
commercialisation 
and research in host 
country to contribute 
to host country and 
regional development 
Collaborate with host 
country entities and 
investors for 
commercialisation 
and capacity-building 
in host country and 
region 
Leverage on HCOs in 
different countries for 
efficiency 
Ic-IBC New Country X HCO 
to expand University 
commercialisation 
and research in host 
country to contribute 
to host country and 
regional development 
New Country X HCO 
to collaborate with 
host country entities 
and investors for 
commercialisation 
and capacity-building 
in host country and 
AA region 
Leverage on HCOs in 
different countries for 
efficiency 
Table 5.39   Criteria for University C TNE Models Across Its Three  
      Roles (adapted from Guimon 2016, 222) 
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5.4.2.1.2 Pre-tipping Point Research and Community Engagement Roles 
 
There was no evidence of research and community engagement activity 
undertaken by these early rudimentary TNE operations. It was however, 
interesting to note that unlike TNE, the University’s research presence in 
various countries (e.g., Countries O and R) did not result in better 
onshore enrolments of students from those countries (CI2). 
 
5.4.2.1.3 Post-tipping Point Teaching Role 
 
Post-tipping point, the University’s TNE approach was more strategic. In 
fact, the TNE review was undertaken to align with the University’s 2012-
2020 Strategic Plan (University C TNE Project Team 2013a, 3). As CF2 
alerted in the focus group, TNE contracts were scrutinised for alignment 
with the strategies and recommendations of the White Paper.  
 
After the TNE review, the University’s TNE teaching role was set to grow 
more aggressively. Its strategic plans call for inter alia, growth in both 
onshore and offshore international student enrolments (‘there are 
certainly plans and certainly … a desire to build (more TNE operations), 
and to increase TNE numbers’ – CI3). It has for instance, re-negotiated 
the VKP contract which enabled ‘growing our student base now (and) 
we’re getting a more equitable share of revenue’ (CI11). It also 
envisages ‘very big plans with the new Country X OP’ (CI6) under 
improved contractual terms (CI11), compared to the previous XGI OP 
contract (CI3). The modus operandi remains the same, viz., to leverage 
on its OP’s capabilities as CI11 explained, ‘we partner with infrastructure 
providers … they provide … all the infrastructure to deliver IP ... it’s the 
lower of risk modeling in terms of capital-intensive risk … for the 
University’.  
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The two new contracts enabled the University to leverage on two 
international providers with highly efficient TNE delivery infrastructure, 
effective marketing and international agent networks (CI4, CI10). The 
University’s HCOs in each of these Countries provide administrative, 
teaching and systems support to their respective OPs (CI3, CI7). The 
Country V HCO Dean also provided contract negotiation, new business 
development and leadership for the University’s global TNE operations 
(CI3, CI4).  
 
Offshore branding is a priority for the University as seen in the White 
Paper’s recommendation to engage an external marketing agency to 
‘enhance the appeal of its TNE offerings’, which will also benefit its 
Country V HCO’s onshore international student enrolment portfolio. 
 
CI10 is of the view that onshore enrolment growth is limited and the 
University needs to focus on offshore growth. The University was also  
reported to be planning for TNE operations in another five new countries. 
It is starting with a Country H market entry in 2019 (CI10).  
 
Its Country H entry to deliver post-graduate Business programs will be 
undertaken jointly with the VKP OP and leveraged on the OP’s ’local 
knowledge, the agent network ... their reputation ... (and) the efficiency of 
their model’ (CI10). In the future, the Country V HCO will take an active 
role in initiating and managing the University’s worldwide TNE operations 
(CI3, CI4, CI10), thus improving TNE operational efficiency. 
 
5.4.2.1.4 Post-tipping Point Research and Community Engagement 
Roles 
 
After its TNE tipping point, the University was able to extend its TNE 
scope of business beyond its teaching role to undertake research and 
community engagement, starting with its Country V TNE operation. CI10 
asserted that ‘it does distinguish I think a university where it has other 
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locations where it delivers its programs, where it has research offshore, 
where it has engagement, it has alumni that is global ... they’re really 
points of distinction’ (CI10). 
 
The University was able to fund a research centre (SCORE) within its 
Country V HCO from royalty income earned from its VKP operation 
(‘good gross margin … that’s seeded the research centre’ - CI2; ‘diversify 
the University’s interests … our research centre’ – CI10). All VKP HCO 
teaching staff have research responsibilities built into their employment, 
enabled by a two-trimester teaching/one-trimester research schedule 
(CI9). While SCORE’s research projects are also supported by host 
country researchers (CI4) and home campus faculty (CI5), there is no 
imposition of research on the OP or its teaching staff, many of whom are 
part-timers (CI11).  
 
SCORE has been reported to have successfully sourced funds from both 
Country V government and private sector organisations, and developed a 
growing reputation in Country V (CI4). The University is looking forward 
to replicating the SCORE research centre at the new Country X HCO 
(CI11) through leveraging on its own ‘great coverage with some really 
good universities across the continent’ and synergies with the XNV OP 
which has a ‘good record, good grounding in region AA’ (CI2). It is also 
considering extending its research activities to countries around its TNE 
delivery centres (‘opportunities for research … connect with the country 
and partners we’re looking to work with’ – CI11). 
 
The income generated by the VKP operations also spawned 
commercialisation initiatives, one of which secured venture capital 
funding (CI10). These ventures are similarly targeted for roll-out in new 
TNE countries in the hope that they can ‘add quality back into that 
community and the government in that part of the market’ (CI11). CI10 
added the aspiration of ‘nation building, capacity building … if we can do 
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some good, and if we can do it in a commercially savvy way that’s 
sustainable economically, then I think, why not?’. 
 
5.4.2.2 Longevity of University C TNE Operations 
 
The age of each of the University’s six main TNE operations were 
tracked with respect to three key dates, viz., the AUQA Cycle 2 audits in 
2008, the University’s re-registration with TEQSA in 2012 and the 
University’s TNE tipping point (Table 5.40). These TNE operations 
include the TKD, NCE and VSM r-FPs, the VKP r-FP that became an i-
FP, the XGI ic-IBC and the XNV ic-IBC. At the time of the interviews, only 
VKP remained and XNV had just commenced. See table below. 
 
The 2008 introduction of the internationalisation theme in AUQA Cycle 2 
audits is a watershed year that affected all universities that had TNE 
operations. But it did not seem to have any impact on the University’s 
TNE operations. That year saw the commencement of two new TNE 
operations, viz., VKP and XGI. 
 
The 2012 TEQSA re-registration was another watershed event for 
University C. It is observed that NCE was terminated just before the start 
of the University’s TEQSA re-registration. 
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1 TKD                r-FP        X      
2 NCE                    r-FP  X        
3 VSM                        r-FP   X   
4 VKP                       r-FP i-FP 
5 XGI                           ic-IBC    X 
6 XNV                              ic-IBC  
Legends X Year of termination of TNE operation 2000 AUQA Cycle 1 audits commence 
  r-FP Franchised operation with remote oversight 2008 AUQA Cycle 2 audits commence 
  i-FP Franchised operation with in situ oversight 2012 Start of TEQSA operations 
  ic-IBC Collaborative international branch campus 2013 Tipping point year when TNE review was  
   with in situ oversight    initiated and Country V HCO set up 
Table 5.40   Duration of University C TNE Operations 
 
The 2013 tipping point was significant because the University took a 
proactive decision to review its TNE operations, with a view to setting up 
a robust TNE infrastructure to enable high quality TNE operations that 
are financially sound. CF2 reported that the University would review all 
TNE operations that did not align with the new White Paper strategies. 
Interestingly, TKD was terminated in the year the TNE review was 
conducted. Further, CI6 did allude to the high resource requirements at 
VKP that restricted the University’s commitment to TKD. 
 
The durations of the University’s terminated TNE operations were 
investigated through the lens of Falck’s age-related firm liabilities 
(Section 2.7.4.4), identifying the reasons for failure at the four stages of a 
business lifecycle, viz., newness, adolescence, obsolescence and 
senescence. The remaining TNE operations were also analysed for their 
potential for failure. 
 
All the University’s terminated TNE operations lasted beyond the three-
year business survival age as well as the five-year business longevity 
age (Section 2.7.4.3). A possible exception to the financial sustainability 
of its apparently long-run TNE operations is XGI, where its ten-year 
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operation was reported to be unsustainable financially (‘we certainly 
didn’t generate enough profit to sustain’ - CI2). 
 
No. TNE 
Operation 
Age-related Liability Informant Perspective 
1 TKD Obsolescence due to 
value propositions 
University college status restricted 
TNE participation (CI2, CI6) 
2 NCE Failure from 
adolescence due to 
rejection by supplier 
Quality control issues (CI2, CI4) 
3 VSM Obsolescence due to 
management strategies 
Change in management; loss of focus 
(CI3) 
4 XGI Failure from 
adolescence due to 
rejection by students 
Unable to grow (CI2, CI6) 
5 VKP1 Obsolescence due to 
value propositions 
Set up of HCO and increased control 
over academic processes (CI1, CI2) 
6 VKP2 Potential failure from 
obsolescence due to 
value propositions 
Danger of levelling of pricing, program 
duration and ranking advantages (CI6, 
CI7, CI10) 
7 XNV Potential failure from 
newness due to uncom-
petitiveness 
Danger of inability to attract sufficient 
number of enrolments due to 
competition (CI3, CI11) 
8 HKP Potential failure from 
newness due to uncom-
petitiveness 
Danger of inability to attract sufficient 
number of enrolments due to mis-
pricing (CI10) 
 
Table 5.41   Age-related TNE Liabilities for University C TNE  
     Operations 
 
While the University’s Business programs at TKD had a long run of 
twelve years, its IT programs did not last beyond three years due to poor 
growth of student numbers (CI6). The reason for TKD’s termination was 
reported by CI6 to be due to insufficient number of students. However, 
CI2 who is a senior staff with strategic responsibility ascribed the failure 
to the TKD OP having been upgraded to a university college. Under 
Falck’s lens, TKD was identified to have suffered failure at obsolescence 
arising from a change in the OP’s value proposition represented by the 
elevation of its status to university college. After termination, the teachout 
process took an unusually long five years to complete (CI2). In the case 
of NCE, it was observed to have been terminated in adolescence by the 
University due to quality control issues.  
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After delivering the University’s TNE programs for eleven years, VSM 
failed at obsolescence through a loss of focus of the OP resulting from a 
change in its management. XGI operated for ten years before being 
terminated in adolescence by the University for its inability to grow its 
student enrolments.  
 
While XNV was too new for performance assessment, CI6 expressed 
doubts for its survival, saying ‘I don’t believe it covers the costs ... I fail to 
see how classes with so few students can be profitable’. However, CI11 
commented that ‘at this stage, I don't think we can judge the benefits of 
being in Country X for University C, fully ... I think in 25 years time we 
might or 20 years time, maybe even in ten years when we’ve been there 
20 years … (because) if you looked at some of the others that have been 
there 20 years, they … (have) very much more substantial numbers ... 
play a greater role in the community, or in business … have got a higher 
profile, and they’ve got their own campuses’.  
 
The VKP partnership had its initial five-year contract renewed once 
before the recent ten-year contract was signed (CI10). It was however 
observed to be in danger of obsolescence because of the levelling of its 
pricing, program duration (CI2) and ranking advantages (CI7). 
 
CI10 expressed some reservations about the pricing of the new Country 
H TNE post-graduate program that is scheduled for launch in 2019 with 
the VKP OP (HKP). There were concerns that students in Country H, an 
emerging economy might not be able to afford the Country V pricing level 
that was proposed. 
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5.4.2.3 Analysis of University C Reflectors of the Theories of the Firm 
 
The reflectors analysed for University C will follow the propositional 
framework of Table 4.12, and compared against a priori expectations 
formulated in Section 5.1.2. 
 
The sections below will quote from selected informants to demonstrate 
key points of the analysis. Other supporting perspectives will be 
incorporated in the tables summarising all the perspectives observed. 
These tables distinguish perspectives expressed on the Direct and 
Outsourced Models, as well as separate out perspectives of informants 
with different TNE roles (viz., strategic, managerial and academic). The 
latter distinction provides a framework to separate perspectives that 
reflect the University community from mere conjectures. Reference is 
also made to focus group observations for data triangulation, especially 
for value chain activities which were very detailed.  
 
5.4.2.3.1 Transaction Cost Economics 
 
This section will analyse the interview data for evidence of support for, or 
disconfirming evidence of the theoretical propositions for TCE at 
University C’s TNE operations. 
 
a) Asset Specificity 
 
Both the University and its OPs were seen to have invested in TNE-
specific assets. While there were several common TNE-specific assets, 
there were also a few unique ones associated with specific TNE 
operations. The analysis considered asset specificity that was observed 
both before and after the University’s TNE tipping point. The interviews 
focussed on the pre-tipping point TKD, NCE and XGI operations, and the 
post-tipping point VKP and XNV operations. 
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Although there were a large number of TNE-specific assets deployed 
both before and after the University’s TNE tipping point, not all TNE-
specific assets can be considered investment-specific in the TCE sense. 
 
(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
It was evident that the University’s pre-tipping point TNE operations 
deployed many TNE-specific assets, e.g., intellectual property (IP) and 
materials (CI1), staff specialised in TNE administration (CI3), teachout 
infrastructure (CI2, CI3, CI4), the University’s out-of-load teaching staff 
(CI6, CI10), and University reputation (CI2, CI5).  
 
The OPs were responsible for investing in campus infrastructure (CI1, 
CI6), dedicated studios and equipment (CI2), and teaching staff (CI1). 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) CI2 XGI film and media infrastructure 
XGI ‘failed’ on-site Deans  
TKD teachout is specialised 
NCE teachout is very expensive 
b) CI10  GEN out-of-load teaching staff 
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 XGI OP wanted Uni IP 
XGI OP infrastructure debt 
XGI full-time OP core teaching staff 
XGI Dean and admin staff 
XGI Uni reputation 
 
b) CI3 XGI Deans institutionalised 
XGI poor Uni TNE management 
XGI Uni reputation 
VSM on-site Principal 
3 Academic Role 
a) CI6 XGI OP infrastructure provider TKD education institution campus 
b) CI4  VSM out-of-load Accounting staff  
Abbreviations :   Uni – University; GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.42   University C Informant Perspectives on TNE-specific  
Assets (Pre-tipping Point) 
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
After the University’s TNE tipping point, the University was observed to 
have engaged the Direct Model exclusively, i.e., the i-FP at VKP and the 
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ic-IBC at XNV. The University invested in all of the pre-tipping point 
assets, except the out-of-load teaching staff which were phased out. 
Additionally, the University invested in a host country office (HCO) in 
Country V (CI10), with full-time academic staff (CI5), learning support 
staff (CI3) and a research centre (CI2). It also provides teacher training 
and alumni support (CI7, CI9). This was corroborated by the University C 
focus group participants (CF1, CF2). At the time of the interviews, the 
University was planning to expand the small office in the XNV operation 
into a HCO (CI11) and employing full-time program coordinators who 
would function like the Country V HCO full-time academic staff (CI3). 
This XNV HCO is expected to provide a regional academic presence 
(CI4). 
 
Its home campus University TNE Office (UTO) is a key coordinator 
between the schools and the OPs (CI3), while its alumni office actively 
supports Country V alumni (CI7, CF2). The schools also employ 
specialist TNE staff to administer TNE programs (CI5, CI6). 
 
The OPs invested in the campus infrastructure (CI2, CI6, CI9), marketing 
expertise (CI3, CI5, CI6, CF2), recruitment agent networks (CI2, CI10, 
CF2), brand equity (for itself as well as the University’s) (CI2, CI4), 
program management team, lecturer management team, examination 
management team (CI3, CI5), and host country regulatory compliance 
expertise (CI7). They are also the holders of the TNE operating licence in 
each country (CI3, CI10), and are valued for their local knowledge of the 
host country operating environment (CI2, CI5). 
 
A detailed scrutiny of the pre-tipping point and post-tipping point TNE-
specific assets indicate that almost all of them are replicable and can be 
re-deployed if the TNE operation ceases, as has been demonstrated in 
the swapping of OPs in Country X (Section App J 3.0). These assets 
include teaching staff, specialist administrators and campus facilities. 
This observation is also made by CI10 when he remarked that while 
 443 
‘certainly they (i.e., the OP) probably value the IP, … they've got other 
university partners that offer business degrees ... there's nothing 
particularly novel about that’ (CI10). Similarly, CI8 commented that the 
OP ‘does not ever put all the eggs in one basket – you see all the 
schools they have, all the universities – and last year they made another  
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced 
Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) WP GEN Full-time Uni academic staff at TNE location 
GEN Full-time Uni learning support staff at TNE location 
GEN Uni teacher training at TNE location 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI2 VKP OP extensive agent network 
VKP Uni’s flexible curriculum 
VKP OP local knowledge, reputation and brand, efficient TNE    
   administration model and contemporary campus 
VKP teaching seeded HCO research centre 
XNV new premises 
XNV OP has proven track record 
c) CI10 VKP HCO boots on the ground 
VKP OP value Uni IP, but IP not particularly novel 
VKP OP holds licence of TNE operation 
XNV OP very experienced, good agent network 
d) CI11 XNV HCO helmed by Dean 
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 VKP HCO minimise compliance risk 
VKP curriculum change led to dip in student numbers 
VKP HCO greater cost but more secure 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI3 VKP Uni UTO coordination 
VKP HCO control and oversight 
VKP OP marketing machine 
VKP two-year completion of three-year degree 
VKP OP’s proprietary vehicle 
XNV OP holds licence of TNE operation 
XNV HCO new program coordinators 
XNV previous OP recruiting for new OP 
c) CI7 VKP HCO headed by a Dean 
VKP Uni home campus alumni office support 
VKP HCO support for alumni 
VKP OP’s regulatory compliance 
 CI9 VKP HCO support for alumni 
VKP OP’s classroom scheduling IT system 
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4 VKP OP investment in University brand and reputation 
XNV HCO regional academic presence 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI5 VKP OP sales management, program management, lecturer  
   management and exam management teams 
VKP Uni schools’ specialist TNE administrators 
XNV OP teaching staff local knowledge 
c) CI6 VKP Uni’s IP, quality assurance, student admin system 
VKP OP’s premises and facilities, marketing 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;    WP – White Paper;  GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.43   University C Informant Perspectives on TNE-specific  
Assets (Post-tipping Point) 
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agreement with, I don’t know which Australian university, for engineering 
– they now have a university for nursing, they are I think, diverging, 
diversifying so that if one is eliminated, they will still have the … numbers 
... when the star is dying out, you know, there will be others that are 
already there, but merging and getting bigger’. 
 
An exception to the replicability and redeployability of these assets is the 
University’s brand equity and host country operating licence, which are 
invested by the OPs (CI3, CI4, CI10). The investment-specific nature of 
these assets had been demonstrated in the near-termination of the 
University’s Country X TNE operation, where the partners almost invoked 
the ire of the host country regulator and risked serious reputational 
damage (‘unhappy with both parties … it caused some level of concern 
among Australian circles as well; this was the way the Regulator viewed 
it ... it was ‘can we trust Australian institutions?’ … they might have had a 
flow-on effect there ... it looked bad for the University to pull out after 
making commitments to the city - in the Regulator’s view … they take a 
long view of it obviously’ - CI1). 
 
On the possibility of a VKP termination, CI10 mused that ‘we really 
depend upon each other quite a lot … it's almost a situation where there 
would be mutually-assured destruction if either one of us pulled out of the 
relationship ... although you know, I think that the Country V OP will 
probably continue on without us, and we probably continue without them 
... but it is acknowledged I think by both sides that it is a relationship that 
works for both parties’. The HCO, which represents the sum of many 
TNE-specific assets demonstrates the University’s concern over the OP’s 
hold-up potential (‘they (i.e., the VKP OP) know when to say no, pack 
their briefcases and walk away from the table … they attempted to do so’ 
– CI4). 
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The analysis provides evidence that the pre-tipping point TNE operations 
incurred less investment-specific assets. All the University’s TNE 
terminations were of operations started before the tipping point. The pre-
tipping point XGI OP was also replaced by the new XNV OP, with a view 
to seeing more students enrolled in the future. In fact, the University 
encountered a minor hold-up by the XGI OP during the seven-month 
transition between XGI and XNV, due to the XGI OP’s control of the TNE 
infrastructure brand association. On the other hand, post-tipping point 
operations were highly committed in investment-specific assets, where 
there would be ‘mutually-assured destruction’ if either partner pulls out of 
the operation (CI10). Although displaying high TNE asset investments, 
the termination of XGI did not result in major losses by either partner 
because the operation was small (about 500 – 600 students, compared 
to 6,000 students at VKP) and these assets could be re-deployed to 
service the OP’s new university partner. 
 
b) Behavioural Uncertainty 
 
This section explores the University’s efforts in assessing the credibility 
of potential OPs and in monitoring OP performance in complying with 
University and regulatory requirements (CI1). The compliance required 
the TNE operation to ensure comparability of student experience across 
all campuses ‘in enrolments, … assessment of students, quality of 
student feedback, completions, retention, all of the same variables that 
we require through TEQSA’ (CI2). 
 
(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
The University’s pre-tipping point TNE history had been peppered with 
individual schools’ collaborations with ‘small companies’ (CI4), many of 
which do not have experience in running education institutions (CI1, CI3, 
CI4, CI10). Many potential OPs were known to have proferred over-
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inflated promises of student and financial projections (CI4), which were 
not backed up with proper due diligence (CI2). 
 
The University responded to the schools’ poor OP choices by centralizing 
its due diligence processes at senior executives’ level (CI3), and 
tightening it up by considering ‘everything from emerging markets, 
sovereign risks, alignment to our strategic goals … and … how does our 
brand, product, if you like … connect with the country and partners we’re 
looking to work with’ (CI11). 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) CI2 XGI failed Deans 
XGI OP not done market research 
NCE OP unclear assessment 
 
b) CI10 VSC OP secondary business  
c) CI11 GEN Uni exhaustive due diligence  
   on OP 
GEN TEQSA’s requirements 
 
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 XGI OP no educational experience 
XGI OP follow strict rule 
XGI OP another entity for new TNE 
GEN comparable experience 
VSM OP an industry association 
 
b) CI3 XGI Uni poor monitoring and control 
XGI OP do not know education 
XGI Uni program coordinator control 
VSM OP management and direction   
   change; not focussed 
VSM Uni on-site Principal to oversee  
   academic delivery, but  
   institutionalised by being at OP 
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4 XGI OP no academic background 
XGI OP over-inflated promises 
NCE OP quality concerns 
NCE Uni fly-in-fly-out required 
b) CI6  TKD OP became university college 
GEN setting up with small companies 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.44   University C Informant Perspectives on Behavioural  
Uncertainty (Pre-tipping Point) 
 
The University’s pre-tipping point TNE experience included unclear 
student assessment methods, quality delivery concerns at the OP (CI2), 
holding the University to ‘the strict rule of the contract’ during the 
transition of OPs at Country X (CI1), and a termination resulting from the 
upgrading of an OP to university college status (CI6). These concerns 
arose out of the OP pushing against established standards, the lax 
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University control of academic processes (CI3), change of OP 
circumstances (CI3, CI6) and possibly poorly constructed contracts (CI4).  
 
Focus group discussions also identified the VSM OP’s insistence on 
‘block teaching’ and the variability of University-OP staff interactions as 
impacting the quality of TNE delivery (Section 4.4.1.3.1e). 
 
To address these concerns, the University appointed Principals at the 
OP delivery locations to monitor OP behaviour (CI2, CI3). However, a 
number of these Principals failed as they were compromised by being 
institutionalised by the OPs (CI3). 
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
During the tipping point, the University resorted to the set up of a HCO in 
Country V, headed by a Dean (CI7). It employed full-time academics who 
had responsibilities for teaching students, coaching OP teaching staff 
and conducting research (CI4). The University also re-negotiated its VKP 
contract, resulting in better academic processes and financial benefits 
(CI2, CI10). Its choice of the VKP OP over the VSM OP was due to the 
VKP OP’s size, brand, resources, marketing network, local knowledge 
and TNE administration efficiency, capabilities that the University lacked 
(CI1, CI10). 
 
The HCO at VKP provided the University with ‘a lot more control and 
oversight of our whole operation’ (CI3), ‘better understanding about how 
we should work together’ and the ability to remind the OP to comply with 
agreed protocols (CI10). In fact, ‘everything is still governed by University 
C, not by the OP ... they only help us to facilitate, provide the premises, 
undertake marketing ... but still overall controlled by University C’ (CI7). 
 
There were musings on the lack of University staff travel to get to know 
‘how the campus works there, … how the teaching gets done, … what 
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the rooms are like ... and if you have not met that group of students, 
again it’s just a list of names in a class list ... and until you get to actually 
sit down and talk to the academics in Country V, again there is a 
temptation … to not take them seriously’ (CI6), and being distant from 
the students (CI4). CI6 also reported that liaison with OP teaching staff 
was conducted with great difficulty via ‘email, skype and so on’. 
However, CI6 admitted that the previous fly-in-fly-out mode of teaching 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced 
Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) CI2 XNV Uni and OP scrutinised closely by Regulator after swap 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI10 VKP OP need reminder on protocols 
VKP HCO better understanding now between OP and Uni 
VKP OP capabilities that Uni lack 
VKP 10-year contract reflect confidence of both partners 
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 VKP OP was big, with greater resources and marketing 
network 
VKP HCO involved Uni more 
VKP HCO more control over admissions which was a bit loose 
VKP Uni unit coordinator talk to OP teaching staff directly 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI3 VKP HCO a lot more control and oversight of whole operation 
c) CI7 VKP OP overall controlled by Uni 
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4 GEN Uni-OP time needed to build up trust 
VKP OP teaching staff with lower turnover in past 3-4 years 
VKP OP attempted to walk out of contract re-negotiation 
VKP OP’s multiple university partners a risk diversification 
XNV HCO Dean located at OP, unlike VKP HCO 
No 
outsourced 
model b) CI5 VKP OP classroom size limitation 
c) CI6 GEN fly-in-fly-out needed to understand how campus works 
GEN academic liaison – done with great difficulty 
VKP OP risk of OP sales team bias 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University; GEN – generic comments  
 
Table 5.45   University C Informant Perspectives on Behavioural  
Uncertainty (Post-tipping Point) 
 
and support was not scalable, and ‘think the models now are far more 
pragmatic and that changed because they had to change to actually 
make things work ... because I don’t think that we could do it the way we 
used to do’. These concerns are partially addressed by having University 
appointed full-time academic staff at the HCO. CI4 further reported that 
in the last 3 – 4 years, the turnover of VKP OP teaching staff had 
improved to about 10 per cent only, and that a lot of time was required to 
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build up trust between the University’s unit coordinators and the OP’s 
teaching staff to produce the academic consistency required of the 
University. 
 
CI4 raised the issue of conflict of interest in working with an OP that also 
delivers programs of other universities. However, these concerns which 
CI4 thinks the University is not worried about, are probably mitigated by 
VKP’s size, i.e., that ‘the OP has come to the realisation I think, over the 
last few years, that they need the University maybe more than the 
University needs them ... (since) we’re their biggest partner ... we must 
be making the most money for them’ (CI3). 
 
The success of the VKP HCO motivated the University to replicate it in 
Country X, and includes the appointment of program coordinators who 
function as unit coordinators (CI3). However, CI4 noted that the XNV 
HCO Dean was located within the OP’s office, a practice that the 
University avoided in Country V because of the institutionalisation of 
previous Deans by the OPs. 
 
CI4 reported that the VKP OP almost walked away from the contract 
renewal negotiations despite the long collaboration, while CI10 intimated 
that the University did contemplate going it alone - indicating a 
commercially-focussed relationship between the University and the OP. 
The negotiations were ‘exhausting’ and ‘complex’, but ‘both parties saw 
the future potential ... and I think when both parties did their financial 
modelling … (and) when we both … looked at the total value of the 
partnership, it was quite striking for both parties over the ten-year period’ 
(CI10). The partners concluded the negotiations with a ten-year renewed 
agreement which ‘says a lot about the confidence on both sides’ (CI10). 
 
Concerns were expressed by CI4 about the risk diversification strategy of 
the VKP OP in delivering multiple university partner programs having 
potential conflicts of interest, while CI6 pointed out that there is a 
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possibility of bias in the recruitment of students by the OP for multiple 
partner universities. These concerns, together with the contract re-
negotiation exercise potentially reflect a lack of trust in the relationship.   
 
The pre-tipping point TNE operations exhibited a lot of uncertainties with 
respect to OP behaviour, mainly because of the lack of on-site 
monitoring but also due to less mature TNE administration infrastructure 
operating within a University TNE environment driven by individual 
schools. Post-tipping point, the University’s new policy of establishing a 
HCO in both its TNE operations has helped it closely monitor and control 
OP behaviour. Its White Paper strategies also established clear policies 
to circumscribe OP behaviour. These measures have not reduced the 
potential for OP behavioural uncertainty, but merely act as brakes on 
such behaviours as evidenced in CI10’s remark that ‘occasionally we get 
a bit muddled up by our partner ... we have to remind them that there're 
certain protocols that need to be followed and just keep everyone on the 
same page’. CI6 also worries about the potential for the VKP OP sales 
team’s bias, while CI4 was concerned about the VKP OP’s conflicting 
interests in managing multiple university partners. 
 
c) Transaction Frequency 
 
The focus group study pointed to TNE operations that involved very high 
frequency transactions, servicing about 6,000 students through the 
efforts of 73 University unit coordinators and a pool of 144 OP teaching 
staff (Section 4.4.1.3.1g). The interviews demonstrated the high 
frequency and complexities of TNE at University C in more detail. 
 
(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
The University’s pre-tipping point TNE models engaged more fly-in-fly-
out University teaching staff, but were thin on compliance processes, 
compared to post-tipping models. The TNE terminations were also cause 
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for concern because of the obligation for the University to see all 
students through their program of study; this was clearly demonstrated in 
the long teachout at TKD (CI2). 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) CI2  TKD dual mode teaching 
TKD long teachout duration 
NCE costly fly-in-fly-out mode 
b) CI10  VSN fly-in-fly-out mode 
VSC fly-in-fly-out mode 
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI7  VSM-VKP replication of resources 
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4  VSM MBA joint delivery was less  
   demanding for Uni 
b) CI6  TKD Uni resources occupied at VKP 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University; GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.46   University C Informant Perspectives on Transaction  
Frequency (Pre-tipping Point) 
 
The resource demand on the University at VKP was so high that it had to 
reduce its support for TKD in preference for VKP which was growing 
rapidly (CI6). The University also discontinued VSM to focus on VKP 
(CI7). As the University considered reducing its offshore TNE resource 
commitments, it trialled the joint delivery teaching mode, where the 
University and the OP shared teaching resources (CI4). This was still 
considered high cost and of questionable quality (CI6).  
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
The University’s tipping point marked its shift towards higher compliance 
as seen in the White Paper’s insistence on establishing ‘non-negotiable 
minima’ in TNE delivery in line with TEQSA requirements (University C 
TNE Project Team 2013a). This shift resulted in re-negotiated contracts 
that were legally ‘quite extensive’ (CI4), more thorough in due diligence 
(CI11), and involved a re-organisation of its TNE management 
infrastructure (among its HCO, UTO and schools) (CI3). The fly-in-fly-out 
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teaching model was also replaced by a combination of full-time on-site 
University teaching staff and OP teaching staff (CI4, CI5, CI6). 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced 
Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) CI2 GEN new contracts quite extensive 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI10 VKP three-piece TNE management seems to work 
VKP HCO research and commercialisation 
VKP HCO participation in community engagement 
c) CI11 GEN thorough TNE due diligence  
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 GEN all ic-IBCs have academic boards 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI3 VKP annual contract review 
GEN multiple study periods always a challenge 
GEN Uni UTO to work with all 8 schools 
GEN TNE a lot of complexities and challenges 
GEN use blended learning to reduce student contact hours 
c) CI7 VKP HCO offer letters within 24 hours 
VKP HCO enter enrolments three times a year 
VKP OP lecturer management team distributes unit guides  
   each trimester 
GEN Uni UTO informs unit coordinators to prepare materials 4  
   weeks before each study period 
d) CI9 VKP OP thrice-yearly enrolment projections for 88 classrooms  
   in 2 campuses across multiple university programs are a lot  
   of work and a ‘headache’ 
 VKP OP sales administration to cope with large student  
   volume 
VKP OP issue mandated DQF student contracts 
VKP OP collect all fees 
VKP HCO encumber students who have not paid fees 
VKP OP conducts orientation for about 800 new students each  
   trimester 
VKP HCO enter about 10,000 enrolments each trimester 
VKP HCO holds supplementary exams 
VKP OP hold two graduations per year for about 1,000  
   students each 
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4 GEN OP teaching staff vetted and approved by unit 
coordinators 
GEN comparability monitoring is a lot of work 
GEN 3-part moderation process 
GEN Uni and OP student surveys 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI5 VKP OP teams to handle admissions, enrolments, program  
   management, lecturer management, exam management 
VKP Uni UBS has large number of students 
VKP HCO ‘don’t know how CI7 does it’ (i.e., key in enrolments) 
VKP daily liaison with OP teaching staff 
GEN shift of workload from UTO to the schools 
GEN Uni staff never get a break from multiple study periods 
c) CI6 GEN previous fly-in-fly-out mode not scalable due to large TNE  
   cohorts 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University; GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.47   University C Informant Perspectives on Transaction  
Frequency (Post-tipping Point) 
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The set up of the University’s three-piece TNE management 
infrastructure at VKP incorporating the HCO, UTO and OP (CI10) was in 
recognition of the size of the operation, processing about 10,000 
enrolments per trimester (CI9), and making up about one-third of the 
University’s student body) (University C TNE Project Team 2013a). It 
also addressed the acknowledged ‘complexities and challenges’ of TNE 
delivery (CI3), which encompass student recruitment, student enrolment, 
orientation, fee collection and encumberance, teaching, distribution of 
study materials, assessment, student support, facilities planning, quality 
assurance, regulatory compliance and graduations (Table 5.49). 
 
Due to the large student cohorts at VKP, the OP has had to set up teams 
to manage marketing, admissions, program administration, lecturer 
administration, student support, examinations and graduations (CI5). The 
OP had to project facilities utilisation for about 88 classrooms across two 
campuses each trimester (CI9). 
 
The infrastructure put in place by the University and the OP with respect 
to VKP were however not able to ease the tight assessment turn arounds 
of the trimester delivery model (CI5), although blended learning provided 
some relief (CI3). In fact, CI5 reported that CI5 needed to be in 
communication with CI7 almost on a daily basis. 
 
The income from the VKP operation ‘seeded the research centre’ 
SCORE within the HCO, providing the University with a platform to 
conduct research and community engagement (e.g., the 
commercialisation spin-off mentioned by CI10) in Country V and the 
region (CI2). The introduction of research and community engagement to 
the HCO’s portfolio added more TNE transactions to the already high 
volume TNE operations at VKP. 
 
It can be concluded that TNE transactions were frequent in pre-tipping 
point TNE operations, but became even more frequent post-tipping with 
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the imposition of tighter quality standards, and the need to address a 
rapidly growing TNE student population and the University’s offshore 
research aspirations. 
 
d) Business and Legal-political Uncertainty 
 
The aim of the analysis of the business and legal-political operating 
environment is to ascertain if the University incurred transaction costs in 
adapting to its operating environment, and if there are differences in the 
adaptation before and after its TNE tipping point (Rindfleisch and Heide 
1997, 46). The analysis focussed on the two largest pre-tipping point 
TNE operations in Countries V and X. 
 
(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
During the negotiations leading to the start up of XGI, the economy in 
Country X was ‘flourishing’ and ‘we were in some way, like many 
organisations, buoyed or seduced even, to go to … Country X’, although 
‘it was not part of … the University’s strategic plan’ (CI1). The University 
also went along with the OP’s recommendation to start the TNE 
operation with ‘media and film’ programs, instead of the more popular 
business programs – a strategy that turned out to be poorly conceived 
and led to low student enrolments (CI2). CI2 explained that ‘they (i.e., the 
OP) hadn’t done the market intelligence … as well as they should have 
because it’s an expensive start-up and it’s more expensive to deliver 
(Communication programs) than Business (programs)’. Similarly, CI1 
commented that ‘we (i.e., the University) just didn’t do any research on 
this ... I presume that they proposed something interesting  … you’ve got 
to understand this was 2007,  before the … global financial crisis’. These 
early approaches to TNE initiatives were described as ‘often quite 
opportunistic, a bit reactive’ (CI10). 
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No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) CI2 XGI incredibly competitive environ- 
   ment 
XGI affected by financial crisis 
XGI mistake in curriculum offerings 
XGI Regulator very concerned; Uni  
  and OP scrutinised closely 
thereafter 
XGI-XNV transition delayed by legal 
   requirements 
XGI country X risk higher than in V 
XGI paucity of free speech 
NCE language issue 
b) CI10 GEN opportunistic and reactive  
   approach 
 
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 XGI economy flourishing 
XGI Uni destroyed trust through  
   reversal 
XGI OP followed strict rule of  
   contract 
 
b) CI3 XGI Regulator frown on reversals 
XGI market rumours on termination 
XGI higher risk at transition of OPs 
XGI Uni back in Regulator’s good 
   books 
VSM Uni tried all sorts of things to help 
   OP succeed, including on-site  
   Principal 
VSM teachout students transferred to  
   VKP 
VSM affected by VKP’s growth 
VSM on-site Principal institutionalised 
c) CI7  VSM Uni introduced exactly the same 
   programs at VKP 
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4 XGI mindful of cultural and religious  
   background of jurisdiction 
VSM Accounting requirement for Uni 
   teaching staff 
b) CI5 XGI Uni ‘lean on’ OP teaching staff  
   for local sensitivities 
 
c) CI6 XGI careful of lecture recordings VSM market disappeared due to move  
   to the suburbs 
TKD insufficient students; university 
   college upgrade 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University; GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.48   University C Informant Perspectives on Business and  
Legal-political Uncertainty (Pre-tipping Point) 
 
The XGI operation later encountered the global financial crisis which 
adversely affected Country X and led to an ‘incredibly competitive 
environment in 2009 … (where) a prominent American public university 
had just closed down and that was very significant’ (CI2). The partners 
tried to salvage the operation by introducing business programs, and ‘we 
worked relatively cooperatively I think for six, seven, eight years but the 
last few years became difficult when we wanted to grow’ (CI2). On the  
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part of the OP, they ‘did try very hard, but I’m sure they lost money, and 
we certainly didn’t generate enough profit to sustain’ (CI2). 
 
The decision to terminate XGI was met with concern by the Country X 
Regulator, which scrutinised the University more closely thereafter (CI2). 
The University’s subsequent decision to re-start its TNE operation with 
another OP encountered negative market perception, delays in 
transitioning caused by the previous OP’s insistence on the ‘strict rule of 
the contract’, and higher risk resulting from the continued participation of 
the previous OP in marketing during the transition (CI3). The University 
and the new OP had to just sit out the transition, ‘can’t do anything just at 
the moment’ and not even ‘employing anybody’ (CI1). However, the 
University and its new OP started to make plans for infrastructure and 
teaching resources, and initiated discussions with the Regulator. These 
initiatives brought the University back into the Regulator’s ‘good books’ 
(CI3). Interestingly, CI1 asserted that the University destroyed the trust 
that was built up with the previous OP. 
 
Staff of the University had reservations about the paucity of free speech 
in Country X (CI2), resulting in concerns about the suitability of lecture 
recordings (CI6) and the need to be mindful of cultural and religious 
sensitivities (CI4). CI5 reported that the OP teaching staff were relied on 
for advice on the appropriateness of study materials within that 
jurisdiction. 
 
The University collaborated with the VSM OP for about 12 years before 
terminating the operation because of declining student numbers (CI1). 
CI3 explained that the VSM OP, an industry association, later had a 
change of management and lost focus. It’s market ‘disappeared almost 
overnight’ as a result of a move from the CBD to the suburbs (CI6). 
VSM’s performance was also adversely affected by the University’s 
appointment of another OP to operate its VKP programs in the same city, 
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howbeit delivering different programs initially (CI3). The University later 
duplicated its VSM programs at VKP, intensifying the competition (CI7). 
 
In attempting to help VSM to grow its student enrolment, the University 
‘did all sorts of things together … we held their hand and we tried’, and 
even employed an on-site Principal (CI3). It however failed to grow the 
student numbers and led to its termination. Fortunately for the University, 
the teachout for VSM was trouble-free because VKP could absorb all its 
students (CI3). 
 
The University encountered language issues in its (now defunct) NCE 
operation in Country N (CI2), a country known to have unclear TNE 
regulations. Its TKD termination was attributed to insufficient students 
and the OP’s upgrade to university college status (CI6). 
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
As discussed in Section 5.4.2.1.4, Country X operating environment is an 
‘incredibly competitive’ environment, with unique cultural and religious 
sensitivities. The Regulator there required that the OP be ‘just in the 
background helping the University to run it ... so no one really knows 
about the OP … they (i.e., the Regulator) don't want anyone to really 
know about the OP’ (CI3). Further, the Regulator ‘don't want them (i.e., 
the OP) involved in the actual delivery of courses ... (but) they’re just an 
infrastructure provider … (although the OP is) an education provider’ 
(CI3). The restriction on the OP to run its own programs is a financial 
advantage to the University (CI3). 
 
Country V has been described as ‘politically stable’ and ‘peaceful’ (CI9). 
This perception belie a ‘very regulated’ private education sector (CI7), 
and ‘a high risk environment for foreign institutions’ (CI8), where ‘some of 
the big brands of course came here and then left’, referring to several 
world renowned universities, some of which were set up to support the  
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No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced 
Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) CI2 VKP HCO research centre has more traction in Country V 
VKP lost 2-year degree advantage 
VKP UBS over-exposure to VKP is a massive risk 
XNV incredibly competitive environment 
XNV OP and Uni have good synergies on locations for 
research 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI10 VKP OP carries the VKP TNE registration  
VKP OP invested significantly in Uni brand and reputation 
VKP Uni-OP mutually-assured destruction on pull-out 
VKP some big brands came and left Country V 
VKP previously 60% domestic students 
VKP Country V students very price sensitive 
VKP Country V liberalisation followed by re-regulation 
VKP Regulator disapprove programs that are not run in home 
   country; quite pedantic 
c) CI11 XNV Uni to add research opportunities to new HCO 
GEN Uni aim to give back, while making money 
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 VKP OP engaged because it was anticipated to grow the  
   market 
VKP OP also delivering degrees from other universities 
XNV Regulator no longer permit OP to run programs 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI3 VKP 2-year degree attractive to students 
VKP weak Country V economy 
VKP Country V government changed regulations discouraging 
   recruitment of international students, delaying new MBA 
VKP OP needs Uni because of large VKP student number 
XNV Uni holds licence of TNE operation 
XNV OP operating in the background 
c) CI7 VKP very regulated operating environment 
VKP Uni should look at opportunities elsewhere due to a very 
   saturated market 
VKP criteria for students ‘location, price, ranking and duration  
   of the course’ 
d) CI9 VKP operating environment politically stable and peaceful 
VKP market facing low population growth, impacting numbers 
VKP domestic students not used to accessing materials online 
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4 VKP lower performance causing HCO to be shrunk 
VKP Uni mindful of cultural and social standards prevailing 
VKP students reluctant to be active learners 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI5 VKP DQF slow in approving new program 
c) CI6 VKP DQF overzealous 
VKP Uni wants a good brand in Country V 
VKP tightened regulations due to high profile failures and  
   outcome of recent elections 
VKP majority of students are part-time students; some civil  
   servants 
VKP need public transport and telecommunication 
infrastructure 
d) CI8 VKP high risk operating environment 
VKP local universities enrolling both ‘top tier’ and ‘the bulk of  
   the’ students 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University; GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.49   University C Informant Perspectives on Business and  
Legal-political Uncertainty (Post-tipping Point) 
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development of local government institutions (CI10). The domestic 
students who at one time made up 60% of VKP’s student population 
(CI10) select their programs based on ‘location, price, ranking and … 
duration of the course’ (CI7). The loss of students at VSM when it moved 
from the CBD to the suburbs demonstrate the importance of location for 
a predominantly part-time student cohort (CI6). To address the ‘price 
sensitive’ nature of the bulk of the VKP students (CI10), the University’s 
programs were set to be ‘pretty cheap ... we’re at the bottom end’ (CI1).  
 
While the University revels and brands itself as an international university 
with multiple offshore campuses and Times Higher Education (THE) 
ranking (CI2, CI3), there no longer seems to be any ‘competitive 
advantage between universities ... all our Australian universities, you can 
only look at their rankings’, which are similar (CI7). As for program 
duration, VKP used to have an advantage, delivering 3-year degrees that 
can be completed within two years (CI3). It no longer has that advantage 
because other universities are also delivering such programs (CI2). 
Further, the University has to contend with another eleven universities 
within the OP’s stable of programs (CI3). 
 
The informants reported that the operating environment in Country V was 
becoming more competitive from increased supply, demographic 
changes, change in government higher education emphases and 
regulatory tightening. The Government had set up more local 
universities, resulting in the mopping up of the ‘bulk’ of the domestic 
students; this contrasts with the previous focus on ‘top tier’ students 
when there were fewer local universities (CI8). CI9 also reported on the 
declining prospective students arising from low population growth. 
 
Of grave concern were the Government’s campaign to encourage 
vocational careers (instead of white collar careers), and the tightening of 
immigration regulations restricting the entry of international students 
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(CI10). Although some high profile TNE failures and recent election 
outcomes necessitated the tightening of private higher education 
regulations, the higher education regulator was also perceived as 
‘overzealous’ (CI6), where ‘everything needs to be approved by DQF’ 
(CI7). This has resulted in one post-graduate program launch being 
delayed (CI5). 
 
Coupled with a weakening economy which is adversely impacting the 
performance of the whole TNE sector (CI3), the above developments 
have resulted in falling student enrolments, and the need to give up 
some leased HCO office space (CI4). The HCO Dean is now also 
deployed to explore and manage business development for Country X 
and other new locations.  
 
The current operating environment has also imposed severe limitations 
on TNE growth, leading CI7 to remark that ‘the growing market no longer 
is Country V … our universities should also look at opportunities 
elsewhere’ (CI7). CI10 confirmed that the University is exploring four 
other new TNE locations, including one in Country H, an emerging 
economy (CI10, CI3). 
 
Although Country V students were not used to accessing blended 
learning materials online, the University pressed on with the change in 
teaching mode, and CI9 reported that these students have gotten used to 
the new mode. CI4 makes it a point to convey his expectations to 
students to address his concerns with the students’ reluctance to be 
active learners. 
 
There was no perceivable difference in the impact of host country 
environmental uncertainties before and after the University’s TNE tipping 
point. The above discussion highlighted the mainly adverse impact of 
changing economic conditions on TNE performance in both Countries V 
and X. In the case of Country V, the University’s TNE operation was 
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further buffeted by tightening immigration rules which limited international 
enrolments, a highly regulated education sector, changing government 
emphases and policies choking competition, and increased competition 
from new government universities. In exasperation, CI10 remarked that 
the environment is ‘really unclear’. CI1 added that the University’s TNE 
operations were also affected by the vagaries of Australian government 
policies.  
 
The University responded in various ways to the environmental influence 
on its TNE performance, e.g., terminating the NCE operation, appointing 
the new VKP OP to backstop the falling VSM performance, reducing 
program duration and pricing in Country V to compete, introducing 
blended learning and changing program scheduling (from 12-weekly to 6-
fortnightly) to reduce delivery cost, and giving up leased space in its 
Country V HCO to reduce expenditure.  
 
The University also benefited financially from the change in Country X 
TNE policies restricting the OP from delivering its own programs. It’s 
fortunes were however dragged down by the VSM OP’s decision to move 
to the suburbs, resulting in a drastic drop in student enrolments – 
displaying poor understanding of Country V’s market environment. The 
University’s lead in program duration, pricing and ranking in the Country 
V market is observed to be gradually narrowing by the competition, 
leading CI7 and CI10 to remark that the University has been exploring 
the market in other countries to diversify its TNE operations. It is 
scheduled to launch a post-graduate program in Country H in 2019. 
 
The regulatory environment in Australia post-tipping point has seen a 
tightening of regulations with the launch of TEQSA which has regulatory 
powers. Holloway et. al (2013) argued that the quest to generate onshore 
and offshore international student fee income to compensate for reduced 
government funding has introduced systemic risks of deterioration of the  
quality of university programs and student experience, resulting in the set 
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up of TEQSA (Holloway et al. 2013, 10). They also reported on the high 
costs of compliance of the TEQSA self-accrediting institution re-
registration (Ibid., 2). 
 
5.4.2.3.2 Property Rights Theory 
 
This section explores the validity of the PRT propositions with respect to 
the University’s pre-tipping and post-tipping point TNE operations. 
 
a) Control of Mission-critical Resources 
 
The University and its OPs deployed a large number of TNE-specific 
assets (Section 5.4.2.1.1). However, not all of these assets can be 
considered mission-critical. To determine if the TNE-specific asset is 
mission-critical, emphasis is placed on the ‘capabilities that we don’t 
have as an institution’ identified by CI10, the chief negotiator of the VKP 
contract renewal, viz., the OP’s local knowledge, agent network, 
reputation and brand, efficient delivery model and contemporary campus. 
CI6, a TNE veteran of 18 years noted that the OP’s marketing expertise 
and student services are also key to the success of the TNE operation.  
 
Although the University’s IP was considered ‘nothing particularly novel’, it 
is still a mission-critical resource in TNE (CI10, CI7). CI6 added the 
University’s brand, quality assurance, student management systems as 
key to TNE success.  
 
Tables 5.50 and 5.51 have been refined using the foregoing filters to 
identify mission-critical resources identified in the University’s TNE 
operations. 
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(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
It was obvious that the University’s IP/curriculum, academic staff, on-site 
TNE leadership, reputation and onshore TNE management infrastructure 
(including ‘very expensive’ teachout infrastructure – CI2) were key to the 
sustainability of its TNE operations (Table 5.52). Prior to the University’s 
TNE tipping point, it relied on fly-in-fly-out teaching staff, a practice that 
brought significant ‘discretionary income’ to participating University 
teaching staff and their schools (CI10). 
 
The OP’s key contribution to TNE success was identified as campus 
facilities, marketing, teaching staff, student services, government liaison 
and local knowledge. 
 
The pre-tipping point TNE operations demonstrated some exercise and 
transfer of, and benefit from each partners’ property rights, e.g., the 
University was comfortable with the program delivery by TKD because of 
TKD’s status as an ‘education institution’ (CI6); ‘staff were very 
disappointed when TKD ended’ (CI2). On the other hand, the University 
passively relied on the XGI OP’s poorly conceived decision to offer 
media and film programs, resulting in poor student enrolments and XGI’s 
termination (CI4), although the University holds the TNE licence (CI3) – 
reflecting a failure on the part of the University in exercising its legally-
enforceable decision rights. The NCE operation also demonstrated the 
failed experiment to deliver in bi-lingual mode, a reflection of the 
University’s reliance on the OP’s teaching in the Country N medium of 
instruction. 
 
There were numerous examples of the exercise of the partners’ residual 
rights of control. The University exercised its own residual rights when it 
started up VKP and subsequently offered the ‘same programs’ while still 
in partnership with VSM (CI7), and quietly initiated XNV while 
withdrawing from XGI (CI2). It also engaged an external marketing 
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agency to manage its TNE positioning, independently of its OP’s 
marketing initiatives (University C TNE Project Team 2013a).  
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) CI2 XGI film and media infrastructure 
XGI ‘failed’ on-site Deans  
TKD good quality instruction 
TKD fully-equipped campus 
TKD teachout is specialised 
NCE teachout is very expensive 
b) CI10  GEN out-of-load teaching staff 
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 XGI OP wanted Uni IP 
XGI OP infrastructure debt 
XGI full-time OP core teaching staff 
XGI Dean and admin staff 
XGI Uni reputation 
 
b) CI3 XGI Deans institutionalised 
XGI poor Uni TNE management 
XGI Uni reputation 
VSM on-site Principal 
GEN centralised TNE approvals by  
   senior executives 
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4  VSM out-of-load fly-in-fly-out  
   Accounting staff  
b) CI6 XGI OP infrastructure provider VSN, VSC required fly-in-fly-out  
   teaching staff 
TKD education institution campus 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.50   University C Informant Perspectives on Control of  
Mission-critical Resources (Pre-tipping Point) 
 
The OPs similarly demonstrated such behaviour, e.g., when the TKD OP 
converted to a university college and terminated its partnership with the 
University (CI2). In XGI, the OP was free-riding by making ‘their money’ 
(CI1) from the delivery of its own Foundation program as a feeder to the 
University’s degree programs. The XGI OP later also exercised its 
residual rights by setting up ‘another (legal) entity’ to work with University 
A in a new TNE venture (CI1), while transitioning out of the XGI 
operation. 
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
Previously, the ‘often quite opportunistic, (and) a bit reactive’ approach to 
TNE set-ups (CI10) led to problems in program delivery, and drove the 
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University to centralise future TNE approvals (‘very much controlled by 
our senior executive group’ – CI3). 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced 
Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) WP GEN Full-time Uni academic staff at TNE location 
GEN Full-time Uni learning support staff at TNE location 
GEN Uni teacher training at TNE location 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI2 VKP OP extensive agent network 
VKP Uni’s flexible curriculum 
XNV new premises 
XNV OP has proven track record 
c) CI10 VKP HCO boots on the ground 
VKP OP value Uni IP, but IP not particularly novel 
VKP OP holds licence of TNE operation 
VKP OP local knowledge, reputation and brand, efficient TNE    
   administration model and contemporary campus 
XNV OP very experienced, good agent network 
d) CI11 XNV HCO helmed by Dean 
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 VKP HCO minimise compliance risk 
VKP curriculum change led to dip in student numbers 
VKP HCO greater cost but more secure 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI3 VKP Uni UTO coordination 
VKP HCO control and oversight 
VKP OP marketing machine 
VKP two-year completion of three-year degree 
VKP OP’s proprietary vehicle 
XNV Uni holds licence of TNE operation 
XNV HCO new program coordinators 
XNV previous OP recruiting for new OP 
c) CI7 VKP HCO headed by a Dean 
VKP Uni home campus alumni office support 
VKP HCO support for alumni 
VKP OP’s regulatory compliance 
 CI9 VKP HCO support for alumni 
VKP OP’s classroom scheduling IT system 
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4 VKP OP investment in University brand and reputation 
XNV HCO regional academic presence 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI5 VKP OP sales management, program management, lecturer  
   management and exam management teams 
VKP Uni schools’ specialist TNE administrators 
XNV OP teaching staff local knowledge 
c) CI6 VKP Uni’s IP, quality assurance, student admin system 
VKP OP’s premises and facilities, marketing 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   WP – White Paper;   GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.51   University C Informant Perspectives on Control of  
Mission-critical Resources (Post-tipping Point) 
 
The phenomenal growth in VKP triggered the urgent set up of the HCO 
(Section App J 2.3.3) which provided the University with a means for 
‘control and oversight’ of the whole operation (CI3). The span of control 
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covered OP liaison (CI10), provision of full-time teaching staff (CI5), 
training of OP teaching staff (CI8), student advisory support and training 
(CI8), hosting of supplementary examinations (CI9) and alumni support 
(CI7, CI9). The University also re-structured its onshore TNE 
infrastructure into a central coordinating University TNE Office (UTO), 
liaising with its eight schools (CI3) to provide academic and quality 
assurance support for its TNE operations (CI6). 
 
The OP, an international education provider, has an ‘efficient model’ of 
TNE (CI10) delivery comprising marketing, admissions, program 
management, lecturer management, and examination management 
teams (CI5). It also provided the University operation with a proprietary 
limited vehicle to hold its operating licence (CI3), and a contemporary 
campus for program delivery (CI10). Although the OP manages various 
TNE processes, it is subject to the University’s absolute control, except 
for marketing (‘everything is still governed by University C, not by the OP 
... they only help us to facilitate, provide the premises, undertake 
marketing ... but still overall controlled by University C’ - CI7). 
 
Although the HCO hosted a research office (SCORE), research and 
community engagement were not imposed on the OP (CI10). 
 
No. Partner Mission-critical Resources 
Direct Model (ic-IBC/i-FP) Outsourced Model (r-FP) 
1 University 
a) Pre-tipping 
(ic-IBC and 
r-FP) 
i) IP/curriculum 
ii) Uni-held licence (only XGI) 
iii) unit coordinators 
iv) fly-in-fly-out faculty 
v) on-site Principal 
vi) onshore TNE management 
vii) light-touch quality assurance 
viii) brand/reputation 
ix) regulatory compliance 
i) IP/curriculum 
ii) unit coordinators 
iii) fly-in-fly-out faculty 
iv) onshore TNE management 
v) light-touch quality assurance 
vi) brand/reputation 
vii) regulatory compliance 
b) Post-tipping 
(ic-IBC) 
i) centralised TNE approval 
ii) IP/curriculum 
iii) Uni-held licence (only XNV) 
iv) unit coordinators 
v) on-site faculty 
vi) on-site Dean 
vii) onshore TNE management 
viii) quality assurance 
ix) brand/reputation 
x) research and community 
No outsourced model 
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engagement 
xi) regulatory compliance 
 Post-tipping  
(i-FP) 
i) centralised TNE approval 
ii) IP/curriculum 
iii) unit coordinators 
iv) on-site faculty 
v) on-site Dean 
vi) onshore TNE management 
vii) quality assurance 
viii) brand/reputation 
ix) alumni relations 
x) research and community 
engagement 
xi) regulatory compliance 
No outsourced model 
2 OP 
a) Pre-tipping 
(ic-IBC) 
i) University C branded 
campus facilities 
ii) marketing 
iii) teaching staff 
iv) student services 
v) local knowledge 
vi) quality assurance 
vii) regulatory compliance 
i) OP campus facilities 
ii) OP-held licence 
iii) marketing 
iv) support teaching staff 
v) student services 
vi) local knowledge 
vii) quality assurance 
viii) regulatory compliance 
b) Post-tipping 
(ic-IBC) 
i) University C branded 
campus 
ii) marketing 
iii) program management 
iv) lecturer management 
v) examination management 
vi) student services 
vii) graduations 
viii) local knowledge 
ix) quality assurance 
x) regulatory compliance 
No outsourced model 
 Post-tipping 
(i-FP) 
i) OP campus facilities 
ii) OP-held licence (only 
VKP) 
iii) marketing 
iv) program management 
v) lecturer management 
vi) examination management 
vii) student services 
viii) graduations 
ix) local knowledge 
x) quality assurance 
xi) regulatory compliance 
No outsourced model 
 
Table 5.52   Mission-critical Resources controlled by University C  
and its OPs 
 
In summary, the mission-critical resources controlled by the partners are 
identified in the table above. OP resources that are not under the control 
of the University are highlighted in bold italics. 
 
Pre-tipping point, the University took a ‘hands-off’ approach where TNE 
delivery was fully in the hands of the OP (CF2). It is noteworthy that 
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those early TNE operations functioned within an environment of low 
regulatory conditions, where the OP, with ‘no academic background … 
simply recruited sufficient staff that they needed to deliver our units, and 
a couple of academic managers/administrators to have oversight of the 
program’ (CI4). The fewer mission-critical resources required for TNE 
delivery then were controlled by the OP, resulting in the University 
discovering non-compliance much later in some instances. 
 
Post-tipping point, the University’s TNE operations were subject to 
greater regulatory control both in the host country as well as by TEQSA. 
These imposts required greater monitoring and control, resulting in 
additional resources required for central due diligence and deployment of 
on-site faculty. In Country V, the set up of the VKP HCO, which CI4 
referred to as a necessary bureaucracy, effected the transfer of some 
mission-critical OP rights to an on-site University team, providing ‘more 
control and oversight’ (CI3). The University also added research and 
community engagement as part of its on-site TNE roles. 
 
In Country X, the University re-gained its right to deliver all programs in 
XNV, including the Foundation program and effectively controlled all 
academic processes while the OP delivered the programs (‘the OP are 
just in the background, helping the University to run it’ – CI3). It 
continued to rely on the XNV OP’s local knowledge, marketing expertise 
and infrastructure, and student services, while controlling all other 
functions.  
 
In the case of VKP, the University relied on the OP’s local knowledge, 
and highly efficient marketing, program management, lecturer 
management, examination management, and student services expertise. 
The VKP OP’s modularised processes and infrastructure are designed to 
cater to a multiplicity of university and program specifications, and are 
therefore not university-specific. 
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The VKP OP clearly exercised its residual rights of control, as seen in the 
VKP OP’s control of the University’s choice of programs to deliver in 
Country V (CI3), its delivery of a multiplicity of university partner 
programs (CI4), and its insistence on trimester study periods and small 
classroom delivery (CI3). The VKP OP also stands to gain from 
delivering skills development programs that the Country V government 
currently favours, demonstrating possible value dissipation (CI7). In the 
case of XGI, the OP exercised its residual rights of control by 
determining the choice of programs to deliver, and insisting on the ‘strict 
rule of the contract’ during the XGI-XNV transition. 
 
Clearly, the University considers its teaching, research and community 
engagement roles as mission-critical to its TNE operations (‘we’re not in 
these countries just to make money off teaching ... we’re ready to give 
back on the research and we’re a research-intensive university’ – CI11; 
‘the idealism around transnational education for me is around nation 
building, capacity building ... if we can some good, and if we can do it in 
a commercially savvy way that’s sustainable economically then I think, 
why not?’ – CI10). This observation reflects Weisbrod et. al’s argument 
that the university needs sufficient revenue goods to pay for its mission 
goods (Section 2.4.1). While teaching is traditionally considered a 
revenue good, University C’s SCORE research centre demonstrated that 
research can also be revenue-generating. 
 
b) Risk of Opportunism 
 
Opportunism may arise in an environment that lacks trust and where 
opportunities for profitable exploitation exists. CI6 hints at this possibility 
in saying that ‘there is always risk when you don’t have control over all 
aspects of your business’. It is also part of the debate on the merits of 
having one OP against having multiple OPs (CI1, CI7 in Section App J 
5.2). 
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(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
The XGI OP was said to have premised the TNE operation on the 
training of its own workforce, but which did not eventuate (CI1). The OP 
clearly ‘see that there's money to be made’ out of private education and 
capitalised on the delivery of its own Foundation programs (CI3). 
Ultimately, although the University ‘didn’t generate enough profit to 
sustain’, the OP ‘made their money with the Foundation’ program (CI2). 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) CI2 XGI insufficient profit for Uni to  
   sustain 
 
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 XGI OP’s TNE motive is mainly  
   financial 
XGI OP’s initial staff training  
   objective not implemented 
XGI OP made their money from  
   their own Foundation program 
XGI OP upset with University for  
   ending contract 
XGI OP followed strict rule of  
   contract 
XGI OP recruited for XNV; XNV OP  
   cannot do anything in transition 
XGI Uni destroyed trust through  
   reversal 
 
b) CI3 XGI Regulator permitted the OP to  
   run its own Foundation program 
XGI OP revenue motive for TNE 
XGI Deans institutionalised 
XGI OP pushed against TNE  
   standards 
XGI Uni was to blame for poor TNE  
   set up 
XGI OP marketing for Universities A  
   and C at the same time, causing 
dip  
   in student enrolments for XNV 
XGI Uni strategic plan to increase     
   onshore and offshore enrolments 
VSM on-site Principal institutionalised 
VSM teachout students transferred to  
   VKP smoothly 
c) CI7  VSM Uni introduced exactly the same 
   programs at VKP 
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4  VSM Principal captured by  
   organisation 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.53   University C Informant Perspectives on Risk of  
Opportunism (Pre-tipping Point) 
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CI3 related the story of how one of the Country X Deans was 
compromised by being institutionalised by the XGI OP, and became ‘one 
of them’. The presence of a University Dean could not ensure the 
University’s interests were safeguarded, e.g., violations in teaching staff 
approvals and lax admission standards (CI3). CI3 however pinned the 
blame on the University’s poor TNE set-up. Similarly, the University’s on-
site Dean at VSM was also institutionalised by the OP. 
 
The University’s reversal of decision at Country X upset the XGI OP and 
‘destroyed trust’ between the partners (CI1). What followed was a dip in 
University student enrolments (CI3) during the transition between the 
XGI and XNV operations, where the XGI OP insisted on following the 
‘strict rule of the contract’ (CI1) and recruited students for both XNV and 
its new University A partner TNE operation (CI3). The XNV OP was 
rendered unable to ‘do anything’ during the seven-month transition (CI1).  
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
Part of the reason for the VKP success was attributed to the University’s 
willingness to be flexible with its curriculum, providing the OP with a 
three-year degree that can be completed within two years (CI2). The 
University was also willing to price the programs at ‘the bottom end’ 
(CI1). These strategies effectively enabled the operation to make ‘the 
most money for’ the OP (CI3). CI10 however warned that the Country V 
higher education market ‘has become very mature and challenging’. As 
discussed in Section 5.4.2.1.4b, VKP has lost its two-year degree 
advantage (CI2) as well as its ranking advantage (CI7). 
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No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced 
Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) WP GEN imposed ‘non-negotiable minima’ in TNE delivery 
GEN outsource external marketing agency to enhance TNE  
   appeal 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI2 VKP Uni curriculum more flexible for two-year degree 
VKP Uni income is significant 
VKP Uni research centre seeded by TNE 
VKP Uni research centre obtained good government funding 
c) CI10 VKP OP can continue on without Uni C, and vice-versa 
VKP Uni-OP mutually-assured destruction on pull-out 
VKP Country V market very mature and challenging 
d) CI11 GEN Uni recruitment for onshore more important than TNE  
   revenue  
XNV OP in TNE for the same reason as the University 
XNV Uni will ‘add research opportunities there’ 
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 VKP HCO minimise compliance risk 
VKP HCO more control over admissions which was a bit loose 
VKP OP exploited Uni ‘pretty cheap’ program pricing 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI3 VKP HCO a lot more control and oversight of whole operation 
VKP OP making the most money from Uni C 
VKP OP do not want to run programs suggested by Uni C 
VKP two-year completion of three-year degree 
c) CI7 VKP OP’s ‘other uni’ programs for backup 
d) CI9 VKP HCO replacing some OP roles, e.g., exam venue, student  
   support, alumni support 
VKP HCO Learning Advisor supports students at HCO and OP 
VKP OP marketing team is highly rewards-driven 
e) CF2 VKP HCO has onshore enrolment KPI 
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4 VKP HCO Dean ‘a focal point, a regional academic presence’ 
VKP OP investment in University brand and reputation 
VKP OP runs its own diploma programs 
VKP OP’s other partners as ‘risk diversification’ – a potential  
   conflict of interest 
VKP OP attempted to walk out of contract re-negotiation 
VKP Uni research centre obtained more funding in Country V  
   than from Australia for some areas 
VKP Uni re-negotiation weakened by its own traumas No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI5 VKP Uni earns significant amounts from onshore international  
   students 
c) CI6 VKP OP risk of OP sales team bias 
VKP OP an MNC, will not be ‘bamboozled by some regional 
university’ 
VKP Uni recruitment for onshore more important than TNE  
   revenue 
d) CI8 VKP OP are strategic-minded, highly intelligent operational  
   Management 
VKP OP’s multiple uni partners as insurance 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University; GEN – generic comments;   WP – White Paper 
 
Table 5.54   University C Informant Perspectives on Risk of  
Opportunism (Post-tipping Point) 
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The VKP OP’s modus operandi leveraged on a multiplicity of university 
partners, which CI4 described as a ‘risk diversification’ strategy which 
poses ‘potential conflicts of interest’. Given the OP sales team’s rewards-
driven approach (CI9), CI6 worries that ‘the sales team will direct 
students to the course … that gives them the most benefit’. The OP also  
benefited from the delivery of its own diploma programs as feeders to the 
degree programs of the other eleven partner universities (CI4). 
 
To ensure that the appeal of the University’s TNE offerings is enhanced, 
the White Paper recommended ‘engaging a professional marketing 
agency’, and hence, not rely only on the OP’s marketing team which 
have to promote a multiplicity of university partners (University C TNE 
Project Team 2013a). The University’s independent marketing initiative 
reflects a low level of dependence on the OP to promote its brand 
interests. 
 
Similar to its experience in Country X, the University encountered the 
institutionalisation of its Deans in Country V (CI3). Coupled with the 
phenomenal growth of VKP, the University’s White Paper recommended 
the set up of a HCO and the adoption of ‘non-negotiable’ minima in 
delivery standards to minimise OP non-compliance (University C TNE 
Project Team 2013a). The establishment of the HCO inadvertently also 
benefited the OP with additional space for supplementary examinations, 
University student support services and alumni relations (CI9). 
 
Opportunistic OP behaviour was identified in the re-negotiation of the 
VKP contract, where the OP threatened to walk out of the negotiation 
with a University weakened by ‘its own traumas … with (governance 
issues and changes in) its Vice Chancellor’ (CI4), and the knowledge 
‘that the Country V OP will probably continue on without us’ if need be 
(CI10). 
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It is interesting to note that the University also likely exhibited 
opportunistic behaviour in its dealings with its OPs. CI1 described how 
the University destroyed trust in terminating the XGI operation in favour 
of starting a new XNV operation in Country X with a new OP described 
as ‘very experienced’, a ‘good partner’, with ‘good agent network’ and 
‘proven track record’ (CI10, CI2). Similarly, in Country V, the University 
initiated the VKP competing TNE operation alongside VSM, offering 
‘exactly the same’ University programs (CI7) – driven by the aspiration 
that VKP is ‘likely to get more students attracted through them to our 
programs’ (CI4). The VKP OP was described as a ‘marketing machine’ 
with ‘extensive agents’ and ‘they were big, and they had greater 
aspirations, greater resources, the means to deliver the kinds of things … 
to be a better partner than the VSM OP’ (CI1). 
 
The University’s opportunistic behaviour extends to its strategic plan for 
more onshore international enrolments (CI3), leveraging on its HCO 
(which in the case of the VKP HCO, has established KPIs to achieve 
enrolment targets by an on-site marketing manager) which is funded by 
the VKP programs (CF2). Onshore enrolments of international students 
is a University priority (CI6) because it earns significant revenue (CI5). 
Further, the HCO provides the University with a means to station a 
research centre on location (CI2). In the case of the VKP HCO, the 
research centre has proven to be successful in attracting both 
government (CI2) and private sector funding (CI10). Finally, the HCO 
‘gives the University a strategic focal point to deal with not just the 
Country V partner, but to use the Country V Dean as a kind of regional 
academic presence’, including negotiating with the XNV OP (CI4). 
 
Pre-tipping, there were instances of opportunism represented by the 
institutionalisation of the University Deans in both XGI and VSM, which 
resulted in low quality delivery. The XGI OP lured the University into the 
market through promises of staff training and regional expansion, which 
did not eventuate. It was also reported to have generated income from 
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delivering its own Foundation program as a feeder into the University’s 
programs. The University was seen to have taken advantage of the 
expiry of the XGI contact to engage a better-performing OP in Country X, 
and similarly dropped the VSM OP for the better-resourced VKP OP. 
 
Post-tipping, the VKP OP benefitted from the University’s generous 
program pricing and flexibility, delivery of its own Diploma feeders and 
student services delivered by the HCO. CI4 also intimated that the OP 
took advantage of the University’s weaker bargaining position during 
contract re-negotiation. On the other hand, the University was observed 
to have made use of its HCO to drive onshore international enrolments 
and host its SCORE research centre. 
 
c) Information Asymmetry 
 
The University has come a long way and ‘learn(t) a lot from the past’ 
(CI3), which was spotted with a lack of market research (CI1), failed on-
site deans (CI2) and non-compliant OP behaviours (CI3). It now 
scrutinises ‘everything’ in its due diligence for new TNE initiatives (CI11) 
and has in place formal quality assurance processes (CI3). A number of 
opportunistic behaviours in Section 5.4.2.2.2 (Risk of Opportunism) have 
been observed arising from information asymmetry. 
 
(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
The University went along with the XGI OP’s focus on Media and Film 
without conducting any market research (CI1, CI2), possibly convinced 
by the OP’s inflated student enrolment projections (CI4). In fact, the OP 
promised to send their staff for the TNE programs and extend the TNE 
programs to the AA region (CI1). Both did not materialise. 
 
The University’s XGI on-site deans were institutionalised by the OP, and 
led to non-conformance with various TNE delivery standards, which were 
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discovered after the tipping point (CI3). The institutionalisation of deans 
recurred in Country V as well (CI3), and resulted in the expeditious set 
up of the HCO in a location separate from the OP (CI7). The separation 
of the HCO from the OP was not replicated in the XNV operation though 
(CI4). 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) CI2 XGI failed Deans 
XGI OP not done market research;  
   convinced Uni on program viability 
XGI insufficient profit for Uni to  
   sustain 
 
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 XGI OP ‘didn’t do any research’ on  
   TNE viability 
XGI OP’s TNE motive is mainly  
   financial 
XGI OP’s AA region business  
   penetration did not materialise 
XGI OP’s initial staff training  
   objective not implemented 
XGI OP another entity for new TNE 
XGI OP recruited for XNV during  
   transition 
VSM OP unhappy with Uni’s VKP start 
b) CI3 XGI Deans institutionalised 
XGI OP pushed against TNE  
   standards 
XGI Uni was to blame for poor TNE  
   set up 
XGI OP marketing for Universities A  
   and C at the same time, causing 
dip  
   in student enrolments for XNV and  
   higher risk of failure 
VSM on-site Principal institutionalised 
VSM OP closely assisted by Uni 
c) CI7  VSM Uni introduced exactly the same 
   programs at VKP 
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4 XGI OP over-inflated promises VSM Principal captured by  
   organisation 
b) CI5 XGI Uni ‘lean on’ OP teaching staff  
   for local sensitivities 
 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.55   University C Informant Perspectives on Information  
Asymmetry (Pre-tipping Point) 
 
The Country V HCO employed Country V nationals who were 
experienced TNE professionals (CI7, CI9), and addressed CI3’s 
concerns about having experienced ‘people on the ground’ and CI10’s 
priority for local knowledge that is ‘difficult to reproduce’. CI5 also 
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emphasised the need to ‘lean on’ XGI OP teaching staff for an 
appreciation of local sensitivities. 
 
During the transition between XGI and XNV, the University was in the 
dark about the XGI OP’s plans with its new University A partnership 
which was set up through a new corporate entity (CI1). It also had to 
endure a risky seven months of poor student recruitment by the XGI OP 
for the new XNV operation (CI3). 
 
The close collaboration between the University and the VSM OP in trying 
to grow the TNE student enrolments demonstrated a high level of 
transparency between the two partners (CI3). These efforts however 
failed, and the University had to appoint another OP (VKP), which took 
over VSM’s programs (CI7). CI1 noted some displeasure on the part of 
the VSM OP with the program replication at VKP. 
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
The new XNV operation featured University-appointed on-site program 
coordinators that the University hoped to provide ‘a lot more control over 
all their teaching staff’ (CI3). These appointments might be able to 
mitigate the lack of cultural and social sensitivities of home campus unit 
coordinators (CI4) and improve the ownership, dedication and integrity of 
the OP’s ‘taxi-cab’ teaching staff (CI6). 
 
The strategic decision to re-enter Country X was said to have been 
decided by senior executives of the University under a cloak of secrecy, 
and that academics and home campus deans were not consulted (CI1). 
The secrecy was necessary because of the sensitive nature of the 
commercial negotiations and the potentially adverse impact on the 
University’s reputation (CI1). 
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No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced 
Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) WP GEN imposed ‘non-negotiable minima’ in TNE delivery 
GEN policy framework around very large student cohorts 
GEN high quality Uni-OP digital interface 
GEN outsource external marketing agency to enhance TNE  
   appeal 
VKP HCO set up expeditiously No 
outsourced 
model b) CI2 VKP OP track record scrutinised in contract renewal c) CI10 VKP HCO being local helps align Uni-OP interests  
VKP OP local knowledge ‘difficult to reproduce’ 
VKP CI10 speaks at OP marketing previews 
VKP three-piece TNE management seems to work 
d) CI11 GEN Uni ‘scrutinised everything’ 
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 VKP HCO minimise compliance risk 
VKP HCO more control over admissions which was a bit loose 
XNV Country X re-entry ‘no one else was consulted on it … not  
   the Deans’ 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI3 VKP HCO a lot more control and oversight of whole operation 
VKP HCO employed experienced ‘people on the ground’ 
VKP Uni-OP annual contract review 
VKP OP have read-only access to Uni systems 
XNV HCO program coordinators assist in OP teaching staff  
   control 
c) CI7 VKP Uni ‘cannot control’ OP marketing  
VKP CI7 is a Country V national employed in TNE for 10 years 
d) CI9 VKP CI9 is a Country V national employed in TNE for 9 years 
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4 GEN 3-part moderation process 
VKP OP’s other partners as ‘risk diversification’ – a potential  
   conflict of interest 
VKP OP runs its own diploma programs 
VKP OP attempted to walk out of contract re-negotiation 
VKP Uni research centre obtained more funding in Country V  
   than from Australia for some areas 
XNV HCO Dean located at OP, unlike VKP HCO  
XNV Uni academics not consulted much on Country X re-entry 
XNV distance accentuates need for mindfulness of cultural and  
   social sensitivities 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI5 VKP OP teaching staff requires minimal monitoring 
c) CI6 VKP Uni unit coordinators need on-site experience for  
   empathy and ownership of TNE unit coordination 
VKP OP risk of OP sales team bias 
VKP OP questionable ownership, dedication and integrity of 
OP’s  
   ‘taxi-cab’ teaching staff 
d) CI8 VKP CI8 speaks at OP marketing previews 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University; GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.56   University C Informant Perspectives on Information  
Asymmetry (Post-tipping Point) 
 
To address OP non-compliance, the University instituted various policy, 
organisational, systems and procedural improvements, including the 
‘non-negotiable minima’ in TNE standards, the policy framework for large 
 479 
student cohorts, HCO set-up, University-OP digital interface, access to 
University information systems, set up of the three-piece TNE 
administration infrastructure, annual contract reviews and three-part 
moderation process.  
 
The set up of the HCO in particular, provided better understanding 
between the partners and helped addressed gaps in perceptions of 
teaching and learning on the ground (‘there’s been different structures 
but probably a gap for the teaching and learning aspects of what’s 
happening on the ground’ – CF2). While (‘there are still, occasionally the 
odd points of friction but most of the time, we realise that our interests 
are actually quite aligned and … being local really helps’ – CI10). Greater 
transparency was also achieved by the participation of the Country V 
HCO staff in OP marketing activities, e.g., previews (CI8, CI10).  
 
However, the VKP OP’s marketing is still an area that the University 
‘can’t control’ (CI7), giving rise to suspicions of OP marketing team bias 
(CI6) and potential conflicts of interest (CI4). It is also interesting that the 
University recommended the engagement of an ‘external marketing 
agency’ to enhance the appeal of its TNE programs offshore, and not 
rely on the OP’s marketing team. 
 
The re-negotiation of the VKP contract and the negotiation with the new 
XNV OP provided the University with an opportunity to ‘re-weight’ the 
previously OP-favoured contracts (CI11), which were not ‘strong’ or ‘tight’ 
(CI2). The University was described as being ‘relatively new in the TNE 
environment’ when the first VKP and XGI contracts were signed (CI2). It 
has since ‘learnt so much over the last ten years’ (CI3). Surprisingly, 
while the University had planned on a 2019 launch of its post-graduate 
programs in Country H, it is still ‘figuring out how to do it at our level 
which is affordable’ (CI10). 
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Pre-tipping, the University was disadvantaged in its two main TNE 
delivery locations, viz., Countries V and X. At XGI, the University failed to 
undertake market research and relied on the OP’s choice of Media and 
Film programs, which proved later to have limited traction in Country X 
market. Its on-site Dean who was supposed to be safeguarding its 
interests was found to be institutionalised by the OP, leaving the 
University in the dark about non-compliance in teaching staff approvals 
and lax student admissions standards. It was thus strange to observe 
that the new XNV HCO and Dean will be situated within the OP’s 
premises. Finally, the seven-month transition from XGI to XNV also 
demonstrated high information asymmetry as the two parties worked on 
their respective salvage plans.  
 
While the University’s on-site VSM Dean was also institutionalised, the 
University demonstrated a high level of transparency in trying to help 
VSM grow its student enrolments. Learning from experience with the 
institutionalised Dean, the VKP HCO and its Dean were located away 
from the OP. 
 
After the tipping point, the University’s HCO in Country V led to a closer 
alignment of interests between the University and the OP because of the 
closer proximity. To improve local knowledge, the HCO employed two 
Country V nationals with long experience in TNE. University systems, 
processes and TNE organisation were revamped to improve 
communication among TNE executives, including communication 
between unit coordinators and OP teaching staff leading to familiarisation 
and minimal need for monitoring. The new HCO at XNV is also expected 
to result in higher transparency and closer alignment of interests. 
 
The re-negotiation of the VKP contract and the set up of the new XGI 
contract provided the University with the opportunity to undertake in-
depth scrutiny of the prospective partners (CI2). Regular student surveys 
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and annual contract reviews also afforded the opportunity for greater 
transparency at a more regular frequency. 
 
d) Maturity of Socio-legal-political Environment 
 
CI4 summed up the need for strong governance in saying that ‘the 
problem with contract enforcement is that they're only as good as you are 
willing to put effort in to hold people accountable for their responsibilities 
and obligations’. This section explores the maturity of formal legal 
institutions and non-formal social conventions in governing the exercise 
of property rights by the TNE partners. It also identifies branding and 
organisational reputation as possible implicit influences (Section 2.6.3).  
 
(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
The University operated TNE in Countries N, T, V and X prior to its TNE 
tipping point. Countries T and X are considered market accelerationist 
states providing both strong state and civil regulations, while V was 
considered a market facilitator state with strong civil regulations but weak 
state regulations in Mok’s Regulatory Regimes construct (Section 
5.2.2.2.2). N has strong state regulations but weak civil regulations, and 
is therefore an interventionist state. The Coface Risk Assessment Map 
locates all four countries within acceptable risk levels for private 
investment (Section 5.2.2.2.3), while the IESE-Emlyon Country 
Attractiveness Index recognises all four countries within the top quartile 
of the 125 countries studied in terms of relative attractiveness for 
investment (Section 5.2.2.2.4). The Index further identified Countries T 
and X as countries to increase investment exposure within the 2015-
2016 period. CI1 confirmed that the University looks for ‘stable markets 
… with proper governance’ in selecting TNE locations. 
 
The transition from XGI to XNV in Country X demonstrated the deference 
that the University and its OPs showed to the rule of law as well as the 
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higher education Regulator. All parties had to abide by the rule of law, 
resulting in the University and its new XNV OP being unable to ‘do 
anything’ for XNV during the transition (CI1). The XGI OP was similarly 
unable by law to commence with its new university partner until the 
legalities were sorted out (CI2). The University was clearly very sensitive 
to the Regulator’s views and response to the TNE termination and 
reversal (‘very concerned’, ‘scrutinised us closely thereafter’ – CI2; 
‘unhappy with both parties’ – CI1). After appointing a new OP, the 
University and the new OP visited the Regulator to mend fences, and 
‘we’re back in their good books’ (CI3). 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) CI2 GEN contracts not as strong/tight 
XGI OP’s new TNE with Uni A had  
   to wait for legal clearance to start 
XGI Regulator very concerned; Uni  
  and OP scrutinised closely 
thereafter 
TKD teachout is specialised 
NCE teachout is very expensive 
b) CI10  VSN, VSC, VSM pre-dated tightened  
   host country regulations  
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 XGI Uni reputation in doubt after  
   reversal 
XGI OP followed strict rule of  
   contract 
XGI OP another entity for new TNE 
XGI Regulator ‘take a long view’ 
 
b) CI3 XGI Regulator frown on reversals 
XGI Uni back in Regulator’s good 
   books 
XGI market rumours on termination 
 
c) CI7  VKP, VSM possible Regulator query on  
   program duplication 
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4  NCE not recognised by Country N 
VSM Uni requirement for teaching  
   under Accounting accreditation 
b) CI6  TKD education institution campus 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.57   University C Informant Perspectives on Maturity of  
Socio-legal-political Environment (Pre-tipping Point) 
 
The University was also concerned about possible damage to its own 
reputation in Country X arising from the initial pull-out (‘can we trust 
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Australian institutions?’) and rumours allegedly spread by a rival 
institution (CI3). 
 
In the case of TKD, the OP was acknowledged and appreciated as a 
formally constituted and accredited higher education institution, 
compared to some other non-education OPs (CI6). TKD was terminated 
by mutual agreement as a result of the OP’s upgrade to university 
college status (CI2). On the other hand, the NCE OP, an industry 
association delivered the University’s program within a regulatory 
environment that has unclear ‘territorial principle’ recognition of foreign 
awards (Ohmori 2015). It was interesting that this TNE operation was 
terminated prior to the University’s TNE tipping point because of ‘quality 
issues’ (CI2). 
 
In early TNE operations, teachouts were seen as University obligations 
to the TNE students (‘we don’t want them to feel that we’ve abandoned 
them’ – CI2). They are now mandated by TEQSA (TEQSA 2016). 
 
The VSN, VSC and VSM operations in Country V commenced when the 
country was promoting itself as a hub for international education 
(‘actively solicited foreign overseas’ institutions – CI10), prior to the 
tightening of the country’s education regulations (CI7). The regulatory 
tightening, a welcome development to improve industry reputation 
(CI10), reflected a move from a market facilitator state to a market 
accelerationist state (Section 5.2.2.2.2). The delivery of ‘exactly the 
same’ University programs in both VSM and VKP was consciously 
flagged as a possible query by the Regulator (CI7), reflecting the 
University’s acknowledgement of the Regulator’s keen oversight of the 
industry. While the compliance to Accounting accreditation requirements 
at VSM is required by the Accounting accreditation body, it was also 
seen as deference to market expectations in the marketplace (CI4). 
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(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
After its TNE tipping point, the University operated TNE only in Countries 
V and X.  The tightening of regulations in Country around 2011 increased 
its state regulations, making Country V a market accelerationist state. 
These countries therefore have good regulatory governance and as 
reported in (a) above, also feature attractive investment climates. The 
University was reported to be planning to deliver new TNE programs in 
2019 at Country H, an emerging country with ‘Very High’ Coface Country 
Risk rating (Section 5.2.2.2.3). 
 
The transition from XGI to XNV in Country X and the contract renewal at 
VKP provided the University with opportunities to ‘re-weight’ contracts 
that previously favoured OPs (CI11) and were thought to be ‘weren’t as 
strong as we’ve got now’ (CI2). The White Paper also contributed to 
various contractual improvements (CI1). However, CI4 is still of the view 
that these new contracts are not good enough ‘in terms of quality control 
measures and holding people accountable’. CI4 also added that ‘that is 
where the bureaucracy and senior management take over’ (to monitor 
and enforce the contracts). These reflections demonstrate the view that 
the University’s TNE contracts are incomplete and require either ex ante 
incentives alignment or ex post governance or adaptation. 
 
In Country X, the Regulator continued to require the University to hold 
the licence of the TNE operation (CI3). The OP must remain ‘in the 
background’ although it is effectively running the TNE operation under 
the University’s tight supervision (CI3) - emphasizing the value of the 
University’s brand in that market. 
 
On the contrary, the Country V Regulator requires the VKP OP to hold 
the TNE operating licence (CI3), thus limiting the University’s latitude in 
TNE delivery, including the delivery of new programs, some of which had 
been resisted by the OP (CI3). By requiring the VKP OP to hold the TNE 
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licence, the Regulator seems to be emphasizing the OP’s liability to 
ensure compliance to local regulatory requirements. The University’s 
interest in regulatory compliance seems assured by the OP’s 
‘government connections’ (CI11). 
 
The tightening of Country V’s education sector involved the need for TNE 
operators to register their operations and programs, and obtain approvals 
for teaching staff (CI7), change of major and name of unit (CI6) from 
DQF the Regulator. OPs are also required to sign DQF-compliant 
contracts with students (CI7). While CI6 thought that the Regulator might 
have been ‘overzealous’, and CI10 considered it ‘quite pedantic’, the 
tightening was in response to dubious TNE programs operated by ‘fly-by-
night’ operators and several ‘high profile failures’ (CI6). 
 
Country V’s higher education market is characterised by cost-sensitive 
full-time students who prefer local university programs and part-time 
students who respond to convenience and accelerated programs 
(Section App J 2.4). These behaviours have dictated the structure and 
pricing of TNE programs to ensure a competitive appeal. Further, the 
Country’s higher education policy directions favouring STEM and 
vocational skills have also hurt TNE providers who are not in these 
sectors (CI10). 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced 
Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) WP GEN outsource external marketing agency to enhance TNE  
   appeal 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI2 GEN Uni in Times Higher Education ranking 
GEN contracts ‘weren’t as strong as we’ve now got’ 
GEN risks higher in Country X compared to Country V 
c) CI10 GEN Uni home funding pressures motivating TNE 
GEN regulations can lift industry reputation 
GEN TNE pull back due to TEQSA; push back due to funding 
VKP OP holds licence of TNE operation 
VKP Regulator disapprove programs that are not run in home 
   Country; quite pedantic 
VKP education environment ‘unclear actually’ 
VKP Country V policies ‘hurt us a little bit’ 
d) CI11 GEN Uni due diligence considers sovereign risks, emerging  
   markets and first mover advantage 
VKP Uni fairer contract after re-weighting 
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VKP OP favoured in previous contract 
VKP OP has government connections 
XNV Uni ‘really good outcomes’ in 15-year contract 
XNV Uni-OP share same reasons for TNE participation 
XNV Uni engaged Regulator on research initiatives 
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 GEN Uni ranked ‘14th in the world’ 
GEN Uni ‘at the vagaries of’ Australian government policies 
GEN WP contributed to changes in contract 
VKP HCO minimise compliance risk 
XNV Uni has higher risk in transition due to contract 
XNV OP ‘can’t do anything’ during transition 
XNV Regulator no longer permit OP to run programs 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI3 GEN Uni learnt a lot from shortcomings of previous contracts 
GEN Uni’s home funding compel Uni to seek offshore income 
VKP OP holds licence of TNE operation 
VKP OP used HCO Dean as ‘white person’ in previews 
XNV Uni holds licence of TNE operation 
XNV OP operating in the background 
XNV OP cannot deliver its own program 
c) CI7 GEN Uni’s home funding compel Uni to seek offshore income 
VKP Uni has no competitive advantage from levelled rankings 
VKP OP’s regulatory compliance 
VKP OP intends to deliver skills programs 
VKP Country V education regulations tightened up in 2011 with  
   DQF set up; TNE and lecturers require registration with DQF 
VKP mandatory DQF student contract 
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4 GEN Uni TNE cannot be subsidised by onshore income 
VKP HCO research has reputation with Country V government 
VKP OP investment in University brand and reputation 
VKP re-negotiated contract not good enough 
VKP OP quality compliance requires Uni bureaucracy and 
senior  
   management oversight No 
outsourced 
model b) CI5 VKP DQF slow in approving new program c) CI6 VKP DQF set up in 2011 in response to high profile failures 
VKP DQF approval required for changes in major and unit 
name 
VKP DQF overzealous 
VKP Uni fear of adverse publicity 
d) CI8 VKP OP used Learning Advisor as ‘white person’ in previews 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   WP – White Paper;   GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.58   University C Informant Perspectives on Maturity of  
Socio-legal-political Environment (Post-tipping Point) 
 
The University’s branding and reputation in Country V is well recognised 
by University informants as well as the VKP OP. Several informants 
mentioned the value of the University’s Times Higher Education (THE) 
ranking in internationalisation as benefiting the University’s TNE 
operations (CI1, CI2, CI3, CI10). The HCO’s research unit SCORE is 
also becoming ‘better known, especially within the Country V government 
authorities’ (CI4), providing another branding advantage in the country. 
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On the flip side, the University is keenly aware of the reputational 
damage adverse publicity can have on its TNE operations (CI6). The 
University’s White Paper also emphasised the need to promote the 
‘distinctive University advantages e.g. local academic and administrative 
staff, local Principal, blended learning, internships, local research 
capability, increased face-to-face contact with University staff with 
international reputations’ (University C TNE Project Team 2013a). 
 
The VKP OP knew how to leverage on the University’s HCO staff for 
marketing previews, especially because they are ‘white people’ (CI3, 
CI8) – demonstrating a recognition of the University’s brand value. In 
fact, CI4 observed that the OP ‘also have a significant amount invested 
in being related to own our brand name and our reputation’. 
 
Apart from host country regulations, the University must also comply with 
its home country regulations, chiefly TEQSA regulations (CI11), including 
the observance of comparability of student experience across all delivery 
locations (CI1). TEQSA proactively engages and coordinates with the 
regulators of other TNE-active countries, e.g., Countries T, V and P, in 
regulating TNE (CI6). The University is further constrained to seek 
alternative funding through TNE by funding pressures in Australia (CI4, 
CI10), some of which CI1 considered unpredictable (‘at the vagaries of 
the government policies here’). 
 
The University initiated TNE operations within well-regulated countries 
both prior to and after its TNE tipping point. These Countries have been 
proven to provide a secure environment for the enforcement of TNE 
contracts, e.g., the orderly terminations at Countries T and N, the 
swapping of OPs in Country X, and the signing of the 10-year VKP 
contract. In a perverse turn, the Country V regulation that requires the 
OP to hold the TNE licence has resulted in the OP controlling what 
programs the University can deliver in the Country.  
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Given the University’s preference for stable and well-governed country 
environments, it was therefore surprising to note that the University will 
be launching a new TNE operation with its VKP OP in Country H, a 
country that is classified as having a Very High Coface risk rating, and 
unclassified in the other rating systems. 
 
Both the University and its OPs recognise the brand equity of the 
University, as demonstrated by the investment of the OPs in the 
University’s brand and reputation, and the University’s celebration of it's 
the ranking. The University has also benefitted financially and reputation-
wise from the performance of its research centre, SCORE in Country V. 
 
5.4.2.3.3 Agency Theory 
 
University C TNE operations are tested against AT reflectors to 
determine if AT has any traction in the University’s TNE decisions. 
 
a) Costs of Search and Monitoring 
 
The University was observed to have been lax in its due diligence of 
prospective TNE partners in the past, e.g.,  signing up ‘small companies’ 
as OPs (CI6) and passively allowing its XGI OP to dictate the types of 
programs for Country X market (CI1). CI2 attributed these mis-steps to a 
lack of familiarity with TNE (CI2). The previously ‘opportunistic, a bit 
reactive’ approaches have been replaced by more in-depth scrutiny by 
the University’s senior executives (CI1, CI3). In some instances, the 
tighter scrutiny was motivated by the dread of adverse publicity (CI6). 
 
University staff acknowledge that due diligence needs to be followed up 
with close monitoring of and holding OPs responsible for compliance with 
the University’s agenda and quality standards (CI4), especially in view of 
the physical distance (CI4, CI10). The benchmarks are largely based on 
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TEQSA’s requirements (CI2), but requires investment in mechanisms for 
monitoring and adaptation (CI1). 
 
(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
The University’s XGI operation demonstrated a lack of research on the 
prospective partner (CI2), which failed to deliver on training for its own 
staff and a promised regional expansion (CI1). CI2 described the 
University’s passive consent to the OP’s choice of TNE programs as its 
‘biggest risk’. CI1 suggested that this could have been due to the OP’s 
interesting proposal amidst the Country’s booming economy at that time 
– which ‘buoyed or even seduced’ the University to act outside of its 
strategic plan. On retrospect, CI3 noted that the OP was not ‘great at 
marketing’ and ‘don’t know education’. CI4 agreed, remarking that the 
OP had ‘no educational institution of their own’ and had ‘no academic 
background’.  
 
CI3 concluded that the University’s senior executive who signed the 
contract and ‘the people that worked in TNE at the University (did not) 
set things up as well as they could have been set up’, contributing to 
poor monitoring (‘we let the OP have too much control’) of OP teaching 
staff approvals and lax admissions standards. 
 
In NCE, the University failed to identify the need to support the OP in an 
expensive ‘experimental’ fly-in-fly-out bi-lingual program, and allowed the 
operation to continue with quality issues for seven years before 
terminating it just before TEQSA commenced (CI2). 
 
At VSM, the University was closely monitoring the OP and started to 
increase its assistance when it discovered that the OP had a change in 
management and was not focussed on TNE (CI3). It was in Country V 
that the University first deployed its own on-site Principals to monitor and 
quality assure its TNE programs (CI3). This monitoring episode failed 
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because the Principals were compromised by being institutionalised by 
the OP (CI3, CI4). On termination, VSM students were easily transferred 
to VKP and hence minimised the University’s teachout monitoring costs. 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) CI2 XGI Uni biggest risk in following  
   OP’s choice of programs 
XGI Uni new in TNE 
XGI OP not done market research;  
   convinced Uni on program viability 
NCE operated for 7 years 
NCE costly fly-in-fly-out mode 
VSM Uni had ‘5 deans in 11 years’ 
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 XGI OP’s AA region business  
   penetration did not materialise 
XGI OP’s initial staff training  
   objective not implemented 
XGI OP ‘didn’t do any research’ on  
   TNE viability; proposed something  
   interesting 
XGI Uni buoyed by market  
   exuberance 
 
b) CI3 XGI OP not ‘great at marketing’;  
   ‘don’t know education’ 
XGI Uni to blame for not setting up  
   well, giving OP ‘too much control’ 
VSM Uni tried ‘all sorts of things’ to  
   help OP succeed 
VSM OP ‘weren’t focussed’ 
VSM on-site Principal institutionalised;  
   now dean located separately 
VSM teachout students transferred to  
   VKP smoothly  
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4 XGI OP ‘no academic background’;  
   ‘no global network’ 
NCE Uni quality control concerns 
VSM Principal captured by  
   organisation 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University 
 
Table 5.59   University C Informant Perspectives on Costs of Search  
and Monitoring (Pre-tipping Point) 
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
CI2 remarked that recent contract preparations were ‘much more 
thorough than … we did in 10 or 11 years ago ... (and) so obviously the 
data on their (i.e., OP’s) track record, their financials, then their ability to 
recruit, their network of recruiting agents, their reputation with the 
government and regulatory body’ were scrutinised. 
 
The negotiations with the XNV OP took a long time, where the University 
invested in in-depth scrutiny of the prospective OP. In the process, it 
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discovered an OP that was ‘very experienced’, a ‘good partner’, with 
‘good agent network’ and ‘proven track record’ (CI10, CI2), and very 
importantly, a partner that was in TNE for  the ‘same reasons’ as the 
University (CI11). It was noted that the negotiations were shrouded in 
secrecy because of the commercial sensitivity of the OP transition (CI1).  
 
The VKP OP was ‘big, and they had greater aspirations, greater 
resources, the means to deliver … to be a better partner than the VSM 
OP’ (CI1), and ‘likely to get more students attracted through them to our 
programs’ (CI4). The VKP OP turned out to be a ‘marketing machine’ 
with ‘extensive agents’, delivering the largest TNE student population 
among its university partners (CI1). The issue with the VKP OP was not 
adverse selection, but monitoring its compliance with University and 
regulatory requirements in a rapidly growing TNE operation which CF2 
described as a ‘very large beast’. The set up of the HCO was the first 
step in monitoring and supporting the rapidly growing TNE operation 
(CI11). The second step was instituting clear policies from the White 
Paper recommendations (CI3). Finally, the negotiations for contract 
renewal provided added opportunity for building in additional 
requirements (CI10).  
 
The University’s investment in the HCO at VKP provided leadership by a 
Dean (CI7), greater control of the TNE operation (CI3), closer alignment 
of interests (CI10) and better OP monitoring (CI10) – a necessary 
bureaucracy (CI4). CI1 concluded that the HCO made the operation 
more secure because there were ‘more people paid by the University’ on 
site, including Country V nationals with extensive TNE experience (CI7, 
CI9). The HCO is however not considered capital intensive (CI11).  
 
The close monitoring by the HCO enabled the University to innovate, 
e.g., change its 12-weekly class delivery mode to a 6-fortnightly one to 
ease the pressure on students (CI1). The introduction of its blended 
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learning delivery is also seen to possibly help reduce monitoring costs 
(CI3).  
 
To provide greater monitoring and control in Country X, the University 
was in the process of establishing a HCO at XNV (CI11) staffed by a 
Dean and an admissions executive (CI1). Unlike at VKP, the XNV Dean 
is located ‘where the teaching is done’ (CI4). This HCO will also employ 
program coordinators who are expected to have ‘a lot more control over 
all their (i.e., OP) teaching staff’ (CI3). 
 
It was interesting to note that the tightened education industry regulations 
in Country V provided a proxy for the University’s TNE monitoring, as 
‘everything needs to be approved by DQF’, the Regulator (CI7). While 
there are costs of compliance, the regulations can reduce the 
University’s monitoring costs. Further, CI10 commented that the tight 
regulations were beneficial in lifting the reputation of the industry, 
although the Regulator can sometimes be pedantic.  
 
Recommendations of the White Paper on ‘non-negotiable minimas’ in 
TNE delivery, policy on large cohorts and a high quality digital interface 
provided the HCO with greater clarity in dealing with the VKP OP 
(University C TNE Project Team 2013a), and thus help reduce the cost of 
monitoring. 
 
TNE monitoring also involves infrastructure investments in the home 
campus of the University, including the setting up of the UTO and the 
TCG (CI3). Senior executives were required to undertake annual TNE 
contract reviews (CI3). The schools were required to take on additional 
responsibilities (CI5), e.g., implementing a three-part moderation process 
and administering student surveys (CI4). In some cases, the OP’s 
teaching staff have been found to be extremely reliable and have 
contributed to the content of study materials (CI5). However, the 
development of these OP teaching staff, and the nurturing of trust 
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between the University’s unit coordinators and OP teaching staff take 
time to develop (CI4). 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced 
Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) WP GEN Uni identified threats to reputation and revenue  
GEN imposed ‘non-negotiable minima’ in TNE delivery 
GEN policy framework around very large student cohorts 
GEN high quality Uni-OP digital interface 
VKP HCO full-time academic staff to be appointed 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI2 VKP OP track record scrutinised in contract renewal  
XNV OP has proven track record 
c) CI10 GEN regulations can lift industry reputation 
GEN opportunistic and reactive approach 
GEN governance framework that oversees all of TNE 
VKP Regulator can be quite pedantic 
VKP OP need reminder of protocols 
VKP three-piece TNE management seems to work 
XNV OP very experienced, good agent network 
d) CI11 GEN Uni ‘scrutinised everything’; HCO ‘not capital intensive’ 
XNV HCO helmed by a Dean 
XNV OP in TNE for the ‘same reasons’ as Uni 
XNV negotiations took a long time 
 
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 VKP Uni unit coordinators work directly with OP teaching staff 
VKP Uni changed delivery mode from 12-weekly to 6- 
   fortnightly classes in response to market 
VKP HCO minimise compliance risk; ‘involve ourselves more’ 
VKP OP ‘greater aspirations’, ‘greater resources’, ‘better  
   partner’ than VSM 
VKP more secure than at XNV due to more paid Uni people 
XNV HCO ‘two staff employed by the Uni’ 
XNV ‘a lot of commercial-in-confidence’ 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI3 GEN TNE due diligence controlled by senior executive group 
GEN use blended learning to reduce student contact hours 
VKP Uni-OP annual contract review 
VKP HCO a lot more control and oversight of whole operation 
VKP HCO employed experienced ‘people on the ground’ 
XNV HCO program coordinators, paid by Uni,  assist in OP  
   teaching staff control 
XNV OP ‘a much more experienced partner … that  
   understands’ education 
c) CI7 VKP HCO headed by a Dean 
VKP ‘everything needs to be approved by DQF’ 
VKP CI7 is a Country V national employed in TNE for 10 years 
d) CI9 VKP CI9 is a Country V national employed in TNE for 9 years  
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4 GEN 3-part moderation process 
GEN Uni needs to hold ‘people accountable’ for better contract  
   compliance 
GEN Uni-OP time needed to build up trust 
VKP Uni distance results in concerns with cultural and social 
sensitivities, and meeting unit coordinator expectations 
VKP Uni and OP student surveys 
VKP HCO a necessary bureaucracy for comparable  
   student experience 
VKP OP quality compliance requires Uni bureaucracy and 
senior  
   management oversight 
XNV HCO ‘Dean located where the teaching is done’ 
No 
outsourced 
model 
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XNV OP ‘more likely to get more students’ 
b) CI5 VKP Uni need not ‘look over shoulder’ 
c) CI6 GEN setting up with small companies  
GEN Uni unit coordinator monitoring OP teaching staff directly 
VKP Uni unit coordinator-OP teaching staff liaison ‘with great  
   difficulty’ 
VKP Uni fear of adverse publicity 
VKP Uni moderate assessments, including exams 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   WP – White Paper;   GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.60   University C Informant Perspectives on Costs of Search  
and Monitoring (Post-tipping Point) 
 
CI10 envisions the future of the University’s TNE management to require 
the set up of a high level governance framework involving senior 
executives of the University that oversees all of TNE in the University in a 
more strategic, rather than adhoc fashion.  
 
In summary, pre-tipping point, the University, or rather its schools (which 
were the principal drivers of TNE) were seen to have been less particular 
and stringent in selecting its OPs. These selections were opportunistic 
and reactive, and resulted in poor selection of marketable programs, 
unacceptable quality delivery and low financial returns for the University. 
The University’s TNE administration systems and processes were 
rudimentary (CF2) and hence, failed to closely monitor its TNE 
operations. Early deployment of on-site Principals to monitor and support 
OPs, while exemplary, was thwarted by the institutionalisation of these 
Principals by the OPs. While the University picked up VSM’s change of 
management and loss of TNE focus, and provided increased support, the 
TNE operation ultimately failed. The University’s perception of the costs 
of search and monitoring was thus low because of the lack of familiarity 
with the industry and lower quality benchmarks. 
 
Post-tipping point, the University invested a lot more in its due diligence 
and contract preparations. It also invested in both its onshore TNE 
administration infrastructure, as well as its offshore HCOs. The White 
 495 
Paper was the driver for many of the changes in the planning and 
monitoring of its TNE operations. 
 
b) University Risk Aversion 
 
This section explores the University’s perspectives on TNE risks and its 
responses to risk mitigation. These risks relate to both the quality of the 
OP (e.g., concerns on adverse selection and moral hazard), and the 
operating environment. Going by CI1’s comment that the University 
prefers stable country operating environments, it is not surprising to 
observe the University operating within countries that are in the three 
lowest Coface risk classifications (Section 5.2.2.2.3). Its new Country H 
TNE venture however, seems to be an anomaly because of the 
Country’s ‘Very High’ risk classification. 
 
The University’s TNE history is marked by shifts from a laissez-faire 
delivery of r-FPs (‘didn’t do any research’ – CI1) to tighter control via ic-
IBC and i-FP (‘a lot more control and oversight’ – CI3), and through to a 
future vision for a proactive, strategic management via a high level 
governance framework (CI10).  
 
The University is observed to have accepted the need for TNE to 
generate much-needed funding (CI10), or to diversify its funding sources 
(CI1). It was also clear that ‘transnational always has moderate risks’ 
despite engaging ‘experienced global provider(s)’, who may be ‘well 
established … with other universities’ (CI2). 
 
For the University, TNE risks are usually financial (CI4), capital 
commitments (CI11), reputational (e.g., risk of adverse publicity (CI6), 
adverse market rumours (CI3)) and legal incrimination (CI4). CI4 also 
noted the risk of mismatched expectations arising from the ‘tyranny of 
distance’ (CI10). 
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Apart from generic TNE risks, the University has to assess risks 
associated with adverse selection and monitoring of OPs (‘risk has really 
been just related to the partner (i.e., the XGI OP)’ - CI2), the competitive 
business environment (CI2), the regulatory environment (CI8, CI7, CI10), 
and the social environment (‘biggest risk we took there’ – CI3). In 
comparing countries, CI2 remarked that the ‘risk was always greater in 
Country X (compared to Country V)’. 
 
(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
The University’s early TNE ventures were invariably r-FPs and described 
as ‘opportunistic’ and ‘reactive’ (CI10). They included bi-lingual 
experiments in Country N (CI6).  
 
CI10 reported that ‘different schools or faculties were doing bits and 
pieces’ of TNE. These early ‘risk-taking’ operations were initiated and 
administered by individual schools, motivated by offshore revenue (CI4). 
The delivery of these operations was usually undertaken by non-
education OPs, including ‘small companies’ (CI6), giving rise to ‘very 
high risks’ (CI11). The sole TKD ‘education institution’ OP brought a lot of 
assurance and was described as ‘like being at home’ (CI6). The early 
TNE r-FPs were more prone to teachouts, which were sometimes ‘very 
expensive’ because of the small numbers of remaining students (CI2). 
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No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) WP   
b) CI2 XGI Uni biggest risk in following  
   OP’s choice of programs 
XGI OP not done market research;  
   convinced Uni on program viability 
XGI OP risk related to partner 
XGI Regulator very concerned; Uni  
  and OP scrutinised closely 
thereafter 
NCE operated for 7 years 
NCE costly fly-in-fly-out mode 
NCE teachout is very expensive 
TKD teachout is specialised 
 
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 XGI OP ‘didn’t do any research’ on  
   TNE viability 
XGI Uni reputation in doubt after  
   reversal 
XGI Regulator ‘take a long view’ 
 
b) CI3 XGI Uni back in Regulator’s good 
   Books 
XGI Uni gave OP too much control 
XGI OP not ‘great at marketing’;  
   ‘don’t know education’ 
XGI Regulator frown on reversals 
XGI difficult to get back in market 
XGI market rumours on termination 
VSM on-site Principal institutionalised;  
   now dean located separately  
 
c) CI7  VKP, VSM possible Regulator query on  
   program duplication 
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4 XGI OP ‘no academic background’;  
   ‘no global network’ 
XGI complaints to government 
NCE was experimental 
VSM Principal captured by  
   organisation 
b) CI5   
c) CI6  TKD education institution campus 
TKD ‘like being at home’ 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.61   University C Informant Perspectives on University Risk  
Aversion (Pre-tipping Point) 
  
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
The schools’ entrepreneurial and independent (of the University’s central 
management) TNE approach in early TNE ventures was picked up by 
senior executives as potential reputational risks (CI10), and thereafter, all 
TNE operations were initiated and monitored centrally (CI3). This 
represented the first stage of the University’s gradual tightening of control 
over TNE operations. 
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The second stage was represented by the University’s TNE review, 
which was triggered by risks to its academic integrity, reputation and 
revenue streams. It provided an opportunity to explore various TNE 
business delivery models, ranging from the w-IBCs to the r-FPs 
(University C TNE Project Team 2013a). Acknowledging its limited size 
and capacity for offshore investment, the University avoided the w-IBC 
model (CI4). Moreover, the w-IBC entailed ‘higher risk’ (CI7), higher 
infrastructure requirement (CI1), higher capital expenditure (CI11) and 
higher operating investments (CI11). 
 
The ic-IBC and i-FP models, using on-site HCOs, were affirmed as TNE 
business delivery models of choice in the White Paper (Ibid.) because 
they represent ‘the lower of risk modelling’ (CI11), ‘somewhere between’ 
the w-IBC and the r-FP (CI11). In fact, the VKP contract was re-
negotiated to effect a re-weighting of risk-sharing between the partners 
(CI11). The dropping of the VSM OP in favour of the VKP OP, and the 
swapping of OPs in Country X is seen as risk mitigation initiatives in 
favour of the more experienced OPs (CI1, CI3, CI4, CI10). 
 
In terms of the operating environment, the University was acutely 
conscious of the gravity of potential regulatory violations in Countries V 
(‘question why we have two partners’ – CI7) and X (‘we’re back in their 
good books’ – CI3). It employed its SCORE research centre to engage 
the Country V government (CI4), and proactively visited the Country X 
Regulator with its new XNV OP (CI3) – to cultivate good governmental 
relations. 
 
While the ic-IBC and i-FP are preferred models of delivery, they also 
come with various other risks. In the case of the Country X ic-IBC (XNV), 
the University risks having its on-site Dean institutionalised (again) by the 
new OP. For the i-FP in Country V (VKP), the University have had to live  
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No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced 
Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) WP GEN Uni identified threats to academic integrity, reputation  
   and revenue  
GEN imposed ‘non-negotiable minima’ in TNE delivery 
GEN policy framework around very large student cohorts 
GEN high quality Uni-OP digital interface 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI2 GEN ‘always a risk transnationally’; ‘moderate risk’ 
GEN risks higher in Country X compared to Country V  
XNV incredibly competitive environment 
XNV OP has proven track record 
c) CI10 GEN opportunistic and reactive approach 
GEN governance framework that oversees all of TNE 
GEN Uni home funding pressures motivating TNE 
GEN schools ‘doing bits and pieces’ 
VKP OP holds licence of TNE operation 
XNV OP very experienced, good agent network 
d) CI11 GEN Uni ‘scrutinised everything’; HCO ‘not capital intensive’ 
GEN Uni due diligence considers sovereign risks, emerging  
   markets and first mover advantage 
GEN w-IBC has high capital risk 
GEN early TNE were very high risk 
GEN risk of not complying with TEQSA 
GEN HCO is the lower of risk modelling 
VKP Uni fairer contract after re-weighting in risk share 
XNV HCO helmed by a Dean; admissions executive 
XNV Uni engaged Regulator on research initiatives 
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 GEN ‘has to be stable’ 
GEN ‘very high risk in those days’ 
GEN ‘a little bit more secure … more people paid by Uni’ 
GEN other operations to diversify income 
GEN HCO ‘somewhere in between’ r-FP and w-IBC 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI3 GEN TNE due diligence centralised 
VKP HCO a lot more control and oversight of whole operation 
VKP OP do not want to run some Uni programs 
XNV HCO program coordinators, paid by Uni,  assist in OP  
   teaching staff control 
XNV OP ‘a much more experienced partner … that  
   understands’ education 
c) CI7 GEN ic-IBC risk higher than w-IBC 
GEN ‘reputational risks’ 
VKP ‘very regulated environment’ 
d) CI9 VKP Country V ‘politically stable’ 
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4 GEN Uni risk-taking by schools 
GEN Uni small size 
GEN risk of mismatched expectations 
VKP OP potential conflicts of interest No 
outsourced 
model 
c) CI6 GEN Uni schools engaged ‘small companies’ 
GEN w-IBC ‘high risk of not having numbers’ 
VKP Uni fear of adverse publicity 
VKP OP risk of OP sales team bias 
d) CI8 VKP high risk for foreign institutions 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   WP – White Paper;   GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.62   University C Informant Perspectives on University Risk  
Aversion (Post-tipping Point) 
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with the OP’s multiplicity of university partners (CI4), control of the TNE 
operating licence (and hence, control of University C programs approved 
to be delivered) (CI3), and the risk of termination by the OP (CI7). 
 
Prior to its tipping point, the University was involved in TNE largely 
through the entrepreneurial agency of its schools within an environment 
of low onshore and offshore regulatory requirements. The University did 
not commit a lot of TNE-specific assets in those early TNE operations, 
but relied on the OP’s delivery infrastructure due to its high risk aversion.  
 
The rapid growth of the VKP TNE operation triggered the University to 
consider threats to its academic integrity, reputation and revenue 
streams arising from poorly managed TNE operations. The TNE review 
that followed heightened the University’s sensitivity to TNE risk, and 
brought about many proactive policy, process and structural changes to 
the ‘very large beast’ of the TNE administration (CF2). Its preference is 
for an on-site presence which provides leadership, administration and 
support services to both the OP and TNE students. The measures taken 
by the University to ameliorate TNE risks have afforded the University 
the latitude to explore high risk countries such as Country H. 
 
c) Incentives Alignment 
 
The aim of this section is to determine if the University and its OPs take 
ex ante incentives alignment into consideration when developing TNE 
collaborations. Most informants identified monetary gain as the 
motivating factor for TNE participation of both the University and the OPs 
(CI1, CI2, CI5, CI6, CI7, CI9). For the OPs, this was obvious because of 
their commercial nature, including TKD a higher education institution that 
was operated privately (CI6).  
 
In the case of the University, TNE seems to be an important source of 
alternative funds (CI3, CI10), mainly due to reducing Australian 
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government funding (CI10) and decreasing domestic student enrolments 
(CI3). CI2 asserted that ‘it has to generate an income for the University ... 
we can’t be there with a sense of service and benevolence and things 
like that ... it has to fund the research here, for example’. In addition to 
TNE income, the University is keen to generate income from international 
students studying on the University’s home campus (‘significant amounts 
of money’ – CI6). Independently, four University C researchers have 
published a paper asserting that ‘a significant reduction in public funding 
… has driven a financial imperative for higher education providers to 
diversify their revenue sources’ and ‘that period of time has also seen 
higher education providers developing a significant focus on recruiting 
international fee-paying students as well as expanding into 
offshore/transnational education (TNE) operations’ (Holloway et al. 2013, 
11).  
 
The Country V HCO seeded the SCORE research centre that was later 
able to tap into funding from both Country V government and the private 
sector (‘good government funding’ and ‘traction from investors in Country 
V’ - CI2). CI11 noted that the research portfolio enabled the University to 
‘balance the two off’, i.e., between teaching and research/community 
engagement. 
 
(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
The early TNE operations were opportunistic and reactive, resulting in 
‘bit and pieces’ of TNE operations (CI10), many of which are delivered by 
‘small companies’ which have no education background (CI6). These 
were initiated and administered by the schools, without central university 
coordination, and motivated by profit (CI10). Some OPs lured the schools 
with promises of ‘hundreds of students’ which did not materialise (CI4). 
Only two TNE operations stood out in longevity, viz., TKD (21 years) and 
VSM (11 years) among the early TNE operations. The TKD OP is a 
private higher education provider and thus was more closely aligned with 
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the University compared to other non-education OPs. The VSM OP, 
although a trade association, had an interest in the training of its  
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) CI2 XGI Uni ‘didn’t generate enough  
   profit to sustain’ 
XGI Uni ‘some failed Deans’ 
XGI OP’s Media and Film focus 
XGI OP’s focus misplaced 
 
NCE operated for 7 years 
NCE costly fly-in-fly-out mode 
NCE teachout is very expensive 
TKD teachout is specialised 
 
b) CI10  VSN, VSC, VSM pre-dated tightened  
   host country regulations 
c) CI11   
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 XGI Uni motivation is financial 
XGI Uni destroyed trust through  
   reversal 
XGI OP made money from  
   Foundation program 
XGI OP’s AA region business  
   penetration did not materialise 
XGI OP’s initial staff training  
   objective not implemented 
XGI OP upset with Uni leaving 
XGI OP followed strict rule of  
   contract 
XGI OP’s TNE motive is mainly  
   financial 
XGI OP recruited for XNV; XNV OP  
   cannot do anything in transition 
XGI Uni and XNV OP ‘can’t do  
   anything’ 
 
b) CI3 XGI OP ‘there’s money to be made’ 
XGI Uni one Dean institutionalised 
XGI OP recruited students for XNV 
VSM OP ‘weren’t focussed’; ‘don’t do 
education anymore’ 
c) CI7  VSM Uni introduced exactly the same 
   programs at VKP 
VSM and VKP same programs a 
‘waste of resources’ 
d) CI9   
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4  VSM Principal captured by  
   organisation 
b) CI5   
c) CI6  TKD education institution campus 
d) CI8   
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.63   University C Informant Perspectives on Incentives  
Alignment (Pre-tipping Point) 
 
members. It however, lost focus in education as a result of a change in 
management, and ultimately ‘don’t do education anymore’ (CI3). The 
 503 
demise of the VSM operation was also precipitated by the University’s 
decision to start the VKP operation, offering ‘exactly the same’ programs 
as in VSM (CI7). 
 
At XGI, both the University and the OP were motivated by profit (CI1, 
CI3). However, while the University ‘didn’t generate enough profit to 
sustain’ (CI2), the OP ‘made their money with the Foundation’ program, a 
feeder into the University’s programs (CI1). The failure to grow the 
University’s programs was attributed to the OP’s ‘misplaced’ choice of 
Media and Film programs that were not as popular as Business 
programs (CI2). The OP also failed to deliver on the training of its staff 
and the promised regional expansion (CI1). 
 
The initial appointment of University Deans to monitor the XGI operation 
failed due to institutionalisation by the OP, resulting in a number of non-
compliance (CI2, CI3). 
 
The termination of the XGI contract on expiry ‘upset’ the OP and 
‘destroyed the trust’ between partners (CI1). The subsequent re-entry of 
the University into the Country V market via the XNV OP encountered 
some difficulties resulting from the XGI OP’s insistence on the ‘strict rule 
of the contract’. The University had to rely on the XGI OP to recruit 
students during the final seven months of the XGI operation (CI3), while 
the XNV OP had to wait in the wings, unable to ‘do anything’ (CI1). 
 
It was interesting to note that on termination, the teachout of remaining 
students becomes the sole responsibility of the University as 
demonstrated in the TKD, NCE and VSM teachouts. Fortunately for the 
University, the VSM teachout was effected by the transfer of VSM 
students to the VKP operation (CI3). 
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(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
In reversing the decision to terminate TNE operations in Country X, the 
new VC argued that it would have been a waste to throw away the 10 
years of reputation-building there (CI3). CI3 added that the University 
have ‘very big plans with the new XNV OP’, which have a ‘proven track 
record’ (CI11), and known to be ‘very experienced’,  a ‘good partner’, 
with ‘good agent network’. The University anticipates that this OP is 
‘more likely to get more students’ (CI4). The OP is also favoured 
because of its network in the AA region which the University is interested 
to synergise with its own research interests in that region (CI2).   
 
The phenomenal growth at VKP triggered the TNE review which 
highlighted the threat to the University’s revenue streams, among other 
things (University C TNE Project Team 2013a). The set up of the HCO 
was expedited as an intermediate White Paper strategy (Ibid.). The HCO 
also benefitted the OP through the University’s oversight of OP teaching 
staff (CI5), timely issuance of offer letters (CI7), academic support for 
students (CI8), host country University brand presence (CI3), hosting of 
supplementary examinations (CI8) and leveraging on the University’s 
international staff for marketing (CI3, CI8). 
 
No. Infor-
mant 
Perspectives 
Direct Model Outsourced 
Model 
1 Strategic Role 
a) WP GEN Uni identified threats to academic integrity, reputation  
   and revenue  
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI2 GEN TNE ‘has to generate income for Uni’ 
VKP HCO SCORE ‘attract good government funding’ 
VKP HCO SCORE ‘traction from investors’ 
VKP HCO SCORE seeded by HCO 
VKP Uni better return; committed to growth 
VKP OP benefit from curriculum advantages 
VKP Uni-OP ‘win-win’ new contract 
VKP lost 2-year degree advantage 
XNV Uni-OP good research synergies 
c) CI10 GEN Uni needs to focus on TNE because onshore maxed out 
VKP Uni don’t have OP capabilities 
VKP Uni strategic plan to be gateway for AS, SS and SA 
regions 
VKP Uni-OP contract re-negotiations exhausting and complex 
VKP Uni and OP financial modelling quite striking 
VKP Uni-OP mutually-assured destruction on pull-out 
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VKP Uni-OP expand into Country H due to mature Country V 
VKP OP getting ‘bigger flow of income’ 
VKP OP local knowledge, reputation and brand, efficient TNE    
   administration model and contemporary campus 
d) CI11 VKP HCO SCORE ‘balance the two off’ 
VKP Uni fairer contract after re-weighting in risk share 
VKP OP carrying more infrastructure and capital risks 
XNV OP has proven track record 
2 Managerial Role 
a) CI1 GEN Uni at the vagaries of government policies 
GEN Uni need to diversify income 
GEN Uni priority for ‘stable’ countries with ‘proper governance’ 
VKP Uni better fee share; ‘involve ourselves more’ 
VKP Uni changed delivery mode from 12-weekly to 6- 
   fortnightly classes in response to market 
VKP OP benefit from ‘pretty cheap’ Uni programs 
VKP OP ‘greater aspirations’, ‘greater resources’, ‘better  
   partner’ than VSM 
VKP OP operates in Country P and can help Uni expansion 
No 
outsourced 
model 
b) CI3 GEN Uni onshore climate motivational push for TNE 
GEN Uni strategic plan to grow onshore and offshore 
VKP Uni use blended learning to reduce student contact hours 
VKP Uni more favourable financial returns from new contract 
VKP HCO control and oversight 
VKP OP used HCO Dean as ‘white person’ in previews 
VKP OP runs programs of 11 uni partners 
VKP OP did not want to run Uni programs 
XNV Uni not throw away 10-year reputation 
XNV Uni has ‘very big plans with the new XGI OP’ 
c) CI7 VKP Uni has no competitive advantage from levelled rankings 
VKP HCO quick issuance of offer letters 
d) CI9 VKP HCO alumni considered PR asset 
3 Academic Role 
a) CI4 GEN Uni try placing as much financial risk as possible on OP 
GEN OP ‘potential for hundreds of students’ 
VKP Uni executives are ‘not business people’ 
VKP Uni research centre obtained more funding in Country V  
   than from Australia for some areas 
VKP OP invested in Uni brand/reputation 
VKP OP runs its own diploma programs 
VKP OP’s other partners as ‘risk diversification’ – a potential  
   conflict of interest 
VKP OP attempted to walk out of contract re-negotiation 
XNV OP ‘more likely to get more students’ 
No 
outsourced 
model b) CI5 VKP Uni earns significant amounts from onshore international  
   students  
VKP HCO oversight of OP teaching staff 
VKP OP sales management, program management, lecturer  
   management and exam management teams 
c) CI6 GEN international onshore generate significant amounts of  
   money 
d) CI8 VKP HCO Learning Advisor provide student support 
VKP HCO provide supplementary examinations 
VKP OP used Learning Advisor as ‘white person’ in previews 
Abbreviations :   Uni – University;   WP – White Paper;  GEN – generic comments 
 
Table 5.64   University C Informant Perspectives on Incentives  
Alignment (Post-tipping Point) 
 
 506 
The VKP OP reciprocated with investments in its admissions, program 
management, lecturer management and examinations management 
teams to cater for the University’s programs (CI5), and in the University’s 
brand (CI3, CI4). The VKP OP was considered ‘big, and they had greater 
aspirations, greater resources, the means to deliver … to be a better 
partner than the VSM OP’ (CI1), and ‘likely to get more students 
attracted through them to our programs’ (CI4). The assumption of 
responsibility over a large number of TNE processes, and infrastructure 
and capital risks (CI11) meant that the VKP can enjoy a ‘bigger flow of 
income’ (CI10). Indeed, CI10 reported that the University did not have 
the capabilities that the OP had, and thus have to ‘try and place as much 
of the financial investment risk on the organisation that chooses to be the 
one that manages and delivers our programs, and they are the ones that 
have to enter into building leases, equipment leases … they are the ones 
with the sunk costs’ (CI4). 
 
The success of the VKP operation was to some extent due to the 
University’s willingness to be flexible in permitting the completion of 3-
year degrees within two years (CI2) and pricing the programs ‘pretty 
cheap … at the bottom end’ (CI1). Some informants pointed out the 
danger of a levelling playing field, where the advantages of a shorter 
duration program (CI2) and University ranking (CI7) are being matched 
by the competition. To maintain its competitiveness, the University 
changed its delivery mode (CI1) and introduced blended learning (CI3). 
The HCO also proactively reached out and serviced its alumni, and in the 
process, considered them as the University’s PR (public relations) assets 
(CI9). 
 
Before the expiry of the VKP contract, the two parties entered an 
‘exhausting’ and ‘complex’ 18-month negotiation (CI10), which was 
almost aborted (CI4). During the negotiations, the partners developed 
10-year financial models where ‘the total value of the partnership was … 
quite striking for both parties’ (CI10). The ‘win-win’ contract (CI2) was 
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ultimately re-weighted in terms of commercial outcomes ‘to be a lot fairer 
towards the University in terms of both risk sharing and IP development 
and the infrastructure partner requirement … their overheads … the 
models are now …  settled, in place in the University in that we’ve got a 
better way to share the revenues coming from the partnership with 
respect to relevant risks, overheads and development costs for IP, etc’ 
(CI11). The University now receive a ‘higher fee share … but involve 
ourselves more’ (CI1).  
 
Both the University and the VKP OP have ambitions to expand 
throughout the region, particularly into the AS, SS and SA regions, where 
the University has identified five new countries for exploration (CI10). 
These ambitions are motivated by the OP’s own Country P presence and 
large network of agents region-wide (CI1). The first TNE to be jointly 
launched outside of Country V will be in Country H, an emerging 
economy (CI3, CI10) – which seems incongruent with the University’s 
stated TNE criteria for ‘stable’ countries with ‘proper governance’ (CI1).  
 
While the interests of the University and the VKP OP ‘are actually quite 
aligned’ (CI10), the University have had to accommodate the OP’s 
delivery of its own (CI4) and 11 other university programs (CI3) in the 
same location. CI4 remarked that the University ‘doesn’t share these 
concerns’ of the OP’s ‘potential conflicts of interests’. The University 
have had to also live with the control the OP has on the choice of 
programs to deliver in Country V (‘the VKP OP sometimes don’t want to 
run programs that we feel … should run well’ – CI3). These are the trade-
offs that the University and the VKP OP have had to make as they ‘really 
depend upon each other quite a lot’, and a termination of the operation 
might lead to ‘mutually-assured destruction’ (CI10). 
 
The University’s experience with incentive alignment can be observed in 
the swapping of OPs in Country X and the market dominance of VKP 
(over VSM) in Country V. The XGI and VSM operations seem to have 
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encountered poor alignment of incentives, triggering the University to re-
assess its partnerships and ultimately favouring the XNV and VKP OPs 
due to their superior experience and resources. The negotiations to 
renew the VKP contract was also an exercise in refining incentive 
alignment between the two parties.  
 
Prior to the University’s TNE tipping point, the University and its OPs 
shared rudimentary incentives, viz., TNE income and branding. There 
were obvious alignment of incentives in the case of TKD, VSM and XGI 
considering the length of the TNE operations. 
 
Post-tipping point, the University’s TNE objectives were more refined, 
viz., revenue growth, regional expansion, enhanced brand equity, 
offshore research opportunities and community development 
contributions at TNE countries and regions. These are now seen to be 
well aligned with the OPs’ own largely financial and regional growth 
objectives, as observed in the VKP and XNV contract negotiations. 
These alignments require the University and its OPs to accommodate 
certain trade-offs. For instance, the University had to accommodate the 
VKP OP’s eleven other university partners and its control over the TNE 
operating licence in Country V, while the OP had to live with the 
University HCO’s competing marketing objective of international onshore 
enrolments. In the case of XNV, the OP had to forego delivering its own 
programs due to regulatory restrictions. 
 
d) Maturity of Legal-political Environment 
 
While PRT operates within environments with strong formal legal 
institutions and non-formal social conventions, AT requires only the 
presence of strong formal legal institutions to ensure the enforcement of 
‘complete’ contracts (Kivisto 2011). The discussion in this section will 
thus be based on the observations made in Section 5.4.2.2.4. 
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(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
The discussion in Section 5.4.2.3.2 identified a pattern of opportunistic 
TNE start-ups that were initiated and administered by individual schools 
of the University. There were no clear strategic directions guiding these 
schools. However, the Countries where these early TNE operations 
functioned were considered countries with acceptable risk and 
investment attractiveness levels.  
 
While there is no direct evidence of a deliberate choice of these 
Countries, the legal-political environments within these Countries 
provided a robust framework for the enforcement of TNE contracts, e.g., 
the orderly teachouts in Countries N, T and V, the overly strict 
regulations governing Country V TNE operations, and the careful 
transition from XGI to XNV in Country X. 
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
The University operated only within Countries V and X, countries with 
good legal-political governance. The TNE operation at XNV was a 
deliberate decision of the VC to remain in the Country so as to not lose 
the reputation built up over the past ten years (CI3).  
 
The VKP TNE contract was recently successfully re-negotiated after a 
gruelling 18-month negotiation (CI10), which saw a ‘win-win’ outcome 
that re-weighted the risks and benefits of each partner, allowing the 
University to negotiate better returns for its investments (CI2). 
 
The University’s new TNE operation to be launched jointly with the VKP 
OP in Country H seems like an anomaly since the Country has the 
highest Coface risk rating (Section 5.2.2.2.3) in light of University 
preference for ‘stable’ countries with ‘proper governance’ (CI1). It is 
possible that this decision might have been influenced by a desire to be a 
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first mover in a new market (‘we’re looking at other countries at the 
moment, with emerging markets that have some instability but are 
growing markets, and you have to be very careful ... so, we are looking at 
them because if you have first mover advantage in some of those 
countries, then obviously, you know you can build a better reputation, a 
strong reputation over time … but it comes with higher sovereign risk 
obviously’ (CI11). Although it is not possible to conclude that the 
University exclusively favours operating within strong legal-political 
environments, the University prefers such environments but will explore 
options that can provide first-mover advantage and the building of brand 
equity. 
 
5.4.2.3.4 Rival Theories 
 
Although the University C focus group did not pick up any evidence of 
the Upper Echelon Theory (UET), the in-depth interviews detected some 
evidence that UET might be at work in the University’s TNE decisions. 
These UET occurrences were observed in the decisions of two VCs. The 
first VC called for the University-wide TNE review (University C TNE 
Project Team 2013a), approved the delivery of VSM programs in VKP 
(bewildering even some University staff – CI1) and informed the XGI OP 
that the University was terminating the operations on contract expiry 
(CI3). The second VC (who ‘had the final say’ – CI3) convinced 
University staff about the merits of staying in Country X and reversed the 
pull-out (CI3, CI10).  
 
Further, the leadership shown by CI10 and CI11 in the negotiations with 
OPs and the resulting better returns negotiated are possibly a reflection 
of their long experience in managing TNE across multiple universities 
and their private sector work experience. These senior executives have 
been observed to have been responsible for various strategic TNE 
decisions of the University. 
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The University C focus group found that the Resource-based View was 
not evidenced because there was no evidence of profit maximisation in 
the University’s TNE operations. The in-depth interviews however did 
find some evidence of such behaviour through the negotiations for the 
renewal of the VKP contract, where the University succeeded in 
negotiating for better returns (CI2, CI3). This is further supported by the 
acknowledgement that the University is dependent on TNE income for 
operational funding (‘it has to generate an income for the University ... we 
can’t be there with a sense of service and benevolence and things like 
that ... it has to fund the research here, for example’ – CI2; CI3; CI10). 
Further, the drive for growth in funding might have motivated the decisive 
changes in OPs in Countries V and X, in favour of high-performing OPs. 
 
There is some indication that the University might be moving towards the 
development of Strategic Nets (Butler and Soontiens 2015) in its quest to 
grow its international network of TNE operations. This is evidenced by 
the set up of its offshore HCOs, the modularised VKP OP TNE 
management teams, and the University’s joint regional expansion plans 
with the VKP OP. The University has been reported to also have ‘big 
plans’ with its new XNV OP in the AA region. 
 
Although all pre-tipping point TNE operations were adduced to have 
yielded fair financial returns, XGI reportedly ‘didn’t generate enough profit 
to sustain’ (CI2). There were also reports of ‘very expensive teachout’ 
commitments on termination of TNE operations (CI2). Post-tipping point, 
the University used TNE financial models that were scrutinised and 
recommended by the White Paper; these models were founded on a 
minimum 45% revenue share for the University. It can be concluded that 
post-tipping point TNE operations are all required to be financially self-
sustainable.  
 
While the University had clear post-tipping point financial objectives, its 
pre-tipping point TNE financial considerations were observed to be less 
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clear. There is a possibility of some loss-making pre-tipping point TNE 
operations that might have been cross-subsidised by other profit-making 
TNE operations.  
 
5.4.2.3.5 University C Case Study Findings 
 
This section will address the three research questions, based on the TNE 
Decision Model construct (Fig. 3.2), which takes into consideration the 
characteristics and perspectives of the University with regards to TNE 
operations, and the prevailing operating environment.  
 
a) University C Criteria for TNE Business Delivery Model Selection 
 
The University’s pre-tipping point TNE operations, which were 
sporadically initiated by individual schools, were focussed only on 
teaching for profit, and its motivation for TNE teaching was confined to 
only market-seeking and resource-seeking (Section 5.4.2.1). The r-FP 
model, an Outsourced Model was the model of choice because it 
required minimum University offshore involvement, and there were ready 
OPs with similar profit motives. Pre-tipping point, the regulatory 
environment was less stringent and hence, the OPs could get away with 
rudimentary TNE delivery infrastructure and services. And indeed, some 
were ‘small companies’ (CI6) while others had ‘no academic background’ 
(CI4). 
 
Post-tipping point, the University centralised TNE initiation and 
management, driven by clear revenue-generating objectives, including a 
45% revenue share target (University C TNE Project Team 2013a, 19). 
TNE operations are now involved in teaching, research and community 
engagement. The University operates in partnership with OPs that have 
proven TNE teaching track record, international student recruitment and 
teaching delivery networks, and highly efficient teaching delivery 
infrastructures. With the set up of the Countries V and X HCOs, the 
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University was able to leverage on efficiencies enabled by cross-border 
entities. The University’s post-tipping point TNE operations are thus 
market-seeking, resource-seeking and efficiency-seeking in pursuing its 
three-fold roles of teaching, research and community engagement. Its 
preference was for a Direct Model of either an ic-IBC or an i-FP to enable 
closer monitoring and control, as well as provide infrastructure for the 
delivery of research and community engagement activities. 
 
b) Theoretical Drivers for University C’s TNE Business Delivery Model  
Selection 
 
The analysis of informants’ perspectives on the reflectors of the three 
theories of the firm (Section 5.4.2.3) are summarised below; these 
analyses were based on the propositional framework of Table 4.12.  
 
Note that in two cases, there was insufficient data or evidence to enable 
any meaningful identification of the reflectors of the theories. The TNE 
operations that have been observed to satisfy all the propositions for a 
particular theory are highlighted in grey scale. 
 
VKP was started before the tipping point, and continues to this day. The 
tipping point coincided with the renewal of its OP contract. It is therefore 
investigated under both pre-tipping point and post-tipping point 
conditions. 
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A Pre-tipping Point 
1 TKD 21 OM L H H NR OP NR NR H L H H H 
2 NCE 7 OM L H H NR NR NR NR H L H NR H 
3 VSM 11 OM L H H H OP H H H L H H H 
4 XGI 10 DM L H H H OP H H H L H H H 
5 VKP1 5 OM L H H H OP H H H L H H H 
B Post-tipping Point 
1 VKP2 5+ DM H H H H UP H L H H L H H 
2 XNV 1+ DM H H H H UP H L H H L H H 
Abbreviations  :  L – Low; H – High; UP – University; OP – Offshore Partner; NR – Not Referenced 
      DM – Direct Model; OM – Outsourced Model 
      VKP1 – VKP under previous contract;   VKP2 – VKP under new contract 
    Shaded cells indicate fulfilment of all reflectors for one of the theories 
 
Table 5.65   University C Responses to Propositions 
 
Focus group findings predicted that University C’s r-FPs that were in 
operation prior to its TNE tipping point were driven by AT considerations, 
while its ic-IBCs (post-tipping point) could be driven by either TCE or 
PRT considerations. The focus group did not identify XGI as an ic-IBC 
presumably because the two participants were not in strategic roles and 
therefore were not privy to the corporate structure of XGI. The in-depth 
interview informants have identified XGI as an ic-IBC, according to the 
Observatory’s definition of an IBC with regards to its ownership, 
exclusive branding, delivery of entire programs and award of degrees 
(Garrett et al. 2017). Following the focus group findings, XGI should also 
be expected to be driven by either TCE or PRT considerations. 
 
(i) Pre-tipping Point 
 
The University’s early TNE operations were initiated by individual schools 
in ‘bits and pieces’ (CI6) through out-of-load payments (‘paid … on top of 
their normal salaries’ – CI10) ‘so they could have some money to spend 
on themselves’ (AI6). These ‘very high risks’ (CI1), ‘often quite 
opportunistic, a bit reactive’ ventures (CI10) were initiated mostly with 
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OPs that do not have education backgrounds, e.g., ‘small companies’ 
(CI6). In the early years of the University’s TNE ventures, there was little 
competition; hence, these offshore teaching ventures prospered (CI2, 
CI3, CI1) as the University’s revenue good. The University imposed no 
requirement for research and community engagement at its TNE 
operations. 
 
The early TNE operations were reported to have been initiated with very 
little due diligence (CI1). Although the University appointed Principals at 
the delivery locations, a number of these Principals were found to have 
been compromised by the OPs (CI3), and thus diminished the 
University’s efforts to reduce information asymmetry. Further, the OPs 
were reported to have been operating with multiple university partners as 
a risk diversification strategy, but considered an opportunistic ‘danger’ to 
the University’s interests (CI4). However, the mutually beneficial financial 
incentives (‘we’re their biggest partner … we must be making the most 
money for them’ – CI3) ensured the longevity of many of the TNE 
operations, all of which lasted beyond the five-year reasonable returns 
period (Table 5.65).  
 
Admittedly, as a small university, its TNE approach was ‘probably 10 or 
12 years ago ... (to find) the right partnership institution who had the 
responsibility to provide all the infrastructure and then in essence we 
provide the intellectual assets’ (CI4). This asset-light approach enabled 
the University to address the highly risky TNE operations (CI1), and 
resulted in low asset specificity. Hence, TCE can be precluded from 
having contributed to the r-FP and ic-IBC models prior to the University’s 
TNE tipping point. 
 
In conclusion, it would seem that AT had been the driving approach in 
four pre-tipping point TNE operations. Three of these are r-FPs, while 
one is an ic-IBC, i.e, the XGI operation. There was insufficient data to 
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enable any meaningful analysis of the University’s business delivery 
model selection for the NCE r-FP. 
 
Following the focus group findings, it was not surprising that the r-FPs 
were seen by the interview informants to be driven by AT considerations, 
but XGI seems like an anomaly. It has however been noted that XGI is 
‘not really a branch campus but people do refer to it as a branch campus’ 
(CI3). For all intents and purposes, XGI actually operated as an r-FP with 
a light-touch University presence in the form of an on-site Principal (who 
was later found to be institutionalised by the OP) (CI3). The White Paper 
corroborates this by stating that ‘University C operates franchised models 
with all offshore partners’ (University C TNE Project Team 2013a, 10).  
 
The r-FPs operated within pent-up high demand business environments 
which were lightly regulated. Consequently, costs of search were low, 
while monitoring was light touch. It was not surprising that the r-FP was 
deployed to address the ‘very high risk’ (CI11) of TNE delivery, including 
extended and expensive teachouts that followed terminations (CI2). 
 
The Countries where the University delivered its pre-tipping point TNE 
programs were observed to be low risk countries that also have highly 
regulated education sectors, suitable for the enforcement of contracts. 
The Australian regulatory environment was seen to be promoting 
university efforts in generating additional funding, and this possibly 
emboldened schools to initiate ‘risk-taking’ TNE operations (CI4). 
 
It can be concluded that AT was a possible driver for the University’s 
choice of the Outsourced Model of TNE business delivery before its TNE 
tipping point.  
 
Although the OP was in control of mission-critical resources, the high 
levels of concern for opportunism and information asymmetry precluded 
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PRT as a consideration for the selection of the r-FP (an Outsourced 
Model) as the pre-tipping point models. 
 
(ii) Post-tipping Point 
 
TNE growth rate and experience impacted the University’s TNE 
decisions favourably. Its phenomenal growth at VKP prompted the TNE 
review and precipitated its TNE tipping point. Its pre-tipping point 
experience provided the basis for the promulgation of the White Paper 
strategies and recommendations, and the successful re-negotiation of its 
VKP OP contract and the new highly favourable XNV OP contract. 
 
Post-tipping point, VKP was observed to have been driven solely by TCE 
considerations. The difference lies in the higher level of post-tipping point 
transparency between the University and its VKP OP resulting from 
greater operational proximity between the two partners, thus reducing 
information asymmetry (‘our interests are actually quite aligned and … 
being local really helps’ – CI10). The remaining post-tipping point TNE 
operation, XNV was also seen to be similarly driven by TCE 
considerations. 
 
To manage the high transaction frequency TNE operation amidst 
tightened regulatory environments (CI10), the University and its OPs 
were seen to have deliberately invested in TNE-specific assets, some of 
which like IP and branding are clearly asset-specific to the TNE 
operations (CI2, CI3). Its research and community engagement KPIs 
were undertaken by its SCORE research centre and HCO teaching staff 
(CI10). Behavioural and environmental uncertainties continue to be 
concerns that the University now addressed via its on-site HCOs (CI10). 
The University was sensitive to a number of key transaction costs, viz., 
closer scrutiny of OPs (CI1, CI11), set up of the HCO for performance 
monitoring, operational efficiency and communication (CI1, CI3, CI10), 
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more intense contractual bargaining with OPs (CI2, CI3), and new 
business development to address business obsolescence (CI11). 
 
Post-tipping point, the University’s TNE agenda was more strategic, 
guided by its 2012 – 2020 Strategic Plan and the White Paper. It was 
possibly driven by home country funding constraints (CI10) and its limited 
resources (‘we are a small university’ – CI4; ‘University C was very 
subject to government funding ... we don't have a big foundation ... we 
have land but we don’t have other income ... so, we are very at the 
vagaries of the government policies here ... so (we need) to have other 
operations … (in) diversifying (our income sources)’ (CI1). Secondary 
data analysis indicated the possibly higher propensity of small 
universities to engage in TNE (Section 5.4.2). The University also 
expanded its TNE scope to undertake research and community 
engagement as its mission goods, funded largely by its TNE teaching, a 
revenue good. 
 
The foregoing findings suggest that TCE is a possible driver for the 
University’s preferred Direct Model of TNE business delivery post-tipping 
point. The post-tipping point higher costs of search and monitoring 
(CI11), and lower risk aversion associated with the University’s on-site 
HCO and Dean’s ‘boots on the ground’ monitoring (CI10) precluded AT 
as a driver for the University’s choice of the i-FP and ic-IBC (both Direct 
Models). Similarly, the close University monitoring of the OP via the 
Dean and HCO enabled the reduction of information asymmetry and 
hence precluded PRT as a possible driver for the post-tipping point 
Direct Models. 
 
In summary, the in-depth interviews identified AT as the driving 
perspective pre-tipping point for the selection of the r-FP, an Outsourced 
Model, as well as a pseudo ic-IBC, which operated as an Outsourced 
Model (Table 5.66). After the tipping point, the University no longer 
deployed any Outsourced Model; it relied on two variants of the Direct 
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Model, viz., the FP model with in situ oversight (i-FP) and the 
collaborative IBC with in situ oversight (ic-IBC). Both of these Direct 
Models were observed to have been driven by TCE perspectives. 
 
No. In Relation 
to Tipping 
Point 
Type of TNE Business 
Delivery Model 
Direct/ 
Outsourced 
Possible 
Rationale for 
Model 
Selection 
1 Before 
Franchised (remote 
supervision) (r-FP) OM AT 
Pseudo-collaborative 
IBC (in situ oversight) 
(pseudo ic-IBC) 
OM AT 
2 After 
Franchised (in situ 
oversight) (i-FP) DM TCE 
Collaborative IBC (in 
situ oversight) (ic-IBC) DM TCE 
 
Table 5.66   University C Theoretical Perspectives in Deploying TNE  
     Business Delivery Models 
 
c) University C Value Chains 
 
Drawing from the generic TNE value chain of Fig. 4.6, the University’s 
pre-tipping point and post-tipping point TNE value chains are reproduced 
below. 
 
In the pre-tipping point Outsourced Model, the OP provides all of the 
TNE operation’s physical infrastructure, academic support and student 
services, administration and professional services and marketing. The 
University provides all of the curricula for program delivery. The two 
partners share responsibilities for academic staff support, intermediate 
activity, staff recruitment, teaching and assessment. 
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    University infrastructure (OP) 
  Academic support/student services (OP)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
    Admin/professional services (OP)                                                                                                                           
(UP)   Academic staff support   (OP) 
                                                                                                                                                          Parents          
 (UP)  Intermediate activity (including QAA)  (OP)                                  Employers                
   (UP)                                                                                       Community                                                                              
Staff                                                                                                                                 Country                            
Recruit-            (UP)                               (UP)                               (UP)                                                                                          
ment                                                                                                                                                           
   (OP)       Curriculum Devt            Teaching                           Assessment                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                      
 Student              (OP)              (OP)             
 Recruit-                                                                                                                        
 ment  
   (OP)                                                                                                                     
Abbreviations : UP for University Partner; OP for Offshore Partner 
 
Fig. 5.7   University C TNE Outsourced Model Value Chain (Pre- 
tipping Point) 
 
The pre-tipping point pseudo Direct Model is similar to the pre-tipping 
point Outsourced Model, except for the additional presence of an on-site 
Principal who was supposed to have provided academic support, student 
services and additional academic staff support, but was found to have 
been compromised by the OP. 
 
Both the pre-tipping point Direct and Outsourced models were observed 
to be rudimentary; they do not include alumni relations, research and 
community engagement activities. 
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    University infrastructure (OP) 
(UP)  Academic support/student services   (OP)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
    Admin/professional services (OP)                                                                                                                           
(UP)   Academic staff support   (OP) 
                                                                                                                                                          Parents          
 (UP)  Intermediate activity (including QAA)  (OP)                                  Employers                
   (UP)                                                                                       Community                                                                              
Staff                                                                                                                                 Country                            
Recruit-            (UP)                               (UP)                               (UP)                                                                                          
ment                                                                                                                                                           
   (OP)       Curriculum Devt            Teaching                           Assessment                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                      
 Student              (OP)              (OP)             
 Recruit-                                                                                                                        
 ment  
   (OP)                                                                                                                     
Abbreviations : UP for University Partner; OP for Offshore Partner 
 
Fig. 5.8   University C TNE Direct Model Value Chain (Pre-tipping  
Point) 
 
After the tipping point, the University deployed only Direct Models, viz., 
the i-FP and ic-IBC. These operations undertook all three university roles 
of teaching, research and community engagement. Research and 
community engagement were mission goods that the University delivered 
on its own, without OP involvement. It also undertook alumni relations as 
its own primary TNE value chain activity. The other value chain activities 
reflected the pre-tipping point Direct Model value chain activities, except 
for academic staff support where the post-tipping point Direct Model’s 
HCO was responsible for providing more services.  
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    University infrastructure (OP) 
(UP)  Academic support/student services   (OP)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
    Admin/professional services (OP)                                                                                                                           
(UP)   Academic staff support   (OP) 
                                                                                                                                                          Parents          
 (UP)  Intermediate activity (including QAA)  (OP)                                  Employers                
   (UP)                   Managing Research (UP)                                                   Community                                                                              
Staff                                                                                                                                 Country                            
Recruit-  Topic identification Obtaining Funds          Research           Commercialisation 
ment                                                                                                                                                           
   (OP)                                  Managing Teaching                  
  
       (UP)         (UP)      (UP) 
 Student          
 Recruit-     Curriculum Devt         Teaching            Assessment     Alumni 
 ment                                                                                                        Relations                    
   (OP)               
               (OP)   (OP) 
          Community Engagement (UP) 
 
Abbreviations : UP for University Partner; OP for Offshore Partner 
 
Fig. 5.9   University C TNE Direct Model Value Chain 
(i-FP and ic-IBC) (Post-tipping Point) 
 
d) The Influence of Theoretical Perspectives on TNE Longevity 
 
It was observed that all TNE operations investigated have outlasted the 
three-year break-even business survival and five-year ‘fair rate of return’ 
business longevity periods defined in Section 2.7.4.3.  
 
Of the four pre-tipping point TNE operations investigated, three were 
terminated as a result of liabilities associated with adolescence, viz., 
NCE (rejection by the University due to quality control issues), VSM (OP 
management change resulting in loss of focus) and XGI (rejection by 
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students resulting from poor program choices). TKD succumbed to the 
liabilities of obsolescence arising from a change in value proposition of 
the OP as a new university college. All four TNE operations exceeded 
both the business survival and business longevity periods, indicating a 
fair rate of return for these operations. However, CI2 a senior executive 
with strategic responsibilities intimated that XGI was not financially 
sustainable at the time of termination.  
 
Pre-tipping point TNE operations were seen to be financially 
disadvantageous to the University, as indicated in informant comments 
about the unfair returns in older TNE contracts. The TNE review of 2012-
2013, inter alia ‘comprehensively’ scrutinised the University’s ‘capacity, 
cost and delivery of TNE’ and warned that ‘a significant revenue stream 
will be diluted or lost’ if the University does not respond to the external 
challenges facing the University (University C TNE Project Team 2013a, 
4). The review team generated various financial models for scrutiny and 
ended up with five potential models for adoption.  
 
The post-tipping point VKP operation was clearly yielding better returns 
to the University. The VKP SCORE research centre was also reported to 
have secured government and private sector funding. However, there 
were signs of liabilities of adolescence setting in, resulting from the loss 
of competitive advantages in price, duration and ranking. While new and 
difficult to assess, XNV and HKP show signs of liabilities of newness due 
to the lack of competitiveness of their academic programs. They 
obviously do not currently undertake research and community 
engagement. 
 
In terms of TNE longevity (Section 2.7.4.3), it is observed that all the 
University’s TNE operations exceeded both the three-year business 
survival and five-year business longevity benchmarks (Table 5.71), 
suggesting that all TNE operations were run at fair rates of returns. 
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Hence, there was no possibility of ascribing any of the theories of the firm 
to the longevity of the University’s TNE operations. 
 
5.5 Chapter 5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter started with outlining a priori expectations of possible 
theoretical drivers for the two Universities’ choice of TNE business 
delivery models – based on focus group findings. These a priori 
expectations formed a basis to compare with empirically-generated 
constructs. 
 
To provide data clarification, authentication and triangulation, secondary 
data was analysed. They comprise data on the Australian public 
university sector and a comparative analysis of country operating 
environments (for countries where the two Universities operated TNE). 
 
The in-depth interviews were coded and reported according to identified 
themes, concepts and stories as thick descriptions in Appendix I and J, 
and summarised in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. 
 
The chapter concludes with single case analyses of Universities A and C, 
addressing the criteria that each University used in their choice between 
Direct and Outsourced Models, and the possible theoretical perspectives 
driving these choices. The single case studies were however unable to 
draw any conclusion about the influence of theoretical perspectives on 
the longevity of TNE operations – due to insufficient data points.  
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Chapter 6  Cross-case Analysis and Findings 
 
This chapter brings together the single-case analyses of chapter 5 for a 
cross-case analysis, seeking to identify similarities and differences, as 
well as patterns of behaviour relevant to the selection and administration 
of TNE operations by the two Universities. This cross-case analysis will 
seek to answer the three research questions pertaining to TNE 
operations as defined by the characteristics and motives of these 
Universities, and their operating environments. 
 
The first research question is analysed through the Guimon (2016) 
construct mapping the three roles of each University (viz., teaching, 
research and community engagement) against their motives for going 
offshore (Section 2.6.5.3). The criteria that these Universities are 
observed to use in the selection between the Direct Model and 
Outsourced Model are also distinguished between the pre- and post-
tipping point periods. The Guimon construct for multinational universities 
was an apt framework because both Universities were described as 
multinational universities (‘University C has become a multinational’ – 
CI10; ‘a global university, with multiple campuses’ – AI1).  
 
The behaviours of the two Universities are then compared using the 
reflectors of the three theories of the firm – to identify similarities and 
differences in an attempt to answer the second research question. This 
section concludes with a tabulation of TNE value chain activities 
circumscribed by the specific circumstances of these two Universities. 
The longevity of the Universities’ TNE models were also compared to 
determine if any of the three theories might be able to explain possible 
trends. 
 
Finally, the cross-case study also explored possible rival theories and 
other disconfirming evidence. 
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6.1 TNE Business Delivery Models Identified 
 
Before commencing the cross-case analysis, it is useful to summarise 
the TNE business delivery models that had been discussed in the in-
depth interviews. 
 
The in-depth interviews specifically explored four different TNE models, 
viz., the wholly-controlled international branch campus (w-IBC), the in 
situ supervised collaborative IBC (ic-IBC), the in situ supervised 
franchised program (i-FP) and the remotely-supervised FP (r-FP). 
 
The w-IBC fully conforms to the Observatory’s definition of an IBC with 
regards to its university ownership of campus infrastructure, exclusive 
university branding, delivery of entire university programs and university 
award of degrees (Garrett et al. 2017). The collaborative IBC (c-IBC) has 
been identified as a pseudo IBC that does not fully conform to the 
Observatory’s definition, e.g., a TNE operation that is widely known as an 
IBC but operates out of a host country OP’s premises (Section 2.5.3). 
Specifically, the in-depth interviews identified a variant of the c-IBC, i.e., 
a c-IBC that is managed by the university’s OP but monitored on-site by 
the university’s Pro-Vice Chancellor (PVC) – the ic-IBC (e.g., University 
A’s Country V ic-IBC). 
 
In the course of investigating franchised programs (FPs), the in-depth 
interviews came across two variants, viz., the remotely-monitored FP (r-
FP) and the in situ monitored FP (i-FP) (Section 4.4.2.2). The former 
describes the traditional FP which is the means for the university to 
licence its programs for offshore delivery to an appointed OP delivering 
out of OP premises. The i-FP is a traditional FP that is monitored on-site 
by one or more university representatives, e.g., University C’s Country V 
i-FP that is monitored by a University-owned host country office (HCO) 
which employed a Dean, several full-time teaching staff and a small team 
of administrators. Interestingly, while University C’s XGI operation was 
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widely called a branch campus, it was officially considered a r-FP 
(University C TNE Project Team 2013a). Further, although supposedly 
monitored by a Dean, the integrity of these Deans was reported to have 
been compromised or ‘institutionalised’ by the OP (CI3). 
 
While the w-IBC is a hierarchy in organisational economics parlance, the 
other models are hybrids. Moreover, by virtue of the university’s control 
of mission-critical resources (Sections 5.4.1.3.2a(ii) and 5.4.2.3.2a(ii)), 
the w-IBC, ic-IBC and i-FP are considered Direct Models, while the r-FP 
an Outsourced Model (Appendices I and J), as illustrated in Tables I.4 
(University A), J.2 (University C) and 5.66 (Universities A and C), and 
summarised below. 
 
No. Descriptor TNE Business Delivery Model Classification 
1 TNE Model w-IBC ic-IBC i-FP r-FP 
2 Governance Model Hierarchy Hybrid 
3 TNE Model Type Direct Outsourced 
 
Table 6.1   Classifications of Identified TNE Business Delivery  
    Models 
 
6.2 Universities A and C Criteria for TNE Business Delivery Model 
Selection 
 
This section tracks the morphing of the two Universities’ TNE roles from 
pre-tipping point teaching only, to post-tipping point provision of all three 
services of teaching, research and community engagement. In addition, 
these Universities also actively pursued the recruitment of host country 
students for onshore study. The cross-case analysis and findings are 
based on the single case studies of Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2. Tables 
5.10 and 5.39 were amalgamated into Table 6.2 to provide a cross-case 
comparison. 
 
The criteria that these Universities used in the selection of TNE business 
delivery models for the provision of TNE services were explored. These 
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criteria were found to have been influenced by the characteristics of the 
Universities and the prevailing operating environment. These 
characteristics include the type of university, size and resources of the 
university, TNE agenda (if any), previous TNE experience (if any) and 
TNE growth rate. The operating environment was analysed in terms of its 
business, social, legal, regulatory and political dimensions. These criteria 
were also found to have been influenced by the Universities’ perception 
of its OPs, although the characteristics of OPs were not the subject of the 
present study. These OP characteristics also include OP type, size, 
resources, TNE agenda, TNE experience and TNE growth rate. 
 
6.2.1 Pre-tipping Point 
 
Both Universities were observed to have focussed solely on teaching 
prior to their respective tipping points (Table 6.2). These teaching-only 
TNE operations were almost exclusively r-FPs, except for University C’s 
XGI branch campus, which for all intents and purposes can also be 
considered a r-FP.  
 
Both Universities sought to grow their TNE markets for TNE income, and 
to promote their brands for the recruitment of international students to 
study onshore. They relied heavily on their OPs to provide the resources 
for TNE teaching delivery, a revenue good. Although both Universities 
operated multiple r-FPs in several countries, there was no discernible 
effort to leverage on these operations for cross-border efficiencies. No 
TNE operation was involved in the provision of the mission goods of 
research and community engagement. 
 
The quest for TNE in both Universities was not a proactive, strategic 
whole-of-university endeavour. They were largely initiated and managed 
by entrepreneurial staff who were motivated by financial returns for their 
faculty/school and for themselves.  
 
 529 
This state of affairs was in turn encouraged by Australian government 
policies that encouraged the commercialisation of education. The 
Universities also operated within an Australian higher education sector 
that had immature TNE regulations. Host country TNE regulations were 
similarly lax.  
 
The selection of r-FPs to deliver TNE did not seem to have been 
influenced by University type or size; University A was considered a large 
university while University C a small university. 
 
The decentralised nature of TNE initiation and management at these 
Universities, the lack of TNE experience among University staff and the 
Universities’ TNE risk aversion were observed to have possibly 
motivated the deployment of the low cost, hands-off Outsourced Model 
(OM) (i.e., r-FP) for TNE teaching delivery. The close alignment of 
interests between the Universities and their OPs enabled all pre-tipping 
point r-FPs to last beyond the five-year reasonable rate of returns period. 
 
Apart from the alignment of interests, the Universities selected their OPs 
because of their OPs’ ability to provide basic teaching and learning 
infrastructure, employ low cost teaching staff, recruit students and 
demonstrate good local knowledge. Although most OPs generated good 
student numbers and hence, good financial returns, many were later 
found to have been lacking in quality of academic delivery – especially 
when the regulatory environment became more mature and formalised 
post-tipping point. 
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University 
Role 
Ref 
Tipping 
Point 
TNE 
Model 
TNE Motivations 
Market-seeking Resource-seeking Efficiency-seeking 
Teaching 
 
Pre Uni A 
r-FP 
Develop as many r-
FPs as possible for 
income and leverage 
on r-FPs for onshore 
enrolments and 
income 
Engage OP 
expertise and 
resources to reach 
more students at 
lower costs 
Not identified 
Uni C 
r-FP 
Grow TNE 
enrolments for TNE 
income and build 
offshore branding for 
onshore enrolments 
and income 
Engage OP 
expertise and 
resources to reach 
more students at 
lower costs 
Not identified 
Uni C 
Ic-IBC 
Grow TNE 
enrolments for TNE 
income and build 
offshore branding for 
onshore enrolments 
and income 
Engage OP 
expertise and 
resources to reach 
more students at 
lower costs 
Not identified 
Post Uni A 
r-FP 
Develop financially 
sustainable r-FPs for 
specific purposes and 
leverage on r-FPs for 
onshore enrolments 
and income  
Engage OP 
expertise and 
resources to reach 
more students at 
lower costs 
Not applicable. 
Some r-FPs 
continue to be 
managed by 
faculties 
Uni A 
ic-IBC 
Develop campuses in 
multiple countries for 
TNE income and 
leverage on 
campuses for 
onshore enrolments 
and income 
Engage OP 
expertise and 
resources to reach 
more students at 
lower costs 
Leverage on OP 
efficiencies and the 
University’s hub-
and-spokes TNE 
administration 
Uni C 
i-FP 
Grow TNE 
enrolments for TNE 
income and build 
offshore branding for 
both TNE and 
onshore enrolments 
and income 
Engage OP 
expertise and 
resources to reach 
more students at 
lower costs 
Leverage on OP 
efficiencies and 
HCO coordination 
Uni C 
Ic-IBC 
Grow TNE 
enrolments for TNE 
income and build 
offshore branding for 
both TNE and 
onshore enrolments 
and income 
Engage OP 
expertise and 
resources to reach 
more students at 
lower costs 
Leverage on OP 
efficiencies and 
HCO coordination 
Research Pre Uni A 
r-FP 
Not identified Not identified Not identified 
Uni C 
r-FP 
Not identified Not identified Not identified 
Uni C 
ic-IBC 
Not identified Not identified Not identified 
Post Uni A 
r-FP 
Not identified Not identified Not identified 
Uni A 
ic-IBC 
Gain access to 
international research 
projects through ic-
IBCs and their PVCs  
Outsource foreign 
researchers and 
funding, and 
collaborate with 
foreign entities 
Leverage on the 
University’s 
research and ic-
IBC networks for 
efficiency 
Uni C 
i-FP 
Access research 
projects in host 
country and region 
Tap into 
government and 
private sector 
research funding, 
and collaborate with 
Leverage on the 
University’s existing 
international 
research networks, 
VKP OP marketing 
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researchers in host 
country and region 
network and HCO 
coordination 
Uni C 
Ic-IBC 
New HCO in Country 
X to access research 
projects in host 
country and region 
New HCO in 
Country X to tap 
into government 
and private sector 
research funding, 
and collaborate with 
researchers in host 
country and region 
New Country X 
HCO to leverage 
on the University’s 
existing region AA 
research networks, 
XNV OP marketing 
network and HCO 
coordination 
Community 
Engage-
ment 
Pre Uni A 
r-FP 
Not identified Not identified Not identified 
Uni C 
r-FP 
Not identified Not identified Not identified 
Uni C 
Ic-IBC 
Not identified Not identified Not identified 
Post Uni A 
r-FP 
Not identified Not identified Not identified 
Uni A 
Ic-IBC 
Connect with 
governments and 
private sectors to 
contribute to capacity- 
and nation-building 
Outsource to OPs 
for funding and 
participation 
Not identified 
Uni C 
i-FP 
Expand University 
commercialisation 
and research in host 
country to contribute 
to host country and 
regional development 
Collaborate with 
host country entities 
and investors for 
commercialisation 
and capacity-
building in host 
country and region 
Leverage on HCOs 
in different 
countries for 
efficiency 
Uni C 
ic-IBC 
New Country X HCO 
to expand University 
commercialisation 
and research in host 
country to contribute 
to host country and 
regional development 
New Country X 
HCO to collaborate 
with host country 
entities and 
investors for 
commercialisation 
and capacity-
building in host 
country and AA 
region 
Leverage on HCOs 
in different 
countries for 
efficiency 
  
Table 6.2   Criteria for Universities A and C TNE Models Across  
    Their Three Roles (adapted from Guimon 2016, 222) 
 
6.2.2 Post-tipping Point 
 
For University A, its post-tipping point TNE experience had been marked 
by a tightening regulatory environment within Australia and its host 
Countries, leading to the closure of many r-FPs which did not meet the 
new standards that emerged. Most University C TNE operations were not 
affected by the regulatory tightening, except for two r-FPs that were 
observed to have been terminated in response to the TEQSA re-
registration exercise. Its TNE tipping point occurred when one of its r-FPs 
grew at an alarming rate and inter alia, threatened its TNE academic 
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integrity, risked non-compliance with TEQSA and the host Country’s 
regulatory requirements, and threatened its TNE revenue streams. 
 
University A’s response to post-tipping point tightening of regulations was 
to terminate non-compliant r-FPs gradually, as the standards became 
more specific, e.g., ten r-FPs terminated around the AUQA Cycle 2 
period and one around the commencement of TEQSA. It took another 
eight years before University A started another ic-IBC, presumably 
because of risk aversion in responding to the tightening regulatory 
environment.  
 
University C, on the other hand, took a proactive approach to its TNE 
tipping point by conducting a comprehensive review ‘to examine every 
facet of the way in which University C offers its course overseas’ 
(University C TNE Project Team 2013a, 3) in terms of ‘TNE delivery, 
administration and financial models’ (Ibid., 4). Two r-FPs were observed 
to have been terminated around the commencement of TEQSA’s 
university re-registration exercise, of which the University was one of the 
first to participate in. 
 
Both Universities were seen to have embraced research and community 
engagement, in addition to teaching and onshore recruitment in their 
post-tipping point TNE operations. In the case of University A, it was a 
strategic, deliberate move that arose from its Global University approach 
and formalised in new TNE OP contracts. These contracts required both 
the University and its OPs to commit to these mission goods. For 
University C, the incorporation of research and community engagement 
in its TNE operations was unplanned and resulted from the leveraging 
opportunity afforded by the host country office (HCO). Unlike University 
A, University C did not require its OP to deliver these mission goods. The 
University delivered these mission goods through its own on-site 
teaching staff, led by a Director. 
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While both Universities were able to attract research funding from 
external sources, e.g., host governments and venture capitalists, 
research is still considered a predominantly mission good which required 
university funding (‘you don’t really make money out of research’ – AI15). 
 
The delivery of the full suite of university roles (viz., teaching, research 
and community engagement) was enabled by various drivers in each 
University, some of which were similar. Both Universities were reported 
to consider themselves ‘research active’ (AI12) and ‘research intensive’ 
(CI11). While University A had the resources ‘because we’re a big 
university’ (AI19), University C, a ‘small university’ (CI4) relied on TNE 
income to support research and community engagement (CI1). 
 
Both Universities were able to transform and refine their TNE delivery 
models as a result of their TNE experiences ('we’ve learnt along the way 
… and now, we are wise after 20 years of running offshore programs’ – 
AI20; ‘learn a lot from the past’ – CI3). University A’s TNE growth rate 
within the six years post-tipping point was very high, recording 16 start-
up r-FPs – only one survived at the time of the interviews, demonstrating 
the impact of the tightening regulatory environment. University C on the 
other hand, did not have a high growth rate of TNE start-ups but a high 
rate of TNE student enrolment growth post-tipping point. This led to the 
comprehensive university-wide TNE review and the expeditious set-up of 
the Country V HCO. 
 
Both Universities gravitated towards OPs that were better resourced, 
better experienced and better networked, compared to pre-tipping point 
OPs. For University A which required OP participation in research and 
community engagement, some OPs were good fits, e.g., a State 
government and a private institution with nation-building missions. Other 
OPs had to be coaxed (e.g., VCS) or coerced (e.g., XCD) into accepting 
these commitments. University C did not require its OPs to participate in 
these mission goods. 
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Both Universities sought market access, resource access and 
efficiencies from their respective TNE networks to deliver all three roles. 
In addition, both also leveraged on their TNE networks for recruitment of 
international students for onshore study. While University A did not seem 
to have a strategic TNE approach to recruitment for onshore study, 
University C had specifically set recruitment KPIs for its HCO. The 
Universities’ recruitment for onshore study can be considered an  
additional market-seeking activity under the Universities’ teaching role. 
 
Both Universities selected Direct Models to deliver the three university 
roles because of better monitoring and control of TNE delivery through 
close on-site monitoring. While University A deployed the ic-IBC 
exclusively, University C developed Direct Model variants of the r-FP 
(viz., the i-FP and the ic-IBC). University A’s investments in its ic-IBCs 
were ‘asset-light’ (AI1), comprising only an on-site Pro-Vice Chancellor 
(PVC) (and a Deputy PVC in TSW, and an Admissions Manager in 
XCD). University C’s offshore investments were more extensive and 
comprised a Dean, at least one academic staff representing each 
participating school, a Learning Advisor and administrators; all housed in 
a University-funded HCO. Both Universities were observed to have 
enjoyed access to markets, resources and efficiencies through their 
cross-border network of Direct Model operations.  
 
While University C no longer deploy r-FPs, University A continues to 
utilise this Outsourced Model for TNE operations that are not considered 
strategic for its Global University agenda, but serve specific purposes, 
e.g., ‘community-building’ (AI11) and ‘cross-selling’ programs (AI2). 
These r-FPs are teaching-only operations that leverage on OPs for 
market and resource access; they do not seem to provide cross-border 
network efficiencies. 
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6.3 Theoretical Drivers for the Universities’ TNE Business Delivery 
Model Selection 
 
The single case analyses of the two Universities yielded very similar 
findings in terms of the theoretical drivers for TNE business delivery 
model selection. The Outsourced Model (OM) seems to be driven by AT 
consideration both before and after their tipping points, while the Direct 
Model (DM) by TCE considerations. The cross case analysis is anchored 
on the theoretical bases developed in Section 2.6, and propositions of 
Table 4.12. Each model will require satisfaction of all propositions 
relating to it as shown in Table 6.3 below. For example, a University is 
said to have been driven by TCE in selecting the Direct Model (DM) if the 
analysis demonstrated high asset specificity, high behavioural 
uncertainty, high transaction frequency and high environmental 
uncertainty. 
 
No. 
TNE 
Model 
TCE Propositions PRT Propositions AT Propositions 
AS BU TF EU MC Op IAs IAl MEs SM RA IAi ME 
1 DM H H H H UP H H H H H L L L 
2 OM L L L L OP L L H H L H H H 
Abbreviations  :  L – Low; H – High; UP – University; OP – Offshore Partner 
          DM – Direct Model; OM – Outsourced Model 
          AS – Asset Specificity   BU – Behavioural Uncertainty    
        TF – Transaction Frequency   EU – Environmental Uncertainty 
        MC – Control of Mission-critical Resources   Op – Opportunism Risk 
        IAs – Information Asymmetry   IAi – Ex ante Incentives Alignment 
        ME – Maturity of Socio-Legal-Political Environment 
        SM – Costs of Search and Monitoring   RA – University Risk Aversion 
        ME – Maturity of Legal-political Environment 
 
Table 6.3   TNE Model Satisfaction of Propositions (based on Table  
    4.12) 
 
6.3.1 Transaction Cost Economics 
 
The propositions developed for testing TCE at the two Universities were 
based on Williamson’s discriminating alignment hypothesis, i.e., 
‘transactions which differ in their attributes are aligned with governance 
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structures, which differ in their costs and competencies’, so as to reduce 
transaction costs (Williamson 1991).  
 
The analyses investigated the transaction costs of setting up safeguards 
(in response to asset specificity), ‘communication, negotiation and 
coordination’ (to address environmental uncertainty), and ex ante 
‘screening and selection’ and ext post ‘measurement’ (to address 
behavioural uncertainty) (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997, 46). Some 
opportunity costs were also identified, e.g., failure in investing in 
‘productive assets’, ‘maladaptation’, picking unsuitable partners and 
‘productivity losses’ arising from adaptation (Table 2.5). 
 
6.3.1.1 Asset Specificity 
 
A number of the Universities’ TNE-specific assets can be considered 
investment-specific in the TCE sense, viz., University IP, fly-in-fly-out 
teaching staff, teachout organisation, TNE operating licence and 
business equity. The post-tipping point DM OPs are also seen to have 
committed to investment-specific assets like custom-designed campuses 
that resemble their University partner’s home campuses, the TNE 
operating licence and research personnel. OM OPs (both pre- and post-
tipping point) were however seen to be less committed to asset 
specificity because of the Universities’ hands-off approach and lower 
priority for such operations. 
 
The crux of asset specificity for TNE operations lies in the possibility (or 
difficulty) of asset redeployment after the termination of the TNE 
collaboration. In the case of the OM operations, redeployment of TNE 
assets were executed fairly easily – both before and after tipping point. 
Such is the case for PHS (University A) and VSM (University C), where 
the OP held the operating licence and were delivering programs from a 
range of university partners. Even the XGI (a pseudo ic-IBC that is more 
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like a r-FP) OP did not present a serious hold-up for University C’s TNE 
re-establishment in Country X. 
 
DM collaborations however are more intertwined between the partners 
and involved higher capital and operational investments. They are 
typically long term contracts of at least ten-year durations. There were 
two types of DM operations identified, viz., the i-FP and the ic-IBC.  
 
The i-FP is essentially a r-FP where the University appointed on-site 
personnel to safeguard its interests. Although the OP still held the 
operating licences of i-FPs, they have also been observed to be highly 
invested in the collaboration, e.g., investments in the University partner’s 
branding. The potential hold-up at VKP was considered so grave that 
CI10 described any termination as a ‘mutually-assured destruction’. 
 
The ic-IBCs are even more intertwined between the partners in view of 
the University-specific investments, e.g., ic-IBC campuses that were 
required to have the ‘look and feel’ of their home campuses (AI6). With 
the exception of TSW and XCD (University A) and XGI and XNV 
(University C), all other ic-IBC operating licences were held by the OPs. 
The operating licences of XGI, XCD and XNV were held by the 
respective Universities, while that of TSW held by the joint-venture 
company. 
 
It is therefore observed that the OM operations of both Universities 
feature low asset specificity both before and after their TNE tipping 
points. While there were no DM operations before tipping points, the DM 
operations of both Universities post-tipping points were observed to 
feature comparatively higher asset specificity. 
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6.3.1.2 Behavioural Uncertainty 
 
Behavioural uncertainty on the part of the OPs arise from difficulties in 
measurement and evaluation. It manifests itself in the form of shirking 
and free-riding. The TNE operations of both Universities exhibited high 
behavioural uncertainties both before and after their TNE tipping points. 
 
OM operations were run by OPs that largely also run ‘substitute’ 
programs (AI2) from other competing partner universities; these OPs 
sometimes encounter conflicts of interests from contending interests of 
their university partners. The OPs of OMs are inclined to over-inflate their 
student enrolment projections at the contract negotiations stage to entice 
the Universities into the collaboration, but some have been found to have 
failed to achieve these projections (AI2, CI4). It was also common to find 
OM OPs operating at unacceptable quality levels, e.g., accepting 
students with ‘sceptical entry’ qualifications into the program (AI13), 
teaching in a foreign language and changing teaching schedules without 
prior approval (AI4) or assessments conducted in a foreign language 
(CI2).  
 
Despite the closer scrutiny at the DMs, these OPs were still found 
wanting, e.g., ‘promised very high numbers from the partner … has not 
eventuated’ (AI7), ‘the operator not delivering your IP properly’ (AI10), 
‘host country teaching staff weren’t being approved appropriately’ (CI3), 
and OP reluctant to participate in research and engagement (AI1, CI15). 
 
While the behavioural uncertainty at the OMs might have arisen where 
‘there’s distance … so you can’t confirm compliance’ (AI4), behavioural 
uncertainty at the DMs were seen to have been attributed to the OPs’ 
business model which sometimes are in conflict with the Universities’ 
operating processes and standards (AI9, CI4). Behavioural uncertainty 
seems to have been mitigated somewhat by the Universities’ investment 
in on-site personnel (AI2, CI10) and in some DM operations, the trust 
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developed over long periods of association between the Universities and 
their OPs (AI19, CI4). The high trust levels between University A and its 
UCT/UCM OP was a probable reason for the OP’s low behavioural 
uncertainty. 
 
6.3.1.3 Transaction Frequency 
 
TNE operations are demonstrably high frequency transaction business 
activities for both Universities. Pre-tipping point TNE operations were 
comparatively less involved due to lower University internal requirements 
and external regulatory imposts, while post-tipping point operations 
required both Universities to restructure their TNE processes and 
organisation to cope with additional compliance requirements that were 
both internal and external. Additional internal compliance requirements 
came in the form of the BSA accreditation for University A and in the 
form of tightened ‘non-negotiable minima’ in TNE delivery standards at 
University C. Both Universities were subject to additional external 
compliance requirements brought about by AUQA, AUQA Cycle 2, 
TEQSA and the regulatory authorities of their host Countries. 
 
6.3.1.4 Business and Legal-political Uncertainty 
 
Central to the governance problem in TCE is the issue of adaptation to 
the operating environment (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997, 46). With the 
exception of University A’s UCT/UCM operations, all the other TNE 
operations were observed to have been operating within environments 
with high business and legal-political uncertainty. They apply equally 
before and after the Universities’ TNE tipping points. 
 
For both Universities, the pre-tipping point TNE operating environment 
was characterised by ‘a lot less compliance’ (AI7), and frequently large 
numbers of students (AI16, CI7). However, the business environment 
changed in several Countries, resulting in reduced student numbers, 
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e.g., the change in student preferences in Country P that caused the 
termination of University A’s POL operation, and the global financial 
crisis that resulted in an ‘incredibly competitive environment in 2009 … 
and we certainly didn’t generate enough prift to sustain’ (CI2). Country X 
was reported by both Universities to have strict legal rules around 
cultural propriety which University staff did not fully comprehend (AI2, 
AI17, CI4, CI6). 
 
Post-tipping point TNE environments were affected by tightening 
regulations in Australia as well as in the host countries. The emergence 
of AUQA, and later TEQSA, and the tightening regulations at Countries 
T, V and X contributed to a number of TNE terminations for both 
Universities. For example, ten University A r-FPs were observed to have 
been terminated around the time of the AUQA Cycle 2 audits (Table 5. 
17), and University A made unusual effort to comply with a dramatic 
change in Country T higher education regulations requiring the 
achievement of a certain quota of international students at TSW (AI20). 
University C faced a highly interventionist Country V government that 
contributed to heightened competition (CI8, CI10) and ‘overzealous’ 
regulations (CI6). 
 
University A’s UCT/UCM operations were set up and managed by an OP 
that is one the Country’s four largest conglomerates with strong 
governmental ties. Although informants reported low environmental 
uncertainty in Country U, secondary data reported weak state and civil 
regulations (Table 5.4 and 5.5). Informant perspectives are likely to have 
reflected the University’s positive experience with a highly influential OP. 
 
The foregoing discussion points to TCE as the two Universities’ driving 
consideration in the selection of the DM in post-tipping point TNE 
delivery, satisfying Williamson’s discriminating alignment hypothesis 
(Table 6.3). This theoretical perspective was however not able to explain 
the Universities’ selection of the OM both before and after the 
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Universities’ TNE tipping points – because of the low asset specificity 
observed in such operations. 
 
6.3.2 Property Rights Theory 
 
Williamson argued that the ‘basic need is to get the property rights 
straight, after which, markets will reliably assign resources to high valued 
uses’ (1990). The assignment of rights under PRT ensures that the party 
that values these rights are assigned these rights for maximised 
outcomes (Kim and Mahoney 2005). The study therefore investigates the 
control of mission-critical resources between the University and its OP, 
and the impact of the TNE operation on each partner. 
 
6.3.2.1 Control of Mission-critical Resources 
 
Both Universities relied on their OPs in a hands-off approach in running 
OM operations before and after their TNE tipping points (AI10, CF2). 
While the Universities’ motivation for pre-tipping point hands-off 
management was afforded by the lax regulatory environment (AI17, 
CI10), University A’s post-tipping point hands-off management was the 
result of treating such models with lower priority compared with DM 
models (AI6, AI10). University C did not operate any OM post-tipping 
point. Mission-critical resources of OM operations were observed to be 
controlled by the OPs. 
 
Post-tipping point, the tightened TNE regulatory environment of 
University A’s OM operations provided the impetus for investments in a 
larger number of TNE processes (AI5) and in a re-structured TNE 
organisation (AI20). These changes assured the University of ‘absolute 
control’ of its TNE operations (AI19). University C on the other hand re-
structured its TNE operations in response to the phenomenal growth of 
one of its TNE operations. Like University A, the re-structured TNE 
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organisation provided University C with control over all TNE processes 
(CI3).  
 
Informants also reported that the OP was the partner that had the most 
to gain from the XCD collaboration, and the most to lose in the event of a 
termination (Section App I 10.6). 
 
6.3.2.2 Risk of Opportunism 
 
The potential for opportunism arises when there is an opportunity for 
covert exploitation within an environment lacking in trust (Section 2.6.2). 
Prima facie, the financial motivation of all TNE operations provides an 
incentive for opportunism by the OP (AI9). Pre-tipping point OM 
operations were particularly vulnerable to opportunism because of the 
lower levels of oversight by the University (AI4) and the lax regulatory 
environment (AI7). Although post-tipping point operating environments 
were characterised by tightened regulations, University A’s OM 
operations continue to be vulnerable to opportunism because of the 
hands-off approach for such non-strategic TNE operations (AI6). 
University C did not continue with OM operations post-tipping point. 
 
Although designed as an ic-IBC with on-site oversight by a University-
appointed Principal, University C’s XGI operation failed to operate as 
such because the Principal was reported to have been ‘institionalised’ by 
the OP (CI3).  
 
The potential for opportunistic behaviour was also observed in post-
tipping point DM operations. The VKP OP was reported to deliver a 
range of substitute programs alongside University C’s programs (CI4). 
Even VCS which operated University A’s ic-IBC exclusively, delivered its 
own diploma programs as a feeder to University A’s degree programs 
(AI16).  
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University A’s UCT/UCM operations seem to be an exception to the risk 
of opportunism. This was due to the ‘almost humanitarian’ ethos and 
mission of the OP in running delivering the University’s programs (AI12). 
However, it can also be noted that the OP actually delivers its own 
substitute programs within the same campus (UCM 2019). While these 
free-riding behaviours can be considered opportunistic in the early days 
of TNE (CI4, CI6), post-tipping point OPs that deliver substitute programs 
are tolerated because of the trade-off in University TNE benefits (e.g., 
market access, financial returns and operational efficiency) (AI1, CI10). 
 
Common to both Universities is the higher levels of trust generated in 
some long-running operations, e.g., TSW, UCT/UCM, VCS and VKP. 
This environment has the potential to mitigate the risks of opportunism.  
 
6.3.2.3 Information Asymmetry 
 
The pre-tipping point OM operations of both Universities exhibit high 
levels of information asymmetry. The low regulatory imposts of early TNE 
operations coupled with the entrepreneurial drive of faculties/schools led 
to a proliferation of OM operations. Many of these operations had to be 
terminated because of quality concerns, e.g., the admission of students 
with ‘sceptical entry’ qualifications (AI13), low quality delivery (AI6) and 
non-compliant OP processes (CI3). These quality concerns had the 
potential of damaging the Universities’ reputation (AI2, CI7). The 
occurrence of information asymmetry was attributed to the ‘tyranny of 
distance’ (CI10) and ‘so you can’t confirm compliance’ (AI4). 
 
The continued low engagement approach to post-tipping point OM 
operations at University A practically ensured continuing information 
asymmetry (AI3, AI7).  
 
Post-tipping point DM operations at both Universities demonstrated 
comparatively lower information asymmetry, with the exception of 
 544 
University A’s XCD operation (Table 5.36). The Universities were 
reported to have had to respond to a tightening regulatory environment 
via ‘a different lens of quality’ (AI6). Both Universities enhanced their 
TNE processes and re-structured their TNE organisation to inter alia, 
improve transparency and control (AI20, CI3).  
 
The lower levels of information asymmetry has been attributed to longer 
collaboration with OPs (AI19, CI4) and closer scrutiny of OP operations 
through on-site monitoring (AI2, CI3). While University A could rely on 
one or two on-site University representatives (e.g., PVC, Deputy PVC 
and Admissions Manager), University C chose to deploy a whole host 
country office (HCO) of University-appointed staff led by a Dean (CI11). 
The difference lies in University A’s reliance on OPs that demonstrate 
high levels of alignment of interests with the University (AI10, CI10), and 
that have collaborated with the University over a long period of time (i.e., 
TSW, VCS and UCM). University C on the other hand continued to work 
with an OP that also runs substitute programs from other university 
partners (i.e., VKP) and a new OP with which the University had not 
collaborated before (i.e., XNV).  
 
The only exception to the low information asymmetry is University A’s 
XCD DM operation. As discussed in Section 5.4.1.3.5b(ii), the OP is new 
to University A and had fallen out of a previous TNE operation. It was 
therefore not surprising that there was comparatively higher information 
asymmetry in this collaboration. 
 
6.3.2.4 Ex Ante Incentives Alignment 
 
The initiation and management of pre-tipping point OM operations by 
both Universities were driven by entrepreneurial faculties/schools as a 
result of Australian government encouragement to commercialise. They 
were not centralised, strategic initiatives of each University. These profit-
driven operations mirrored the OPs’ financial motivation, and led to long-
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running OM operations, all of which lasted beyond the five-year 
reasonable rate of return period. 
 
Post-tipping point TNE operations were subject to higher levels of 
external and internal quality oversight, and hence required higher levels 
of partner inputs. Despite these increased demands, the OP contracts of 
both Universities’ DM operations were observed to have been signed 
over long periods of between ten and fifteen years. Many of these 
contracts have either been re-negotiated for renewal or signed new 
under improved terms, including more favourable financial terms (e.g., 
University A’s insistence on a minimum 45% revenue share, and 
University C’s insistence on a minimum 5% gross margin. These ‘non-
negotiable minimas’ have clearly been accepted by the OPs. In fact, 
University A’s DM OPs have committed themselves to delivering the 
mission goods of research and community engagement. University C’s 
DM OPs also stand to gain from the presence and services of its HCOs.  
 
University A’s post-tipping point OM operations were also known to have 
been run for very long periods of time, with the prevailing operations 
having run for between seven and seventeen years. Although these 
operations are not considered strategic, they obviously provided 
sufficient alignment of incentives to the collaborating partners. 
 
6.3.2.5 Maturity of Socio-legal-political Environment 
 
PRT requires an environment of strong formal legal institutions and non-
formal social conventions to provide the motivation for compliance and 
the sanction for violations.  
 
The OM operations of both Universities were run within Countries with 
strong state or civil regulations, except for UCT, WSL and YSR – both 
before and after their respective TNE tipping points. Countries W and Y 
had weak state and civil regulations. 
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Post-tipping point DM operations of both Universities were also run within 
Countries with strong state or civil regulations, except for UCM. It should 
be noted that UCM operated within an environment with strong OP-
government relations, i.e., strong social conventions. This also applied to 
the pre-tipping point UCT OM operation. 
 
The readiness of University OPs to manage University ic-IBCs as a 
faceless infrastructure provider behind the Universities’ branding in 
Country X demonstrates the value of University branding as an effective 
social convention to regulate OP behaviour (AI10). Similarly, the 
Universities’ prestigious international rankings had been reported to have 
positively impacted the TNE performance of both Universities (AI20, CI1, 
CI2). 
 
The analyses of PRT reflectors at the two Universities’ DM operations 
(post-tipping points) indicate that the UP was in control of mission-critical 
resources but were run within environments with low information 
asymmetry. The propositions for the Direct Model (DM) were therefore 
not fully satisfied, and hence PRT cannot be said to drive the 
Universities’ choice of the DM (Table 6.3). Similarly, OP control of the 
Universities’ OM mission-critical resources negated the possibility of PRT 
as a driver for the OM operations of both Universities (both before and 
after their tipping points). 
 
6.3.3 Agency Theory 
 
As discussed in Section 3.7.5.5, the University can be said to have 
considered AT if it was concerned with adverse selction and moral 
hazard, and if there are efforts to narrow the incentives and risk aversion 
gaps between the University and its OP. 
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6.3.3.1 Costs of Search and Monitoring 
 
Pre-tipping point due diligence of prospective OPs was minimal for both 
Universities. This was due to the minimal benchmarks available, 
corresponding to the lack of experience of the Universities (CI2) and to 
the low levels of regulatory requirements for TNE delivery (AI17, CI10). 
The revenue that the faculties/schools was earning, without concerns for 
central University costs (AI20, CI11), spurred the faculties/schools to 
grow these OM operations as quickly as possible (AI19, CI6).  
 
Similarly, monitoring costs were low and consisted mainly of audits 
conducted in the course of offshore teaching visits (AI12, CI3) and 
moderation of assessments (AI6, CI6) by OP teaching staff. Early on-site 
monitoring by University C Principals largely failed because their 
independence and integrity were compromised by being ‘institutionalised’ 
by the OPs (CI3). 
 
The post-tipping point operating environment was characterised by 
tightened external regulatory conditions and internal benchmarks 
(Section 5.2.2). While the external conditions (viz., AUQA, TEQSA and 
host country regulations) impacted both Universities, each of these 
Universities also developed enhanced internal standards. University A 
went for the prestigious BSA accreditation which impacted Business 
programs (AI19), the majority of the University’s TNE programs. The 
University C VC commissioned a university-wide TNE review which 
produced a White Paper that spelled out ‘non-negotiable minimas’ for the 
delivery of TNE programs (University C TNE Project Team 2013a). 
 
The new operating environment required a lot more of both the 
Universities and their DM OPs (AI11, CI3). The Universities responded 
by improving their TNE processes, introducing management information 
systems and re-structuring their TNE organisation (AI7, AI20, CI3). Their 
OPs also invested in TNE-specific processes, organisation and systems 
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(AI19, CI7). Both Universities also engaged professionals to vet 
prospective OPs through centralised and more involved due diligence 
processes (AI18, CI1). 
 
In the case of University A, it was observed that post-tipping point OM 
operations were not part of the University’s strategic plan (AI6), and 
sometimes still initiated and managed by individual faculties (AI5). While 
also subject to the new regulatory environments, these OM operations 
seem to incur less search and monitoring costs. 
 
6.3.3.2 University Risk Aversion 
 
For both Universities, OM operations (before and after their TNE tipping 
points) are considered high risk activities (AI10, CI1), arising from OP 
behaviour (AI6, CI4) and the operating environment (AI6, CI10). The high 
risk rating for OM operations can be attributed to the lower OP 
engagement due to the distance (AI10, AI13, CI11). 
 
While DM operations are more complex, they are considered by both 
Universities as attracting comparatively less risk (AI13, CI11) because 
the Universities could exercise ‘absolute academic control’ (AI16) or ‘a lot 
more control and oversight’ (CI3). It is noteworthy that over time, both 
Universities have developed highly sophisticated systems and processes 
to manage DM operations, leading to a heightened sense of control. 
 
6.3.3.3 Ex Ante Incentives Alignment 
 
As discussed in Section 6.3.2.4, the ex ante incentives alignment 
between the Universities and their OPs for all DM and OM operations 
was found to be high. This was demonstrated by the largely long-run 
operations which lasted beyond the five-year reasonable rate of return 
period, and the newer ten- to fifteen-year DM contracts. 
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6.3.3.4 Maturity of Legal-political Environment 
 
AT operates within strong legal-political environments because it is 
based on the complete contracting assumption. The analyses of the two 
Universities indicated that both operate out of stable (AI17, CI1), mature 
(CI2) legal-political jurisdictions, with the exception of Countries U and H 
(Section 5.2.2.2).  
 
In conclusion, all OM operations of both Universities were observed to 
have fulfilled the AT propositions for OM selection – both before and after 
their TNE tipping points (Table 6.3). The Universities’ low risk aversion 
for DM operations negated AT as a possible driver. 
 
The TNE operations of both Universities are tabulated below according 
to their TNE Direct/Outsourced Model classification and empirically-
observed theoretical drivers. 
 
No. Univer
-sity 
In Relation 
to Tipping 
Point 
Type of TNE Business 
Delivery Model 
Direct/ 
Outsourced 
Model 
Possible 
Rationale for 
Model 
Selection 
1 A 
Before Franchised (remote supervision) (r-FP) OM AT 
After 
Franchised (remote 
supervision) (r-FP) OM AT 
Collaborative IBC (in 
situ oversight) (ic-IBC) DM TCE 
2 C 
Before Franchised (remote supervision) (r-FP) OM AT 
After 
Franchised (in situ 
oversight) (i-FP) DM TCE 
Collaborative IBC (in 
situ oversight) (ic-IBC) DM TCE 
 
Table 6.4   Universities’ Theoretical Perspectives in Deploying TNE  
    Business Delivery Models 
 
This classification is based on the cross case findings which are 
summarised in Table 6.5 below. The cross case analysis concluded that 
the OM operations of both Universities were possibly driven by AT 
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considerations before and after their TNE tipping points. DM operations 
were found to have been possibly driven by TCE considerations.  
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A Pre-Tipping Point 
1 Uni A r-FP OM L H H H OP H H H H L H H H 
2 Uni C r-FP OM L H H H OP H H H H L H H H 
B Post-Tipping Point 
1 Uni A r-FP OM L H H H OP H H H H L H H H ic-IBC DM H H H H UP H L H H H L H H 
2 Uni C i-FP DM H H H H UP H L H H H L H H ic-IBC DM H H H H UP H L H H H L H H 
Abbreviations  :  L – Low; H – High; UP – University; OP – Offshore Partner 
      DM – Direct Model; OM – Outsourced Model 
      Shaded cells indicate fulfilment of all reflectors for one of the theories 
 
Table 6.5   Universities A and C Responses to Propositions 
 
6.4 Universities’ TNE Business Delivery Frameworks 
 
The foregoing case study analyses of the two Universities have 
uncovered a number of new details and concepts relating to their TNE 
value chains. The focus group studies helped refine the Hutaibat value 
chain for higher education (Fig. 2.13) to address TNE operations. The 
stylised TNE value chain of Fig. 2.14 and the corresponding TNE 
Framework of Table 2.4 were further refined from interview findings to 
reflect each of the two Universities’ post-tipping point TNE delivery 
structures, resulting in the TNE Frameworks for University A (Table App 
I.4) and University C (Table App J.2). An analysis of these two 
frameworks revealed many similarities and a few differences. 
 
The primary activity of curriculum design was invariably undertaken by 
the Universities for all TNE models. However, University A was beginning 
to experiment with unit and program development at its long-running 
TSW ic-IBC, where it had some share equity. The awards for programs 
delivered in all TNE models were from the Universities without exception. 
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While all TNE operations deployed OP teaching staff for program 
delivery, there were two exceptions. University C also deployed its own 
on-site teaching staff to teach in its VKP i-FP operation. University A’s 
TSW ic-IBC teaching staff could be said to be the University’s because of 
its equity in the joint venture and the academic leadership of its PVC and 
Deputy PVC on-site. The delivery of teaching was strictly regulated by 
both Universities, e.g., curriculum coverage, medium of delivery and 
schedule of delivery. 
 
The grading of continuous assessments at University A’s TNE operations 
were all done by its OPs. University C also outsourced this process to its 
OPs, except in the VKP i-FP where its on-site teaching staff graded 
continuous assessments of units that they taught.  
 
The grading of final examinations was less similar. University A 
outsourced this process to its OPs at the TSW, UCM and XCD ic-IBCs, 
but not at its VCS ic-IBC and its r-FPs. It was reported that the University 
was considering outsourcing this process also to the VCS ic-IBC OP in 
the future. University C outsourced examination grading to its XNV ic-IBC 
OP, but not its VKP i-FP OP. Some of its own teaching staff at the VKP i-
FP who were unit coordinators also graded examinations. 
 
For moderation of continuous assessments, University A home campus 
unit coordinators were responsible for all TNE models, except at the 
TSW and VCS ic-IBC where some OP teaching staff were allowed to 
moderate on a trial basis. University C moderated all coninuous 
assessments through its home campus unit coordinators and for the VKP 
iFP, also through its on-site unit coordinators. The moderation of all TNE 
examinations at University A was conducted by home country unit 
coordinators. University C moderated TNE examinations through its 
home campus, and in Country V also through its HCO unit coordinators. 
One University A informant with strategic responsibility, AI2 expressed 
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the hope that the University and its ic-IBC OPs could one day be able to 
‘moderate each other’. 
 
For both Universities, the OPs were fully responsible for the recruitment 
of students, based on admissions criteria set by the Universities. All 
marketing materials were approved by the Universities prior to 
publication. 
 
Alumni activities by the OPs were detected in all of University A’s ic-IBC 
operations, but not at its r-FPs. University C was observed to have 
proactively facilitated alumni activities in its VKP i-FP through its HCO. 
Although not yet started, University C planned to introduce alumni 
activities at its XNV ic-IBC in the future. 
 
All University A’s ic-IBC OPs were formally committed jointly with the 
University to research and community engagement by contract. Actual 
performance varied from highly active OPs at TSW and UCM, to newly 
participating at VCS and XCD. University C is actively delivering 
research and community engagement in its VKP i-FP through a formal 
research centre housed within its HCO. It plans to do the same in its 
XNV ic-IBC. 
 
For both Universities, support activities are largely undertaken by their 
OPs. All ic-IBC physical infrastructures at both Universities were 
provided by their respective OPs, and they had to reflect their home 
campus façade and functionalities. In the case of University C, it also 
invested in a HCO at its VKP i-FP, that housed a Dean, teaching staff, 
Academic Advisor, administrators and the SCORE research centre – 
located away from the OP’s operations. Its VKP i-FP operation was not 
exclusively branded, but promoted and delivered under its OP’s brand. 
 
All student support services, whether academic or administrative/ 
professional, at both Universities were provided by the OPs 
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benchmarked against University standards. University C’s VKP i-FP 
student support services were part of the OP’s student support services 
that also catered to eleven other university partners and hence, were not 
exclusively targeted for University C’s students. The University also 
provided additional academic advisory and administrative services 
through its HCO. 
 
Academic staff support at ic-IBCs and i-FPs for both Universities were 
provided by the OP and on-site University staff. University A’s r-FP 
academic staff were supported by home campus staff and visiting 
University teaching staff. Divisional management support for TNE was 
provided by the Universities and their OPs in areas like accounting, 
finance, corporate legal services, human resource management, 
marketing and corporate communication. 
 
To address tightening regulatory conditions and accreditation 
requirements, as well as enhanced internal quality assurance 
benchmarks, the two Universities were observed to have changed their 
TNE processes and re-structured their TNE administration. University A’s 
hub-and-spoke model (AI20) was seen to be similar to University C’s 
‘three-piece’ model (CI10) for DM operations as depicted below. Given 
the proximity of the two Universities, it would not be surprising that these 
similarities were the result of mimetic isomorphism (Section 2.5). 
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      Offshore        Onshore 
University A ic-IBC Hub-and-Spoke Administration 
 
 
 
 
 
      Offshore        Onshore 
University A r-FP Hub-and-Spoke Administration 
 
 
 
 
 
      Offshore        Onshore 
University C ic-IBC and i-FP Three-piece Administration 
Fig. 6.1   Universities A and C TNE Administration Structures 
 
The foregoing findings on the Universities’ value chains are summarised 
in the TNE Business Delivery Framework below to show their Direct 
Model - Outsourced Model and ic-IBC – i-FP – r-FP classificiations. This 
framework reflects the preferences of two Australian universities that are 
similar in TNE agenda and experience, but dissimilar in size, resources 
and growth rate – both operating within similar environments and era. 
 
While partner responsibilities for some non-critical value chain activities 
might vary between universities, it seems certain that all universities 
would insist on the control of mission-critical primary activities. 
OP 
Adminis-
tration 
PVC or 
PVC and 
DPVC 
IAO (hub) 
Faculties 
(spokes) 
OP 
Adminis-
tration 
IAO (hub) 
Faculties 
(spokes) 
OP 
Adminis-
tration 
HCO UTO Schools 
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No. TNE Processes Direct Models Outsourced 
Models 
Hybrid Governance Models 
ic-IBC i-FP r-FP 
A University A C A C A C 
B Primary Activities 
1 
A
ca
de
m
ic
 
re
cr
ui
tm
en
t Curriculum design S S NA S S NA 
2 
Curriculum delivery HS HS NA H
S and 
Si 
HS and 
Sr	 NA 
3 Student recruitment HS HS NA HS HS NA 
4 
Te
ac
hi
ng
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
Award S S NA S S NA 
5 
Curriculum designed S S NA S S NA 
6 
Curriculum delivered HS* HS NA H
S and 
Si 
HS and 
Sr NA 
7 
Continuous assessment grading HS HS NA H
S and 
Si H
S NA 
8 
Examination grading HS HS NA S
i and 
S S NA 
9 
Moderation of continuous assessment S S NA S
i and 
S S NA 
10 
Moderation of exam grading S S NA S
i and 
S S NA 
11 
Alumni relations H NRp NA S NR NA 
12 
Research H
S and 
S NR
p NA Si NA NA 
13 
Community engagement H
S and 
S NR
p NA Si NA NA 
B Support Activities 
1 T and L physical infrastructure provision HS HS NA H and Si H NA 
2 
S
tu
de
nt
 
su
pp
or
t Academic H H NA H and Si 
H and 
Sr NA 
3 
Admin/Professional H H NA H H NA 
4 
Academic staff support H and Si 
H and 
Si NA 
H and 
Si 
Sr and 
S NA
 
5 
Divisional management H and S 
H and 
S NA 
H and 
S 
H and 
S NA 
 
Abbreviations :  1)   S – Sending Higher Education Institution/Provider 
   2)   H – Host Higher Education Institution/Provider 
   3)   HS – Undertaken by H, but wholly-controlled by S 
4)   HS*– Undertaken by H, but wholly-controlled by S; with some recent unit  
     coordination by H using S materials at University A’s two ic-IBCs 
5)   Si – Sending Higher Education Institution/Provider providing service 
       in situ 
6)   Sr – Sending Higher Education Institution/Provider providing service 
       remotely 
7)   NR – not referenced 
8)   NRp- not referenced but planned for future implmentation by Sending  
      Higher Education Institution/Provider 
9)   NA – not applicable 
 
Table 6.6 TNE Business Delivery Framework for Organisational  
  Economics Research (Universities A and C)  
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6.5 The Influence of Theoretical Perspectives on TNE Longevity 
 
Research question 3 was formulated to investigate if any of the three 
theories of the firm could explain the longevity of TNE operations. The 
longevity of these operations was to be benchmarked against the three-
year break even survival longevity and the five-year reasonable rate of 
return business longevity. 
 
The University A in-depth interviews identified 32 separate TNE 
operations, and was able to elicit information on 16 of them. A majority of 
the University’s TNE operations (all r-FPs) were terminated as at the time 
of the interviews. The study also identified and investigated six TNE 
operations at University C, out of which two survived at the time of the 
interviews. 
 
All terminated University A TNE operations that were started pre-tipping 
point were r-FPs and lasted more than the five-year reasonable rate of 
return period. They lasted from nine to 26 years before termination. 
University C’s terminated TNE operations (also all r-FPs) lasted between 
seven and 21 years. One r-FP lasted five years before being converted 
to an i-FP. There was no TNE operation that lasted less than the three-
year breakeven period. 
 
Post-tipping point, University A’s terminated TNE operations lasted 
between two and 14 years. Three lasted less than the three-year 
breakeven period, four less than five years, and ten more than five years. 
Unfortunately, there was insufficient information on many of the short-
lived r-FPs. In the case of University C, there was no termination among 
its two post-tipping point TNE operations. 
 
University A’s terminated pre-tipping point r-FPs were observed to have 
lasted longer than post-tipping point r-FPs. This difference has been 
attributed to the higher regulatory and accreditation benchmarks imposed 
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post-tipping point. There was insufficient comparisons in the case of 
University C to make any similar conclusion. 
 
In summary, both Universities’ terminated TNE operations consisted 
entirely of r-FPs (i.e., OM operations). No DM operation were terminated 
as at the time of the interviews. It was therefore not possible to compare  
the longevity between DM and OM operations, and attribute differences 
to any of the theories of the firm. 
 
6.6 Rival Theories 
 
The focus group studies specifically examined the possibility of the 
Resource-based View (RBV) in the four Universities TNE business 
delivery model selection, but concluded that there was no evidence for it. 
The focus groups however indicated that there might be some evidence 
of the Upper Echelon Theory (UET).  
 
While the in-depth interviews at University C provided some evidence of 
RBV, viz., the profit maximisation motive, informants at University A were 
mixed in their responses relating to RBV. Although there was some 
indication of the profit maximisation motive at University A’s TNE 
operations, the TNE resources of both the University and its OPs do not 
seem to be highly valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (VRIN).  
 
UET was more evident in both Universities. University A’s Vice-
Chancellors (VC) were reported on some occasions to have managed 
TNE in a ‘top down’ fashion. Similarly, the University C’s VCs 
demonstrated strong leadership in several strategic TNE decisions. It 
was evident that both Universities also appointed and relied on the 
expertise and decisions of senior executives with strategic 
responsibilities. In both Universities, there were rumblings amongst 
managerial and academic staff about the lack of broad consultation 
regarding strategic TNE decisions. 
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The two Universities were clearly aspiring to grow their respective TNE 
networks into highly coordinated networks of international universities. 
University A has a Global University agenda to grow its international 
network though asset-light ic-IBCs led by PVCs, while University C’s 
growth trajectory is premised on the replication of its HCOs to support its 
DM operations. Both Universities have de-prioritised r-FPs due to the 
higher risks resulting from the lack of engagement. 
 
There is therefore some evidence that RBV, UET and Strategic Nets 
might find traction in university choice of TNE business delivery models. 
 
6.7 Chapter 6 Conclusions 
 
The chapter started with a summary of the types of TNE business 
delivery models identified throughout the study, viz., the w-IBC, ic-IBC, i-
FP and r-FP. These models were classified according to their 
organisational governance and whether they were Direct or Outsourced 
Models. The focus of the chapter was on a cross-case analysis of the 
two Universities to answer the three research questions previously 
formulated.  
 
The first research question used the Guimon construct (Table 2.7) to 
determine the criteria that these Universities used in selecting between 
the Direct (DM) and Outsourced Models (OM). The empirical findings 
indicated that both Universities favoured the OM for their pre-tipping 
point single-role (i.e., teaching only) TNE operations because of the low 
investments required and the prevailing lax regulatory environments. 
Post-tipping point, both Universities migrated to DM as the model of 
choice for the ‘fully-fledged’ TNE operations (AI10) that delivered 
teaching, research and community engagement. The enhanced role of 
these ic-IBC and i-FP operating within a tighter regulatory environment 
required higher investments in TNE administration infrastructure, most of 
 559 
which had been underwritten by the OPs. While still being operated, r-
FPs at both Universities were de-prioritised and initiated only for highly 
specific purposes, e.g., cross-selling programs and branding for 
recruitment of host country students for onshore study – because of the 
higher risks associated with these OM operations. 
 
The analysis of the reflectors of the three theories of the firm found that 
both Universities favoured the r-FP (OM) in their pre-tipping point 
teaching-only operations from AT considerations. These risk averse 
Universities chose the OM because they were able to achieve high 
alignment of incentives with their OPs amidst operating environments of 
strong legal enforcement, and low search and monitoring costs. In fact, 
post-tipping point, both Universities continue to choose the r-FP for low 
priority TNE operations. 
 
Both Universities preferred DM models (viz., the ic-IBC and i-FP) for 
post-tipping point ‘fully-fledged’ (AI10) TNE operations because of the 
higher degree of control exercised by the Universities over their OPs 
amidst higher external and internal performance benchmarks. In re-
structuring their TNE administration to cope with these full-role TNE 
operations, both Universities developed very similar administration 
models (Fig. 6.1), which are much more sophisticated compared to OM 
administration models. 
 
An analysis was also conducted on the longevity of TNE operations 
across both Universities. While it was possible to identify key watershed 
events (e.g., AUQA, AUQA Cycle 2, TEQSA, BSA accreditation) and 
University tipping points as possible rationale for the termination of some 
TNE operations, and to speculate on the difference in longevities of 
University A’s pre- and post-tipping point TNE operations, there was 
insufficient suitable data points to link TNE longevity with University 
considerations for the three theories of the firm. 
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The study also identified three other possible theories that could 
influence University selection of TNE business delivery models. There 
was some (but scant) evidence for the Universities’ consideration of the 
Resource-based View, the Upper Echelon Theory and Strategic Nets. 
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Chapter 7  Research Study Conclusions and  
Future Research 
 
This qualitative constructivist study was undertaken in two stages. The 
first stage, a series of focus groups validated the TNE Decision Model 
construct (Fig. 3.2), addressed the first research question and 
established prima facie the relevance of the three theories of the firm for 
investigating TNE business delivery models. It also uncovered the 
influence of tipping points in each University’s TNE journey. The second 
stage of the study deployed in-depth case studies of two Universities 
which were previously investigated in the focus groups. These case 
studies attempted to answer the three research questions. 
 
In the course of the dual-case study, the relevance of the TNE Decision 
Model construct was further validated through the analyses of these 
Universities’ motivations for TNE participation and their rationale for 
selecting TNE business delivery models for specific purposes. The 
operating environments characterised by their pre- and post-tipping 
periods also influenced the Universities’ choice of TNE models. These 
models were explored in-depth and provided a rich description of the in 
situ-monitored IBC (ic-IBC), the in situ-monitored franchised program (i-
FP) and the remotely-monitored FP (r-FP), all of which are hybrid 
governance models with varying degrees of University control. While the 
r-FP is an Outsourced Model (OM), the others are Direct Models (DM). 
Informants also provided rich inputs on the wholly-controlled international 
branch campus (w-IBC) model. It is worth noting that the DM-OM 
dichotomy also reflects the distinction between GATS mode 1 (cross-
border supply) and mode 3 (commercial presence) as discussed in 
Section 2.1.1. 
 
The Universities’ criteria for the selection of specific TNE models for 
specific purposes and within certain operating environments were 
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investigated using the Guimon construct for multinational universities 
(2016). 
 
The Universities’ TNE model decisions both before and after their 
respective TNE tipping points were also investigated by analysing 
reflectors of the three theories of the firm. These investigations were 
designed to determine the extent to which any of these theories could 
have underpinned each University’s TNE model selection. 
 
This chapter concludes with a discussion on how the two Universities 
have transformed their TNE operations as their TNE agenda, internal 
capabilities and experience evolve while coping with the changing 
operating environments; underpinned by specific considerations 
reflecting one of two theories of the firm. It outlines specific limitations of 
the study and key contributions that the study can potentially make to 
theory, practice and policy, and recommends future research to explore 
additional frontiers of this phenomenon. 
 
7.1 Criteria for TNE Model Selection within an Evolving Operating 
Environment  
 
Research question 1 explored the criteria that the two Universities used 
in determining the deployment of the DM or OM in their TNE operations. 
This exploration utilised the Guimon analytical framework for 
investigating the motives of multinational universities in delivering their 
three roles (or missions) of teaching, research and community 
engagement (Section 2.6.5.3). Guimon argued that these universities’ 
motives can be categorised as market-seeking, resource-seeking and 
efficiency-seeking through a consideration of their ownership, location 
and choice of internalisation (i.e., vertical integration). This multi-role, 
multi-motive construct is an attempt to ensure universities ‘avoid 
decisions that are based largely on a single dimension’ of the 
phenomenon (Wilkins and Huisman 2012, 627). 
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The case studies confirmed the commercial orientation of the TNE 
operations of both Universities, e.g., both setting clear financial KPIs for 
their TNE operations (viz., 5% gross margin at University A, and 45% of 
TNE revenue share at University C). Indeed, other case studies have 
shown that ‘if Australian universities are to continue, or indeed increase 
their level of (TNE) activity … there will need to be a strategic 
commitment to entrepreneurship and appropriate investment in 
developing strategic markets (Shanahan and McParlane 2005). 
 
The host country entry modes of universities that delivered TNE 
operations ‘approximate the “classical” sequence of MNC business entry 
: exporting, licensing and franchising, joint ventures and wholly-owned 
subsidiaries … even employ strategic alliances and turn-key projects’ 
(Ibid., 120). University parallels are the distance learning programs, 
franchised programs, joint ventures, international branch campuses and 
other strategic alliances like joint program deliveries (Tsiligiris, Ilieva and 
Hill 2018). The two Universities investigated illustrate similar evolution of 
entry modes, i.e., from OM to DM modes as models of choice when the 
Universities gain experience in TNE and respond to the changing post-
tipping point operating environments. The current study refined the 
Guimon framework by distinguishing between universities that deployed 
the DM and the ones that deployed the OM, and tracked the evolution of 
the two Universities’ TNE models across their TNE tipping points. It 
further added international student recruitment for onshore home campus 
study as an additional criterion for market-seeking within the teaching 
role (Table 7.1). 
 
The current study traced the evolution of the two Universities’ TNE 
operations both before and after their TNE tipping points, to investigate 
various antecedents of the Universities’ choices of TNE models to fit the 
operating circumstances. The experiences of these two Universities in 
undergoing change across their tipping points were not isolated 
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experiences, but had also been experienced by other TNE-active 
universities. 
 
This section concludes with a refined framework for TNE model type 
selection based on university criteria for engaging in its three 
fundamental roles (Table 7.1). 
 
7.1.1 Early TNE Operations 
 
Early TNE operations at both Universities were observed to have been 
initiated and managed by entrepreneurial staff in a decentralised fashion, 
incentivised by the out-of-load personal remuneration and faculty/school 
income, an observation that Bok described as the ‘spirit of enterprise’ 
within universities (Bok 2003). Lim and Shah also reported that 
‘historically, transnational programs/partnerships have been initiated 
through individual academics or senior university leaders’ (2017), while 
Shanahan and McParlane described how all ‘UNE (University of New 
England) programs in HKSAR (Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region) arose out of individual contacts, made by individual academics 
rather than from any strategic initiative of the Faculty or the University’ 
(2005, 223). The entrepreneurialism was encouraged by the Australian 
government’s Dawkins Revolution of the 1980s which ‘turned … local 
focuses into international outlooks, vice-chancellors into corporate 
leaders … (and) remodelled higher education and how it was funded in 
only a few years’ (Wells, Marginson and Norton 2013). 
 
These early TNE initiatives were encouraged by the pull of host country 
demand for higher education opportunities, e.g., the education hub 
aspirations of Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, the United Arab 
Emirates and South Korea (Lim and Shah 2017; Ahmed and Rao 2011; 
Morshidi 2006), and the push of reduced government spending on higher 
education by sending country governments (McBurnie and Ziguras 
2009). This reduction in government spending on higher education was 
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not confined to Australia but had also occurred in other countries, e.g., 
the UK, and ‘”Thatcherism” in Britain and the parallel relative decrease in 
government subsidies to education elsewhere in the world, have forced 
many universities to look for alternative sources of revenue including 
offering their … respective products for revenue generation’ (Ahmed and 
Rao 2011, 122), these products being their academic programs for which 
there was ready demand in many developing countries (Stafford and 
Taylor 2016). 
 
The operating environments at that time were characterised by minimal 
regulatory controls, both in Australia and in the host countries. Bok 
reported on the lack of clarity about values (2003), affirming informants’ 
views that the regulatory environment was lax (AI7, CI10). This state of 
affairs provided the conditions for rapid growth in TNE operations, some 
of which were later discovered to be of questionable quality and violated 
established regulations. These violations were later picked up by various 
regulatory bodies, e.g., ‘alarming concerns raised in (AUQA) audit 
reports’ (Lim and Shah 2017, 256). 
 
These early university TNE forays focussed entirely on teaching for profit 
by leveraging on their offshore partners’ (OP) expertise, assets and 
resources to grow offshore markets. The reliance on OPs was common 
because of the limited knowledge and expertise of universities (CI10) to 
deal with the ‘complexities and challenges’ of TNE delivery (CI3). TNE 
delivery is ‘undeniably resource intensive’ and hence required the 
participation of OPs ‘who bring distinct and complementary strengths and 
who can help to scale up provision, reach markets and access resources’ 
(Tsiligiris, Ilieva and Hill 2018, 2,13), a view shared by several 
informants, e.g., AI1 who asserted that the OP must be ‘a partner of 
substance ... an organisation with resources’. The universities 
themselves prefer to ‘leverage their core competencies with a minimal 
permanent commitment of resources’ (Ahmed and Rao 2011, 130). 
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The pre-tipping point TNE operations were all OM operations focussed 
solely on teaching for profit, through the agency of OPs which provided 
the market access and delivery infrastructure. These early TNE 
operations did not have the advantage of enjoying cross-border 
networking efficiencies (Table 7.1). 
 
7.1.2 Significance of University Tipping Points 
 
Both Universities’ TNE tipping points were quality related. University A’s 
TNE tipping point was triggered by its pivotal move to initiate offshore 
branch campuses, and coincided with the gradual tightening of Australian 
regulatory conditions which impacted TNE delivery irreversibly. 
University C’s TNE tipping point was triggered by the ‘very phenomenal’ 
growth of one of its r-FP operations (CF2), which threatened its TNE 
academic integrity, risked non-compliance with TEQSA and the host 
Country’s regulatory requirements, and threatened its TNE revenue 
streams. 
 
Both these tipping points energised the Universities to proactively review 
and restructure their respective TNE operations to meet the tightening 
regulatory environments. Both started culling their poorly performing TNE 
operations, while tightening the delivery quality of their remaining 
operations. The proactive internal tightening also resulted in University A 
subscribing to a prestigious Business school accreditation (BSA), while 
University C adopted ‘non-negotiable minimas’ in its TNE delivery and 
took immediate steps to set up its highly successful host country office 
(HCO) in Country V. 
 
7.1.3 Post-tipping Point TNE Operations 
 
Post-tipping point TNE operations at the two Universities were in stark 
contrast to their pre-tipping point operations. The triggers were largely 
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related to legislative and regulatory changes within the TNE operating 
environment. 
 
First, Australian universities encountered tightening government 
expenditures on education, represented by the Nelson Reforms of the 
early 2000s. The Nelson Reforms were driven by the notion that ‘there 
was no case for increased public funds to expand the sector … partly 
because they believed or hoped that any increase in domestic university 
training would come from young people paying full fees’ (Birrel and 
Edwards 2009, 5). This state of affairs provided added impetus to 
universities to seek alternative sources of funding, e.g., TNE revenue. 
 
However, Australian universities also had to contend with tightened 
regulatory conditions both within Australia and in their TNE host 
countries. In Australia, AUQA commenced operations in 2000 and 
between 2000 and 2007, AUQA audits were reported to have triggered 
the termination of many TNE operations (Lim and Shah 2017). AUQA 
Cycle 2 audits from 2008 to 2011 further tightened regulations 
specifically for TNE through the mandatory inclusion of 
‘internationalisation’ as one of two audit themes (Shah, Nair and Wilson 
2011). Later, from 2012, TEQSA replaced AUQA and operated with 
enforcement powers (unlike AUQA), resulting in more TNE closures. It 
was obvious that the regulatory tightening won over funding constrictions 
in the universities’ aspiration to seek more TNE revenue. 
 
Thirdly, the euphoric aspirations of host countries that envisioned 
profitable education hubs were gradually mellowed by the reality of poor 
quality TNE delivery and market saturation (Dessoff 2012). There were 
some high profile failures, e.g., the closure of UNSW’s operations in 
Singapore within less than a year of commencing, and the observation 
that China’s international student population chalked up 377,054 
students in 2014, way ahead of its rather modest target of 150,000 by 
2020 (Lim and Shah 2017, 258). These countries responded by 
 568 
tightening their TNE regulations, e.g., the set up of the Committee for 
Private Education in Singapore, the Malaysian Accreditation Board 
(which was later replaced by the Malaysian Qualifications Agency), and 
the Hong Kong Council for Academic Accreditation (which later became 
the Hong Kong Council for Accreditation of Academic and Vocational 
Qualifications).  
 
The reality of tightened regulatory conditions coupled by the need to 
generate revenue to offset reduced government funding led the two 
Universities to review their respective TNE operations and instituted 
university-wide restructuring which resulted in a more strategic approach 
to TNE, centralised TNE initiation and management, and a broader focus 
on teaching, research and community engagement.  
 
These Universities now deliver the full offering of teaching, research and 
community engagement through their DM operations. University C does 
not run OM operations anymore, while University A’s remaining OM 
operations were de-prioritised and are teaching-only operations. The 
focus on the full suite of university roles in DM operations can also be 
observed within the industry, e.g., TNE operations engaging in 
‘collaborative research’, and contributing ‘to the local economy’ (Tsiligiris, 
Ilieva and Hill 2018, 12), international branch campuses ‘increasing the 
domestic welfare’ of the host country (Lien and Wang 2012), and 
Monash University seeking to ‘expand the University’s focus beyond a 
concentration on international and postgraduate coursework students … 
abroad to include engagement in all aspects of international research … 
and commercialisation of intellectual property’ (Murray 2011c, 40). It is 
also recognised that ‘there is a continuum between a single-purpose 
TNE teaching partnership and a full campus with research and 
community engagement as well … there is significant middle ground 
where different universities conceptualise their initiatives in different ways 
… but campuses are mostly characterised by a broader scale than 
teaching pertnerships’ (Stafford 2015, 142). 
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The delivery of the full suite of teaching, research and community 
engagement through DM operations was obviously due to the higher 
investment in TNE infrastructure by highly experienced and resourced 
OPs. Although University A required its DM OPs to jointly commit 
financially to research and community engagement, University C 
delivered on these two roles through its own HCO staff. University A’s 
DM offshore operations were more asset-light than University C’s. 
University A is represented by a Pro-Vice Chancellor (PVC) and in some 
DM operations accompanied by a Deputy PVC or Admissions Manager, 
while University C by a HCO Dean, at least one teaching staff for each 
school involved in teaching offshore, administrative TNE personnel, an 
Academic Advisor and research staff. These adaptations reflect industry 
practice, where ‘in the third wave (of globalisation of higher education), 
the higher educational institutions in the traditional host countries 
establish their own branches or engage in strategic alliances in the 
recipient countries’ (Ahmed and Rao 2011, 127). 
 
The two Universities are seen to have leveraged on their DM presence in 
host countries to seek out research opportunities (market-seeking) as 
well as researchers (resource-seeking), and to take advantage of their 
global network for efficiencies of scale and scope for research 
(efficiency-seeking). Community engagement was active in both 
Universities’ DM operations, with University C also recording venture 
capital funding for a product commercialisation in Country V. University 
A’s TSW operation was even reported to be more active in community 
engagement than its home campus. The delivery of research and 
community engagement through TNE operations as ‘fully developed’ 
campuses is now a norm for many TNE-active Australian universities, 
having been exhorted by AUQA to do so (Stafford and Taylor 2016). An 
example of the leverage on international networks for efficiency is 
demonstrated in Monash University’s ‘One Monash’ network, where 
partnerships ‘cannot be bilateral (between a campus and a partner); they 
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must be multilateral (between all Monash campuses and the partner)’ 
(Murray 2001c, 41). 
 
Informants of both Universities also mentioned branding and reputation 
as motives for TNE involvement. When probed, these motives for 
international branding and reputation were seen to be ultimately driven 
by revenue objectives.  
 
The reliance on international branding through TNE operations is not an 
isolated practice of these two Universities, e.g., Monash University 
considered its Sichuan University collaboration as a ‘better assurance 
about continuing flows of high quality fee paying international students’ 
(Murray 2011c, 42). This motive was also observed in numerous other 
Australian universities operating TNE (Lim and Shah 2017). The student 
recruitment for onshore study is thus an extension of the Guimon 
framework’s market-seeking and resource-seeking motives for the 
University’s teaching role.  
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Univer-
sity Role 
TNE 
Model 
Type 
TNE Motivations 
Market-seeking Resource-seeking Efficiency-seeking 
Teaching OM Expand teaching 
programs to attract 
more TNE students 
and generate more 
TNE revenue, and 
enhance branding to 
recruit for home 
campus study 
Engage OP expertise, 
assets and resources 
to reach more students 
at lower costs 
Leverage on  
university central TNE 
administration and 
OP networks for 
economies of scale 
and scope 
DM Expand campuses for 
TNE student and 
income growth, and 
leverage on offshore 
campuses for home 
campus enrolments 
and income 
Engage OP expertise, 
assets and resources 
to reach more students 
at lower costs 
Leverage on  
university central TNE 
administration and 
campus networks for 
economies of scale 
and scope 
Research OM Gain access to 
international research 
projects and funding 
through OP networks 
Engage international 
researchers and 
collaborate with foreign 
entities for international 
expertise at lower costs 
Leverage on the 
University’s research 
and OP networks for 
economies of scale 
and scope 
DM Gain access to 
international research 
projects through 
campus network 
Engage international 
researchers and 
collaborate with foreign 
entities for international 
expertise at lower costs 
Leverage on the 
University’s research 
and campus networks 
for economies of 
scale and scope 
Commu-
nity 
Engage-
ment 
OM Gain access to 
governments and 
private sectors 
through OP networks 
to contribute to 
capacity- and nation-
building via 
commercialisation 
and contract research 
Engage OP and host 
country expertise and 
resources for delivery 
and support at lower 
costs 
Leverage on the 
University’s research 
and OP networks for 
economies of scale 
and scope 
DM Connect with 
governments and 
private sectors to 
contribute to capacity- 
and nation-building 
through 
commercialisation 
and contract research 
Engage campus and 
host country expertise 
and resources for 
delivery and support at 
lower costs 
Leverage on the 
University’s research 
and campus networks 
for economies of 
scale and scope 
  
Table 7.1 University Criteria for TNE Model Selections Across  
 Their Three Roles (adapted from Guimon 2016, 222) 
 
The two Universities’ post-tipping point criteria for selecting between the 
OM and DM for their TNE operations reflect the industry’s current 
practices to a large extent, except with the absence of research and 
community engagement at their OM operations. A generic tabulation of 
university criteria for the selection of the OM and DM mode of operation 
is produced in Table 7.1 above. This tabulation extends Guimon’s 
framework to include the distinction between the OM and DM modes of 
TNE delivery, and student recruitment for onshore study. 
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The case study informants were in consensus that offshore teaching 
generate revenue, and sometimes generate ‘significant amounts of 
income’ (AI1). Weisbrod et. al (2008) argued that revenue goods (i.e., 
teaching) generate revenue to support mission goods (viz., research and 
community engagement which are generally accepted as non-renevue 
generating) thereby creating a tension between the two types of goods. 
The case studies found support for this tension.  
 
No. University 
Role 
Reference 
to tipping 
point 
University A University C 
Revenue 
Good 
Mission  
Good 
Revenue 
Good 
Mission 
Good 
1 Teaching Pre-tipping Yes No Yes No Post-tipping Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2 Research Pre-tipping NA NA NA NA Post-tipping Mixed Mixed 
3 Community Engagement 
Pre-tipping NA NA NA NA 
Post-tipping No Yes Mixed 
 
Table 7.2   Universities A and C Revenue and Mission Goods 
 
However, the two Universities’ DM operations have also shown that 
some research and community engagement activities do generate 
external funding, e.g., University A’s TSW government funding for 
research and community engagement, and University C’s SCORE 
research centre funding from government and the private sector (through 
venture capital). The generation of funding for research and community 
engagement through TNE operations has also been observed in other 
TNE-active universities, e.g., Monash University tapping Malaysian 
government ‘e-science and techno’ grants (Sidhu and Christie 2015, 
310).  
 
It can be concluded that TNE-active universities run the full suite of roles 
(i.e., teaching, research and community engagement) largely through DM 
operations which are better resourced. These universities seek market 
and resource access either on their own or through well-resourced OPs, 
and leverage on their TNE networks (if any) for cross-border economies 
of scale and scope. OM operations are usually less well-resourced and 
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deliver only teaching, through OPs that enable market access and 
provide outsourced expertise, assets and resources. Monash University’s 
International Partnership Typology categorises its international 
partnerships into four categories, with Category 1 ‘a limited number of 
top-tier institutions, for very active, comprehensive and well funded 
alliances’ (DM) as the category of choice, and Category 4, the lowest 
priority as ‘institutions in developing countries which … would benefit 
from capacity building support from Monash (curriculum design, teaching 
partnerships, staff upgrading and research training)’ (Murray 2011c, 41). 
 
7.2 TNE Business Delivery Models and Rationale for Deployment 
 
This section explores the validity of the three theories of the firm in 
potentially driving TNE business delivery model selections at Universities 
A and C. It also investigates parallel experiences at other Australian 
public universities through secondary data analysis to verify the findings 
drawn from the two Universities as a triangulation strategy for analytical 
generalisation. This exercise is aimed at addressing the ‘apparent 
neglect of theoretically-based and empirically-tested models’ for the TNE 
phenomenon (Bradmore 2007, xiii) from the perspectives of 
organisational economics, and thereby provide answers to the second 
research question. 
  
The emergence of the three theories of the firm (among others) was due 
to a dissatisfaction with the stylised notions of neoclassical economics 
that relied on the ‘invisible hand’ to efficiently order economic activity 
based upon self interest driving the economic actors. This is particularly 
significant when economists considered the existence of the firm, which 
should not occur if markets worked costlessly. The reality is that markets 
do not function costlessly due to the existence of transaction costs. The 
present study was designed to investigate if any of the three theories of 
the firm can explain the choice of the Direct or Outsourced Model (i.e., 
firm) of TNE business delivery. 
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7.2.1 Pre-tipping Point 
 
Both Universities deployed the r-FP business delivery model, which is an 
OM type of operation, in the years prior to their TNE tipping points. 
These early TNE operations were initiated and managed by 
entrepreneurial staff at the faculties or schools. They were not centrally 
strategised or coordinated.  
 
The lax regulatory environment during this period permitted the 
proliferation of these TNE operations which were initiated with little due 
diligence and operated with minimal quality assurance (low costs of 
search and monitoring). The high risk aversion of participating 
Universities restricted these operations to the ‘hands-off’ r-FP model 
(AI10, CF2), which required low capital investments on the part of both 
universities and their OPs. They also operated within mature legal 
jurisdictions which provided the contracting parties assurance of contract 
enforcement. The closely aligned financial interests of the 
entrepreneurial University initiators and their OP counterparts (ex ante 
incentives alignment) ensured the rather long run of many of these r-FPs 
(Section 6.5). The Universities’ selection of this OM mode of TNE 
operation reflects AT considerations on the part of the Universities. 
 
TCE could not have driven the Universities’ decision to deploy the OM 
mode because of the low levels of asset specificity associated with the 
asset-light r-FP operations. These asset-light investments were made 
possible by the minimal regulatory imposts of the time. Alternatively, the 
reliance on the OM mode by virtue of PRT considerations during the pre-
tipping point period would have been possible only in an environment of 
low opportunism and information asymmetry - two conditions that are 
obviously not met. 
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A survey of the literature indicates that the experiences of these two 
Universities were not unique to them, but also applied to other Australian 
universities. For example, the initiation of r-FPs by entrepreneurial staff, 
taking advantage of the lax regulatory environment of the pre-tipping 
point era was widely reported (Section 7.1.1).  
 
The push of a shrinking public purse affected many Australian 
universities adversely and induced some to embark on revenue-
generating r-FP operations (Shanahan and McParlane 2005a). 
Australian universities were reported in AUQA audits to be starting TNE 
operations with little concern for ‘proper quality control’ (implicating low 
asset specificity), driven by ‘the pressure on universities to source 
income in this way’ (Edwards, Crosling and Edwards 2010, 314). These 
early TNE motivations at Australian public universities coincided with 
their mostly commercially-oriented OPs, whose ‘motive and mission … is 
to generate profit’ (Edwards, Crosling and Edwards 2010, 305), possibly 
establishing the close ex ante alignment of this common but mutually 
high priority incentive. 
 
It was observed that the lax regulatory environment, high offshore 
demand for TNE programs and constricted home country funding 
provided a fertile environment for the care-free proliferation of OM 
operations at the two Universities, evidencing low costs of search and 
monitoring. Shanahan and McParlane reported similar sentiments, i.e., 
‘the pressure to gain markets has the potential to reduce the vigilance of 
universities when assessing the viability and suitability of programs’ 
(2005, 226). In the case of the University of New England, an AUQA 
audit report noted that ‘little consideration was given to the risks inherent 
in these undertakings … there was no detailed risk analysis undertaken’ 
(Ibid., 225). The proliferation of r-FPs was partially incentivised by host 
country governments, e.g., Malaysia’s Private Higher Education 
Institution Act 1996 which ‘without doubt … has encouraged private 
sector involvement through partnership with foreign institutions’ (Morshidi 
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2006, 115). They have also responded to strong economic growth in 
many developing countries, whence ‘global demand for higher education 
has been increasing in leaps and bounds’ (Ahmed and Rao 2011, 119). 
 
Like Universities A and C, the disciplinary focus of many universities was 
in Business, rather than the Sciences or Engineering because of the low 
infrastructure requirements – ‘business education, compared to natural, 
physical and applied sciences, does not need huge investments in 
physical plant, labs, equipment, etc … it is therefore relatively easier to 
initiate operations abroad’ (Ahmed and Rao 2011, 125). This generic 
observation also explains the low asset specificity of early TNE 
operations (precluding TCE considerations), and provides a possible 
explanation for how they could have proliferated. 
 
The use of the r-FP model was widely associated with the ‘risk of 
opportunism’ (Edwards, Crosling and Edwards 2010, 303) and which 
required ‘robust due diligence, and in-depth knowledge of local 
conditions and regulatory frameworks prior to engaging in TNE’ 
(Tsiligiris, Ilieva and Hill, 2018, 11) - indicating the high information 
asymmetry existing in such collaborative relationships. These 
environments of high opportunism and information asymmetry preclude 
the exercise of PRT considerations in the selection of the OM mode of 
operation. 
 
University risk aversion was clearly identified in the two Universities as 
they chose the hands-off, low investment r-FPs to minimise their risks. 
This behaviour was also observed in the University of New England’s 
early r-FP operations, where it ‘espoused the notion of minimizing risk 
through an alliance’ (Shanahan and McParlane 2005, 225). Clearly, ‘the 
preparedness of universities to participate in franchising or twinning 
programmes exposes their reputations to risk both abroad and at home’ 
(Edwards, Crosling and Edwards 2010, 305). 
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The case studies and secondary analysis showed that the host countries 
where the two Universities operated exhibited mature and strong legal-
political enforcement environments. A survey of the literature on TNE 
operating environments also reported that these countries were mature 
legal jurisdictions with growing centralised agencies for the regulation of 
private higher education (Lim and Shah 2017, 257). These environments 
are necessary for AT considerations which assume complete contracts 
that can rely on host country legal systems to enforce.  
 
The foregoing findings were based on the analysis of informant accounts 
of the Universities’ TNE experience informed by the Decision Model 
construct of Section 3.7.3 (Fig. 3.2), and supported by triangulation 
against industry practice. The pre-tipping point AT considerations are 
summarised against the Decision Model construct below. 
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No. Decision Model Factors 
Agency Theory 
Search and 
Monitoring Costs 
University Risk 
Aversion 
Ex ante Incentives 
Alignment 
Enforcement 
Environment  
1a University Type  
Values its reputation 
and ranking   
1b OP Type Reputable TNE operator    
2a University Size     
2b OP Size 
Demonstrated 
current operation/s 
and marketing 
network (if any) 
   
3a University Resources 
Proven processes 
and systems for 
monitoring OP 
performance 
   
3b OP Resources 
Willing to invest in 
transparent 
processes and 
systems, or use 
university’s  
   
4a University TNE Agenda  
High risk aversion 
assumed; 
Asset-light investment 
approach 
Complete contract 
with clearly spelled-
out objectives 
 
4b OP TNE Agenda 
Transparent 
business objectives  
Complete contract 
with clearly spelled-
out objectives 
 
5a University TNE Experience 
Long association 
with OP 
Operated r-FP 
previously   
5b OP TNE Experience Proven track record    
6a University TNE Growth Rate  
Stable and have 
capacity for additional 
operation 
  
6b OP TNE Growth Rate 
Demonstrated 
performance over 
extended period; 
Stable non-erratic 
TNE operations 
   
7 Operating Environment    
Stable host country 
legal environment 
 
Table 7.3 TNE Outsourced Model Selection through AT 
Considerations 
 
7.2.2 Post-tipping Point 
 
Post-tipping point, the Universities and their OPs encountered tightened 
regulatory conditions which required higher costs of compliance 
(Holloway et al. 2013). The Universities themselves enhanced their own 
internal quality benchmarks by submitting to a prestigious Business 
school (BSA) accreditation (University A) and instituted ‘non-negotiable 
minimas’ in TNE delivery (University C). Both Universities also added 
research and community engagement to the TNE’s teaching role. These 
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additional quality benchmarks and requirements associated with the new 
roles showed up the contracting parties’ shortcomings, e.g., low 
admissions standards, poor quality delivery, unsuitably qualified OP 
teaching staff, poor quality facilities and OP teaching staff who were not 
research active. OPs were also found to have divergent interests (a form 
of free-riding), e.g., partnering with multiple universities to deliver 
competing programs.  
 
The new quality imposts increased transaction frequency and required 
investment-specific assets. These investment-specific assets were 
however not highly asset specific in the TCE sense, and hence did not 
require outright vertical integration. They resulted in a shift towards a 
more highly controlled (by the Universities) mode of hybrid governance 
delivery, viz., the ic-IBC or the i-FP, where the Universities invested in 
on-site staff to monitor and assist in ex post adaptations to environmental 
uncertainties. The circumstances that led the Universities to deploy these 
DM models reflect TCE considerations on the part of the Universities. 
 
The selection of the DM mode could not have been driven by PRT 
considerations because of the low information asymmetry observed 
between the partners, which is in turn the result of the highly aligned 
interests of the partners (e.g., TSW State government and UCT/UCM 
conglomerate partner, both with clearly capacity-building interests) or 
long-standing associations between the partners (e.g., VCS and VKP). 
Alternatively, AT also could not have driven these DM modes because of 
the lower University risk aversion, and the higher monitoring costs 
associated with quality assuring highly regulated TNE operations. 
 
University A continued to retain several legacy r-FP operations due to 
specific strategic purposes; some of them run out of the faculties instead 
of being centrally coordinated. These small OM operations were however 
de-prioritised and do not fall under the University’s strategic planning 
processes. They did not require investment-specific assets because they 
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continued to be teaching-only operations. Like their counterparts during 
the pre-tipping point period, they are thus observed to have been driven 
by AT considerations. 
 
There are clear parallels with the two Universities’ experiences among 
Australian public universities. First, the tightened regulatory environment 
occasioned by AUQA (Burdett and Crossman 2012) and later TEQSA 
(Bentley, Henderson and Lim 2017) within Australia, and the universities’ 
reactions were widely reported. For example, the University of South 
Australia was reported to have systematically phased out most of its TNE 
operations in 2008 in response to AUQA, while Monash University’s 
response was to initiate ‘a significant rebalancing of its 
internationalisation activities … to significantly reduce the number of its 
international partnerships and linkages and target a small number of 
relationships with top institutions around the world in globally significant 
locations on a bilateral, multilateral and thematic basis’ (Murray 2011c, 
28). RMIT University and the University of Wollongong chose vertical 
integration through the establishment of the wholly-controlled 
international branch campus (w-IBC) in Vietnam and the UAE 
respectively (Edwards, Crosling and Edwards 2010, 313).  
 
The tightened regulatory environments sometimes resulted in ‘vagaries 
of the (Australian) government policies’ impacting university funding 
(CI1), and the ‘vagaries of Country V policies … have hurt us a lot’ and 
‘limited its growth’ (AI1). In some jurisdictions, e.g., in Country V, the 
education sector became ‘very regulated’ (CI7), and regulators perceived 
to be ‘perhaps overzealous’ (CI6). To many host governments, market 
failures are sufficient justification for intervention, which sometimes do 
more harm than good (Balleisen and Moss 2012). The future for TNE has 
been reported to be challenging because of tightening regulations as well 
as increased competition from host country institutions which have begun 
to proliferate to meet local needs and develop their own TNE offerings 
(Lim and Shah 2017, 260). 
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Environmental uncertainties can also come about from non-regulatory 
events such as ‘the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
epidemic in HKSAR (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region) in 2003 
… (which) necessitated the suspension of teaching activities’ (Shanahan 
and McParlane 2005, 225). With the TNE ‘landscape constantly evolving’ 
(Sugimoto 2006, 2), universities need to be vigilant and prepared to 
adapt to the local environment (Borgos 2016, 285).  
 
Apart from unpredictable operating environments, TNE-active 
universities also have to contend with behavioural uncertainties 
associated with their OPs. TNE research literature is littered with 
numerous incidences of behavioural uncertainties, e.g., one of 
Macquarie University’s ‘partner offering unauthorised courses … (and) all 
assessment was conducted by the partner with no moderation occurring 
by Macquarie University staff, and staff were appointed by the partner 
without university assessment’ (Edwards, Crosling and Edwards 2010, 
310). Edith Cowan University (ECU) was reported to have one partner 
‘enrolling students in ECU courses without ECU authorisation … (and) 
offshore partner was offering too much credit for a degree which involved 
professional accreditation, unbeknownst to some of the students’ (Ibid.). 
 
These restructuring exercises led to universities incurring investment-
specific spending, e.g., Monash University’s A$200,000 seed funding for 
its Sichuan University collaboration (Murray 2011c, 29). There were 
expectations of ‘commitment from both partners (in DM operations) to 
commit the necessary resources’, leading universities to ‘increasingly 
function as corporate entities’ with asset specific investments (Shanahan 
and McParlane 2005, 227). The increased investments were a necessity 
because of increased complexity in TNE delivery of full suite roles 
(Edwards, Crosling and Edwards 2010, 305; Stafford 2015, 129), 
evidencing the high transaction frequency of DM operations. 
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There is an observed increase in scrutiny at due diligence undertaken by 
many universities when assessing DM operations, e.g., Monash 
University took five months to sign off on a broad agreement with 
Sichuan University for a comprehensive collaboration, but took another 
eight months to sign off on disciplne and administrative memoranda of 
understanding, while the DVCI and DVCR expended three weeks to 
negotiate with the participating faculties (Murray 2011c, 42). In 
responding to AUQA recommendations, the University of New England 
(UNE) ‘has now implemented a detailed process of approval for overseas 
ventures … (involving) the development of a scoping document that sets 
out the parameters of the project, a business plan, financial projections 
and a detailed risk analysis’ (Shanahan and McParlane 2005, 225). 
UNE’s TNE approval process requires the proposal to go through school 
approval, followed by faculty approval, and finally a senior level 
University Entrepreneurship Committee where a ‘full review of the 
planned entrepreneurial activity is undertaken’ before final approval is 
given (Ibid.). These due diligence exercises, while increasing search 
costs, also lead to lower information asymmetry (which precludes PRT 
as a possible driver of DM operations as discussed earlier) and lower risk 
aversion on the part of the university (an observation in Universities A 
and C as well). The high costs of search and monitoring coupled with the 
low university risk aversion precludes AT as a driver for DM selection. 
 
Table 7.4 below is a tabulation of informant perspectives on the 
Universities’ TNE business delivery model selection based on the 
Decision Model construct of Section 3.7.3, and referenced against 
industry practice. 
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No. Decision Model Factors 
Transaction Cost Economics 
Asset Specificity Behavioural  Uncertainty 
Transaction 
Frequency 
Environment 
Uncertainty 
1a University Type     
1b OP Type Education institution 
Appropriately 
approved and 
accredited 
  
2a University Size     
2b OP Size 
Demonstrated 
current operation/s 
and marketing 
network (if any) 
   
3a University Resources 
Existing basic TNE 
administrative 
organisation;  
Teachout capacity; 
Capacity to invest in 
full campus (for w-
IBC), or on-site 
presence (for ic-
IBC/i-FP) 
 
Existing TNE 
administrative 
organisation can cope 
with new operation, or 
willing to add capacity 
Capability and 
capacity to cope with 
changing operating 
environment 
3b OP Resources 
Current campus 
suitably equipped 
(for i-FP);  
Capacity to invest 
(for ic-IBC) 
 
Existing TNE 
administrative 
organisation can cope 
with new operation, or 
willing to add capacity 
Capability and 
capacity to cope with 
changing operating 
environment 
4a University TNE Agenda 
Strategic and 
calculated decision 
for either w-IBC or 
ic-IBC/i-FP 
   
4b OP TNE Agenda 
Willing to deliver 
university’s 3 roles 
Transparent business 
objectives   
5a University TNE Experience 
Operated TNE 
previously    
5b OP TNE Experience Proven track record 
Demonstrated 
business integrity   
6a University TNE Growth Rate   
Stable and have 
capacity for additional 
operation 
 
6b OP TNE Growth Rate  
Demonstrated 
performance over 
extended period; 
Stable non-erratic 
TNE operations 
  
7 Operating Environment    
Assumed highly 
variable host country 
environment 
 
Table 7.4 TNE Direct Model Selection through TCE Considerations 
 
7.2.3 The OM and DM Operations on the Hybrid Governance 
Spectrum 
 
Hybrid governance models allow for a loosening of conditions of the 
hierarchy, and ‘viewed as intermediate solutions to the problem of 
minimizing haggling, opportunistic behaviour, and exploitation … when 
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these problems are present yet not too severe’ (Lafontaine and Slade 
2013, 966). Indeed the TNE operations of the two Universities 
demonstrated how the TNE partners came to various compromises, e.g., 
University A accepting the VCS OP’s delivery of the OP’s own programs 
within its ic-IBC (DM) campus in exchange for the OP’s management of 
the campus on behalf of the University. Similarly, University C accepted 
the VKP OP’s substitute programs from its eleven other university 
partners, in exchange for the OP’s ‘well-oiled (marketing) machine’ (CF2) 
that resulted in one of the largest TNE operations in Country V. It is no 
wonder that hybrid models are ubiquitous (Menard 2013) and popular 
(Tsiligiris, Ilieva and Hill 2018). 
 
The ic-IBC and i-FP hybrid models are ‘asset-light’ models (AI1) that are 
the ‘lower of risk modelling in terms of capital-intensive risk … for the 
University’ (CI11). The deployment of such hybrid governance models 
reflects Menard’s observation that hybrids ‘improved capacity to face 
uncertainty’, create ‘value through mutually-accepted dependence’ and 
provide ‘expected spillovers if adequate sharing rules are implemented’ 
(Menard 2013, 1078). For both Universities, these hybrid models resulted 
in ‘improved capacity’ to grow student enrolments, required ‘mutually-
accepted dependence’  (or face ‘mutually-assured destruction’ on 
termination – CI10), and also provided spillovers, e.g., in the form of 
feeder program revenue for OPs and onshore students for the 
Universities. Similar to Universities A and C, a number of other Australian 
universities were also seen to have expanded their offshore TNE reach 
and recruited international students for onshore study through mutually-
accepted dependence on their OPs, e.g., the University of South 
Australia’s Singapore OM operations and Monash University’s Malaysian 
DM joint venture (Murray 2011c). Stafford concluded that ‘partnerships 
provide a means of pursuing objectives that neither partner can achieve 
on its own’ (2015, 143). 
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The resulting DM mode of delivery is best represented by Menard’s 
‘strategic center’ hybrid which reflects greater university control, while the 
OM by the ‘third-party coordination’ hybrid reflecting a lower level of 
control (Fig. 2.7). 
 
7.2.4 The OM and DM Operations as Global Value Chains 
 
The global value chain governance construct of Gereffi et. al (2005) is a 
useful TCE lens to understand the TNE phenomenon although it is 
mainly applied to manufacturing (Section 2.6.5.5). Applying the Gereffi 
construct to TNE, a service industry, requires an appreciation of value 
co-creation in higher education. Under the Gereffi construct, the TNE 
value chain can be considered a complex one (CI3), but codifiable and in 
fact, highly codified in Universities A (AI7) and C (CI3). Stafford 
acknowledged that ‘TNE has been characterised by its inherent 
complexity’ (2015, 129). 
 
In the early days of TNE, Universities A and C operated in lax regulatory 
environments, both onshore as well as offshore (Section App J 6.2d). 
The lax regulatory environment attracted many OPs, some of which are 
‘small companies’ (CI6). There was therefore a sense that the 
capabilities of the supply base for OM delivery in offshore locations were 
high (due to the low regulatory requirements). This continues to be the 
case post-tipping point because of the de-prioritised OM operations at 
both Universities. 
 
With the tightening of Australian higher education regulations and host 
country regulations, particularly in Countries T, V and X where 
Universities A and C operated, fewer organisations were capable enough 
to meet the higher regulatory requirements of TNE delivery (AI16, CI10). 
This was because of the high investments required for TNE-specific 
assets, e.g., specialised teams to manage TNE value chain processes 
(CI5), campus-like facilities to ensure comparability of student experience 
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(AI19, CI4) and ic-IBC campuses that resemble the University’s home 
country campus (AI6). The lower capacities in the supply base were 
demonstrated in University A’s preference for OPs that can set up and 
manage an ic-IBC, and in University C’s change in OPs in Countries V 
and X to OPs that have better expertise, experience and resources.  
 
Under the Gereffi et. al construct, OM delivery can be classified as 
operating under the Modular global value chain governance type 
because of its high level of transaction complexity, high codifiability and 
perceived high supply base capabilities, while DM delivery under the 
Captive governance type because of the lower supply base capabilities 
(Table 2.8).  
 
For most DM operations, the Gereffi et. al construct correctly categorises 
the DM’s Captive governance type as having high degrees of explicit 
coordination and power asymmetry, while the OM’s Modular governance 
type as having lower explicit coordination and power asymmetry. There 
is however some observed non-conformance in University C’s VKP OP 
relationship, where there seems to be symmetric power relations 
between University C and its VKP OP, which runs a stable of programs 
from 12 university partners. On the other hand, University A’s XCD DM 
OP was reported to have been ‘strong’ and hence was able to negotiate 
for itself the right to grade examination scripts, a devolution granted only 
to proven OPs (AI7) – reflecting a reversed power asymmetry. The more 
symmetric power relations in the VKP DM can be attributed to the 
relatively lower asset specificity of the OP’s investments (compared to 
other DMs), which elicited CI10’s remark that there would be ‘mutually-
assured destruction’ if the operation was terminated. In the case of XCD, 
there were unverified informant reports of political intervention in the 
setting up of the DM operation – which might explain the OP’s behaviour. 
The anomalies in these TNE operations may be fundamentally due to the 
fact that it is a service industry where value is co-created between the 
partners and the students. 
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7.2.5 PRT as Potential Driver for Full Suite DM Operations 
 
Although PRT was not identified as a driver for any of Universities A and 
C TNE operations, it can be argued that the industry’s shift towards full 
suite TNE deliveries (viz., teaching, research and community 
engagement) might have their motivation in PRT considerations. 
 
In analyzing TNE operations from AUQA audit reports, Edwards et. al 
concluded that universities are exposed to opportunistic OP behaviours 
(2010, 303). They also reported that the TNE operating environment is 
characterised by high levels of information asymmetry (Ibid., 308). These 
observations are confirmed by informant reports of both Universities A 
and C pertaining to DM operations (Table 6.3). 
 
Australian universities are reported to be migrating towards full suite TNE 
delivery, e.g., Monash University’s Sichuan University DM collaboration 
(Murray 2011c). AUQA audit reports of 2000 – 2011 indicate that ‘there 
are broader drivers (instead of just teaching) including cross-cultural 
engagement, international staff and student mobility, access to high-
quality research students and research projects and partnerships, 
internationalisation of the curriculum and pursuit of community service 
obligations’ (Bentley, Henderson and Lim 2017, 342). Universities that 
deliver the full suite of roles can be argued as potentially gaining more 
than their host country commercial OPs whose motive and mission are 
largely ‘to generate profit’ (Edwards, Grosling and Edwards 2010, 305). 
 
These full suite TNE operations are usually also imbued by a mission to 
generate positive externalities for communities within its sphere of 
influence and the host country government. For example, Stafford’s 
thematic analysis of AUQA audit reports asserted that ‘a key strategic 
question is whether a TNE teaching partnership serves the needs of local 
students, contributes to the need of local employers and generates a 
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financial surplus that is sufficient to fit well with the university’s 
international and strategic plans’ (2015, 144). Further, ‘where a major 
partnership or campus is established, the purpose needs to be defined in 
terms of its contributions to the university’s research profile and 
performance, and to meeting the expectations of the local community 
and industry and their economic needs through its research program’ 
(Ibid., 144-145). These concerns for broader stakeholder incentives are 
defining characteristics of PRT considerations. 
 
In the event such partners are able to find close ex ante alignment of 
incentives, while operating within strong legal jurisdictions and/or 
subjected to strong informal social conventions that can enforce the 
exercise of property and decision rights, the DM operation can be said to 
be driven by PRT considerations. A UK university DM example is 
observed to be potentially driven by PRT, i.e., the University of 
Sheffield’s (UoS) offshore International Faculty in Thessaloniki, Greece 
(Tsiligiris, Ilieva and Hill 2018, 40-41). This offshore faculty is a joint 
venture (i.e., DM operation) between the university and its Greek partner, 
Strategakis, and delivers the full suite of university roles across eight 
South East and Eastern Europeen countries (Ibid.). Although the offshore 
faculty is a separate legal entity, it delivers UoS programs exclusively 
and complies with all UoS standards and requirements (i.e., university 
control of mission-critical resources). The admissions process is a fully 
devolved offshore faculty function (demonstrating re-allocation of PRT 
decision rights) but students are registered with UoS and receive UoS 
acceptance letters.  
 
The PRT reflectors for such DM operations are tabulated against the 
Decision Model construct of Section 3.7.3 as a possible set of PRT-
driven propositions, based on Universities A and C TNE experiences and 
industry practice as exemplified by the UoS offshore faculty. 
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No. Decision Model Factors 
Property Rights Theory 
Control of 
Mission-critical 
Resources 
Risk of 
Opportunism 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Ex ante 
Incentives 
Alignment 
Enforcement 
Environment 
1a University Type    Education institutions 
 
1b OP Type  Reputable TNE operator  
2a University Size      
2b OP Size      
3a University Resources 
University 
controls 
mission-critical 
resources 
    
3b OP Resources 
Proven TNE 
processes and 
systems 
 
Proven TNE 
processes and 
systems 
  
4a University TNE Agenda University stands to gain 
more than OP 
 
  Broad stakeholder 
interests, 
including host 
country’s 
 
4b OP TNE Agenda Transparent business objectives  
5a University TNE Experience 
Operated TNE 
previously 
Operated TNE 
previously    
5b OP TNE Experience 
Operated TNE 
previously Demonstrated business integrity   
6a University TNE Growth Rate 
Stable and have 
capacity for 
additional 
operation 
    
6b OP TNE Growth Rate 
Demonstrated 
performance 
over extended 
period; Stable 
non-erratic TNE 
operations 
Due diligence on substitute 
programs, if any   
7 Operating Environment     
Mature host 
country legal-
political 
environment and 
social 
conventions 
 
Table 7.5 TNE Direct Model Selection through PRT Considerations 
 
Section 7.2 shows strong indications from the dual case studies as well 
as industry practice that TCE is a possible driver of DM operations, while 
AT possibly for OM operations. It also postulates that PRT can be a 
possible driver for full suite DM operations which embrace a broader field 
of stakeholders. 
 
The two case studies did not provide any clear, specific trend in 
longevities between OM and DM operations, except to highlight the 
longer-running pre-tipping point OMs (compared to post-tipping point 
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OMs), which might be attributed to highly aligned partner interests driving 
OM operations within lax regulatory environments. Research question 
three is thus not addressed. 
 
7.3 Value Chains for TNE Business Delivery Models 
 
The current study provided rich data to explicate the ic-IBC, i-FP and r-
FP business delivery models. They provide an opportunity to unpack 
these models and thereby extend previous frameworks, e.g., Davies et. 
al’s construct from which the current study derived the OM-DM 
dichotomy (Sections 2.1.2.2 and 2.7.1), and the KM framework (Section 
2.5.2) from which the current study’s value chain-based TNE framework 
of Section 2.5.5 (Table 2.4) was underpinned. The resulting TNE 
framework is a more fine-grained classification of TNE business delivery 
models viewed through the organisational economics lens, more 
particularly through TCE, PRT and AT. It thus extends the KM framework 
beyond the three academic criteria to include commercial, ownership and 
governance considerations. 
 
The original TNE framework of Table 2.4 provided the basis for detailed 
coding and analysis of the reflectors of the three theories of the firm. 
Following the in-depth case studies, it has been refined to include value 
chain activities that were heretofore not identified (viz., Table App I.4 for 
University A, Table App J.2 for University C, and Table 6.6 for cross-
case), and presented in Table 7.6, with suggestions for other modes of 
TNE operations as well following the survey of the operations of other 
Australian public universities (underscored in grey tone). 
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No
. 
TNE Processes Direct Models Outsourced Models 
Hier-
archy 
Hybrid Governance Models 
w-IBC ic-IBC i-FP Multi-
national 
University 
r-FP Partner-
ship 
Program 
Joint 
HEI/ 
provider 
A Primary Activities 
1 
A
ca
de
m
ic
 
re
cr
ui
t-
m
en
t 
Curriculum 
design S S S S or A S 
S or 
H and S H and S 
2 Curriculum 
delivery S H
S HS A H
S or  
HS and Sr 
H or 
H and S A 
3 Student recruitment S HS HS A HS H A 
4 
Te
ac
hi
ng
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
Awarded S S S S or A S S or  H and S H and S 
5 Curriculum 
designed S S S S or A S 
S or  
H and S H and S 
6 Curriculum 
delivered S H
S H
S and 
Si A 
HS or  
HS and Sr 
H or 
H and S A 
7 Contin. 
Assess. S H 
HS and 
Si A H
S H or H and S A 
8 Exam 
grading S H 
Si and 
S A S 
S or  
H and S A 
9 Contin. 
assess. 
mod 
S S S
i and 
S A S 
S or  
H and S A 
10 Exam mod S S S
i and 
S A S 
S or  
H and S A 
11 Alumni relations 
S H Si A H and S H or H and S A 
12 Research S HS and S S
i and 
S A and S NA H and S A 
13 Community 
engagement S H
S and S Si A and S NA H or H and S A 
B Support Activities 
1 T and L physical 
infrastructure 
provision 
S HS H and Si A H 
H or 
H and S A 
2 
S
tu
de
nt
 
su
pp
or
t Academic S H H and Si A H and S
r H or H and S A 
3 Admin/Pro-
fessional S H H A H 
H or 
H and S A 
4 Academic staff 
support S H and S
i H and Si A H
S and Sr H or H and S A 
5 Divisional 
management S H and S 
H and 
S A H and S H and S A 
Abbreviations :  1)   S – Sending Higher Education Institution/Provider 
   2)   H – Host Higher Education Institution/Provider 
   3)   HS – Undertaken by H, but wholly-controlled by S 
4)   HS*– Undertaken by H, but wholly-controlled by S; with some recent unit  
     coordination by H using S materials at Country V ic-IBC 
5)   Si – Sending Higher Education Institution/Provider providing service 
       in situ 
6)   Sr – Sending Higher Education Institution/Provider providing service 
       remotely 
7)   A – Autonomous/semi-autonomous management 
8)   NR – not referenced 
9)   NRp- not referenced but planned for future implmentation by Sending  
      Higher Education Institution/Provider 
10) NA – not applicable 
   11) HS – Undertaken by H, but wholly-controlled by S 
   12) Grey scale indicates probable accountabilities based on current literature 
Table 7.6 TNE Business Delivery Framework for Organisational  
  Economics Research (Refined) 
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The detailed findings represented by Table 7.6 has been summarised 
diagrammatically as a refinement of Hutaibat’s original value chain for 
higher education (Fig. 2.13 in Section 2.7.3.3) to reflect the current 
study’s OM and DM operations. These value chains have been refined 
by distingushing between the OM and DM operations, the inclusion of 
alumni relations and community engagement as primary activities, and 
the separation of roles between the University (UP) and their OPs.  
 
 
    University infrastructure (OP) 
  Academic support/student services (OP)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
    Admin/professional services (OP)                                                                                                                           
(UP)   Academic staff support   (OP) 
                                                                                                                                                          Parents          
 (UP)  Intermediate activity (including QAA)  (OP)                                  Employers                
   (UP)                                                                                       Community                                                                              
Staff                                                                                                                                 Country                            
Recruit-            (UP)                               (UP)                               (UP)                                                                                          
ment                                                                                                                                                           
   (OP)       Curriculum Devt            Teaching                           Assessment                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                      
 Student              (OP)              (OP)             
 Recruit-                                                                                                                        
 ment  
   (OP)                                                                                                                     
Abbreviations : UP for University Partner; OP for Offshore Partner 
 
Fig. 7.1   TNE Outsourced Model Value Chain (Pre- and Post-tipping  
Point) 
 
In the pre-tipping point OM operations, the OP provides all of the TNE 
operation’s physical infrastructure, academic support and student 
services, administration and professional services and marketing. The 
university provides all of the curricula for program delivery. The two 
partners share responsibilities for academic staff support, intermediate 
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activity, staff recruitment, teaching and assessment. Post-tipping point 
OM models are similarly represented by the same diagram. 
 
The post-tipping point DMs (Fig. 7.2) delivered the full suite of teaching, 
research and community engagement. Research and community 
engagement were mission goods that University C delivered on its own 
without OP involvement, while University A required participation of its 
OPs. While University C undertook career placement and alumni 
relations as its own primary TNE value chain activity, University A’s DM 
operations delivered them through OP involvement. The duality is 
represented by dashed lines separating UP and OP. 
 
The other value chain activities reflected the OM value chain activities, 
except for academic staff support where the post-tipping point DM 
operations saw the involvement of the university either in the form of an 
on-site PVC or an entire host country office (University C) in providing 
additional services. The DM diagram also continues to incorporate the 
broader external stakeholders of parents, employers, community and 
country as possible criteria for PRT considerations. 
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    University infrastructure (OP) 
(UP)  Academic support/student services   (OP)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
    Admin/professional services (OP)                                                                                                                           
(UP)   Academic staff support   (OP) 
                                                                                                                                                          Parents          
 (UP)  Intermediate activity (including QAA)  (OP)                                  Employers                
   (UP)             (UP)      Managing Research  (UP)                                      Community                                                                              
Staff                                                                                                                                 Country                            
Recruit-  Topic identification Obtaining Funds          Research           Commercialisation 
ment                                                                                                                                                           
   (OP)                                  Managing Teaching                  
  
       (UP)         (UP)  (UP)    (UP) 
 Student             Career 
 Recruit-     Curriculum Devt         Teaching            Assessment     Placement & 
 ment                                                                                                        Alumni                    
   (OP)            Relations 
               (OP)   (OP)           (OP) 
 (UP)               Community Engagement  (OP) 
 
Abbreviations : UP for University Partner; OP for Offshore Partner 
 
Fig. 7.2   TNE Direct Model Value Chain (Post-tipping Point) 
 
7.4 Limitations of the Study 
 
While the current study has shed valuable light on the first two research 
questions, it was unable to address the third. The two Universities’ TNE 
portfolios did not provide any indication of longevity trends to enable any 
meaningful analysis. Both Universities operated OM or OM-like 
operations pre-tipping point, while only University A continued with OM 
operations post-tipping point. All pre-tipping point OMs lasted beyond the 
five-year reasonable rate of return period. There were no terminated 
DMs at both Universities. Except for newly minted DMs, the other DMs 
have also been in operation beyond the five year period. Therefore the 
two longevity benchmarks (viz., the three-year breakeven business 
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survival and five-year reasonable rate of return business longevity 
periods adopted in Section 2.7.4.3)  were rendered meaningless.  
 
While there might be some value in comparing University A’s short-lived 
(some of which lasted less than three years) post-tipping point OMs 
against its longer-run (all of which lasted more than five years) pre-
tipping point OMs, there was insufficient data to work on. Further, there 
would have been no comparison against University C, which did not have 
any TNE operation that has lasted less than five years. 
 
The Decision Model construct of Fig. 3.2 in Section 3.7.3, which was 
validate through the focus group study, served the case study very well, 
providing a high utility framework to unpack the value chain activities of 
the two Universities, investigate the two Universities’ criteria for choosing 
between the OM and the DM (research question 1), and analyse the 
reflectors of the three theories of the firm for the two Universities’ TNE 
model selection choices (research question 2). In the course of the case 
study, various issues relating to the Universities’ OPs surfaced, viz., the 
evidently high trust levels between the Universities and selected OPs, 
and the lack of OP perspective.  
 
While these did not thereaten the validity of the study, they raise some 
interesting questions about the interactions between the partners. For 
example, high trust levels between partners have the effect of reducing 
the risk of opportunism, and hence there is no need to monitor related 
transaction costs, e.g., shirking and free-riding (Edwards, Crosling and 
Edwards 2010, 307). These high trust levels coupled with high alignment 
of interests might explain the apparent acceptance of the OP’s substitute 
programs (offered by other partner universities or by the OP) by both 
Universities.  
 
Further, the study would benefit from additional triangulation from OP 
perspectives on issues such as ex ante incentives alignment and 
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behavioural uncertainties. Tables 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 would benefit from an 
analysis of OP characteristics, if they are part of the Decision Model 
construct. 
 
Tables 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 are applicable to OMs and DMs that are hybrid 
governance models. They do not include any hierarchies (e.g., w-IBCs) 
because both Universities did not operate such models. Further, while 
these models have been compared against various TNE-active 
Australian public universities in Section 7.2, they do not imply that these 
models are analytically generalisable across all TNE-active Australian 
public universities. However, the comparisons indicate strong similarities 
across the industry and provide prima facie evidence for analytical 
generalisation. 
 
7.5 Key Contributions of the Study 
 
This study is an analyses of two TNE-active Australian public Universities 
that have contrasting characteristics, yet took similar strategic decisions 
in TNE business delivery model selections. The operational 
arrangements were however dissimilar.  
 
a) Identification of TNE as Commercial Venture 
 
The study established the commercial orientation of both Universities 
through their TNE delivery model selection and use of commercial KPIs. 
It provided additional evidence for this orientation within the wider 
Australian public university sector. The analysis of TNE offerings (viz., 
teaching, research and community engagement) within the Weisbrod et. 
al mission goods – revenue goods tension between pre- and post-tipping 
point periods also found that some research and community engagement 
activities were attracting funding (like the teaching function) and hence 
could be considered revenue-generating.  
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b) Development of TNE Decision Model Construct 
 
The development of a Decision Model construct (Fig. 3.2 in Section 
3.7.3) underpinned by Porter’s value chains to study the TNE 
phenomenon provided a framework for the investigation of the two 
Universities’ TNE model selection. The scope of this construct 
encompassed the institution’s inherent characteristics, and the 
environment within which the TNE operation is delivered. This construct 
can potentially provide a generic framework for future investigations into 
TNE practice. 
 
c) Discovery of Tipping Points in the Universities’ TNE Journey 
 
The in-depth dual case study provided rich data to demonstrate a 
significant tipping point in each University’s TNE journey. These tipping 
points were instrumental in explaining the change in approach, 
motivation and governance of these Universities towards TNE delivery 
model selection. They also provided a longitudinal perspective to TNE 
investigations. 
 
d) Application of New Institutional Economics (NIE) to TNE Research 
 
In this study, the three theories of the firm have been applied to the  
investigation of Australian public university TNE operations. These 
empirical case studies attributed the selection of OM delivery to AT 
considerations, and the selection of DM delivery to TCE considerations. 
They are a contribution towards the NIE body of knowledge with respect 
to TNE phenomenon. 
 
e) Extension of the Guimon OLI Construct to TNE 
 
In this study, the generic Guimon construct was extended to TNE 
operations, and deployed to distinguish between OM and DM operations. 
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The study also introduced international student recruitment for onshore 
study as part of the market-seeking and resource-seeking motives of the 
teaching role of TNE operations, thus making the adapted Guimon 
construct more complete with respect to TNE operations. 
 
f) Application of Menard’s Hybrid Governance Models to TNE 
 
The generic Menard conceptual justification for the utility of hybrid 
governance models was applied to TNE operations, and the dual case 
Australian public university study demonstrated the ubiquity of the hybrid 
governance model in Australian public university TNE operations. The 
two University cases fitted well with Menard’s conceptualisation. 
 
g) Extension of the Global Value Chain to TNE 
 
The Global Value Chain conceptualisation was applied to the 
increasingly popular multinational university approach with full suite (i.e., 
teaching, research and community engagement) offerings. While the 
current study confimed the general application of the largely 
manufacturing-based Global Value Chain conceptualisation to a service 
industry (i.e., higher education), there were two anomalies that pertained 
to reversed power asymmetry. These anomalies can be attributed to the 
unique value co-creation (amongst partners and students) within the TNE 
service industry. 
 
h) Development of a more Detailed TNE Classification, and 
Identification of Variants of TNE Delivery Models  
 
Within the TNE sector, the study unpacked three specific variants of TNE 
business delivery models, viz., the ic-IBC, i-FP and r-FP, and explored in 
less detail, the w-IBC. The resulting TNE business delivery framework 
(Table 7.6) extended the KM classification of TNE models which were 
defined by only three academic criteria (Section 2.5.2), The study’s finer-
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grained TNE business delivery framework now also incorporated 
commercial, ownership and governance criteria, and can potentially open 
up new vistas in TNE study.  
 
i) Refinement of the Hutaibat Value Chain for TNE Research 
 
The TNE business delivery framework is a refinement of the Hutaibat 
value chain for higher education to accommodate the study of the TNE 
phenomenon, and can potentially have wider applications beyond the 
scope of the current study. The two TNE Value Chain diagrams of Fig. 
7.1 and 7.2 are proferred as extensions of the Hutaibat value chain for 
OM and DM TNE operations. 
 
j) Contribution to Improved TNE Practice 
 
Relating to TNE practice, the study uncovered innovative asset-light 
approaches to TNE management which allowed universities to grow their 
offshore operations more quickly at lower capital and operational costs, 
and at lower risks. These hybrid governance arrangements provided 
improved operational capacity and spillover benefits (e.g., branding, 
recruitment of international students for onshore study, and student and 
staff mobility). They however required mutual dependence between 
partners, which in turn is dependent on tighter due diligence and higher 
levels of trust between partners. These hybrid models are usually 
anchored on variants of on-site university monitoring and leadership 
arrangements. These can range from having one senior executive on-
site to a whole office that undertakes a higher proportion of TNE value 
chain activities. The financial sharing arrangement would of 
consequence be commensurate with the workload and risk profile of 
each partner. 
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k) Development of Good Practice Construct 
 
Finally, Tables 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 which cross-tabulate university 
characteristics against reflectors of the three theories of the firm provide 
templates for a broader consideration of key elements defining TNE 
business delivery models. These can potentially inform policy decisions 
on the governance of TNE operations, and form the basis for future 
organisational economics research in TNE. 
 
7.6 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
As discussed in the cross-case analysis, there is a possibility that the 
Upper Echelon Theory (UET), the Resource-based View (RBV) and 
Strategic Nets (SN) might find application in university decision-making 
with regards to the choice between the OM and DM mode of TNE 
operation. However, only RBV can be closely compared with the other 
three theories of the firm because of similar theoretical underpinnings. 
UET and SN will require a fresh look at their respective antecedents. 
 
Related to UET is the question of informed decision-making. While it is 
acknowledged that strategic decisions are made by senior executives 
entrusted with such responsibilities, the case study identified musings by 
managerial and academic staff about the lack of wider consultations. 
This is corroborated by Stafford’s research when she reported that 
‘champions for new initiatives are always important, but with the 
dispersion of responsibilities and power within a university, it is also 
important to have an effective involvement and support of all the relevant 
parties in the senior management team and the relevant organisational 
units’ (2015, 136). It would therefore be insightful to investigate if 
strategic decisions actually incorporate views from operational and 
academic staff. Further, the antecedents of the informants’ private sector 
and TNE experiences might also inform university TNE risk appetites and 
business delivery model selections. 
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The case studies discovered that some DMs are actually OMs in 
regulatory terms, e.g., ‘in fact, a lot of our operations are really franchised 
agreements ... they’re not branch campuses in the true sense of what the 
industry understands them ... we call them branch campuses, but … we 
represent them to our accrediting bodies actually as franchised 
arrangements ... (except for TSW which) ‘is a little bit different because 
it’s a joint-venture’ (AI19) so from a franchising perspective, that’s 
actually what they are’. In the conversion of the UCT r-FP into the UCM 
ic-IBC, AI13 asserted that ‘basically it’s the same structure, same staff, 
there is no change just rebranding … its basically the OP institute … just 
being re-modeled and re-branded’. AI11 added that ‘there is no 
fundamental change in terms of the underlying financial and commercial 
arrangement’. A finer-grained analysis of TNE contracts will help to refine 
TNE classifications more accurately. 
 
Fundmental to the sustainable function of TNE operations is the integrity 
of financial projections and reporting. While some informants assert that 
their University operates sustainably, some others report loss-making 
operations. It was previously noted that all Australian public university 
offshore operations must be self-sustainable financially and not draw 
from Commonwealth funding (Section 2.7.4.1). The conflicting informant 
reports warrant some investigation to ascertain the financial sustainability 
of these ventures, especially when the variation between the two 
Universities’ TNE revenue share as a proportion of total revenue is wide 
(University A reported revenue share of 4%, compared to its ATN 
average of 9%, while University C’s revenue share was 24% compared 
to its IRU average of 9%). Further, prima facie case data indicates poor 
returns at both Universities. While University A reported a TNE revenue 
share of 4%, its TNE student population is 15% of its total, and while 
University C enjoyed a 24% TNE revenue share, it enrolled 35% of its 
total students as offshore students in 2015. 
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Mention was made in Section 7.4 regarding the limitations of the study 
on behavioural uncertainty (e.g., trust) and the value of investigating OP 
perspectives. While the current study is based on the Universities’ 
perspectives, OP perspectives might provide interesting insights, e.g., 
exploring AT where an alternative view of the OP as the principal in the 
business of host country private education, engaging the university as an 
agent to further the interests of the OP. 
 
Extending the research to a larger number of universities, as originally 
envisaged in Section 3.7.4.2 would enable a richer investigation into the 
influence of university types, detailed comparative impacts of host 
country environments and the inclusion of wholly-controlled international 
branch campuses (w-IBCs). This would also provide better analytical 
generalisation across the sector. 
 
The availability of a more refined TNE Business Delivery Framework 
(Table 7.6), Tables 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5, and Figures 7.1 and 7.2 can 
potentially provide frameworks for more detailed investigations of the 
TNE phenomenon – in terms of value chain efficiency, critical success 
factors, contractual responsibilities and governance. For example, the 
PRT approach could be tested using Table 7.5 within DM operations that 
are globally extensive. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the DM-OM dichotomy parallels the 
GATS mode 1/mode 3 classifications, viz., cross-border supply versus 
commercial presence (see Section 2.1.1), and warrants future research 
with respect to cross-border funds flow, cross-rates and fiscal policy 
considerations. 
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APPENDIX A 
Comparative Perspectives Chart Of Theories Of The Firm 
Table adapted from journal article (Hutaibat 2011, 218) 
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No Perspec-
tives 
Theories of the Firm 
Transaction Cost Economics Property Rights Theory Agency Theory 
1 Central 
ideas of 
the theory 
1)  ‘… the ultimate unit of activity 
… must contain in itself the 
three principles of conflict, 
mutuality, and order. This unit 
is a transaction. … 
governance is chosen in a 
cost-effective degree to infuse 
order, thereby to mitigate 
conflict and realise mutual 
gain.’ (Jongwook and 
Mahoney 2005) 
2) ‘Transactions, with their 
different attributes, are best 
executed using different 
governance 
structures.’(Tadelis and 
Williamson 2010, 3) 
3) ‘Transaction cost economics 
makes provisions for both 
autonomous (i.e., price driven) 
as well as coordinated (i.e., 
administration driven) 
adaptations in the service of 
efficiency through recognition 
that adaptation is the central 
problem of economic 
organisation.’ (Tadelis and 
Williamson 2010) 
4) Operationalizing TCE (Tadelis 
and Williamson 2010) 
a) Identify transactions with their 
key attributes 
b) Describe properties of 
alternative modes of 
governance (viz., make or 
buy). 
c) Analyse using ‘discriminating 
alignment’ hypothesis 
(‘… transactions, which differ 
in their attributes, are aligned 
with governance structures, 
which differ in their 
adaptive capacities, so as to 
minimise transaction costs.’ 
(Tadelis and Williamson 
2010)) 
1) Property rights are ‘[t]he 
rights of individuals to 
the use of resources … 
supported by the force 
of etiquette, social 
custom, ostracism, and 
formal legally enacted 
laws supported by the 
states’ power of violence 
or punishment.’ (Tadelis 
and Williamson 2010) 
2) ‘Property rights are the 
rights to use, to earn 
income from, and to 
transfer or exchange the 
asset or resources.’ 
(Alchian, 1965 cited in 
Jongwook and Mahoney 
2005) 
3) ‘All economic activities 
including trade and 
production are the 
exchange of bundles of 
property rights.’ 
(Libecap, 1989 cited in 
Jongwook and Mahoney 
2005) 
4) ‘… a standard property 
rights definition applies 
where the partitions of 
property rights are 
grouped into appropriate 
bundles and assigned to 
the transacting party 
who is most capable of 
efficient production 
(utilizing that bundle), 
and the property rights 
that compose those 
bundles will be grouped 
so that appropriate 
economic incentives are 
created for owners of 
each bundle of property 
rights.’ (Furubotn and 
Pejovich, 1972 cited in 
Jongwook and Mahoney 
2005) 
1) Agency relationships 
can be argued to be 
present in all 
cooperative efforts.  
2) Agency theory has 
been developed to 
explain the interaction 
between a principal and 
an agent whom the 
principal engages to 
execute specific 
business activities for a 
pre-agreed fee. 
(Jongwook and 
Mahoney 2005) 
3) The theory investigates 
the issues principals 
face in selecting 
suitable agents 
(adverse selection), 
and in monitoring their 
work performance 
(moral hazard). (Garg 
2000) 
4) It requires the fulfillment 
of two necessary 
conditions, viz., that 
there is a potential for 
divergence of interests 
between the principal 
and agent, and for 
difficulties in 
ascertaining the 
capability and actions 
of the agent. (Pizanti 
and Lerner 2003) 
5) Agency problems arise 
from information 
asymmetry and 
differences in risk 
aversion between 
principal and agent, 
and are premised upon 
the assumption that the 
parties’ actions arise 
out of self interest. 
(Worsham, Eisner and 
Ringquist 1997) 
2 Unit of 
analysis 
Transaction Institution Principal-agent contract 
3 Focal 
dimen-
sion 
Types of asset specificity Property rights Incentives 
4 Focal cost 
concern 
a) Maladaption 
b) Holdup problems/ opportunism 
a) Externalities 
b) Rent-seeking 
Residual loss 
5 Contrac-
tual focus 
Choice of ex post governance 
mechanism 
a) Ex ante property rights 
allocation 
b) Ex post distributional 
conflicts 
a) Ex ante incentive 
alignment 
b) Ex post monitoring 
mechanisms 
6 Theore-
tical 
orienta-
tion 
Comparative assessment Comparative assessment Constrained optimisation 
7 Strategic 
intent 
Shareholder view Shareholder view Shareholder view 
8 Sources of 
market 
frictions 
a) Bounded rationality 
b) Uncertainty 
c) Information asymmetry 
d) Opportunism 
e) Asset specificity 
[a-d from incomplete contracts] 
a) Externalities 
b) Unclearly defined and 
difficult –to-enforce 
property rights (weak 
appropriability) 
c) Vested interests 
[b from incomplete contracts] 
a) Information asymmetry 
b) Unobservability 
c) Risk aversion (by 
agents) 
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Sen	Lee	Lim	(Henry)	
36	Ashmore	Avenue	
Canning	Vale	
Western	Australia	6155	
	
	
February	8,	2013	
	
	
Prospective	Focus	Group	Participant	
Designation	
University	
Address	
	
	
Dear	xxx	
	
Focus	Group	Research	on	Business	Delivery	Models	in	Transnational	Education	
	
Thanks	for	taking	time	to	meet	me	yesterday.	I	am	excited	with	X	University’s	current	review	of	its	
transnational	education	(TNE)	operation.	Coincidentally,	my	PhD	research	is	in	the	study	of	business	
delivery	models	used	by	Australian	public	universities	in	their	TNE	operations.	
	
My	a	priori	thesis	is	that	TNE	is	a	commercial	operation	that	must	have	self-sustainability,	and	hence	
must	 be	 operated	 as	 a	 business	 in	 order	 to	 succeed.	 Although	 higher	 education	 has	 traditionally	
been	considered	a	public	good,	an	increasing	number	of	research	and	industry	publications	refer	to	
TNE	 in	 commercial	 terms,	 in	 recognition	 of	 the	 changing	 economic,	 financial	 and	 political	
environments	in	which	TNE	operates.	
	
My	research	seeks	to	understand	the	motivations	underlying	universities’	choice	of	business	delivery	
models,	and	the	possible	relationship	between	these	models	and	the	sustainability/longevity	of	their	
TNE	operation.	 Initial	 literature	review	indicates	that	the	study	might	possibly	be	undertaken	from	
the	 lenses	of	several	 theories	of	the	firm,	viz.,	agency	theory,	resource	scarcity	theory,	 transaction	
cost	analysis,	and	property	rights	theory.	
	
My	research	will	be	undertaken	through	a	mixed	methodology	anchored	by	qualitative	 interviews,	
and	 supported	 by	 a	 quantitative	 survey	 –	 administered	 to	 all	 Australian	 public	 universities	 with	
current	and	terminated	TNE	operations.	In	order	to	refine	the	construct	and	validate	the	applicability	
of	 each	of	 the	 theories	of	 the	 firm,	 I	 plan	 to	 conduct	 a	 series	of	 focus	 groups	 at	 each	of	 the	 four	
Western	Australian	public	universities.	
	
I	 would	 like	 to	 request	 your	 assistance	 in	 organizing	 a	 focus	 group	 at	 X	 University.	 I	 believe	 the	
University,	and	in	particular,	its	TNE	review	project	team	will	benefit	from	this	focus	group.	I	will	be	
using	 a	 TNE	 value	 chain	 (adapted	 from	 Porter’s)	 as	 a	 basis	 to	 explore	 the	 motivation	 of	 the	
University’s	choice	of	business	delivery	models.	The	deliberations	will	be	conducted	in	reference	to	
the	theories	of	the	firm,	with	a	view	to	validating	their	utility	in	the	research.		
	
The	focus	group	is	expected	to	take	between	90	and	120	minutes.	My	sampling	frame	for	the	focus	
group	 requires	 the	 participation	 of	 colleagues	 with	 responsibilities	 for	 strategic,	 academic	 and	
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operational	 functions.	 The	 identities	 of	 all	 participants	 as	 well	 as	 the	 University	 will	 be	 kept	
confidential.	
	
Please	do	not	hesitate	 to	 contact	me	on	mobile	0419	940	998,	or	email	henrylimsl@yahoo.com	 if	
you	require	any	clarification.	
	
Many	thanks.	
	
	
Kind	regards	
	
	
	
	
Henry	Lim	
PhD	student	ID	15652409	
	
	
	
	
This	study	has	been	approved	by	the	Curtin	University	Human	Research	Ethics	Committee	(Approval	Number	GSB	18-12).	If	
necessary,	 verification	 of	 approval	 can	 be	 obtained	 either	 by	 writing	 to	 the	 Curtin	 University	 Human	 Research	 Ethics	
Committee,	c/-	Office	of	Research	and	Development,	Curtin	University	of	Technology,	GPO	Box	U1987,	Perth,	WA6845,	or	
by	telephoning	08-92662784	or	hrec@curtin.edu.au.		
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March 4, 2013 
 
 
Dear Participant 
 
I am a PhD candidate with the Curtin Graduate School of Business, investigating how Australian universities 
manage their transnational programs. I wish to invite you to participate in a focus group that will explore the 
group’s collective as well as personal experiences in dealing with transnational education. This focus group will 
comprise personnel from your university, with responsibility for strategic, managerial/operational and 
academic functions of transnational education programs. I will be repeating this focus group with each of the 
other three Western Australian public universities. The purpose of the focus groups is to help in refining the 
research construct, and inform the development of the qualitative and quantitative investigations. I believe 
this study will help Australian university personnel as well as regulatory bodies better understand the nature 
of transnational program delivery, and in the process, enhance the quality, viability and longevity of 
transnational programs. I also believe the focus group discussion can help you and your colleagues better 
conceptualise your own university’s transnational strategies and operations. 
 
The focus group is expected to last about 90 minutes, depending on the group’s engagement. It is my 
intention to record the focus group discussion as this will ensure accuracy with transcription and analysis of 
the information.  Please note however that you will at all times remain anonymous (your name will not be 
used) and that the information you provide will be treated as confidential. Please note that the archiving 
regulations of the university require that the interview recordings and notes be stored in an electronic format 
in Curtin University-approved hardware and systems for a period of 5 years. 
 
To ensure the focus group provides a rich discussion, I will be taking the first few minutes to gather 
demographic information, and generic information describing the transnational program/s you have dealt 
with or are still dealing with (e.g., type of model, country of operation). I will then provide a framework of 
topics guiding the discussion to relate to your own experiences in transnational education. To ensure absolute 
anonymity I will only report aggregate data – in the form of themes obtained from the various focus groups, 
without reference to any single individual. In presenting data, I will always present statements as anonymous 
quotations that cannot be linked to a specific person, for example ‘one participant stated that …….’. It will be 
impossible to identify a participant from the statements.   
 
I will be most grateful for your willingness in contributing to this very important research study. Please do not 
hesitate to contact me for any clarification relating to the data collection or your interest in the research 
analysis and outputs, on either email henrylimsl@yahoo.com, or mobile 0419 940 998. 
 
 
 
Yours truly 
 
 
Sen Lee Lim (Henry) 
Student ID : 15652409 
 
This study has been approved by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee (Approval Number GSB 18-12). If necessary, verification of 
approval can be obtained either by writing to the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee, c/‐ Office of Research and Development, Curtin 
University of Technology, GPO Box U1987, Perth, WA6845, or by telephoning 08-92662784 or hrec@curtin.edu.au.  
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FOCUS	GROUP	DATA	SHEET	
Australian	University	Transnational	Education	Programs	:		
An	Empirical	Investigation	into	the	Choice	of	Delivery	Models	and	Outcomes	
	
FOCUS	GROUP	 1	 DATE	 	
PARTICIPANT	BACKGROUND	
Participant	
No.	
Gender	 Age	Group	 No.	of	
years	TNE	
Experience	
Previous	
Experience	
(tick	one	or	both)	
Remarks	
M	 F	 20-30	 31-40	 41-50	 51-60	 Above	
60	
Public	
sector	
Private	
sector	
1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
2	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
3	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
4	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
5	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
6	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
7	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
INSTITUTION’S	TNE	OPERATIONS	(current	&	last	five	years)	
No.	 Type	of	Delivery	 Country	 Course/s	 Current	
Status	
Remarks	
(e.g.,	rationale,	success	level,	reason/s)	
1	 	 	 	 	 	
2	 	 	 	 	 	
3	 	 	 	 	 	
4	 	 	 	 	 	
5	 	 	 	 	 	
6	 	 	 	 	 	
7	 	 	 	 	 	
8	 	 	 	 	 	
9	 	 	 	 	 	
10	 	 	 	 	 	
11	 	 	 	 	 	
12	 	 	 	 	 	
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CONSENT FORM – PARTICIPATION IN PhD FOCUS GROUP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Project Title : AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITY TRANSNATIONAL EDUCATION  
PROGRAMS : AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE BUSINESS  
MODELS 
 
PhD Candidate : Sen Lee Lim (Henry) 
 
I herewith confirm that I wish to participate in a focus group of about 90 minutes as part 
of the above research project and confirm the following: 
 
  I am 18 years of age or older; 
  I have been informed of, and understand the purposes of the study; 
  I have been given an opportunity to ask questions; 
  I understand I can withdraw at any time without prejudice; 
  I understand that the information collected will be stored on University 
approved hardware and systems for a period of 5 years and will only 
be accessible by the researchers; 
  Any information which might potentially identify me will not be used in 
published material; 
  I agree to participate in the study as outlined to me. 
 
 
Name  : _______________________________________________ 
 
 
Signature : ___________________________ 
 
 
Date  : ___________________________ 
 
Witnessed by Data Collector 
 
Name   : _______________________________________________ 
 
 
Signature  : ___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Curtin Graduate School of Business  
Curtin University of Technology 
78 Murray Street (Cnr Pier) 
Perth WA 6000 
Telephone +61 8 9266 3460  
Facsimile +61 8 9266 3368  
Email enquiries@gsb.curtin.edu.au 
Web www.gsb.curtin.edu.au  
CRICOS Provider Code 00301J  
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FOCUS	GROUP	 
Facilitator	Guide	 
  
1.
0	 PRE-EVENT	PREPARATIONS	 
 
PARTY	 
  
 
DEADLINE	 REMARKS	 
1.
1	 Send	FG	Request	Letter	 
HL	 
  
Feb	11	 
  
 
1.
2	 
Confirm	participants	&	
date/time/venue;	send	
Outlook	appointments	 
HL	 Mar	7-15	  
1.
3	 Reminder	Friday	prior	to	FG	 
 
HL	 
  
Mar	22	 
  
 
1.
4	 
Test	recording	equipment	&	
prepare	gifts	 
HL	 
  
Mar	23	 
  
 
1.
5	 
Prepare	iPad,	voice	recorder,	
flipcharts,	FG	Facilitator	
Guide,	refreshments,	name	
tents,	consent	forms,	data	
sheets,	coloured	markers,	
note	pads,	pens	and	masking	
tape	 
HL	 Mar	23	  
2.
0	 EVENT	PREPARATIONS	        
2.
1	 
Room	preparation	–	
flipcharts,	name	tents,	forms,	
equipment	test,	
refreshments,	stationery	 
HL	 Mar	25	11.00am	  
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3.
0	 FOCUS	GROUP	 POINTERS	 NOTES	 
3.
1	 
Welcome	&	introduction	to	
PhD	research	&	FG	   
3.
2	 
Ground	rules	a)	Please	share	
your	honest	 
opinion	 
5. b)		What’s	said	in	this	
room	  stays	here	   
6. c)		Anonymity.	You	won’t	
be	  identified	by	name	
in	the	  research.	   
7. d)		To	respect	your	time,	
we	will	  stay	as	close	to	
the	agenda	as	possible.	   
    
3.
3	 
Icebreaker	–	a)	Why	do	
public	universities	 
engage	in	TNE?	Prioritise	
these	reasons.	 
. b)		What	in	your	view	is	a	
successful	TNE	
project?	   
. c)		What	in	your	view	is	a	
failed	TNE	project?	   
 Cf	official,	published	perspectives	 
4.
0	 
FOCUS	GROUP	AIDE	
MEMOIRE	     
4. Please	identify	the	 . a)		Identify	value-	  
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1	 university’s	current	internal	
and	outward-	facing	TNE	
functions,	as	well	as	partner	
TNE	functions,	if	any.	 
creation/-adding	
model	chosen	for	
each	function.	   
. b)		Watch	for	
linear/non-	linear	
flow	of	value-	
creation	
functions	   
4.
2	 
Please	distinguish	between	
the	primary	and	support	
functions.	 
  
4.
3	 
Please	explain	why,	in	your	
opinion,	the	university	has	
chosen	to	deploy	a	particular	
model	for	each	function.	 
Watch	for	a)	TCE–	 
• focus	on	transaction	
(rather	than	firm	
or	consumer),	  
• transaction	costs	(e.g.,	
negotiation,	
monitoring	&	
enforcement	of	
contract),	  
• governance	structures	
(i.e.,	make/buy	
decision),	  
• asset	
specificity/holdup
s	  
• firm-specific	
advantages	(e.g.,	
proprietary	know-	
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how/unique	
assets	&	
transactional	
advantages);	  
• country-specific	
advantages	(viz.,	
structural	market	
imperfections,	
e.g.,	govt	reg;	&	
potential	to	  
   
• economise	on	TCs	by	
reducing	risks	&	
benefit	from	local	
opportunities;	  
• internalisation	
advantages	
 associated	with	
different	entry	
modes	(e.g.,	
exports,	licensing,	
JVs,	FDI)	 b)	PRT–	  
• property	rights	
 bundles	(e.g.,	IP,	
market	intell,	local	
knowledge),	  
• incentives	related	to	
property	rights,	  
• focus	on	contractual	
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details,	  
• contractual	
incompleteness	
 c)	AT–	  
• adverse	selection,	  
• moral	hazard,	  
• branch	proximity,	  
• asset	specificity,	  
• local	knowledge,	  
• information	
 asymmetry,	  
   
⎪ risk	aversion	d)	RST–	 
• focus	on	value	
maximisation	
from	leveraging	
valuable	
resources;	  
• size	of	organisation,	  
• experience	of	
organisation	  
• growth	rate	of	TNE;	  
• franchising	vs	owning;	
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• local	knowledge;	  
• risk	sharing;	  
• speed	to	market;	  
• asset	specificity	  
4.
4	 
  
What	would	you	do	to	
improve	the	existing	delivery	
model,	and	why?	 
Watch	for	the	above	
reflectors	in	their	
criteria	for	change.	 
  
     
5.
0	 CLOSING	     
5.
1	 
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Office of Research  and Development
GPO Box U1987
Perth Western Australia 6845  
Telephone +61 8 9266 7863
Facsimile +61 8 9266 3793
Web research.curtin.edu.au
08-May-2018  
 
Name: Scott Fitzgerald
Department/School: School of Management
Email: S.Fitzgerald@curtin.edu.au
 
Dear Scott Fitzgerald
 
RE: Ethics Office approval
Approval number: HRE2018-0216
 
Thank you for submitting your application to the Human Research Ethics Office for the project Australian University Transnational Education
Programs : An Empirical Investigation of the Business Models (PhD Study).
 
Your application was reviewed through the Curtin University Low risk review process.
 
The review outcome is: Approved.
 
Your proposal meets the requirements described in the National Health and Medical Research Council’s (NHMRC) National Statement on Ethical
Conduct in Human Research (2007).
 
Approval is granted for a period of one year from 08-May-2018 to 07-May-2019. Continuation of approval will be granted on an annual basis
following submission of an annual report.    
 
Personnel authorised to work on this project:
Name Role
Fitzgerald, Scott CI
Lim, Sen Lee Student
Approved documents:
Document
 
Standard conditions of approval
Research must be conducted according to the approved proposal1.
Report in a timely manner anything that might warrant review of ethical approval of the project including: 
proposed changes to the approved proposal or conduct of the study
2.
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unanticipated problems that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project
major deviations from the approved proposal and/or regulatory guidelines
serious adverse events
Amendments to the proposal must be approved by the Human Research Ethics Office before they are implemented (except where an
amendment is undertaken to eliminate an immediate risk to participants)
3.
An annual progress report must be submitted to the Human Research Ethics Office on or before the anniversary of approval and a completion
report submitted on completion of the project
4.
Personnel working on this project must be adequately qualified by education, training and experience for their role, or supervised 5.
Personnel must disclose any actual or potential conflicts of interest, including any financial or other interest or affiliation, that bears on this
project
6.
Changes to personnel working on this project must be reported to the Human Research Ethics Office7.
Data and primary materials must be retained and stored in accordance with the Western Australian University Sector Disposal Authority
(WAUSDA) and the Curtin University Research Data and Primary Materials policy
8.
Where practicable, results of the research should be made available to the research participants in a timely and clear manner9.
Unless prohibited by contractual obligations, results of the research should be disseminated in a manner that will allow public scrutiny; the
Human Research Ethics Office must be informed of any constraints on publication
10.
Approval is dependent upon ongoing compliance of the research with the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research, the
National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research, applicable legal requirements, and with Curtin University policies, procedures and
governance requirements
11.
The Human Research Ethics Office may conduct audits on a portion of approved projects.12.
Special Conditions of Approval
None.
 
This letter constitutes low risk/negligible risk approval only. This project may not proceed until you have met all of the Curtin University research
governance requirements.
Should you have any queries regarding consideration of your project, please contact the Ethics Support Officer for your faculty or the Ethics Office
at hrec@curtin.edu.au or on 9266 2784. 
 
 
Yours sincerely
Amy Bowater
Acting Manager, Research Integrity
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ᄞ
AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITY TRANSNATIONAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS : AN EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATION OF THE BUSINESS MODELS 
1  Research Project Details  
1.1  Research project title  
AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITY TRANSNATIONAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS : AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE 
BUSINESS MODELS 
1.2  Research project summary  
Cross-border education (CBE) started off as an aid-motivated international activity, primarily in the form of international 
students studying in a foreign country. The push of funding restrictions and national competitive environments of provider 
institutions, coupled by the pull of host nation demands for higher education led to the proliferation of various forms of CBE, 
but chiefly the delivery of higher education by providers in foreign countries. These offshore delivery programs are now more 
popularly known as transnational education (TNE). The growth of TNEs has been phenomenal over the past three decades. 
In response to the ubiquity of TNE programs, a large body of literature and research has been devoted to this phenomenon. 
A survey of extant literature however, indicates that the majority of these studies is normative in approach, and mostly focused 
on the academic aspects of TNE. There is a dearth of studies focused on the commercial aspects of TNE, and much less 
that are empirical. 
This study argues that TNE has a commercial dimension that is critical to its success but that has not been sufficiently 
investigated. The lack of attention to the commercial aspect of TNE may have been influenced by the traditional paradigm of 
education as a public good. Recent literature suggests that TNE success is linked to commercial sustainability. This study 
aims to take the argument further through an empirical investigation of the Australian public university TNE phenomenon 
through the lenses of several theories of the firm. More specifically, this study will explore the criteria Australian public 
universities use in the selection of TNE business delivery models, and the explanatory power of these theories in explicating 
these criteria and the longevity of the models.  
The phenomenon will be investigated via a mixed methodology, starting with a qualitative study to ascertain the 
appropriateness of each of these theories to the research questions. The research will culminate in a quantitative study to 
test the veracity of the identified theories in explaining the choice of business delivery models.  
1.3  Keywords  
Transnational education; business models; delivery models; transaction cost analysis; property rights; agency theory; 
resource scarcity theory  
2  Research Project Data Details  
2.1  Research project data summary  
Research data will be sourced mainly from 
a) Statistical repositories such as the Australian Bureau of Statistics b) AUQA and its successor, the Tertiary Education 
Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA) c) Participating university archives and published reports d) Focus group 
deliberations e) Semi-structured interviews f) Survey instruments 
The qualitative methodology will be employed at the outset, to test the appropriateness of each of the four theories of the firm 
Research Data Management Plan
Supervisor Scott Fitzgerald
Data Management Plan Edited by Henry Lim
Modified Date 2/05/2015
Data Management Plan ID FITZGS-BS00411
Faculty Curtin Business School
Curtin University is a trademark of Curtin University of Technology 1 CRICOS Provider Code 00301J (WA), 02637B (NSW)
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on the TNE phenomenon, and to craft related alternative hypotheses. This methodology allows for the teasing out of 
emergent themes and constructs within the natural contexts of the phenomenon (Marshall 2006). Since the study has been 
designed around the theories of the firm, this structured approach lends itself well to a quasi-statistical analytic style and/or 
template analysis proposed by Crabtree and Miller (Marshall 2006) for the analysis of the qualitative data. There is a number 
of computer-aided qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) software available for use. For the purposes of this study which 
effectively deals with predominantly textual data, three software packages are being reviewed for possible use, viz., NVivo10, 
Atlas.ti7 and Qualrus (Lewins and Silver 2007). While NVivo10 and Atlas.ti7 have been popular due to their relative simplicity, 
Qualrus boasts advanced intelligent computational capabilities. A final decision on the CAQDAS software of choice will be 
made after a review of the available qualitative data and the design of a suitable qualitative data analysis strategy. 
A combination of univariate and multivariate techniques will be deployed in the analysis of the quantitative data. Univariate 
tests of means and median will be administered for each of the independent variables to test the individual hypothesis. This 
involves comparing the variable group means/medians and their expected differences. 
A regression model will be developed, and its predictive power tested using multivariate analysis. By virtue of the categorical 
nature of the dependent variable, the quantitative techniques available for multivariate analysis are the logit regression and 
discriminant analysis. However, discriminant analysis requires very strict adherence to multivariate normality and 
homogeneity of the variance/covariance matrices across groups (Warner 2008), assumptions that may be violated since the 
dependent variable consists of only two groups. Logit regression which does not impose such stringent assumptions, and 
is considered more robust (Berenson 2006) is proposed for deployment in this study. The functional form of the logit 
regression model will be determined using appropriate goodness-of-fit measures. 
2.2  Ethical, confidentiality or privacy considerations  
An initial HREC approval (GSB-18-12) was obtained but has since lapsed. The candidate was on leave of absence in the 
past semester, and has just returned to continue with the research. A new HREC approval is being applied for. 
2.3  Data organisation and structure  
The data structure and organisation will be decided within this semester. 
3  Research Project Data Storage, Retention and Dissemination Details  
3.1  Storage arrangements  
Data collected will be stored in print and electronic formats at the Curtin Business School for a period of seven years. No 
unauthorized access will be granted. 
3.2  Estimated data storage volume  
Digital storage space needed is anticipated to take up about 5Gb. 
3.3  Safeguarding measures  
The digital data will be saved in three disks, two in CBS, and one with the PhD candidate. To overcome media obsolescence, 
the data will be tested for readability/access against current software every two years from date of thesis completion. If 
necessary, the data will be saved in the new format and re-stored in three disks. Obsolete disks will be securely destroyed. 
3.4  Retention requirements  
7 years (All other research with outcomes that are classed as Minor) 
3.5  Collaboration  
Not applicable. 
Curtin University is a trademark of Curtin University of Technology 2 CRICOS Provider Code 00301J (WA), 02637B (NSW)
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3.6  Data dissemination  
The bulk of the data is expected to be anonymous and hence, does not require highly secure storage. Access is by request 
only. 
3.7  Embargo period  
Not applicable. 
Curtin University is a trademark of Curtin University of Technology 3 CRICOS Provider Code 00301J (WA), 02637B (NSW)
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Reflexivity : Researcher Background 
 
1.0 Researcher Education Background 
 
My undergraduate training was in engineering, after which I 
completed a MBA in Finance and a Graduate Diploma in 
Electronic Commerce. 
 
2.0 Researcher Work Experience 
 
I have approximately eight years experience in engineering 
services within a range of industries, including manufacturing 
and agriculture. Fifteen years was spent in initiating and 
managing private higher education in Asia, and another nine 
within an Australian public university, overseeing the 
university’s international interests in 12 Asian countries. Some 
of these latter interests include initiating and managing 
transnational operations. I am currently responsible for strategic 
management in an Asian education group that has interests in 
international schools, colleges and a university. 
 
3.0 Researcher Networks 
 
My career in Australia provided the networks to set up the focus 
groups and the in-depth interviews. Some of the focus group 
participants and interview informants are professional 
acquaintances.  
Career relationships with informants, leading to more detailed 
FG stories at Universities B and C. 
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4.0 Possible Influence and Bias on Research 
 
a) There is less of a need for lengthy ‘warm-ups’ and introductions 
when interacting with participants/informants who are known to me, 
and those who have been refered through mutual contacts 
b) Once the ‘ice is broken’, the participant/informant can offer rich 
personal views relatively uninhibited, as can be seen from some of 
the contrarian comments 
c) My own experience within both the private sector and public sector 
enabled me to potentially keep both perspectives in balance, e.g., 
between the notion of education as a public good and as a 
commodity to be traded 
d) Closeness with the participants/informants can potentially blind the 
researcher to familiar issues such as emphathising with a familiar 
view or approach 
e) Familiarity with the experience of the University or 
participant/informant can potentially blind-side the researcher from 
asking deeper to probe, e.g., certain familiar stories about TNE 
f) Familiarity also has its benefits as in a few instances when I could 
pick up discrepant data and to counter-check them against other 
informants 
 
5.0 Actions and Orientations to Ensure Neutrality 
 
While having experience in the industry and being familiar with 
participants/informants and their Universities are beneficial in many 
ways, I am cognisant of the dangers of familiarity and fixations. These 
potential biases are addressed through 
 
a) Bounding the cases at the planning stage ensures that the focus of 
the research is tight 
b) A case study protocol was developed to steer the research more 
effectively and efficiently 
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c) Triangulation was used across different staff respeonsibilities, 
across the onshore-offshore divide, across staff with public sector 
and private sector experience, and across universities 
d) The use of focus groups to refine concepts and validate construct to 
ensure methodological coherence and a more effective case study 
e) Remind participants/informants of my role as a researcher 
f) The use of probing techniques to extract rich data until saturation is 
reached 
g) The use of the split-half method to ensure data integrity 
h) Clear, structured coding rules and templates to guide unbiased 
analysis 
i) Looking out for disconfirming evidence through the use of templates 
to cross-tabulate and analyse data 
j) Developing an audit trail for reviewing the data, themes, concepts 
and stories for any faulty fit of data 
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DATA CROSS-TABULATION 
University’s Current TNE Operations 
University :  __________ 
Participant :  __________          Date/Time  :  __________________ 
 
No. Interview Question Response Remarks 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1.0 TNE Parameters 
 a)  City, Country 
 
   
 b)  Type of collaboration  
 
  
 c)  Type of partner  
 
  
 d)  Stage of maturity  
 
  
 e)  Level of risk  
 
  
 f)   Rationale for risk 
assessment 
 
 
 
  
2.0 Setting up the TNE Operation 
 a)  Rationale  
 
  
 b)  Offshore partner motivation?  
 
 
  
 c)  Who will gain most? How?  
 
  
 d)  Rationale for gain?  
 
 
  
 e)   Who will lose most? How?  
 
  
 f)  Rationale for loss  
 
 
  
3.0 Key TNE Processes 
 a)  Key TNE processes?  
 
 
 
  
 b)  Most labour-intensive?  
 
 
  
4.0 Mission critical TNE Resources 
 a)  What are they?  
 
 
  
 b)  Can they be redeployed? 
How? 
 
 
  
5.0 Offshore Partner Management 
 a)  How to pre-select them?  
 
 
  
 b)  How to monitor them?  
 
 
  
 c)  How are conflicts usually 
resolved? 
 
 
 
  
6.0 Industry Environment 
 a)  Key influencers  
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DATA CROSS-TABULATION 
University’s Terminated TNE Operations 
University :  __________ 
Participant :  __________          Date/Time  :  __________________ 
 
No. Interview Question Response Remarks 
Direct Model Outsourced Model 
1.0 TNE Parameters 
 a)  City, Country 
 
   
 b)  Type of collaboration  
 
  
 c)  Type of partner  
 
  
 d)  Stage of termination  
 
  
 e)  Damage inflicted  
 
  
2.0 Setting up the TNE Operation 
 a)  Rationale  
 
  
 b)  Offshore partner motivation?  
 
 
  
 c)  Rationale for termination  
 
 
  
 d)  Who gained most? How?  
 
  
 e)  Rationale for gain?  
 
 
  
 f)   Who will lose most? How?  
 
  
 g)  Rationale for loss  
 
 
  
3.0 Key TNE Processes 
 a)  Which key TNE processes 
failed, if any? 
 
 
 
 
  
 b)  Most labour-intensive?  
 
 
  
4.0 Mission critical TNE Resources 
 a)  What were they?  
 
 
  
 b)  Can they be redeployed 
after termination? How? 
 
 
  
5.0 Offshore Partner Management 
 a)  How were they pre-
selected? 
 
 
 
  
 b)  How were they monitored?  
 
 
  
 c)  How were conflicts usually 
resolved? 
 
 
 
  
6.0 Industry Environment    
 a)  Key influencers  
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INTERVIEW	ANALYSIS	NOTES	(CONCEPTS/THEMES)
University	C
No. Parameters Code Academic
C2 C10 C11 C1 C3 C7 C9 C8 C5 C6 C4
A Interviewee	Profile
1 Responsibility	(Strategic/Managerial/Academic) INT-RpnC Strategic Strategic Strategic Strategic Managerial Managerial Managerial Academic Managerial/Academic Managerial/Academic Academic
2 Private	sector	experience INT-PrEC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 Years	of	TNE	experience INT-TNEC 11 12 20 10 12 10 9 9 5 18 11
4 Age	range INT-AgeC >60 41-50 41-50 51-60 51-60 31-40 51-60 51-60 31-40 51-60 >60
5 Gender INT-GenC M M M M F M F F F M M
B Issue/Theme/Concept/Story
1 Perspective	on	TNE	operation	type QUE-TtyC
2 Perspective	on	partner,	if	any QUE-OPsC
3 Perspective	on	maturity	of	TNE	operation QUE-MatC
4 Perspective	on	risk	of	TNE	operation QUE-RskC
5 Rationale	for	starting	up	(UP) QUE-RSUC
6 Criteria	for	selecting	DM/OM	(OP) QUE-CriC
7 Rationale	for	starting	up	(OP) QUE-RSOC
8 Who	would	gain	most? QUE-GaiC
9 Who	would	lose	most? QUE-LosC
10 Key	TNE	processes QUE-ProC
11 Key	TNE	resources QUE-ResC
12 Partner	management QUE-OPMC
13 Operating	environment QUE-EnvC
14 Longevity	of	TNE	operation QUE-LonC
15 Contracts QUE-ConC
C Stories	(developed	in	vivo)
1 Country	X	TNE	exchange STO-XExC
2 Host	country	office	(HCO) STO-HCOC
3
4
5
D Emerging	themes/concepts
1 EMT-
E Focus	group	clarifications
1 University	type FGr-UTyC
2 University	size FGr-USzC
3 University	TNE	growth	rate FGr-TGRC
4 Impact	of	new	entrants FGr-NEnC
5 Host	country	regulatory	environments FGr-HCEC
6
How	mission-critical	are	academic	
support/student	services? FGr-AcSC
7
How	mission-critical	are	career	
placement/alumni	relations? FGr-CPAC
8 Comprehensiveness	of	commercial	contracts FGr-ConC
9 University	tipping	points FGr-TipC
10 Uni	C	TNE	Review's	impact	on	TNE	operations FGr-TRvC
11 Uni	C	TNE	developments	since	Focus	Group FGr-pFGC
F Rigor	observed
1 Construct	validity RIG-CVdC
2 Internal	validity RIG-IVdC
3 External	validity RIG-EVdC
4 Reliability RIG-RelC
5 Internal	contradiction RIG-ICnC
6 External	contradiction RIG-ECnC
G
1 ANO-
Interviewee	with	Strategic	Responsibility Interviewee	with	Managerial	Responsibility Interviewee	with	Academic/Managerial	Responsibility
Anomalies/disconfirmation/intervening	conditions
INTERVIEW	ANALYSIS	NOTES	(THEORY)
University	C
No. Parameters Code Academic
C2 C10 C11 C1 C3 C7 C9 C8 C5 C6 C4
A Interviewee	Profile
1 Responsibility	(Strategic/Managerial/Academic) INT-RpnC Strategic Strategic Strategic Strategic Managerial Managerial Managerial Academic Managerial/Academic Managerial/Academic Academic
2 Private	sector	experience INT-PrEC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 Years	of	TNE	experience INT-TNEC 11 12 20 10 12 10 9 9 5 18 11
4 Age	range INT-AgeC >60 41-50 41-50 51-60 51-60 31-40 51-60 51-60 31-40 51-60 >60
5 Gender INT-GenC M M M M F M F F F M M
B Pre-tipping	point	TCE
1 Asset	specificity bTC-ASpC
2 Behavioral	uncertainty bTC-BeUC
3 Frequency	of	transaction bTC-FrTC
4 Uncertainty	in	business-legal-political	environment bTC-EnUC
5 Transaction	costs bTC-TrCC
C Post-tipping	point	TCE
1 Asset	specificity aTC-ASpC
2 Behavioral	uncertainty aTC-BeUC
3 Frequency	of	transaction aTC-FrTC
4 Uncertainty	in	business-legal-political	environment aTC-EnUC
5 Transaction	costs aTC-TrCC
D Pre-tipping	point	PRT
1 Control	of	mission-critical	resources bPR-ResC
2 Opportunism bPR-OppC
3 Information	asymmetry bPR-InAC
4 Maturity	of	socio-legal-political	environment bPR-GvEC
E Post-tipping	point	PRT
1 Control	of	mission-critical	resources aPR-ResC
2 Opportunism aPR-OppC
3 Information	asymmetry aPR-InAC
4 Maturity	of	socio-legal-political	environment aPR-GvEC
F Pre-tipping	point	AT
1 Costs	of	search	and	monitoring bAT-CosC
2 Risk	aversion	of	University bAT-RAvC
3 Ex	ante	incentives	alignment bAT-EAIC
4 Maturity	of	legal-political	environment bAT-EnvC
G Post-tipping	point	AT
1 Costs	of	search	and	monitoring aAT-CosC
2 Risk	aversion	of	University aAT-RAvC
3 Ex	ante	incentives	alignment aAT-EAIC
4 Maturity	of	legal-political	environment aAT-EnvC
H Anomalies/rival	theories/disconfirmation
1 Upper	echelon	theory Riv-UETC
2 OLI	as	rival	perspective? Riv-OLIC
3
Interviewee	with	Strategic	Responsibility Interviewee	with	Managerial	Responsibility Interviewee	with	Academic/Managerial	Responsibility
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INTERVIEW	ANALYSIS	NOTES
Cross-case	Analysis
No. Parameters Code
Strategic/Planning Managerial Managerial/Academic Academic
A Interviewee	Profile
1 Responsibility	(Strategic/Managerial/Academic) INT-RpnX
2 Private	sector	experience INT-PrECX
3 Years	of	TNE	experience INT-TNEX
4 Age	range INT-AgeX
5 Gender INT-GenX
B Issue/Theme/Concept/Story
1 Perspective	on	TNE	operation	type QUE-TtyX
2 Perspective	on	partner,	if	any QUE-OPsX
3 Perspective	on	maturity	of	TNE	operation QUE-MatX
4 Perspective	on	risk	of	TNE	operation QUE-RskX
5 Rationale	for	starting	up	(UP) QUE-RSUX
6 Criteria	for	selecting	DM/OM	(OP) QUE-CriX
7 Rationale	for	starting	up	(OP) QUE-RSOX
8 Who	would	gain	most? QUE-GaiX
9 Who	would	lose	most? QUE-LosX
10 Key	TNE	processes QUE-ProX
11 Key	TNE	resources QUE-ResX
12 Partner	management QUE-OPMX
13 Operating	environment QUE-EnvX
14 Longevity	of	TNE	operation QUE-LonX
15 Contracts QUE-ConX
C Stories	(developed	in	vivo)
1 Country	X	TNE	exchange STO-XExX
2 Host	country	office	(HCO) STO-HCOX
3
4
5
D Emerging	themes/concepts
1 EMT-
E Focus	group	clarifications
1 University	type FGr-UTyX
2 University	size FGr-USzX
3 University	TNE	growth	rate FGr-TGRX
4 Impact	of	new	entrants FGr-NEnX
5 Host	country	regulatory	environments FGr-HCEX
6
How	mission-critical	are	academic	
support/student	services? FGr-AcSX
7
How	mission-critical	are	career	
placement/alumni	relations? FGr-CPAX
8 Comprehensiveness	of	commercial	contracts FGr-ConX
9 University	tipping	points FGr-TipX
10 Uni	C	TNE	Review's	impact	on	TNE	operations FGr-TRvX
11 Uni	C	TNE	developments	since	Focus	Group FGr-pFGX
F Rigor	observed
1 Construct	validity RIG-CVdX
2 Internal	validity RIG-IVdX
3 External	validity RIG-EVdX
4 Reliability RIG-RelX
5 Internal	contradiction RIG-ICnX
6 External	contradiction RIG-ECnX
G Anomalies/disconfirmation
1 ANO-
Cross-case	Analyses
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Higher Education in Australia 
31 
Timeline of significant reform in Australia’s higher education system19 
Year Action 
1987 - Higher education: a policy discussion paper (a green paper) suggested an increase in 
output of graduates to around 125,000 by the turn of the century and fewer, larger 
higher education institutions  
1988 - Higher education: a policy statement (a white paper containing the Government’s 
policy proposals following consideration of public and sector responses to the green 
paper) proposed a unified national higher education system and made a commitment 
to growth in the system. 
- The Committee on Higher Education Funding (the Wran Committee) developed 
options for funding the expansion sought in the number of higher education students 
- Passage of Higher Education Funding Act 1988, the basis of higher education funding 
until 2003 
- Students pay $250 Higher Education Administration Charge 
- Government establishes National Board for Education, Employment and Training 
(NBEET), including its advisory bodies the Higher Education Council and Australian 
Research Council (ARC) 
1989 - Introduction of the Unified National System and conversion of Centres for Advanced 
Education to universities 
- Introduction of the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS), with a flat annual 
student contribution of $1,800 (about $3,600 in 2015 dollars), equivalent to about 20 
per cent of average per student costs 
- Direct Commonwealth funding of higher education institutions conducted via 
individual negotiations between universities and the department, monitored by the 
Higher Education Council 
1990-
1995 
- Relative Funding Model gradually introduces consistent undergraduate grant funding 
by discipline at all universities, becoming the basis for Triennial Funding Rounds 
- Institutions gradually permitted to charge unregulated fees for most postgraduate 
coursework courses 
1994 - Australian Postgraduate Awards introduced 
1995 - Australian Qualifications Framework established 
1997 - Differential HECS introduced, with three ‘bands’ of student contribution by course 
according to future graduate earnings ($3300/$4700/$5500)  
1998 - West Review Learning for Life recommends increased tuition fee flexibility and 
demand driven funding 
- Introduction of full-fee domestic student places at public universities, initially capped 
at 25 per cent of a course enrolments 
2000 - Formal abolition of NBEET and its advisory councils 
- Australian Universities Quality Agency (AUQA) commences 
                                                          
19 Based, in part, on Lee Dow and Braithwaite, Review of Higher Education Regulation, pp. 6-8. 
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Higher Education in Australia 
32 
Year Action 
- Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (ESOS) 
2001 - Australian Research Council (ARC) becomes independent entity for the distribution of 
research grants 
- Expansion of Government competitive research funding; increased science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics places; and introduction of the 
Postgraduate Education Loans Scheme (PELS) 
- Research Training Scheme introduced, providing competitive grants for research 
places 
- Education Services for Overseas Students Assurance Fund commences operation – 
provides tuition assurance and protection to overseas students 
2002-03 - The Nelson review including Higher Education at the Crossroads identified funding 
pressures and recommended options for funding reform. The government’s response 
in the 2003-04 Budget increased Commonwealth contributions to higher education 
and made a number of other reforms that were enacted through the Higher Education 
Support Act 2003 (HESA), to take effect from 2005 
- Establishment of National Institute for Learning and Teaching 
2005 - Commonwealth Grant Scheme established along with student entitlement to 
Commonwealth Supported Places (CSPs) – negotiations managed through funding 
agreements and Institutional Performance Portfolios 
- Most student contributions increased by a maximum of 25 per cent 
- FEE-HELP scheme commences – expansion of private provider market 
- Changes to discipline funding clusters 
- New funding arrangements introduced including workplace productivity and national 
governance protocols 
2006 - Introduction of Voluntary Student Unionism 
2007 - Review of HESA – funding clusters adjusted from 2008 
- HECS renamed to HECS-HELP 
- National Health and Medical Research Council becomes self-governing statutory 
authority 
2008 - Bradley Review of Australian Higher Education – recommends demand driven funding, 
a national tertiary regulator as well as a range of other changes 
- VET FEE-HELP scheme commences, providing loans for vocational tuition fees 
- Changes to discipline funding clusters and student contributions 
2009 - Phasing out of fee paying undergraduate places at public universities 
- Changes to discipline funding clusters and student contributions and loadings 
2010 - Permission to over-enrol CSPs by 10 per cent in transition to demand driven funding 
- Changes to discipline funding clusters and student contributions and loadings 
- First full round of Excellence in Research for Australia 
- Introduction of triennial mission-based compacts for universities 
2011 - ASQA (VET regulator) commences activities 
- Lomax-Smith Higher Education Base Funding Review 
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Higher Education in Australia 
33 
Year Action 
- Review of Funding for Postgraduate Places 
- Knight Review of the Student Visa Program 
- Launch of MyUniversity website 
- Overseas Students Ombudsman commences 
2012 - TEQSA commences activities. First providers given re-registration 
- Full demand driven funding system introduced for bachelor places (caps remain for 
sub-bachelor and CSP postgraduate places) 
- Abolition of Student Learning Entitlement, which limited Commonwealth support to 
seven years of full-time study 
- Office of Learning and Teaching replaces Australian Learning and Teaching Council 
- Tuition Protection Scheme introduced for international students 
- Removal of requirement that RTOs have credit transfer arrangements with higher 
education providers to access VET FEE-HELP 
- PhillipsKPA Review of Reporting Requirements for Universities 
2013 - Reviews of Higher Education Standards and National VET Standards 
- Lee Dow Braithwaite Review of Higher Education Regulation 
- McKeon Review of Health and Medical Research  
- TEQSA Risk Assessments first round completed 
- Launch of MySkills website 
2014 - National Commission of Audit recommends rebalancing of government/student 
contribution and consideration of options for partial or full deregulation 
- Kemp Norton Review of the Demand Driven System 
- 2014-15 Budget proposes expansion of demand driven funding to sub-bachelor 
courses and private providers, fee deregulation for CSPs and other changes 
2015 - Launch of QILT website 
- Reforms to VET FEE-HELP announced 
- Government announced a new institute for teaching and learning to be located in the 
sector and a national consultation to discuss its implementation.  
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Themes, Concepts and Stories from University A 
 
Interviews on University A’s TNE journey provided a very rich tapestry of 
insights that stretches from the University’s first TNE operation in 1986 to 
2018. The TNE stories start with the University’s early TNE operations in 
1986 to 1998 in countries P and V. The serendipitous Country T TNE 
start-up was then explored in depth because it triggered a tipping point in 
the University’s TNE history that set it on a journey to establish branch 
campuses. The next section then discusses the impact of the Australian 
regulatory environment and its Business School international 
accreditation exercise on its TNE operations.  
 
These were followed by an important discussion on the University’s 
quest to become a global university. This quest influenced the evolution 
of the University’s TNE operations in Country V into a second branch 
campus operation, the transmutation of a Country U franchised program 
operation (FP) into the third branch campus, and the serendipitous set-
up of the University’s fourth and latest branch campus in Country X. 
 
This section also explores the future of FPs within the University’s larger 
global university aspiration, and ends with a detailed study of the 
University’s current TNE value chain activities. 
 
1.0 Early Days of TNE (1986 – 1998) 
  
University A is one of the first Australian public universities to initiate TNE 
operations. Its first TNE operation was started in 1986 as a franchised 
program (FP) in Country V, as reported by informant AI19. Between 1986 
and 1999 (when the University’s TNE tipping point occurred), eight FPs 
were started, and all of them lasted more than five years – according to 
data collected from the University’s International Office (Table 5.11). Of 
the eight TNE operations, two were located in Country P, five in Country 
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V and one in Country T. They have all terminated, with the last FP 
(Country P) having completed its teachout in 2018 (AI12).  
 
1.1 Motivation for Early TNE Operations 
 
The majority of informants described financial returns as the main 
motivation for starting FPs during this period of the University’s TNE 
journey (e.g., ‘financial for all of them’ – AI1;  ‘significant revenue’ – AI3; 
‘income generation’ – AI10; ‘very profitable venture’ – AI13). The second 
most quoted motivation was the objective of increasing onshore 
international student enrolments through TNE branding in their host 
countries (e.g., ‘onshore transfers’ – AI19; ‘a lot of student transfers’ – 
AI3; ‘TMC operation - a major stream of students for a long, long time’ – 
AI3). Informants also noted the University’s quest for ‘building new 
markets’ (AI3) and reputation/profile (AI19) as other motivations for TNE 
during this period. It was also interesting that a few informants remarked 
that TNE activity grew during those early days because academic staff 
were handsomely paid (e.g., ‘paid to travel … for every exam paper … 
for every unit outline’ - AI7; ‘a great model for academics to make more 
money’ - AI17). 
 
No. University Motivation for Starting TNE Number of Responses 
1 Financial returns 7 
2 Onshore transfers 3 
3 New markets/place on the map 2 
4 Academic staff payments 2 
5 Reputation/profile 1 
 
Table App I.1   Motivation for TNE in the Early Days of University A  
TNE History (1986 – 1998) 
 
On the part of early OPs, the motivations vary with the type of OP. In the 
case of for-profits, the motivation has invariably been financial returns. 
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AI9 summed this well, saying ‘let’s not beat around the bush … they will 
say and they might mean it; I am sure they do mean it that they are about 
education and stuff like that and they have to be for their business 
models, they have to be focused on that because that’s what they are 
delivering ... (but) at the end of the day, they have to appease their 
shareholders’. For the not-for-profits, like the professional/trade 
associations of Country V, the motivation had been financial returns, 
providing a service (i.e., education and training) to their members, and 
developing a stronger profile through association with the University 
(AI1).  
 
1.2 Country P Franchised Programs 
 
In Country P, the PHS FP was described as a ‘good franchise model … 
like a supermarket’ (AI3), where several ‘substitute’ (AI2) overseas 
university programs were delivered by the same OP. This FP lasted 26 
years, and contributed significantly to the University’s 11,000 alumni in 
the Country (‘I helped set up Country P alumni chapter’ - AI3). AI12 
lamented that the termination of PHS was a ‘tragedy’ because it was 
then run by ‘professionals in industry’. 
 
A number of reasons were offered for the termination of this FP. AI19 
reported that the OP was a ‘low quality provider’, that the cost of having 
University A teaching staff travel to Country P to deliver the programs 
was high, and that the programs were sold ‘too cheap’ such that students 
had no incentive to study in Australia. AI19 also added that the teaching 
visits resulted in lower research output by University staff, as well as the 
need to deploy sessional staff in the home campus to replace travelling 
full-time staff. AI3 thinks that the FP was terminated because the 
University could not develop ‘its own brand’ while being promoted by the 
OP as just one of many universities, like one baked beans brand 
amongst many others on a supermarket shelf. AI5 was of the view that 
the retreat from Country P was for ‘strategic reasons’; AI12 described 
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this more specifically as the University’s quest for a major international 
accreditation.  
 
AI2, a member of senior management who was responsible for the 
termination of PHS described the latter days of the FP as delivering 
insufficient ‘financial returns’ and incurred ‘opportunity costs’, and hence, 
had to be terminated. The termination was a last resort after ‘a number of 
years‘ of trying to ‘increase the number of students’. So, while there were 
a number of weaknesses in the PHS FP, the one that resulted in its 
termination was its insufficient financial returns. AI19 described the 
termination as ‘a decision that was made here for … reasons that best 
suit University A’, despite the OP’s keenness to continue – reflecting a 
unilateral decision by the University.  
 
AI2 observed that the PHS OP was 'disappointed that we were pulling 
out because they were losing more than we were'. AI2 also noted that 
‘the alumni … were upset’, resulting in some ‘push back from the local 
community’. AI3 observed that the termination of PHS did not impact the 
University’s reputation because the FP was one of many other FPs 
delivered or ‘flying under the radar because you are in the supermarket’. 
In AI19’s view, the termination did not result in any ‘long term damage’ 
because the University took pains to communicate closely with both 
existing students as well as alumni during the teachout period.  
 
Similarly, POL, another Country P FP had a short-lived lifespan of five 
years because it ‘lack student numbers’ and delivered ‘low financial 
returns’ (AI17). AI1 argued that the student demand had fallen due to a 
shift in student preferences in Country P. The University continued to 
engage Country P via research and mobility arrangements with their 
local universities after the terminations (AI2).  
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1.3 Country V Franchised Programs 
 
AI19 described the start-up of VMI in Country V as a ‘financial 
opportunity’. It also delivered ‘good student numbers’ and provided a 
‘good feeder’ for onshore enrolments (AI16). This FP lasted 22 years. 
AI16 reported that it was terminated because the University’s strategic 
agenda was ‘much more about connection, networked approach to 
leveraging on the advantages in this region’. The other Country V FPs, 
viz., VBP, VSH and VSI were also terminated between 2008 and 2010, 
after operating for between nine and thirteen years each (Table 5.11) 
due to the University’s deliberate consolidation of TNE operations in 
Country V (Section App I 6.0, and AI6). 
 
1.4 Financial Gain as Key Motivation for Early TNE Operations 
 
The early years of University A’s TNE operations were described as 
‘opportunistic’ and ‘financial for all’ of the FPs (AI1). AI6 reported that the 
University would ‘try and partner with as many partners as possible; to 
get as many students as possible’, and that it was ‘almost a Walmart 
model’. The University’s financial motivation coincided with the profit-
making motivation of participating OPs, all of which were commercial 
entities who are profit-driven (AI12). 
 
This period of time was described as a period circumscribed by three 
important events/circumstances. First, it was the lead up to the 
enactment of the Higher Education Funding Act 1988, also known as the 
Dawkins’ Revolution, which provided the impetus for universities to 
commercialise and internationalise, amidst a new university funding 
paradigm (AI18) which required universities to partially self-fund their 
operations (Dawkins 1987). Second, the University’s TNE was led by a 
highly ‘entrepreneurial’ (AI18) and ‘ambitious’ (AI19) Business School, 
the UBS. It was also described as a ‘trailblazer for the University and the 
(Australian TNE) sector, radical and amazingly innovative’ (AI3). The 
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UBS was the brainchild of an entrepreneurial Executive Dean, who 
wanted to ‘make sure that UBS was a good employer and a … employer 
that provided opportunities to academics to earn extra … earn money 
that they could have gotten in senior roles in industry’ (AI17). This 
probably explains the observations that academic staff were being paid 
‘excessively’, and that ‘some academics were earning more from the 
offshore teaching operation than they were from their regular academic 
activities’ (AI17). This observation was also made in the focus group 
discussions of Universities A and B (Sections 4.3.4.1.2 (d) and 4.3.4.2.8). 
Finally, this period was described as being one of ‘a lot less compliance’ 
(AI17), a situation that is not unexpected given the pioneering nature of 
the University’s new TNE journey. 
 
1.5 Rationale for Terminations of Early TNE Operations 
 
The informants overwhelmingly quoted quality or comparability of student 
experience as the main reason for the termination of these early TNE 
operations, with financial returns as a close second reason. Strategic 
reasons (including the University’s aspiration to be a global university, as 
spelled out in the 2017-2020 Strategic Plan) and reputation/brand 
enhancement are joint third in being quoted. The international 
accreditation of the UBS and control of TNE operations were also 
mentioned as reasons for termination. 
 
No. Motivation for Terminating TNE Number of Responses 
1 Quality/comparability of experience 10 
2 Financial returns 8 
3 Strategic/aiming to be global university 4 
4 Reputation/brand 4 
5 International accreditation 2 
6 Control of TNE operation 1 
Table App I.2   Rationale for TNE Termination in the Early Days of  
    University A TNE History (1986 – 1998) 
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‘Reputation/brand’, and ‘international accreditation’ can be considered as 
part of the University’s ‘quality/comparability of experience’, and hence, 
make up the main reason for TNE terminations during the early years of 
the University’s TNE experience.  
 
As the University rapidly grew its FPs during those early years, quality 
issues arose, with a number of FPs ‘not at appropriate standards’ (AI6), 
including low quality students admitted with ‘sceptical entry’ qualifications 
and ‘woeful’ pass rates (AI13), and poor examination processes (AI17). 
These quality issues began to impact on the University’s reputation (AI2, 
AI19), causing the University (and more specifically, the UBS) to re-
examine its quality assurance processes (AI19) as well as financial 
models (AI7, AI17) for TNE.  
 
A review of the financial models in 2011 led to the policy of locating TNE 
work within academic staff workload (AI7), and more equitable sharing of 
revenue and costs between University departments (AI11). The new 
workload model obviously trimmed down the remuneration of University 
staff participating in TNE management, and hence resulted in staff 
reluctance to engage in TNE work (AI7). The more equitable financial 
models also led to reduced UBS income, possibly dampening UBS’ 
appetite for TNE (AI11). While AI1 noted that all TNE operations were 
either ‘profitable or at least breakeven in the first instance’, AI2’s critical 
view of PHS’ insufficient ‘financial returns’ seems to indicate that some 
TNE operations might be operating at a loss to the University – in light of 
later, more refined financial models using full cost accounting (AI20). 
 
The AUQA Cycle 2 audits (Section 2.2) which started in 2008 (AI17), as 
well as the UBS’ international accreditation exercise in 2014-2016 (AI12) 
brought greater scrutiny to TNE operations, and led to the University’s 
quest to ensure ‘comparability of student experience’ (AI19) ‘around the 
world’ (AI11). It is worthwhile noting that five of the six FPs that started in 
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the 1986 – 1999 period were terminated within the 2008 – 2010 period, 
corresponding to the AUQA Cycle 2 audit. 
 
1.6 Lessons from Early TNE Operations 
 
The early years of TNE ‘matured’ UBS (AI18), and changed its focus to 
one that prioritised ‘quality’ and ‘pursue accreditation’ (AI19). These 
resulted in the culling of ‘non-performing programs’ (AI7) to ‘a few quality 
OPs’ (AI19) that are ‘easier to manage’ (AI6) and ‘control’ (AI2). As the 
University viewed TNE operations ‘through a different lens of quality, we 
didn’t find those acceptable anymore … so, we terminated some of 
those’ (AI6). The University now asks if a potential TNE operation is 
‘strategic for our region?’, and is part of the University’s ‘Global 
University’ agenda (AI18). Central to TNE quality assurance is the 
aspiration for comparable ‘students’ experience, students’ satisfaction, 
and students’ grade outcomes’ (AI19). 
 
The University also discovered that teachouts due to FP terminations 
were costly ‘financially’, and in some cases, took a long time to complete 
because some students were part-time students (AI19). These 
experiences led to the University introducing specific clauses into new 
TNE contracts (AI9), as well as factor teachout costs into TNE financial 
models (AI11). 
 
2.0 University A TNE Tipping Point (1999) 
 
The year 1999 is a tipping point for the University’s TNE journey because 
it marked the first time the University was involved in an IBC operation. 
There were only two other Australian university IBCs at that time. It also 
marked the start of tightening TNE regulations in Australia as well as in 
host countries. 
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2.1 How the TSW IBC Started 
 
The circumstances leading to the set up of the Country T IBC (coded as 
‘TSW’) can be described as ‘opportunistic’ (AI2) and serendipitous - 
‘triggered … by pure chance’ (AI12). It started with a land developer 
making an appointment with the Vice Chancellor (VC) in early 1998 to 
interest the University to set up a college in a small town in Country T 
(Leadership Case Studies 2011). He committed to providing the land, set 
up the college with his own resources, and obtain the necessary local 
regulatory approvals. AI9 confirmed the approach by the land developer, 
and described it as a ‘cold call’ and ‘unorthodox’. The Acting Deputy Vice 
Chancellor International (DVCI), who became the next VC, remarked 
years later, that the IBC would not have been approved if current TNE 
standards and processes were applied (Ibid., 8).  
 
While the land developer’s approach could have easily been dismissed, 
his political connections resulted in several contacts both in Country T 
and Australia between the VC, the Chancellor and the senior leadership 
team of the University, and the Chief Minister (CM) of the State 
Government (in Country T), his senior officials, and the land developer 
(Ibid.). These engagements convinced the VC ‘that the proposition had 
real substance and was an opportunity that the University needed to 
grasp’ (Ibid., 3). He was acknowledged as the main driver of the venture 
(‘top down’ decision-making, Ibid., 9), supported by the Chancellor, who 
also ‘grasped the significance of the opportunity’, and provided the 
leadership in the University Council for the approval of the venture (Ibid.). 
The VC initially faced a hesitant Council, but managed to convince the 
Council of ‘minimal financial exposure’; the DVCI produced a plan that 
was underpinned by a ‘risk averse strategy’, but also added that ‘the 
greatest risk would be in not securing the University’s long-term future in 
Country T’ (Ibid., 4). 
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The entire process for the set up of the IBC took about a year. The year 
1998 saw a frantic pace of meetings, negotiations and submissions, 
which culminated in a change in statute in University A’s State 
Parliament, allowing the University to set up IBCs. In fact, the 
University’s working party took less than four months to develop a full 
academic plan and gain approval for it. It is worthwhile noting that the 
working party involved the ‘DVCI, executive deans, branch directors and 
staff from teaching divisions, finance and other administrative areas’ 
(Ibid., 4), representing a broad and deep consultative approach. 
 
The IBC that resulted was a joint-venture public company involving three 
parties, viz., the host State Government, host State business interests 
(including the land developer), and University A (AI9). The IBC started 
operations in early 1999 within temporary premises, and moved to its 
new campus in 2002. 
 
2.2 State Government Motivation 
 
In later discussions, the college idea became an IBC on the insistence of 
the State Government. The CM wanted an ‘institution’ (AI8) ‘in the 
northern region of the State for supplying the professional workforce 
needed for regional development’, while the town needed the University 
to qualify for city status (Ibid., 3). The IBC was envisaged to cater to the 
needs of the oil and gas industry’s expatriate children around the region 
AI12), students from a neighbouring country (AI12), students from the 
State and the rest of Country T, as well as other international students 
(AI2, AI14). The State Government was observed to be ‘altruistic … not 
share price’ (AI4), and ‘less focused on money’ (AI2). The ‘nation-
building’ contribution of the IBC endeared the Government to the 
University (AI3). AI3 also noted that the Federal Government had an 
interest in having IBCs set up in that State, and thus shift the focus of 
IBC development from the country’s capital to other parts of the country. 
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2.3 University A Motivation 
 
For University A, the drivers of the IBC were slightly different. AI2 lists 
them as ‘opportunistic’, ‘financial’, ‘relationship-building’, ‘providing 
services for constituents’, and establishing a ‘very strong research arm’. 
In fact, ‘research and community development’ were inscribed in the 
joint-venture agreement from the onset (AI14). AI9 noted that the host 
government provided capital for research, while AI5 remarked that the 
IBC benefited from host government funding for its development. AI17 
observed that the motivation for the IBC was ‘a lot more research than 
revenue’. 
 
AI9 listed ‘capacity-building’ and being part of the University’s ‘global 
campus’ as drivers; it is however not likely that the ‘global campus’ 
agenda could have been a driver in 1999 since the agenda was only 
articulated in 2016. Capacity-building is observed to be a common 
incentive for both the State Government and the University. 
 
The VC emphasised to the University Council that the IBC would be an 
additional conduit for international students (Ibid., 4). The University was 
observed to have obtained the greatest financial benefit from the ‘training 
of students’, including the upskilling of teaching staff at the IBC (Ibid., 8)  
 
2.4 Land Developer Motivation 
 
The land developer is part of the host State business entities (AI9) that 
have equity in the IBC joint-venture. AI12 was adamant that the real 
driver of the IBC was the ‘bequeathed land’, and that the land developer 
stood to gain via new ‘residential housing development’ planned around 
the IBC. AI9 also noted the ‘land development objectives’ underlying the 
IBC project. 
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2.5 IBC Corporate Structure 
 
While many, including AI17 would call TSW an IBC, AI9 insists that it is 
‘not a branch campus in the true sense’. AI9 explained that these so-
called IBCs are represented to TEQSA as franchised operations because 
the University does not have any initial equity investments in these 
entities, and do not manage the entire IBC on its own. The TSW IBC is a 
joint-venture of three parties, viz., the host State Government, host State 
business entities and the University (AI9). Although the IBC is an equity 
joint-venture, the University did not put up any seed capital. However, 
royalties earned from the University’s intellectual property rights would be 
re-invested as the University’s 50% equity share (Ibid., 4, AI19); AI6 
describes this as a ‘re-investment model’, where the joint-venture ‘retains 
a lot of money for re-investments’. 
 
While the land developer had initially promised providing the land for the 
IBC, it was ultimately the State Government that bequeathed State land 
(Ibid.). The State Government also funded the construction of the 
campus (AI8), and provided the start-up capital from the State’s statutory 
bodies.  
 
The joint-venture public company funded the operations of the IBC 
mainly through State Government funding (Ibid., 3). Note that the 
University did not put up any seed capital for the joint-venture. This 
explains why AI19 reported that the IBC is ‘largely run by the State 
Government’. AI2 is of the view that the operations of the IBC is 
subsidised by the State Government, while AI5 observed that the IBC 
receives ‘government funding for development’.  
 
On the hypothetical case of a termination, AI1 remarked that the State 
Government would be able to ’find another partner’ to utilise the facilities, 
while the termination would be a ‘problem’ for the University. AI2 agrees 
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that 'the building’s a building ... they could potentially find other partners 
or run it themselves or do something else'. 
 
2.6 IBC Governance Structure 
 
The November 1998 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) spelled out 
the need for a board of directors comprising shareholder interests, a 
Council representing the shareholders and local community interests, 
and a University-appointed resident campus director (Ibid., 4). The 
University Council further insisted on the requirement for the University to 
have full academic control, and full control over key administrative 
appointments (Ibid., 6). The University exercised these controls through 
the presence of a Pro-Vice Chancellor and a Deputy Pro-Vice 
Chancellor, direct employees of the University, the vetting of all key 
administrative and teaching positions, and the establishment of a joint 
Council (AI1). The joint-venture holds the local licence to operate the 
IBC, and is responsible for managing the campus and facilities, 
marketing and administration (AI1). 
 
2.7 Current IBC Performance 
 
The IBC is said to be a ‘very mature’ operation (AI2, AI2), which has 
begun to develop its own units and courses (AI9, AI19). Although the 
market for the expatriate children and neighbouring country did not 
materialise, the IBC is a viable operation that now caters mainly to the 
domestic market (AI12, AI17). AI12 reported that the low fees are a 
possible reflection that the ‘credibility’ of the IBC is poor (‘they're cheap 
because they're not as good as the others’). AI12 goes on to explain that 
the fees are tightly regulated by Country T’s Ministry of Education, and 
that fee increases may only be permitted once every three years. 
 
While AI9 notes that the low employment cost is a financial advantage, 
AI7 reported that it is a likely cause of high staff turnovers, causing some 
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operational disruption. Note that AI9 is a senior staff responsible for 
strategy and planning, and AI7 is a manager with extensive experience in 
TNE management. 
 
The IBC has developed into a ‘very strong research arm’ of the 
University (AI2). AI9 observed that the IBC ‘have a research culture … a 
Dean of Research … a research office’, which are all funded by the 
‘partner’. The IBC is contributing ‘more than money … rather than just 
traditional offshore campus for the generation of revenue’ (AI9), and ‘a lot 
more research’ (AI17). The IBC is also advantaged by being able to 
access government funding for research (AI5). On community 
engagement, AI6 observed that the IBC is highly engaged with the local 
community, and believes that ‘they do more than we do here’. 
 
AI3 described the local regulatory authorities as ‘pretty stringent’, while 
AI11 thinks that the TNE market there is ‘tightly regulated’ and 
‘somewhat more … opaque’. AI11 observed that ‘political influence 
around the regulation and what it means in terms of the operations of the 
campus can often change very quickly and without real explanation or 
justification’. More specifically, AI20 reported that ‘Country T 
requirements changed dramatically in the last couple of years, and they 
made it more difficult for on-shore campuses’. As an example, she noted 
that the local Ministry of Education had recently required all private 
tertiary institutions (including IBCs) to enrol a certain proportion of 
international students in order to be able to retain their approval to recruit 
international students. In order to meet the requirement, the University 
had ‘plundered 400 architecture students to go there’. On the impact of 
the 2018 change in Federal Government in Country T, AI9 remarked that 
the 3,500-student IBC serves ‘quite a big need in that region’, and hence 
should not be impacted in any way. 
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2.8 Significance of the Tipping Point 
 
The 1999 tipping point was significant in that it marked the point from 
which the University was allowed to operate IBCs. This feat required a 
change in University Statute of the State’s Parliament, an exercise that in 
turn required State level approvals. The massive amounts of work to 
obtain approval within and outside the University, all within one year, is 
testament to the dogged determination of the VC and the senior 
management team to alter the University’s TNE trajectory. 
 
The tipping point marked the University’s first foray into IBCs during a 
time when there were only two other Australian university IBCs, one of 
which was reported to be ‘unsuccessful financially and educationally’ 
(Ibid,. 2). It also marked the tightening of the Australian regulatory 
environment for TNE operations, starting with the commencement of 
AUQA in 2000.  
 
The set up of the University’s first IBC in 1999 was commemorated in the 
University’s publication, ‘Brand Journey 1998 – 2013’ (Corporate 
Relations & Development University A 2013). AI20 reminisced about the 
tipping point in 2018, and reflected that 'we’ve learnt along the way … 
and now, we are wise after 20 years of running offshore programs’. It is 
worth noting that the University did not set up another IBC until eight 
years later. 
 
3.0 Australian Regulatory Environment Impacting TNE (2008 and 
2011) 
 
Australian universities are subject to strict government regulations at 
both Federal and State levels. In the area of provision of higher 
education to international students, they are currently regulated by the 
Education Services for Overseas Students (ESOS) Act 2000, and the 
Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA). Between 
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2000 and 2011, Australian universities were also audited by the 
Australian Universities Quality Agency (AUQA), the predecessor of 
TEQSA. AUQA however, had no regulatory powers. 
 
3.1 Impact of AUQA on Australian TNE 
 
The Australian Universities Quality Agency (AUQA) was set up by the 
then Australian Ministerial Council for Education, Employment, Training 
and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA) to audit Australian universities. The first 
cycle of audits started in 2002 and ended in 2007. These audits were 
based on a fitness for purpose approach, and focused on only one 
theme. Cycle 2 audits which were conducted between 2008 and 2010 
focused on two themes, one of which must be Internationalisation. 
 
AI9 noted that Australian universities had to make changes to their TNE 
operations in the lead up to the AUQA Cycle 2 audits starting in 2008. 
They were ‘downsizing their transnational because a lot of universities 
did have too many partners and we were included in that’, and that there 
were issues with having to manage ‘too many franchising, twinning 
arrangements’, and operating at ‘lots of different standards’. In the case 
of University A, seven FPs were terminated within the 2008 – 2011 
period (AI4). 
 
The FPs in Country V were particularly affected during the 2008 – 2011 
period. It also coincided with the University’s aspiration to consolidate its 
multiple TNE operations in the country into one, better-managed TNE 
campus arrangement (AI9). The consolidation gave the University ‘better 
control over quality, a uniform experience for students instead of four 
different experiences’ (AI9). AI9 noted that the changes leading to 2008 
had to be accelerated to ensure the University complied with AUQA’s 
Cycle 2 expectations. 
 
 
 656 
3.2 Impact of TEQSA on Australian TNE 
 
TEQSA requires universities to be re-registered every seven years (AI5), 
while conducting ‘campus reviews’ every five years (AI1). With regards to 
TNE, AI5 noted that TEQSA has certain requirements under Australian 
higher education quality standards ‘about how we conduct ourselves in 
relation to any offshore operations we have', and that universities are 
required to inform TEQSA of any new TNE operations. AI19 commended 
TEQSA as having ‘done a very good job at regulating the quality of TNE, 
because … we’ve got to deliver comparable experience offshore’. 
 
AI9 explained that the University keeps TEQSA informed of new start-
ups because these are considered ‘material change’. The University also 
works very closely with TEQSA, keeping the regulator informed at every 
step of the start-up and termination of TNE operations (AI1). AI1 
considers TEQSA as a sort of ‘quality partner’. The close working 
relationship with TEQSA has obviously generated good dividends, viz., 
that the ‘head commissioner of TEQSA raves about the University’ (AI1), 
TEQSA considered the TSW IBC as the ‘gold standard for offshore 
campuses’ (AI11), and that the University has been seen as a ‘TNE 
leader’ (AI19).  
 
AI20 observed that when TEQSA assesses a program, they ‘look at the 
online delivery, the on-campus delivery, the offshore delivery, and they 
want to make sure that across all those different modes of delivery and 
locations, that the quality is equivalent’. The ‘equivalence’ requirement is 
now a standard expectation of all the University’s TNE operations. 
 
4.0 Prestigious Business School Accreditation (2014 – 2016) 
 
The University pursued a prestigious internationally-recognised Business 
School accreditation (code-named BSA) for its UBS in 2014. The 18-
month exercise culminated in the award of the accreditation in 2016. The 
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BSA had a profound effect on the University’s TNE operations because 
most of the programs delivered offshore were from the UBS (AI13). AI11 
observed that the BSA is a ‘costly’ commitment for the University in 
respect of TNE operations. 
 
4.1 University Motivation for BSA 
 
AI19 reported that the UBS ‘changed and they wanted to be about quality 
… to pursue accreditation’. They chose a very prestigious internationally-
recognised Business School accreditation (BSA). This was in line with 
the University’s ‘desire to be a world-regarded international university’ 
(AI19). The whole accreditation exercise took about 18 months, and 
resulted in various changes in policy and processes, some of which 
impacted the University’s TNE operations. 
 
In reviewing the performance of the University’s TNE operations, AI13 is 
of the view that the BSA is more ‘prestige’ than quality. In addition, AI13 
is hopeful that the BSA will enable the new Country U IBC, UCM to 
attract international students from the AA region. AI7 similarly thinks that 
the BSA is a necessity in attracting students to the University’s Country X 
IBC, XCD because ‘a lot of institutions there have the BSA’. However AI7 
thought that the BSA has not resulted in any increase in the University’s 
home campus enrolments. 
 
4.2 BSA Requirements 
 
While the BSA introduced very stringent requirements on the UBS 
(AI15), there were several notable impacts on the University’s TNE 
operations. First, the BSA required ‘assurance of learning’, or ‘the 
maintenance of equivalence standards across all campuses and being 
able to demonstrate that … through moderation and consistency in terms 
of the use of rubrics’ (AI3). AI19 explained that students at every location 
had to have comparable experience, comparable campus and facilities 
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experience. These include ‘students’ experience, students’ satisfaction, 
and students’ grade outcomes’. These outcomes required ‘really, really 
rigorous, well-defined processes and evidence’ comparability. When the 
accreditation was awarded, BSA commended the UBS for 'the 
maintenance of equivalence standards across all campuses and being 
able to demonstrate that’ (AI3). 
 
Second, BSA required ‘very strict selection of teaching staff’ (AI15), 
described by AI3 as ‘faculty sufficiency’ requirements. Teaching staff had 
to be qualified one level above the program that they are teaching (AI13). 
In the case of the Masters’ programs, all teaching staff had to have a 
PhD in the field that they are teaching in. AI12 clarified that there needed 
to be at least 80% of all teaching staff PhD qualified (AI12). AI13 added 
that newly minted PhD teaching staff are ‘safe for a few years without 
publishing’, but will have to start publishing to keep their BSA 
accreditation. 
 
Lastly, under the BSA accreditation, the University could not partner non-
BSA accredited institutions. AI13 explained that this probably caused the 
University to terminate several partnerships, such as PHS in Country P, 
and TMC in Country T. It was a toss between the BSA accreditation and 
the multiplicity of TNE operations, and the University had ‘no option’. 
AI13 also clarified that the existing OPs are ‘facilitators’, and not partners 
at the ‘university’ or ‘strategic’ levels, and hence are exempt from the 
BSA-accreditation requirement. 
 
4.3 BSA Outcomes 
 
The large TNE presence of the University was a challenge for the BSA 
accreditation exercise. AI19 explained that if the TNE operations were 
‘not well controlled, it impacts their (BSA) brand’. In consultations during 
the accreditation exercise, the BSA assessors confided in AI13 that ‘a lot 
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of universities they accredit don’t have such a huge international 
presence’. 
 
The first challenge is in setting up the necessary processes for assuring 
comparability of student experience, satisfaction and grade outcomes, 
and to evidence these achievements across a large number of TNE 
operations (AI19). This necessitated the culling of a number of poorly 
performing TNE operations – simply to ensure the University had 
sufficient resources to quality assure all of them. AI19 counted a total of 
41 TNE and related operations up to 2007. Further, AI19 explained that 
the University ‘needed to select a few quality partners and we needed to 
make sure that the students at every location had a comparable 
experience … which was a lot of work tracking that in the accreditation’.  
 
There were also OPs that ‘wouldn’t budge’ on the requirements for BSA-
accredited teaching staff due to the ‘nature of their business models’, and 
were hence terminated (AI12). AI3 ascribed the BSA accreditation as the 
'real catalyst for cutting ties with PHS’ in Country P (although AI5 
attributed the termination to poor financials and opportunity costs in 
Section App I 1.2). AI3’s observation was supported by AI4, and AI17 
who added that PHS ‘wouldn’t be deemed favourably’ by BSA because 
of the delivery of ‘multiple degrees by multiple partners’.  
 
Naturally, a number of OP teaching staff had to be dropped because they 
were not BSA-accredited (AI8). The remaining OPs were under ‘a lot of 
pressure’ to engage BSA-accredited teaching staff (AI13), and in the 
case of UCM, to get their existing teaching staff (at UCM’s cost) to start 
on their PhD because they just could not find enough BSA-accredited 
teaching staff in the market (AI12). 
 
Having BSA-accredited teaching staff at the TNE locations also meant 
that the University does not need to send its own staff on teaching trips. 
AI13 observed that teaching staff used to travel a lot in the past, but 
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‘there’s no reason to travel’ now. It has also resulted in the University 
teaching staff being able to devote more time to research, and having to 
reduce the engagement of casual teaching staff (AI19). These translate 
into better cost control and higher operational efficiency for the 
University. 
 
The BSA accreditation (for the elite ‘1% of universities’) confers a 
‘significant bargaining edge’ to the UBS, and to the University in general, 
with reference to both OPs and students (AI13). AI13 explained that the 
BSA-dictated processes ensured the University has less risk and can 
‘exercise greater control’ when setting up IBCs. In describing the 
University’s newest IBC, viz., UCM, AI17 observed that the University 
seems to be wielding ‘a lot more control over academic matters’. AI13 
also added that there is ‘a lot more at stake at least for the business 
school’ in the set up of FPs – because of compliance with BSA. 
 
Finally, the BSA accreditation resulted in a ‘hit on revenue’ for the 
University in a few FPs, such as TMC in Country T, a ‘very profitable 
operation’ (AI13). It also impacted all OPs in that they have had to 
employ BSA-accredited teaching staff and comply with the other 
‘assurance of learning’ requirements (AI13). AI12 remarked that most 
terminations prior to the BSA accreditation were because they ‘didn't 
have the numbers ... and not financially viable’. Post-BSA, the 
terminations were mostly due to quality infringements. 
 
5.0 Strategic Positioning as a Global University (from 2017 to date) 
 
University A is one of the earliest Australian universities to engage 
internationally and deliver programs offshore, starting its first FP in 1986 
(AI19). Over the years, the University has refined its strategies and 
business delivery models as its organisational knowledge and 
experience grew. This can be observed in the University’s publications 
and the perspectives of its officers. It eventually led to the University 
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adopting a ‘global university’ strategy for its preferred offshore 
operations, a conceptualisation that was widely communicated by the 
interview informants.  
 
5.1 Review of University Publications 
 
The University’s 2006 Strategic Plan encapsulated the vision that the 
University will be ‘a leading university … serving the wider Community’ 
(Strategy & Planning Office University A 2006, 3). The next strategic plan 
of 2009 saw a more refined vision of ‘an international leader … 
positioned among the top 20 universities in Asia by 2020’ (Strategy & 
Planning Office University A 2009, 3).  It is noteworthy that the University 
exhibited such a far-sighted vision on Asia, a few years before the 
‘Australia in the Asian Century’ whitepaper was published in late 2012 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2012). The University’s approach to Asia is 
not surprising given its long history (AI1) and ‘sound reputation in Asia’ 
(Strategy & Planning Office University A 2009, 3). 
 
The first use of the word ‘global’ to describe the University’s offshore 
aspirations appeared in the University’s Strategic Plan of 2013, where 
the University aspires to ‘lead in innovative education globally’ and 
‘expand its international outreach with globally relevant networks and 
partnerships in both teaching and research’ (Strategy & Planning Office 
University A 2013). 
 
A brand officer of the University remarked in an electronic mail that the 
University’s brand ‘moved towards becoming global in focus – obviously 
evident in the 2017 Strategic Plan’ (Howard 2018). The VC’s message in 
the University’s 2017 Strategic Plan outlines the vision of a ‘globally 
engaged institution … clear and comprehensive global strategy … to be 
a global university’ (University A 2017, 3). Its position statement aims for 
‘a leading GLOBAL university’ (caps in original) (Ibid., 5). 
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The global university aspiration and conceptualisation were more 
specifically operationalised in the University’s ‘2018 Plan on a Page’ flyer 
(Strategy & Planning Office University A 2018), where the University 
aspired to achieve the following objectives : 
 
a) Develop a research strategy for each offshore campus 
b) Embed vision for global network of campuses and enhance global 
reputation 
c) Optimise interactions between central portfolios and faculties/ 
campuses through … shared KPIs 
d) Progress Country U campus development 
e) Pursue a ‘deep alliance’ in region NN (a first world Western region) 
f) Pursue deeper MOE links in Country O 
g) Operationalise student mobility, with a particular focus on the New 
Colombo Plan 
 
5.2 The Nature of the Global University 
 
The global university approach is a widely embraced approach with 16 of 
the 20 informants referring directly to it and elaborating on it. All Strategic 
officers spoke about the concept, whereas two-thirds each of Managers 
and Academics discussed the concept. It is interesting to note that a TNE 
manager with 20-over years TNE experience did not speak about the 
concept, and even went on to note ‘I don’t know why we are in TNE’, and 
thinks that unit coordinators also ‘don't know’ (AI7). She continued that ‘I 
understand the University’s strategic direction is … to get a brand out 
there, to get as many students from overseas to’ the University’s home 
campus.  
 
5.2.1 University A’s Evolving TNE Approach 
 
The in-depth interviews teased out a number of insightful aspects and 
constructs around the global university approach relating to the 
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University’s evolving TNE aspirations, as can be seen in the evolving 
vision statements over the past 12 years. AI14 observed that the 
University had ‘changed that model over the years’, and takes an 
‘incremental approach … to be a global university … and enhance its 
offshore opportunities’. These changes include changes in the 
‘University’s funding model’ (AI18). AI1 noted that the University’s TNE 
portfolio ‘used to be an Australian university that had branch campuses 
and active internationally … we don't think like that anymore … we want 
to be a global university, with multiple campuses’. 
 
5.2.2 Global Footprint and Brand Presence 
 
AI9 reported that the University is ‘not viewing them (University A’s IBCs) 
as little side appendages that are out there doing their own thing but they 
are part of the network of University A’. These campuses are ‘essentially 
… sort of mini University As; … each of the campuses has a Provost or 
PVC who’s sent from the home campus … all the courses are controlled 
in terms of quality from the home campus’ (AI14). AI1 remarked that the 
University wants ‘a global footprint … to be a global university, with 
multiple campuses’. AI19 expanded on the global footprint further, by 
explaining that although the University ‘expects to make money out of all 
of these operations; otherwise there’s no reason to be there ... but it isn’t 
the defining factor ... it was much more our brand, our reputation, our 
global footprint’. It would seem that the global footprint is driven by an 
aspiration to grow the brand presence of the University, and provide 
‘opportunities for recruiting students’ (AI5), as well as have ‘a global 
presence and a global influence’ (AI19). AI8 confirms this view in saying 
that ‘having these campuses and building brand in those locations will … 
assist in building our reputational capital in those regions which improves 
our rankings on the QS (QS World University Rankings) and THE (Times 
Higher Education World University Rankings) surveys … which again lifts 
our status globally which in return stimulates student demand, both 
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onshore international and at those campus locations and the ones that 
are outsourced (FPs)’. 
 
5.2.3 Geographical Priorities 
 
Geographically, the University is primarily focused on countries around 
the Indian Ocean rim, as a ‘gateway to AA and SA regions’ (AI2). AI1 
confirmed that the University is currently ‘developing the Indian Ocean 
rim capabilities first’. AI10 added that by converting the Country U FP 
into an IBC, the University now has ‘campuses all around the Indian 
Ocean rim’.  
 
Apart from the Indian Ocean rim, the University also has an eye on other 
geographical regions. AI1 noted that the University is ‘trying heading 
West more than anywhere else'. Guided by the University’s 2018 
objectives (Strategy & Planning Office University A 2018), the University 
is particularly interested in penetrating the NN region comprising 
developed countries of the Western world, although 'it’d have to be a 
really good arrangement', alluding to the financial viability of the TNE 
operations (AI2). The 2018 objectives also include an aspiration to 
develop ‘deeper MOE (Ministry of Education) links with Country O’, a 
country where the University has an interest in developing more 
articulation relationships to facilitate onshore international enrolments 
(AI5). These geographical priorities hinge very much on ‘having footholds 
in those countries’ (AI18). 
 
5.2.4 Distinctive Focus of Each IBC 
 
In the past, the University’s TNE start-ups had been ‘opportunistic’, and 
lacked strategic direction (AI1). The global university is now envisioned 
as a ‘global network of university campuses … a global university … that 
have operations that are networked around the globe … each location 
having something distinctive about it in terms of… its major focus in 
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terms of education and … research’ (AI5). The University wants to be a 
‘global university, with multiple campuses' (AI1). These IBC campuses 
‘service different markets’ (AI4), and ‘reach into a different market; has a 
different profile’ (AI10).  
 
The distinctive roles of each IBC include ‘helping develop a sustainable 
local economy’ in Countries T and U (AI5). Country T IBC plays an 
important role in the State’s economy through education and research in 
marine science, oil and gas, and engineering (AI12). The new Country U 
IBC also provides access to the AA region (AI10), while Country X IBC is 
‘seen as a gateway … to attract students from non-traditional markets … 
from countries Q and L … students who may not qualify for a visa for 
Australia’ (AI17). The location-specific, distinctive roles are characteristic 
of multinational universities (AI1). 
 
5.2.5 Roles or Services of Global Campus 
 
These IBCs primarily provide alternative study locations that are 
‘attractive’ and ‘comfortable’ in terms of pricing, safety and proximity to 
the students’ homes (AI18). These study locations are selected ‘so that 
we can offer the same courses, the same quality in a number of different 
locations with research … community engagement going on in each of 
those locations’ (AI5), in keeping with the ‘University’s values and 
TEQSA’s values’ (AI1). These aspirational remarks of University officers 
with strategic responsibilities AI1 and AI5 are somewhat contradicted by 
the on-ground experience of a TNE manager (AI7) who observed that the 
schools which delivered the TNE programs treat offshore international 
students different from students on the home campus, ‘something that 
the schools quite don’t get it’. However, this TNE manager clearly 
acknowledged the University’s aspiration that ‘we must be treating a 
student as a University A student regardless of location … but that 
doesn’t happen’. 
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AI10 observed that, with the recent renewal of the IBC agreement, the 
OP of Country V is ‘starting now to recognise that to be a university 
campus it needs to do more than teaching’. The University’s IBCs are 
also expected ‘to be able to create academic inertia and do their own 
research and have input into courses and input into new courses that 
might be locally relevant’ (AI9). AI10 further explained that the University 
now requires all its IBCs to be involved in ‘community engagement, 
research and teaching … so it will be a fully-fledged university … rather 
than … if it’s just teaching then that’s really not a campus’. ‘The three 
pillars need to be … synergised not just here (in the University’s home 
campus) but across' all campuses (AI13).  
 
On community engagement, AI5 shared that the 'PVC ... expected to 
have strong interaction with the ... Ministry, with the High Commission 
and also ... building up relationships with important stakeholders like the 
health system ... because we run Nursing programs; and industry as well 
... basically to raise the profile and reputation of the University, and to 
look out for other opportunities for recruiting students’. Part of the remit of 
the IBC is to ‘engage more with the local industry, particularly when we 
have units that require students to do internships’ (AI8). AI8 added that 
the PVCs located at each IBC have KPIs related to driving research and 
community engagement at their respective IBCs. 
 
The University now requires all its IBCs to engage in research (AI3), as 
AI5 asserts that ‘the university by definition has to be doing research, 
and … having to invest in research is almost the price of doing business 
in some of these countries’. AI10 is of the view that if the University 
becomes ‘research active, that would be a way of increasing the number 
of students ... enable you to get better accreditation with the government, 
and that they are able to offer PhD and … and be able to have better 
staff’. The University has been observed to incentivise research at all its 
IBCs (‘we would try and stimulate that research environment from here in 
the first instance so that it starts happening’ – AI6) 
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AI2 remarked that the University has neglected alumni relations, an area 
which is now ‘an increasing focus for us’ and that the approach should be 
‘what can we do for our alumni rather than what can alumni do for us ... 
there are people who could benefit from the connections that we can give 
them ... we can do more in terms of professional development, 
mentoring, networking for people’. AI8 agreed that alumni relations is one 
of the areas that the University has been weak in, and thinks that ‘we can 
do better’ if not for ‘limitations’ of not having an alumni office. AI8 cites 
the example of Country V, where ‘we have some top people in Country V 
but we don’t seem to celebrate them as much’. 
 
5.3 Motivations for Global University Aspiration 
 
It was clear that the University’s main motivation for TNE involvement in 
the early years of their TNE journey was the generation of financial 
returns within an environment of tight government funding and of 
government support for commercialisation (Section App I 1.1).  There 
was also evidence that the financial benefits flowed to entrepreneurial 
University departments (rather than to central administration) and to 
individual teaching staff (Section App I 1.4). The second-most quoted 
motivation was the pursuit of international students for onshore study, 
which ultimately also resulted in financial advantage to the University 
(Section App I 1.1). The two most quoted reasons for termination in the 
early years were poor quality of delivery and financial returns (Section 
App I 1.5). There were 11 terminated FPs between 1986 and 2017 (when 
the ‘global university’ approach was formally articulated).  
 
The long TNE experience that the University went through has informed 
successive formulations of the University’s TNE approach. AI10 noted 
that ‘there is a whole range of motivations now in terms of what we want 
to do and we have certainly changed the idea of what we see the 
campus is for’. The University ‘learnt from our own mistakes’ (AI5), and 
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was ‘able to draw experience’ to address ‘the pitfalls of governance … 
risk control … handle regulatory in the new environment … quality 
control’ (AI15). Coupled by the emergence of AUQA, and subsequently 
TEQSA, as well as the UBS’ BSA accreditation, the University’s TNE 
motivation morphed into one that is more quality-driven (‘our quality and 
TEQSA quality … total deal breakers’ - AI1). 
 
AI1 aptly summarises the University’s current motivation for TNE, viz., 
that any potential TNE operation must have ‘strategic fit’, meet the 
University’s and TEQSA’s quality benchmarks, and ‘make a return … in a 
fixed period of time’. Further, AI1 also added that the University believes 
‘in a campus model rather than through the small individual TNEs'. The 
strategic fit also includes being able to ‘extend our operation’ 
geographically (AI2). 
 
More specifically, many informants confirm the need for the University’s 
IBCs to fulfil its three roles, viz., teaching, research and community 
engagement in every location (Section App I 5.2e). AI1 also added 
student mobility as an important activity of the IBC’s teaching role. AI5 
sums up the purpose of the IBCs as ‘our primary means of getting 
reward … around mobility and royalty … and about us diversifying our 
risk as well (through having both onshore and offshore students)’. AI3 
noted that while other universities ‘pulled back from offshore campuses 
… we’ve gone in the other direction … partly a diversification strategy’. 
 
While the teaching role of the University’s IBCs is a revenue-generating 
activity (‘obviously earning significant amounts of income’ – AI1), 
research and community engagement do not directly generate income 
(‘you don’t really make money out of research’ – AI15). Research can be 
funded directly by the University as seed funding for its IBCs (AI5), 
funded by the host government (AI3), funded by the OP (AI6), or funded 
from the University’s TNE royalties (AI10). Research can lend much 
prestige, prevents the IBC looking ‘shallow’, ‘builds … reputation … gives 
 669 
stronger credibility in the market as a university’ (AI6), and promote the 
University’s reputation and ultimately result in better IBC student 
enrolments (AI15). AI10 added that to do ‘world-leading research … you 
can’t just do it in Australia’.  
 
Similarly, community engagement is not a revenue-generating activity, 
but can build University reputation and networks towards improved IBC 
student enrolments (AI5). 
 
The OPs that collaborate with the University have traditionally more 
down-to-earth motivations driving their participation, viz., ‘money and 
profile’ (AI1). AI10 considers the University’s efforts in shifting OPs’ focus 
from merely ‘traditional profit-making’ to developing a ‘proper academic 
structure’ as important and significant. His argument is that the focus on 
research in the ‘short to medium term … would be a way of increasing 
the number of students who want to come and study with you … it will 
enable you to get better accreditation with the government … able to 
offer PhD and … although … it might have a cost … it will also have a 
real benefit because you will also be able to have better staff’. Many 
informants agree that Country T and Country U OPs are proactive in 
research and community engagement by virtue of their corporate 
constitution (AI4, AI10, AI16), but the Country V OP have had to be 
persuaded, and ultimately committed to research and community 
engagement through the renewal of the IBC contract (AI10, AI15, AI16). 
Country X IBC is new, but research and community engagement are 
‘built into the contract … they have to honour it … there’s an investment 
agreement’ (AI6). 
 
In Country V, the OP is a very experienced campus operator that also 
delivers its own diploma programs as ‘feeder programs’ to the 
University’s own degrees (AI1). The only other OP with its own programs 
is the UCM OP (UCM 2019). 
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5.4 The in situ Collaborative International Branch Campus (ic-IBC) 
as Preferred Model 
 
The IBC is obviously a preferred TNE business delivery model for the 
global university, although the University is still involved in several FPs, 
as observed by AI5 ('we now only have the four campus arrangements, 
which we see as our future, and a very small number of ... franchised 
type arrangements’). AI5 clarified that the current FPs in Countries W 
and Y ‘don't really fit into that mode’, but ‘potentially, but equally there 
might be some sense in just retaining a couple of them … because they 
do us no harm and they might serve a specific purpose ... and perhaps in 
the fullness of time, they might show the promise to become more of’ an 
IBC like in Country U. 
 
5.4.1 University Motivation for in situ Collaborative IBCs (ic-IBCs) 
 
The University’s early years of TNE experience highlighted the potential 
for poor quality delivery, which in turn can damage the University’s 
reputation at the location of delivery and beyond (Section App I 1.5). The 
second half of the 2000’s also ushered in three significant quality-related 
regulatory impositions, two of which are external regulatory frameworks 
in the form of AUQA and TEQSA (which later replaced AUQA) (Section 
App I 3.0), while the third was BSA, a self-imposed international 
accreditation for the UBS (Section App I 4.0).  
 
As a result of these regulatory impositions, the University gravitated 
towards greater control of its TNE operations. In discussing FPs, AI13 
commented that ‘it will be a lot less risky for us to exercise greater control 
and set up branch campuses’. AI2 is of the view that the ‘much closer 
operational engagement with our branch campuses’ can confer ‘more 
control … more integration’ with the home campus. Similarly, AI7 
asserted that the University has ‘got more control and say over the way 
things are done (in an in situ collaborative IBC, or ic-IBC, compared with 
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a FP) ... whereas when you are working with a partner you are one of 
many universities’. The ic-IBC is distinguished from a c-IBC as a c-IBC 
that employs University staff on-site at the TNE operation to monitor the 
operations.  
 
AI7 explained the need for control with an example, ‘You might kind of 
say ‘Look! We want you to introduce this policy’, and then they would say 
‘No, that it doesn’t fit with what we are doing with Middlesex and 
Sheffield Hallam, and Wollongong; so no, we are not doing it’. In fact, AI9 
was more blunt in the University’s absolute control over academic 
matters, saying ‘they’re going to have to wear that, and that’s in the 
agreement, so we’ve got the right to change courses, change entry 
requirements; anything to do with academic side of things ... and it’s our 
award which is kind of accredited’. AI9’s blunt comments are probably 
reflective of her team’s operational approach as TNE managers, which 
contrasts with senior strategy executives’ view that it is ‘more in 
relationships we’ve invested in’ (AI1), and that the University ‘tr(ies) to 
make sure that whatever we’re doing is win-win for both of us (i.e., 
partners)’ (AI19). 
 
The University’s control is only over academic matters and standards, 
i.e., ‘control over the academic content … over admission policies … 
over academic quality and performances of the staff’ (AI17). AI16 
explained that the University has ‘absolute academic control ... we 
control the quality of the programs, what’s delivered, what staff to be 
employed, all of that … that is important to the reputation of the 
University, that is important to the students getting quality education, 
students’ experience’, providing a window to the ultimate purpose of the 
academic control, i.e., protecting University reputation and student 
experience.  
 
It was interesting to note AI17’s view, that while ‘universities feel that 
they’ve got more control (using IBCs) … and more control over the brand 
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… in real terms, it’s probably not much different ... it’s just about the 
branding, … branding University A … but everything underneath remains 
the same ... there’s still a partner; we’re still a partner (in a FP model) ... 
so, I think it’s quite cosmetic’. 
 
AI6 had a different take on the motivation for ic-IBCs, and views them 
from a financial returns lens – ‘we’re not doing it for social objectives … 
they need to be financially sustainable, and they need to demonstrate … 
the tangible financial returns … but they also need to deliver the less 
tangible reputational gains that we would get from it … so, having these 
campuses and building brand in those locations will I guess assist in 
building our reputational capital in those regions which improves our 
rankings on the QS and THE surveys ... which again lifts our status 
globally, which in return stimulates student demand, both onshore 
international and at those campus locations and the ones that are 
outsourced’. AI6 did qualify that ‘TSW is probably different; that’s more of 
a re-investment model, the way that works … we make money, and the 
joint venture and entity retains a lot of it and … a new building gets built 
and so on, and so on … it’s owned by the joint venture; they’re not our 
buildings’. Similarly, AI13 views an ic-IBC as ‘a subsidiary’. 
 
Interestingly, while AI6 commented that the ic-IBC network is one 
‘strategy for the diversification of revenue streams’, he also clarified that 
‘it’s not the main source of our revenue ... the main source of our 
revenue is our onshore activities at this campus’. This view is somewhat 
incongruent with AI1’s view that ‘we obviously earning significant 
amounts of income’ from ic-IBCs, but the incongruence may be due to 
different benchmarking. In any case, ‘there’s pressure to make sure that 
our offshore locations are breaking even, certainly … the University 
wouldn’t stomache for very long  … huge losses in offshore locations’ 
(AI14). 
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The ic-IBC also provides the University with a network of global 
universities that can host staff (AI6) and student exchanges (AI6), and 
widen the opportunities for research (AI1, AI15) and research funding 
(AI3). AI17’s experience with SA region indicated that ‘even when we 
had what I’d consider not optimal degrees offered in Country L and 
places like that, the statistics would show that we’d still get a large 
number of students studying in Australia’. However, AI20 believes that 
the offshore campuses did not contribute much to onshore international 
enrolments, saying ‘maybe our presence … contributed to our onshore 
numbers … (but) just recently … I changed my view … some research 
done in Country T indicated that the respondents did not refer to the 
TSW presence’. Similarly, while student mobility is a University KPI, AI4 
asserted that ‘I don’t think there is many at all … it’s offered and student 
mobility is an important KPI for the university, but I don't know that many 
of them do, I'm not aware that many can do’. 
 
5.4.2 Ownership and Supervision of ic-IBCs 
 
The Observatory definition of an IBC requires part or whole ownership of 
the IBC by the university (Section 2.5.3). It is worthwhile noting that the 
University A IBCs are not wholly/partly owned and operated by the 
University (with the possible exception of the Country T IBC; Section App 
I 2.5), unlike the University J Country V campus (AI15). AI6 reported that 
the University ‘don't really own them (i.e., the ic-IBCs), but we are 
operating in partnership with someone’, except in the case of TSW, 
which is not ‘really a partnership’ (AI4) where the University has some 
equity (Section App I 2.5). The local host country ‘licence to operate is 
with the partner’ (AI6), except in the case of XCD (AI1). 
 
AI5 compared the ic-IBC to a home campus faculty, saying ‘in terms of 
scale, ... they are more like smaller ... it's (i.e., TSW) got an Engineering 
faculty, ... Humanities faculty, ... Business faculty ... got a Dean of 
Research, ... a Dean of Learning and Teaching, ... the PVC ... they are 
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like campuses ... but in size, they are actually smaller than any of our 
faculties here, but their operations are not analogous because faculties 
... are not running that kind of licensed university operation with links to 
local government in the host country ... so I don't treat them like I treat 
the PVC of a faculty’. AI5 added that ‘their (i.e., ic-IBCs) budgets are 
usually a lot smaller, but they are treated in a way, like they are part of 
the University … a little bit (like the University’s home country regional 
campus) - except in the branch campus, there is no responsibility for 
infrastructure’. On the issue of revenue, AI5 commented that ‘we receive 
royalty, and we may decide not to receive some of that royalty ... keep 
onshore matched by the partner to actually fund research’. 
 
The University A IBCs are operated by the University’s on-ground 
partners, but supervised on-site by the University’s PVC, ‘as the 
academic manager of the campus who sits on our senior executive team’ 
(AI2). AI6 explained that ‘the big difference between these (i.e., FPs) and 
these (i.e., ic-IBCs) is that we have a Pro Vice-Chancellor, who is a 
University A staff member who works at that campus and is the head of 
that campus’. These PVCs attend ‘weekly senior executive team 
meetings by video link’ (AI1). For these reasons, the term in situ 
collaborative international branch campus (ic-IBC) is used to distinguish 
University A’s IBCs from other forms of IBC (Section App I 5.4).  
 
5.4.3 Asset-light Separation of Roles 
 
In considering the different branch campus models, AI10 commented 
that ‘we are moving away from that idea of the pure franchise model but 
in truth, we are not moving to the model that, say Wollongong arguably 
has (of running the IBC on its own, because) it’s a very expensive model 
and one that has significant risks’. The ic-IBC provides the University 
with a unique ‘vehicle to be present in a market’ (AI1) and that is asset-
light. AI10 reasoned that the asset-light approach is preferred because 
‘we don’t want to take the risks of putting in capital but we want to get the 
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benefits of having what we call a campus’. AI11 clarified that this 
operating model meant that ‘other people invest in infrastructure and the 
people, and we provide the intellectual property and the academic 
integrity and quality as well’. The risks of the operations are thence ‘in 
large part passed on to a third party provider … they are also able to 
employ people much more cheaply than the university here’ (AI11). In 
AI17’s view, ‘it’s (i.e., the ic-IBC) a good model in that there’s a lot of risk 
sharing ... so if the partner doesn’t get students, that will affect the 
partner a lot more than it will have an impact on the University’. 
 
The University ‘replicate most of the value chain elements … apart from 
marketing’ (AI6), and has ‘control over the academic content … over 
admission policies … over academic quality and performances of the 
staff’; however, the OP pays for all staff appointments’ (AI5). On the part 
of the OP, AI14 was simplistic in describing its role, ‘that (the) partner is 
essentially somebody that is part of the marketing of the programs ... a 
partnership with an organisation that essentially acts as its marketing 
arm’. Using the Country X ic-IBC as an example, AI17 described the OP 
in more detail, as being ‘in-charge of infrastructure, buildings, hiring of 
suitably qualified staff … and the University is responsible for QA, and 
quality control, appointment of lecturers, and all academic matters and 
affairs’.  
 
5.4.4 Invisible On-ground Operator 
 
The ic-IBC is also described as a ‘seamless’ arrangement, where the OP 
is usually not visible to the customer, i.e., the student (AI16). AI6 added 
that ‘the universities … always the public face … the partner is sort of 
silent in the background ... particularly in Country X … the regulator does 
not like to know about the partner … the partner should be there; be 
doing but not be seen almost’. However, the University relies heavily on 
the in-country expertise of the OP (AI5), because ‘we would have little 
idea of what to do … how much to charge students, how to market to 
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students, and how to deal with the local economy … we just don’t have 
the expertise’ (AI11). 
 
5.4.5 Management of ic-IBCs 
 
The running of the ic-IBC is through various joint University-OP bodies, 
which are specified in the agreements (AI5). All the University’s ic-IBCs 
‘have their own academic board ... some of them are called councils ... 
joint with the University’ and the ‘University A staff member (PVC) is a 
chair’ (AI1). AI15 explained that ‘a lot of decision is done through a few 
boards and committees’, e.g., ‘the academic council that looks after 
teaching quality, course quality and … the joint-management committee 
that has a higher level kind of a decision over the views and vision’. The 
‘closer operational engagement’ with the ic-IBC (compared with the 
University’s lighter-touch oversight of FPs) is considered ‘less risk to 
reputation’ (AI1). 
 
The ‘critical processes’ for the joint management of the ic-IBCs include 
‘having a clear plan that’s aligned to our … overarching University 
strategic plan … and then monitoring that ... a process of … ensuring 
that we’re meeting our targets and our KPIs ... ensuring that we can react 
… in the instances where we’re not meeting our KPIs … (and) stretching 
people to meet targets’ (AI6). 
 
The running of ic-IBCs ‘is more costly, there are commitments around 
things like the BSA accreditation that you wouldn’t necessarily do if you 
are doing it just on a commercial basis … around appointment of 
academics, and the like’ (AI11). Although ‘direct costs of the operation 
are borne by the partner, there are certainly costs for the University in 
terms of how many staff it has, how many resources it attaches to its 
transnational operations … because every time you schedule and run a 
unit, then there is an academic workload management system where 
time allowance has to be put in’ (AI17). AI19 concluded that ‘we can do 
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this because we’re a big university ... if we were not a big university, we 
wouldn’t have the resources to do it’. 
 
5.4.6 ic-IBC Start-up Criteria 
 
Although the University is ‘approached all the time’ to set up IBCs, it has 
spurned many of these offers due to its formal processes of selection 
that requires ‘strategic fit’ (AI1) and be ‘self-sustaining’ (AI6). AI18 mused 
that the University has ‘since matured and we have moved to, ‘is it 
strategic for our region?’ and ‘having global reputation … and having 
campuses around … our partnerships, our networks … for our future 
survival’.  
 
The University is ‘very keen to be a global university but in a way that 
establishes itself … more fundamentally in parts of the world than others 
... the first thing - it fits the strategic plan … and obviously there’s a 
financial aspect to that’ (AI14). AI12 expanded on this, saying ‘that's got 
to be number one that they can ensure … they can basically pretty much 
guarantee numbers; that their feeder organisations are accredited ... 
where the students are coming from ... the courses they can offer ... what 
the appetite is … the market demand … whether it's a match with what 
we offer ... and where they can get their staff from ... are they able to 
staff with suitably qualified staff’. 
 
AI1 shared that the University ‘actually have a map of … how that 
strategic fit work’, asking whether ‘it enhance(s) us as a global university 
… would it open up relationships … in that part of the world and be truly 
global?’, and ensuring that the University ‘obviously have a beneficial 
financial position … to be able to provide research opportunity for us ...  
mobility opportunity for the students’. Using the new XCD ic-IBC as an 
example, AI5 described how it was ‘a very commercial decision … 
discussed and reviewed by the Senior Executive team and by the UIO 
(University International Office), and clearly it's a decision by our 
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Council’, and that ‘the PVC of each of the faculties are represented at the 
Senior Executive team’.  
 
AI8 shared how the unit coordinators are usually not consulted on the 
start-up of new TNE operations, and that ‘in terms of deciding whether or 
not we want to go ahead with a particular partner that wasn’t really 
something that we had control over as UCs ... and for that matter I don’t 
even know if the heads of school had as much power’. AI8 added that 
‘there were times when I would be told of what was happening, with XCD 
for instance and what the problems and challenges would have been 
with XCD … our head of school would also be involved in some of those 
discussions ... our head of school would be saying well that is not right or 
we can’t do this ... (and) there would sometimes be push back as well’.  
However, AI5 explained that ‘you’ll appreciate that these arrangements 
are often things that need to be … commercial conversations with the 
partners, they are often complex negotiations also with governments … 
and with that, so you can't really consult more publicly about those things 
until you have actually … firmed up the few key parameters … so it’s not 
something that goes out to a vote to academic staff members … it’s an 
agreement that actually is reached based upon sound academic 
principles, but it’s also a commercial decision that is made’ (AI5). 
 
The process of ‘very tight due diligence’, involving market investigations 
and approval to commence usually take at least 18 months to complete, 
and has to ‘account for history and opportunity' (e.g., Country U 
transmutation into an ic-IBC, and Country X serendipitous start-up 
respectively) (AI1). This tight due diligence has led to AI20’s recent 
Country T vocational institute proposal being rejected on the grounds of 
the absence of an ‘industry partner to take the financial risk’. 
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5.4.7 Serendipity as a Norm in Previous TNE Start-ups 
 
AI20 remarked that the University has ‘never been particularly proactive’, 
observing the many ‘partnerships we have’, that the University has not 
sought out delivery locations based on strategic considerations, but have 
responded to serendipitous engagements with unknown suitors offering 
their services (‘It’s been, ‘Hey, this guy walked in yesterday; he wants to 
start … let’s do it'’). While this might reflect previous and current TNE 
operations, the University has certainly formalised its TNE strategies and 
operationalised them through clearly articulated objectives (Section App I 
5.1). It is left to be seen if the objectives will be met via deliberate, 
proactive execution, as opposed to serendipitous approaches by 
potential OPs. 
 
AI12 reflected on how difficult it was to find a suitable partner, and ‘that's 
why … we've actually reduced the number of partners because we had a 
multitude of small ones’ which were not performing. Given the risks and 
start-up costs that the OP has to assume, AI6 mused about whether ‘is it 
harder for them (i.e., the OPs) to find a new university, or is it harder for 
us to find a new partner?’.  
 
5.5 Maturity of ic-IBC Campuses 
 
The University’s ic-IBCs are very different in terms of their age. AI17 
observed that the early years of the University’s management of these 
campuses were driven mainly by teaching, and there was ‘no talk of 
research’, but now there is at least a ‘notional focus on research’. AI15 
noted a ‘shift’ in the University’s dealings with the Country V ic-IBC, 
where there was a shift from ‘just teaching’ to the ‘global university 
vision’, where ‘we have to do research … we have to go out and do 
industry engagement’. AI15 believed that this shift is due to a need to be 
‘looking at the student and the business … can’t just look at the 
business’. Further, AI15 noted that ‘all these three things (viz., teaching, 
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research and community engagement) are … what the university 
strongly focus on … that’s why we are very involved in that process right 
now’. Each ic-IBC is at a different stage of realizing the University’s 
global university vision. In terms of age and research involvement, AI4 
observed that the Country T ic-IBC is the most mature, followed by the 
ic-IBCs of Countries V, U and X. 
 
Country T ic-IBC is ‘almost 20 years old’ (AI10), and is the most mature 
of the campuses. AI9 remarked that it is involved in research ‘more so 
than others’, and has a research infrastructure that is ‘all paid by the 
partner’. While AI3 noted that it supports research from its ‘own funding’, 
AI5 believed that it ‘can access government funding’. Both are right in 
that the funds are from the government, which is also a shareholder of 
the local corporate vehicle that owns the branch campus. The higher 
involvement in research (compared to other ic-IBCs) is observed to be 
due to having ‘faculty employed’, as opposed to having more sessionals, 
like in the Country V ic-IBC. AI5 also noted that the ic-IBC does ‘a lot in 
the community’ through ‘high schools … and different sorts of community 
events’. 
 
Country V ic-IBC is managed by a highly experienced campus operator, 
whose ‘business model has always been teaching and learning’ (AI15). 
AI15 remarked that ‘you don’t really make money out of research … but it 
does build your reputation’. While some reluctance on the part of the OP 
was detected (AI5, AI9), the recently renewed TNE contract included 
research and community engagement as part of the ic-IBC’s deliverables 
(AI10). The ic-IBC has no access to local government funding for 
research (AI5), but AI9 observed that the contract required funds to be 
set aside by the partners for research. This 10-year old ic-IBC is mature 
in terms of its teaching, but ‘not expert’ and ‘very new to research’ (AI15). 
AI15 also expressed the OP’s concern about the ownership of research 
outputs, when noting that ‘you need to be able to see how it’s going to 
benefit because the research is going to go under University A’s name’. 
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The University values this ic-IBC because it is located in a regional ‘hub’ 
that provides attractive student mobility opportunities, enables the 
building of institutional and business partnerships, and allows for 
‘leveraging on the advantages of this region’ (AI16). 
 
The Country U ic-IBC is a new addition to the University’s stable of ic-
IBC in 2018. The relationship between the University and the OP is 
however not new. The University has been running several programs 
within the OP’s campus under a FP arrangement for about ten years 
(Section 5.4.1). AI3 observed that it is ‘primarily a teaching institution’, 
and AI6 remarked that there was no research, ‘but we are developing 
their research’. AI12, however, who is more involved with the on-ground 
operations clarified that it is ‘quite research active … due to the 
commitment of the leadership team there, rather than the impact of 
University A’. AI12 observed that the research commitment was ‘very 
much determined by the culture that exists at that campus’, meaning the 
OP’s commitment towards national capacity-building. 
 
The Country X ic-IBC is the newest kid on the block, having started only 
in 2018. It has no research activity at the moment (AI6, AI12). However, 
research and community engagement are deliverables that are specified 
in the TNE contract (AI10). The campus’ foremost priority is currently in 
ensuring the success of its taught programs (AI12). 
 
A serious impediment to research is the lack of motivation by teaching 
staff who are sessionals, i.e., teaching staff who are teaching on a part-
time basis, and usually paid on hourly wages (AI12). This is particularly 
true for Countries V where the majority of teaching staff are sessionals. 
AI8 also mentioned the less-than ideal opportunities afforded by the ic-
IBCs for research collaboration between the home campus staff and ic-
IBC staff, compared to the more specific discipline-based conferences. 
AI8 was disappointed with ic-IBC teaching staff who discussed potential 
research collaborations, but ‘that hasn’t transpired’. 
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The presence and operation of ic-IBCs have resulted in at least two 
important spillover outcomes, viz., the growing numbers of alumni, and a 
widening range of opportunities for student and staff mobility. AI5 
reported significant flows of students across the University’s Australian, 
Country T and Country V campuses, ‘part of the global University thing’, 
and enables students to ‘get some global experience, but have no 
interruption to their course’. This increasing mobility is due partly to the 
similar ‘look and feel’ of the campuses, a result of the University’s 
aspiration to ensure comparable student experience across its global 
university campuses (AI6). AI5 reported that the campuses in Countries 
T and V have ‘strong alumni groups’. This is to be expected given the 
length of time the campuses have been operating in those countries. He 
also commented that the University is still in its infancy in reaching out to 
the alumni. 
 
AI2 envisions that the ic-IBCs, together with the home campus can 
develop a ‘true partnership between campuses' in the future. He believes 
that the campuses can develop into high quality universities, where 
‘rather than moderation being us moderating them, I would want to see 
each of the partnerships moderating each other... we share the burden 
more'. 
 
6.0 Country V TNE Evolution (1986 to date) 
 
The story of University A’s Country V 33-year TNE journey is very 
important in explicating the University’s evolving motivations, priorities 
and business delivery models amidst changing business, social and 
regulatory environments, including the University’s home country 
regulatory environment (AI14). Its TNE journey in Country V can be 
investigated under four different time periods, viz., the early years of FP 
operations, the short-lived FP consolidation phase, the IBC set-up phase, 
and informant perspectives of the future. 
 683 
 
6.1 Reminiscing the Past 
 
The University started its first FP in Country V in 1986. Over a period of 
21 years, the University started another six FP operations, and one IBC. 
Five of the OPs were either professional or trade associations, while two 
were private higher education providers (one of which was a blended 
learning online provider) (University A 2008). 
 
6.1.1 TNE Performance 
 
All eight FP operations catered mainly to local part-time students, who 
are usually working adults (AI17). The classes were mainly held in the 
evenings or weekends to accommodate these students’ lifestyles. The 
combined total offshore student population in Country V grew from 1,450 
students to 1,647 students in the period 2005 – 2007, just prior to the set 
up of the collaborative campus (University A 2008). The growth was 
partly due to support by the local government, which enunciated an 
aspiration to become a regional hub for education in 2003 (Ministry of 
Trade & Industry Country V 2008). 
 
6.1.2 Partners’ Motivation 
 
AI1 commented that the OPs’ motivation was ‘all about money and 
profile’, intimating a concern for commercial profitability. The 
professional/trade associations were involved in TNE to also provide 
higher education opportunities for their members by ‘upskilling through 
part-time studies’ (AI17). The University was also driven by the prospect 
of commercial returns through ‘good student numbers, good feeder in our 
programs back in University A’s home city’ – alluding to both offshore 
and onshore enrolment of international students (AI16). 
 
 
 684 
6.1.3 Business Delivery Model 
 
During the University’s early years of TNE, the schools had ‘a lot of 
autonomy’ in setting up TNE operations (AI17). All the early Country V 
TNE operations used the remotely-monitored FP (r-FP) business delivery 
model, which required frequent travels by University staff to service the 
offshore operations (AI12, AI13). These offshore travels were designed 
for ‘intensive’ teaching deliveries (AI14), OP staff training (AI8), 
moderation of assessments (AI8), and building ‘relationships with 
students’ (AI8). AI15 described this model as a ‘more prescriptive type of 
relationship … the University would prescribe that this must be done, and 
this must be done, and follow this’. 
 
6.1.4 Operating Environment 
 
The early years of TNE in Country V was characterised by huge student 
demand for higher education (AI17), amidst a lax regulatory environment 
(AI15). This environment resulted in ‘a lot of dodgy players … issuing 
fake degrees’ (AI15). AI9 added that the industry was ‘a shambles ... 
they had so many fly-by-night operators offering courses in shopping 
malls … and all sorts of weird places and … non-accredited’. Country V 
responded to this state of affairs by introducing ‘new sets of regulations’ 
in 2011 (AI15, AI17).  
 
The University’s r-FPs tapped into mostly working adult segments of the 
domestic students market through its OPs which were predominantly 
professional and industry associations. These associations were ‘quite 
well politically connected’, and provided access to a large cohort of such 
students (AI17, AI12).  
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6.2 Attempt at Consolidation 
 
Leading up to 2008, the University realised that there were ‘too many 
franchising, twinning arrangements with lots of different partners, with 
lots of different standards’ in Country V (AI9). There were concerns about 
the quality of delivery, and the risk of losing ‘line of sight with too many 
partnerships’ (AI6). The year 2008 was a watershed year in that the then-
AUQA introduced Internationalisation as the second mandatory theme of 
its audits of tertiary institutions (Section 4.3). The lead up to 2008 saw 
many Australian universities with TNE operations ‘downsizing’ their 
offshore portfolios (AI9). University A was no different. It culled thirteen 
TNE operations within the 2007 – 2009 period (Table 5.11). 
 
6.2.1 TNE Performance 
 
Student enrolments at the University’s Country V r-FPs were robust in 
the lead up to 2008 (AI17). However, there were growing concerns about 
the quality of delivery, especially in light of the up-coming AUQA Cycle 2 
audit in 2008 (AI15). These concerns prompted the University to cull the 
number of partnerships, in order to retain a ‘select few … principal quality 
partnerships’, and to ‘consolidate’ its r-FP operations for ‘easier 
management’ and ‘better control’ (AI6). 
 
The University culled three r-FPs (‘got rid of that’ – AI1), and attempted 
to cluster four other r-FPs under one management structure (‘we tried to 
combine the different ones together into one campus’ – AI1). AI17 
reported that the University did give the remaining OPs the ‘opportunity 
to pitch to have a University A centre’, i.e., as a sole University A TNE 
delivery centre. He continued  that ‘the University had a vision of bringing 
together the four partners into one … location’, and through the 
coordination of the current OP, it ‘had … quite a unique arrangement 
where … initially it was to work with the four professional bodies’ as 
‘potential delivery points for TNE programs’. This clustering of the four r-
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FPs under a new OP did not work out – ‘it became a very fractured 
relationship’, and all the four professional associations eventually pulled 
out of the arrangement, leaving only the current OP (AI12).  
 
6.2.2 Partners’ Motivation 
 
The consolidation exercise was a unilateral decision of the University, 
and AI17 observed that there was not ‘much of an option’ for the OPs. 
The University’s primary reason for consolidating its numerous r-FPs was 
to ‘control … quality’ because ‘each one is doing a different thing’ (AI15), 
resulting in ‘four different experiences’ for the students (AI9). AI15 
explained that state of affairs presented reputational risks for the 
University since the University ‘was churning out students … to the 
market … in industry that’s not equipped with the skills and … University 
A (graduate) attributes’. AI12 mused that the failure to retain the 
remaining OPs ‘was disappointing because our relationship with the VSH 
OP at that point spanned 30 years’. AI17 remarked that the University 
would have ‘many more students’ if it stayed with them, and that the OPs 
were ‘quite well politically connected’. 
 
6.2.3 Business Delivery Model 
 
When it seemed that none of the remaining four OPs were interested in 
being the University’s Country V delivery centre, the University resorted 
to appointing an OP with which it had a very long working relationship, 
but which had no presence in Country V (AI16). The business delivery 
model was described by AI17 as ‘a unique arrangement where … initially 
it was to work with the four professional bodies’ as ‘potential delivery 
points for TNE programs’. The appointed OP was tasked to manage the 
delivery of the University programs through the professional/industry 
associations.  
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6.2.4 Operating Environment 
 
In Australia, the University was growing more conscious of the quality 
impost that the 2008 AUQA Cycle 2 audits was going to have on its TNE 
operations. This concern resulted in the University attempting to 
consolidate its TNE operations, and in particular, in Country V where it 
had the most number of TNE operations. This period of consolidation 
also continued to be characterised by lax host country regulatory control, 
and a national host country quest to become a regional hub for education 
(Section App I 6.1) - which spawned ‘over a thousand players’ (i.e., 
private education providers) (AI15). The government eventually 
implemented a set of very stringent regulations governing the delivery of 
private education. AI15 reported that the tightened regulations imposed 
by the host country government in 2011 was aimed at making a ‘change 
in the whole landscape in education’.  
 
6.3 The Collaborative Campus 
 
With the failure of the University’s attempt to cluster the four 
professional/industry associations, the University then went ahead to 
establish a campus through the agency of the newly-appointed OP 
(AI17). In the University’s 2008 AUQA portfolio report, the University 
described this campus as a ‘collaborative campus’ (University A 2008). 
This collaborative campus is the second ic-IBC after the Country T ic-
IBC, representing a gap of about eight years (Section 5.4.1). 
 
6.3.1 TNE Performance 
 
When the University established a collaborative campus in 2008, its 
student enrolments saw a ‘dip … but it recovered’ (AI6). AI15 reported a 
‘very huge growth’ in student enrolments in the early years of the new 
campus. The domestic students considered the University’s programs as 
 688 
being ‘more prestigious’ than other private university programs because 
it was ‘a campus on its own … not easy to get in’ (AI15). 
 
The loss of the professional and industry association partners resulted in 
a loss of access to a large proportion of part-time students (AI17). The 
location of the collaborative campus (‘a converted secondary school’ – 
AI14) in a suburban area also resulted in a decrease in demand from 
part-time students, who were mostly working adults. This shift in demand 
was due to the difficulty in accessing the suburban campus by public 
transport; the previous locations were all within the central business 
district (CBD), easily accessible to working adult students (‘location of the 
VCS campus not as convenient as those of the professional bodies 
because most of them were on the train lines’ - AI17).  
 
The loss of the predominantly domestic part-time working adult market of 
students meant that the University had to appeal to the domestic full-time 
students who were mostly school leavers, and also to international 
students who were not impacted by the suburban location of the campus 
(AI17). The appeal to domestic school leavers was limited because these 
students were more attracted to the Country’s highly reputable local 
universities (‘the market … strongly preferences the autonomous … 
national universities’ – AI16). Private higher education was a last resort 
for such students (‘next choice’ – AI17). The collaborative campus thus 
ended up with a growing number of international students (‘it never used 
to be a primarily international student market’ – AI12). AI15 reported that 
international students made up ‘70% of our students’, and came mainly 
from Countries O, Q, R, T and Y. 
 
6.3.2 Partners’ Motivation 
 
The University’s initial rationale for establishing the collaborative campus 
was for ‘easier management’, ‘better control’ of academic quality, and 
preparation for the AUQA Cycle 2 audit in 2008 (Section App I 6.2). It 
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was also aimed at ‘diversification of revenue streams, reputation building 
and global positioning’ (AI6). AI1 added that the ‘original vision for VCS 
was growing to a substantial size’. It was also ‘time to have our own 
campus … as the market was maturing’, having operated in Country V 
for 23 years (AI3).  
 
The University chose the OP to manage its collaborative campus 
because they have had a very long working relationship (‘always had a 
close relationship with University A’ – AI3), had developed ‘trust’ as a 
result of the long association (AI14, AI16), and had very good internal 
governance (AI1). AI3 is of the view that the OP is ‘really smart when it 
comes to managing its programs and managing its relationships with the 
industry’. As a result of the OP’s working relationship with ‘a whole raft of 
partners from around the world’ (AI16), the University benefits from the 
cross-fertilisation of TNE administration practices across the OP’s 
multiple partner operations, and the OPs systems, processes and 
technology platforms (AI15). AI5 also described the OP as a ‘partner who 
can see … and understand those regulatory environments and deal with 
them effectively’, and this expertise is needed ‘because there is a limited 
tolerance by governments in the countries in which we operate for 
mistakes and for breaches’. 
 
The OP, being ‘a very successful private organisation … it’s business 
model is taking universities’ IP, teaching it, and getting a slice of the 
revenues’ (AI6). AI2 commented that the OP was ‘motivated by profits 
and returns to shareholders’ as a ‘commercial organisation’, while AI15 
agreed that ‘profitability is definitely’ one of the OP’s motivation. This OP 
also owns and delivers its own English proficiency and Diploma 
programs, ‘providing a … seamless … pathway for students who 
wouldn’t get into the (University’s) program directly’ (AI16). While the OP 
deploys its own teaching staff for its Diploma programs, the collaborative 
campus’ administration staff serve both the OP and University programs 
(AI16). At the time when the University was looking out for a partner in 
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Country V, the OP was ‘keen to expand into the AS region’, and in 
keeping with their business delivery model, ‘they have to work with a 
university’ (AI3). 
 
When asked if the OP has any responsibility for conducting research, 
AI10 replied that ‘they're not’ required to, ‘but you know increasingly 
they're doing some things … (e.g.,) we have some support from them … 
they help out with some financial sponsorship ... having a teaching and 
learning symposium which they're helping us with … and they have a 
teaching and learning journal which is a good development’. While ‘for 
them, the focus is still teaching, learning and … making money, … and 
we understand that they’ve got their shareholders … but you know, in 
recent years they've been a bit more supportive ... I think they also 
realise that they can't just be about making money because that's 
unsustainable ... if they're only about money, inevitably they will fail 
commercially ... so they've got to invest in quality’ (AI10).  
 
6.3.3 Business Delivery Model 
 
While the University refers to its IBCs as collaborative campuses, the 
VCS OP calls it a ‘managed campus … we don’t develop content here 
because we have to use University A’s content’ (AI15). The VCS 
operations started as a ‘teaching focussed’ institution (AI16), and its 
‘business model has always been teaching and learning’ (AI15), where 
the OP pays the University a ‘royalty’ for the right to deliver the 
University’s programs (AI6, AI15).  
 
VCS is run as a wholly-owned private company of the OP, and 
consequently the licence to operate is held by the OP (AI1). The OP is 
‘in-charge of the land, facilities, the infrastructure, human resources’ 
(AI15), while the University has ‘absolute academic control ... we control 
the quality of the programs, what’s delivered, what staff to be employed, 
all of that … that is important to the reputation of the University, that is 
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important to the students getting quality education, students’ experience’ 
(AI16). AI16 continued that ‘the expertise that the OP brings is really 
strong’ with ‘well-developed systems and processes’; its market reach is 
wide because ‘they’re spread through a huge range of markets in the 
region so …  they are able to respond to enquiries rapidly from students’, 
and ‘they’ve got real strength in their English program’. The 
complementarity ‘plays to each other’s strengths’. AI15 commented on 
the OP, saying that ‘huge resources dumped into … developing 
technology always looking at new learning, teaching’. 
 
The University’s ‘absolute academic control’ (AI16) of the quality of 
program delivery is effected through a comprehensive partnership 
contract (AI3, AI19), the secondment of a PVC on-site to oversee all 
academic matters (‘PVC … eyes on the ground’ – AI15), a joint academic 
council, a joint academic board, a joint management committee, regular 
reporting, and its computerised tracking systems (‘easy to track’ – AI15). 
The joint academic council ‘looks after teaching quality, course quality’, 
while the ‘joint-management committee … has a higher level kind of 
decision over the views and vision' of the campus (AI15).  
 
While AI15’s comment that previous FP arrangements were ‘more 
prescriptive’, the current collaborative campus arrangement can also be 
considered highly prescriptive. Her remarks were possibly a result of 
having an on-site PVC to whom the operations staff ‘could quickly seek 
answers’ from, rather than being told from the University’s home country 
executives. Although the OP’s role does not include academic decisions, 
the OP is being given ‘trial’ responsibility to oversee the unit coordination 
of a small selection of the University’s units of study, indicating a possible 
devolution of the University’s TNE academic roles (AI15).  
 
When asked about what value chain activities would be considered 
critical for the success of the campus operations, AI15 replied ‘everything 
we must have’, including ‘teaching staff ... our administration... help the 
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student with the study plan, inquiries, enrollment ... assessments, exams, 
library services ... accommodation’. AI16 added that the campus has a 
‘careers officer’ to manage ‘career fair type activities ... actively engaged 
in building partnerships with business … opening up opportunities for 
students to do internships which make them more employable ... run a 
co-curricular program … many of the clubs are focused on further 
developing the student’s soft skills … the volunteer club that they run, 
community engagement work with disadvantaged kids in the area where 
we are located’, and manage a local alumni chapter.  
 
However, AI15 did acknowledge the lack of a full-sized library, complete 
IT support and counselling by the unit coordinators, and commented that 
the campus is ‘a smaller scale’ version of the home campus. This 
collaborative campus also features the engagement of mostly (‘about 
70’) sessional teaching staff, and anchored by five full-time faculty (AI15). 
She found the deployment of sessionals to be advantageous because 
there is no need to maintain an overhead of permanent staff (‘you might 
bring in someone then tell them we have no classes to teach’), while 
providing the flexibility to appoint BSA-accredited teaching staff from the 
many government universities. 
 
The University’s appointee, the PVC and the OP’s campus director (‘who 
looks after all the operational side’ of the campus operations – AI1) are 
the two key drivers of the operations in VCS, each representing the 
interests of each partner. The start up of the campus in 2008 was 
described as a ‘testing phase for everyone, and there is a lot of 
uncertainty as well’ but the partners were able to ‘draw experience’ from 
their long business relationship to make the arrangement work (AI15).  
 
The position of the PVC is rather unique (‘that’s an interesting one’ – 
AI17) in that she is ‘paid by the OP, but her line manager is University A’ 
(AI1). AI16 explained that the OP payment was due to local ‘legal 
requirements’ and ‘taxation’. When asked about the potential for split 
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loyalty resulting from the disconnect between payor and reporting line, 
AI16 explained that while there is the potential for it (“if the salary is 
coming directly, you’ve still got that … where there’s one of you, and 
there’s a lot of them … I am mindful of the fact that I’m working with two 
organisations … with my executive team here and with the senior 
executive team at University A’), it has been mitigated through ‘respect 
for the partners … because they’ve been in partnership for a long time’. 
Further ‘a lot of the work is done on the OP’s system … a lot of their 
computers are plugged into the OP’s, and a lot of their processes… so 
marketing and all that … all follows the OP’s protocols, but the focus of it 
is University A … and they’re building the University A market’ (AI16). 
AI19 confirmed that ‘they (PVCs) may be paid by the partner or they may 
be paid by the University ... but their loyalty, if you like, resides with 
University A and they sit on our senior executive team’. The collaborative 
campus has been labeled an in situ IBC (ic-IBC) because of the 
presence of the on-site PVC who represents the interests of the 
University (Section App I 5.4). 
 
AI15’s own role in directing academic affairs is similarly challenged 
because she is also paid by the OP, but reports to the PVC as well as to 
the OP’s Country V directors. She acknowledged that the potential for 
conflict of interest ‘has been the view of many people, they see my role 
as you have two bosses, and how do I manage that’, and that ‘there is 
always this conflict … how do you weigh academic quality versus 
profitability … both (partners) have different … sort of … ultimate agenda 
for … this partnership’. Her approach is to consider her KPIs (key 
performance indicators) as both ‘managing that relationship’ as well as 
acting ‘like the conduit’ for the two partners. This is heavily underpinned 
by the need that ‘the two heads must be in collaboration, and must see 
and must move the campus in the same direction’ (AI15). It was 
interesting to note that AI15 referred to herself as an OP staff in 
numerous occasions in the interview (e.g., ‘we have a teaching and 
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learning report that we put together … OP HQ put together’, as AI15 
corrected her own pronoun). 
 
6.3.4 Operating Environment 
 
The collaborative campus saw rapid growth in enrolments in the early 
years due to pent up demands for higher education in the host country, 
which then had only three highly reputable government universities 
providing limited places for its own citizens (Lee 2012). The growth was 
also attributed to the host country’s quest to become a regional 
education hub (Section App I 6.2), thereby encouraging the recruitment 
of international students.  
 
The business environment was described as ‘a hub … a developed 
economy … in the company of some very good universities’, which 
enabled ‘student and staff exchange … build some partnerships … 
global collaborations … leveraging on the advantages in this region’ 
(AI16). AI15 added that the collaborative campus has access to 
specialised expertise in Country V (e.g., logistics, finance and banking) 
for teaching and research. 
 
6.4 Current Situation, Future Prospects 
 
The year 2018 marked the renewal of the Country V collaborative 
campus agreement between the University and the OP. The ic-IBC is 
currently facing a highly competitive environment for students, as well as 
an internal aspiration to deliver on the University’s three pillars of 
teaching, research and community engagement. AI3 commented that ‘a 
lot of universities have come and gone, we managed to remain there’, 
attributing the longevity to having good OPs who understood the 
operating environment. (AI3). 
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6.4.1 TNE Performance 
 
The original vision of the University for the Country V ic-IBC was to grow 
‘to a substantial size’ (AI1). And indeed the ic-IBC did record ‘very huge 
growth’ in the early years (Section App I 6.3a). AI15 attributed this growth 
spurt to the newness of the enterprise (‘that’s very common for very 
young company initially’). This growth corresponded with the growth in 
national participation rate in tertiary education from 15% in 1990 to 45% 
in 2015, and largely attributed to ‘foreign provision’ (Garrett 2015, 9). 
 
However, the student numbers have since ‘declined’ (AI15). AI12 
commented that ‘numbers are declining significantly; so it's impacting 
sustainability’. AI12 also added that the ic-IBC is ‘struggling to find a 
niche area’ because ‘there’re so many competitors … so, we’re a very 
small, very small fish in a big sea at the moment’. The comment about 
finding a niche arose out of a comparison with the ic-IBCs in Country T 
and Country U, which are partly driven by non-financial objectives like 
national capacity-building (Section App I 5.5).  
 
Despite the current challenges in student enrolments, AI15 was upbeat 
about future prospects, saying ‘right now we are trying to climb back … 
with the new VC and there is a lot of new changes'. These changes 
include the possibility of re-locating the campus to enable better food 
provision, and accessibility for students, who are described as ‘always 
dissatisfied’ (AI19). The re-location can possibly help the ic-IBC to re-
focus on the domestic student market as a means to counter the 
declining number of international students (‘we are now looking more 
also in the local market’ – AI15). It was interesting that AI1 reported the 
‘DVCI pushed pretty hard' in a conflict with the OP on student life to get 
to a 'compromise' (referring to the quality of services at the collaborative 
campus). 
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AI12 suggested that the ic-IBC emulate the North American and 
European providers in offering ‘both undergraduate and postgraduate’ 
programs, arguing that ‘most of the money is in the postgraduate, fast-
tracked courses that are cheaper ... so we can't compete in that market 
and that's where I think we're losing out’. Additionally, AI17 commended 
University C’s ‘many more students’ in their Country V FP operation (as 
one of many university offerings under the Country V OP), where it was 
‘priced better ... the location’s better ... and they’re better at catering for 
part-time students’. There is however a resistance to the ‘supermarket’ 
model, where the OP has more prominence (Section App I 1.2; AI15) 
although ‘it’s attractive, particularly on a price point’ (A16).  
 
AI20 went further to comment that the ic-IBC ‘has an identity crisis at the 
moment … really needs to think seriously about why it’s there, and what 
it’s offering to the Country V people as well as the internationals that 
come in’. AI12 commented that the Country V ic-IBC ‘is losing its way, is 
also missing the point too’. 
 
The decline in student enrolments can be attributed to four factors. First, 
the dropping of the University’s previous OPs, which are mostly 
professional or industry associations, resulted in loss of access to the 
working adult part-time student market segment (Section App I 6.3). 
Second, the location of the campus in a suburban area, which is less 
accessible to working adult part-time students, contributed to a decline in 
these students (Section App I 6.3).  
 
Third, the establishment of another three government-funded universities 
since 2008, resulting in a total of six government-funded universities, 
increased the host country capacity to absorb many more new school 
leavers, and thus increased the competition for domestic students among 
tertiary institutions (AI2). Hence, ‘all the campuses in Country V are 
suffering at the moment’ as a result of the increased competition (AI20). 
AI12 lamented that ‘we get the ones that haven't got the grades to get 
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into the’ national universities. AI16 added that the Country V tertiary 
education market ‘is a highly regulated market, that strongly preferences 
the autonomous universities ... we are a private provider here … so there 
are parts of the market where we are just not allowed to compete in … 
and that’s challenging in terms of finding your niche and your space’. 
 
The first three factors led to the ic-IBC growing its international student 
enrolments to about 70% of the total student population in its early years 
(AI15). However, recent tightening in the host country immigration 
regulations (fourth factor) reduced the entry of international students into 
the country, and hence threatened this important source of students for 
the ic-IBC (AI1). 
 
While AI12 might have a dim view of the ic-IBC’s future prospects, AI2 is 
of the view that it is at a ‘growing’ stage, and there is 'still more for us to 
do to develop' it. AI2’s perception is probably underpinned by the 
renewed partnership agreement. The renewed ic-IBC agreement in 2018 
brought with it new University aspirations for research and community 
engagement in Country V, in addition to teaching and learning (AI15).  
 
The OP is ‘very much a teaching partner’ (AI16), ‘traditionally pathway 
colleges’ (benefiting from articulating its own diploma programs into 
partner universities’ degree programs) (AI15), and considers research as 
‘a very new area which I think we are not expert in’ (AI15). AI1 
commented that the research arm of the ic-IBC was 'harder to develop … 
because the OP as a partner, aren’t naturally aligned to research'. The 
OP’s reluctance to participate in research is not unfounded. It is 
underlined by the lack of external funding (‘the OP in Country V cannot 
access government research funding’ – AI10; ‘you don’t really make 
money out of research’ – AI15), and the question of ownership of 
research intellectual property rights resulting from research activities 
(Section App I 5.5). 
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However, AI15 acknowledged that the OP has had to ‘move with … the 
university … it has to be aligned in terms of what we are doing … that the 
university … is putting a lot of resources in research’. Moreover, there is 
a ‘master agreement that move the direction of the campus’ towards 
developing its research and community engagement capabilities. It was 
also insightful to observe that the University faced some difficulty in 
motivating the OP to conduct research and community engagement at 
the ic-IBC in the first ten years, but the agreement renewal in 2018 
provided the opportunity to formalise these activities (‘we couldn’t make 
that decision in connection with Country V; but because we just re-
negotiated our contract with the OP and … they are well aware that it’s 
part of the contract and written in the contract' – AI10) 
 
6.4.2 Partners’ Motivation 
 
The renewal of the partnership agreement in 2018 provided the 
opportunity for the University to introduce research and community 
engagement as an integral part of the ic-IBC’s deliverables. The resident 
PVC was tasked to ‘establish the research program … and to increase 
our engagement with industry, and that’s both from a research point of 
view … and also … internships, work placements, guest lectures, all of 
those things in terms of benefits of industry engagement’ (AI16). The 
University also argued that research and community engagement can 
result in much prestige, good reputation, stronger credibility and 
networks in the market for the University, and thus ultimately result in 
better IBC student enrolments  (Section App I 5.3). 
 
The underlying business activity for the ic-IBC is still teaching, a revenue-
generating business activity, as AI15 remarked ‘it (i.e., teaching) would 
certainly help with student enrollment … it will support that (i.e., 
research) because research is expensive’ – reflecting the importance of 
teaching activities in supporting other non revenue-generating activities. 
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The new agreement required the OP to commit to the University’s new 
deliverables as well. AI16 remarked that the OP is ‘fully aware of it … 
and also … aware that for the relationship to continue and to strengthen 
and flourish, it’s got to change from what it was into where we are now as 
a university’. AI15 noticed that ‘there has been a lot of conversation … of 
what University A is moving towards (i.e., the global university vision) … 
that’s why we are also moving towards saying that we have to do 
research … and then we have to go out and do industry engagement 
because … you can’t just look at the business ... we have to be looking 
at the student and the business’. 
 
AI16 is of the view that the Country V ic-IBC is ‘a partnership rather than 
one’s the master and one’s the servant in it’, but quickly added that  
‘when it’s behind closed doors, at the bargaining table, one is say … 
more than the other, I don’t know’. 
 
6.4.3 Business Delivery Model 
 
The systems and processes governing teaching and learning activities 
are mature. AI19 described the teaching infrastructure as 'very 
structured, very detailed … we know exactly … they (viz., students) are 
having a comparable experience’.  
 
Operating beyond 2018 will require the Country V ic-IBC to undertake 
research and community engagement, in addition to its teaching and 
learning responsibilities (described in Section App I 6.3c). As discussed 
in Section App I 6.4a above, the resident PVC will direct these additional 
activities on behalf of the University and the ic-IBC. A research 
committee was to be set up by July 2018 so that ‘together with University 
A, we can move it in that one direction' (AI15). 
 
Research activities require the appointment of ‘full-time teaching staff on 
board’ (AI15). AI8 explained that sessional teaching staff are usually 
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‘career lecturers and not so much researchers’. AI16 made a comparison 
with another IBC which is fully owned by its university, commenting that 
although the model was ‘high cost, but can provide funding and keeping 
good staff, to have your staff actively engaged in research and teaching 
… able to offer career paths and to have a larger academic workforce 
that’s there all the time’. 
 
6.4.4 Operating Environment 
 
AI16 commented that ‘there are always advantages and disadvantages’ 
within this environment, and ‘one of the advantages of the system here is 
what they say is what they mean, is what they do’, and ‘whilst you might 
not always be happy with that, you know what’s required’. AI9 agreed, 
remarking that 'the regulatory environment is clear and you know where 
you stand’, while AI17 noted the ‘stability of the local system’. AI16 went 
on to describe how students are ‘finger-printed in and out’ of class to 
mark their attendance, as part of the government’s stringent regulations. 
 
Country V is a country that provides opportunities for networking with top 
universities, industries and countries in the region (AI16). AI6 added that 
as ‘an English speaking country … high levels of English amongst most 
of the population … makes delivery of education somewhat easy’. 
However, about ‘70% of students here are from outside of Country V, so 
you have student language challenges’ as well (AI16). 
 
As the private education industry grew amidst lax regulations, and 
encouragement by the government to make the Country an education 
hub, the number of ‘dodgy players’ also increased (AI15). This led the 
government to institute various tightening measures. AI2 remarked that 
the government 'keep things pretty tight', and AI3 commented that ‘the 
local regulators are pretty stringent in Country V'.  
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While the tightened regulations governing the private education industry 
posed ‘a barrier to entry right now … this is good for existing players … 
they also step up the game for existing players’, ensuring the protection 
of students’ rights to quality education (AI15) and preventing students 
from ‘getting ripped off’ (AI9). However, AI3 commented that in the 
course of tightening the regulations, 'Country V companies … get the 
advantage' – a complaint about the negative effects on existing 
providers. AI2 added that 'local providers find it difficult' operating in that 
environment, while AI16 explained that some ‘parts of the market … we 
are just not allowed to compete in’ because Country V is ‘a highly 
regulated market that strongly preferences the autonomous universities’. 
 
AI1 also described the ‘vagaries of the Country V government policies’, 
‘which have hurt us a lot … limited its (ic-IBC) growth’ through ‘policies 
around international students … foreign workers'. According to AI15, this 
is a probable cause for the ic-IBC’s declining student enrolment, since its 
international students make up 70% of its student population. 
 
It was reported that research in Country V was not very developed prior 
to 2000, but grew in stature and influence since then through government 
intervention and investment (Sharma 2017). The growth was triggered by 
the ‘big bang’ effect of the set up of a National Research Foundation in 
2005/2006. The interviewee, the President of one of the Country’s top 
government universities, remarked that research in the Country’s top 
universities is already at the level of Imperial College, London. It is 
however unfortunate that private universities do not have easy access to 
government research funding (AI3). 
 
7.0 Country U TNE Transmutation (2004 to date) 
 
The University had been delivering FPs in Country U since 2004 through 
a sole OP. In this time, the OP had been collaborating with the University 
and an Australian Vocational Education and Training (VET) partner to 
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deliver degree programs and vocational programs respectively (AI2). It 
was only in 2018 that the University converted the FP arrangement to an 
ic-IBC arrangement (AI5), having collaborated in delivering FPs for 14 
years. AI5 reported that the ‘full campus status’ was awarded in May 
2018; and the operation is still ‘in infancy’ (AI2). 
 
7.1 The Initial Franchised Program (FP) 
 
The OP was originally a consulting firm which delivered programs of a 
neighbouring country’s university in Country U (AI17). It later changed 
into a private tertiary institute when UBS signed up to deliver University 
A’s degree programs (AI17). The FP arrangement was a ‘long-standing 
arrangement’ of 14 years (AI6), and ‘approaching a mature relationship’ 
(AI2). 
 
7.1.1 Rationale for the FP 
 
AI17 remarked that the drive to start FPs in Country U was ‘definitely 
revenue’. It was started during the time when University ‘academics 
would get paid extra to teach ... out of load … so there was quite an 
appetite to have programs in different locations, and to be 
entrepreneurial and … there was a direct benefit for the academic staff to 
be involved and be supportive’ (AI17). 
 
The OP on the other hand, was driven by ‘corporate business 
responsibility’ (AI6), ‘very much … about social responsibility for their 
country’ (AI7), ‘sense of society and … developing the community’ (AI1), 
and nation-building (AI3).  
  
AI1 also added that the OP obviously took into consideration the 
‘financial aspect’. AI12 attributed the success of the FP to the OP and its 
parent organisation, a large conglomerate, and commented that the OP’s 
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institute is ‘considered even better than the government university in 
Country U’. 
 
7.1.2 Business Delivery Model 
 
The FPs were delivered remotely from the University’s home country, 
with regular teaching/moderation visits conducted by the University’s 
teaching staff (AI17).  
 
The OP’s institute is reputed to be ‘one of the better campuses’ that AI13 
has worked with, and that they ‘are able to get good staff and the quality 
of students are also really better’. The ‘good’ staffing has been attributed 
to the OP’s commitment to training their staff, including sending them for 
PhD studies to comply with BSA accreditation requirements (AI13). This 
commitment is also a possible reason for the OP institute’s ‘quite strong 
… research arm’ (AI1). 
 
7.1.3 Commitment to Alumni 
 
The OP is part of a large conglomerate, ‘like Wesfarmers … they’ve 
probably got other lines of businesses that are quite profitable’, and one 
of the ‘four big diversified companies that effectively runs Country U … 
this is a very impressive group’ (AI6). Because of the size and diversity of 
the conglomerate, ‘every graduate is given the opportunity for an 
internship … within the company in Country U ... a six month internship 
after they graduate’ which has resulted in ‘a very strong alumni’ (AI12). 
This commitment reflects the conglomerate’s ‘investments in graduates 
… off their own back … to build alumni because … that also then links to 
philanthropy later on’ (AI12).  
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7.2 Conversion to an ic-IBC 
 
AI1 viewed the conversion of the FP arrangement to an ic-IBC as 
meeting a ‘strategic fit’ with the University’s global university vision, while 
AI11 saw it ‘as much about branding and about how it is presented to the 
student as much as it is about a change in the arrangement’. AI11 went 
on to explain that ‘there is no fundamental change in terms of the 
underlying financial and commercial arrangement’.  
 
AI3 clarified that 'even though we knew they’ve been a really good 
partner for many, many years, it's still not a trivial decision to allow them 
to become a campus … that’s a big deal’.  
 
7.2.1 Partners’ Motivations 
 
Apart from AI1’s view that the conversion was for a ‘strategic fit’, AI17 
remarked that the conversion was to provide the University ‘access to 
new markets … have the ability to have good access into the AA region’. 
AI13 talked about the ic-IBC as an enabler to ‘foray into that market there 
... and … attract students from the AA region to come into Country U and 
study there’. More broadly, AI10 ‘looked at the Indian Ocean as an area 
where we can have considerable strengths … and by adding in Country 
U, in fact, we have campuses all around the Indian Ocean’. 
 
AI5 is of the view that the conversion was due (‘could form a  campus’) 
because the FP arrangement had ‘done very well … with UBS and 
Humanities … for the past 14 years’. AI14 agreed that the FP 
collaboration was a ‘very solid relationship … very, very stable’, and that 
‘time builds trust’. 
 
AI12 described the OP’s motivation in setting up the FPs as ‘very much 
almost humanitarian reason for doing it … capacity building … in Country 
U’, resulting in a ‘very good driver ... politically, economically, socially … 
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very important campus stakeholder in Country U’. The ‘humanitarian’ 
drive arose out of the OP’s concern for ‘the high level of unemployment 
and low skill in Country U’. AI2 commented that 'having a local university 
as an employer … also generates wealth and enterprise’. 
 
7.2.2 Business Delivery Model 
 
As in the other ic-IBCs, the Country U ic-IBC provided the University with 
‘control of academic’ matters, and supervision via an on-site PVC, who 
was to be appointed at the time of interviews (AI1). AI1 explained that ‘all 
of the facilities, etc, marketing ... all run through that partner’. However, 
AI5 reported that the ic-IBC is not ‘allowed to call themselves a university 
in Country U ... in our branding’. 
 
AI13 argued that ‘basically it’s the same structure, same staff, there is no 
change just rebranding … its basically the OP institute … just being re-
modeled and re-branded’. AI11 added that ‘there is no fundamental 
change in terms of the underlying financial and commercial 
arrangement’. AI13 believes the University ‘has done extremely well in 
rebranding the OP institute in existing facility into University A campus’. 
 
7.2.3 Operating Environment 
 
AI3 commented that the host country government is very supportive  
when the ic-IBC holds to 'a nation-building’ aspiration. AI13 added that 
‘the government is actually looking forward to more such opportunities of 
collaboration because that’s what industry and the public wants’. 
 
AI1 explained that the University and the OP ‘work closely with the 
government’, and hence the ‘relationship with the government is clear’. 
As a result, the operation ‘appears to be less volatile ... we don’t seem to 
have the same sort of shifts as with the others’. This contributes to the 
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perception that the ic-IBC has the ‘lowest risk’ among the University’s ic-
IBCs.  
 
The market environment is characterised by a healthy demand for an 
international qualification that will give them an ‘edge over others’ in both 
Country U as well as outside the Country (AI13). Students ‘view higher 
education ... a significant investment … so a student wants to look at 
reputation and long term ... want to make sure you recover that money 
and a lot more in a quick period of time’ (AI13). 
 
AI9 reported that the conversion of the FP arrangement to an ic-IBC was 
reported to TEQSA regularly ‘in writing formally’ because it was a 
‘material change’. On receiving clearance from TEQSA, the ic-IBC 
operation ‘would come into our normal governance arrangement and 
TEQSA will look at that’ (AI5).  
 
7.2.4 Internal Inconsistency 
 
AI14 reported that the conversion was effected through the University 
buying over the OP institute campus because the University ‘prefers to 
own that campus in Country U rather than work with a partner’, and the 
University is ‘now running it’. He went on to explain that the OP ‘has no 
role’, and that the University ‘would basically operate the campus there 
as an extension of the University’s home campus', and employs its own 
administrative, marketing and other staff. These perspectives appear to 
be incongruent with the views of all the other informants who discussed 
the Country U operations and hence, AI14 is suspected to have been 
misinformed about the conversion. 
 
8.0 Country X TNE Serendipity (2017 to date) 
 
The Country X TNE operation is another serendipitous development, the 
other being Country T ic-IBC. It was the result of the pull-out of an 
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Australian university (University C) from the original partnership. While 
this opportunity provided the University with access to the MM region 
(AI20), it also positioned the University in very new, ‘unchartered territory’ 
(AI1) and crowded market (AI12), and thus expose the University to high 
risks of failure (AI1, AI9). Ultimately, University C reversed its decision to 
pull out of Country X, and continued its IBC operation with another OP. 
 
8.1 A Serendipitous Takeover 
 
The Country X OP had been the infrastructure partner of University C in 
running University C’s IBC until the University decided to pull out of the 
Country. AI7 commented that the relationship probably ‘soured’. The OP 
then started to approach various Australian universities to continue with 
the IBC (‘was looking for anyone … they got knocked back a few times 
until they went with University A' – AI17). AI17 believes that University C 
had introduced the opportunity to University A ‘initially’, and the 
University was ‘enquiring … is it something that University A would take 
on?’. AI20 asserted that the OP approached the University about taking 
over University C’s programs.  
 
The discussions for the takeover of the University C IBC ‘started … in 
about 2012’, and ‘went slow for quite some time … because it was at the 
end of the previous VC’s term’ (AI17). Even when the new VC came on-
board in 2013, the discussions were still not in earnest – until around 
2015/2016 when it ‘started pushing ahead’ under the new VC (AI17). The 
arrangement was finally concluded in 2017, and the first cohort of 
students started in January 2018 (AI9). 
 
AI9, who is a manager responsible for compliance, reported that there 
was a ‘long approval process’ for the Country X ic-IBC, because ‘Council 
wanted to know a lot about it ... and you have to convince a lot of people 
that it’s a good idea’. AI9 also commented that the University did conduct 
a market survey before starting the operation, and that ‘there's still a 
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niche for us’. AI13 was ‘sure this group (International Office) and the 
senior executive team … would basically be making informed decisions 
... pretty certain that University A perhaps also employs outside 
consultants to do this market research and then give them advice on 
what would be the better thing in getting into X … whether that would be 
worthwhile’. Subsequently, AI14 reportedly relied on the OP to conduct 
the market research for a new MBA program, and admitted that ‘I don’t 
think we looked at the market deeply enough’ since ‘we’re a little bit 
unsure at the moment whether we have the right MBA product in that 
market’.  
 
However, some other informants are of the view that the University had 
not done any market research (‘we didn’t do that for X’ – AI20), or that 
the market survey was flawed (‘we claim to do market research for these 
new locations … I don't know how accurate this market research is’ – 
AI7), or ‘whether we adhere to what the reports come out’ (AI7). These 
dissenting views might have arisen from the notion that the market in 
Country X is a ‘flooded market’ (AI12), and that the ‘very, very poor’ 
numbers (AI7) of the first intake seem to confirm that notion. AI20 also 
doubted the conduct or quality of the market survey since there was no 
attempt at ‘differentiating from the other programs there’ but ‘we decided 
to continue with the same programs University C was offering … does 
that make sense that we’re offering the exact same courses that 
University C is offering, and they’re staying there?’. 
 
University A essentially took over all the existing programs (AI20) of 
University C, and operated from the existing University C IBC premises 
(AI19). The University A ic-IBC has plans to ‘ultimately … have a free-
standing … campus where we can offer that comparable campus 
experience with full faculties’ (AI19). 
 
AI11 noted that the takeover ‘was in some ways opportunistic because 
we wouldn’t have moved into X on our own ... we would need a partner 
 709 
and an opportunity arose because another university was planning on 
leaving X ... and their partner was looking for an alternative’. It was 
insightful when AI11 went on to explain that the University ‘wouldn’t do it 
ourselves’ because of the high costs and the University’s lack of 
expertise in such a ‘completely new market for us’. AI11 added that ‘we 
would have little idea of what to do … how much to charge students, how 
to market to students, and how to deal with the local economy and so on; 
we just don’t have the expertise’. 
 
In an interesting twist, University C later ‘decided not to pull out ... they 
decided they wanted to stay in Country X but they wanted a new partner’ 
(AI20). AI17 commented that the change of heart at University C was 
probably because of the influence of the ‘new Vice Chancellor … there 
was a view that it was strategically important for University C to have a 
presence in Country X ... so … University C is in the process of 
continuing with a new OP’. The University C IBC is still ‘sharing the same 
location … and … probably going to look at a new location’ (AI17). 
 
8.2 Performance of TNE Operation 
 
The Country X ic-IBC started with its first cohort of students in January 
2018 (AI17). While AI20 commented that ‘it’s been quiet to start with as 
expected’, AI7 is of the view that ‘the numbers are very, very poor’. AI9 
thinks that the small number of students in this intake was because the 
ic-IBC was ‘still establishing our brand ... it’s going to take some time’. 
This is despite the operation having taken three years ‘to get it off the 
ground’ (AI9).  
 
The January intake was expected to be a low enrolment intake; it was 
‘not a traditionally big uptake of new students’ (AI9). ‘Country X’s high 
school finishes at a different time ... northern hemisphere ... their biggest 
intake is in September’ (AI7). AI9 remarked that ‘it is too early to tell 
really and the real litmus test is going to be around September this year 
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when we have an intake’. AI8 who will be coordinating a study unit in 
September ‘don’t know if they’ll run’. He is worried that ‘if it runs with only 
three students, it’s not going to be the top of the experience … cause the 
workshops that I run are quite interactive and you want teams to form 
and do things’. His concern is with the OP dictating that the study unit be 
run despite a small cohort - to ensure ‘their ability to graduate’. AI9 
‘predict it’s still going to be quite low (new enrolments) because we are 
still establishing our brand’. 
 
Several informants agree that the low new enrolments at this stage of the 
ic-IBC’s development were due to insufficient branding (‘we haven’t done 
enough branding’ – AI20; ‘still establishing our brand’ – AI9). AI17 
described the ic-IBC as  ‘definitely in infancy’, while AI19 commented that 
‘for green fields site, I think it would take us a while’. AI20 is of the view 
that the University ‘probably have the highest ranking of all the 
universities there …so we just need to keep driving the rankings, and 
say, we’re quality, we're quality, we’re quality, we’re global, we’re great 
programs, great research, QS, ARWU (Academic Ranking of World 
Universities) … I think that … has to be a very strong message because 
the programs we’re offering is offered in every other location as well by 
most other institutions’. AI9 agreed that ‘we have got a good brand’ but 
doubted that the brand ‘extends to the MM region’. 
 
Some other informants are more scathing in their remarks about the 
viability of the new ic-IBC. AI12 exclaimed ‘I don't know why’ the 
University entered that market, and that ‘everybody’s going ‘why?’ … 
99% of people … are against X … it’s a flooded market ... we’re unknown 
in X ... why starting up TNE when it’s a flooded market? … so, there’s 
lots of opposition’. AI12 added that the decision ‘almost smells like … 
one of the decisions of the past', where ‘agreements were signed over 
drinks and dinner, KPI-driven for numbers only’. Sharing the views of the 
schools, AI7 related that ‘we were promised very high numbers from the 
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partner, that has not eventuated ... a lot of the schools turning round and 
saying ‘I told you so; I told you so’’. 
 
AI20 compared the Country X ic-IBC with the Country V ic-IBC, and 
remarked that it ‘really needs to establish what is the identity … you can’t 
just be another campus there’. AI12 also made the same comparison, 
identifying ‘how we position ourselves on what is the value’ of the ic-
IBC’s deliverables in Country X. 
 
8.3 Partners’ Motivations 
 
AI1 commented that the Country X ic-IBC was 'much more strategic' 
because of focus on the MM region, but also ‘opportunistic’ (referring to 
the serendipitous circumstances leading to the start up) for the 
University. AI3 agreed that ‘it looks like a strategic opportunity’. It 
provided a ‘gateway for us to attract students from non-traditional 
markets ... and also a place where students who may not qualify for a 
visa for Australia, could get a visa for that location’ (AI17). In addition, the 
location provided the University ‘access to the AA region’ (AI2).  
 
The University’s rationale for being in Country X was also noted to be 
‘actually the research, … the potential research funding’, being able to 
network with ‘those corporations that are based in X who are potential 
research partners’, and to have a location that is a ‘half-way link between 
Europe and Australia’ (AI19). Although research has been incorporated 
in the relationship, AI1 expects some resistance from the OP 'similar in X 
(to Country V)'. 
 
Student mobility was another reported motivation of the University in 
starting the ic-IBC in Country X. AI7 (an experienced TNE manager who 
does not have Strategic responsibilities) reported that, despite ‘lots of 
opposition … at the end of the day, the VC wanted it … so, we moved 
with it … student mobility … I think that was the VC’s reason’.  
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There were some staff who could not understand why the University 
would agree to operate TNE in a crowded market. This was reported by 
AI12 that ‘quite a few of us … surprised because of everything we had 
gone through to reduce some number of partners, … financially a good 
decision to get rid of those that couldn't meet student number quotas, 
that weren't meeting in terms of performance and quality, to then have 
the University sign up with X, it’s like, really?'. 
 
There was also concern that, despite the market being ‘an unknown ... 
very very new, … financially, (it was) not a good decision’, and that 
‘we've had some ethical dilemmas … (it) appears to have come about 
because of the relationship … our new PVCI already had with the senior 
people running that … institute’, and ‘based not on the market research’ 
(AI12). AI12, an academic,  concluded that ‘clearly I think it's a political 
decision that outweighs the financial value at this point in time ... maybe 
it's a longer term strategy that the rest of us are missing’. 
 
The OP passed muster because ‘they’re considered to be stable’ (AI14). 
AI1 believes that the OP is in the collaboration because of ‘money, profile 
and reach’; the OP is already ‘very active in the AA region, which is good 
for us’. It was reported by several informants that the financial 
arrangement was tipped in the OP’s favour, e.g., ‘the financial model is 
certainly, from what I understand, is in favor of X and not us … so it's 
actually costing us’ (AI12). AI20 rued that the University ‘don't get much 
… it is a very, very small percentage; these are our courses … and they 
are paying the business partner, not us ... so, in that sense, at what cost 
are we selling University A brand, or are we under-selling it?’. But the low 
pricing is possibly a strategy to penetrate the new market (AI20).  
 
There is a possibility that the operation might become a burden to the 
University. AI12 reported that ‘I've heard it said that … the financials … 
works very much in the OP's favour; that in a statement that's been 
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floating around, that's a big mistake that we will financially be carrying 
around for the next 20 years’. Further, AI9 recognised that ‘financial is a 
big part of … risk’ of operating in ‘X … quite a different place’. 
 
8.4 Business Delivery Model 
  
The business delivery model at Country X is similar to the ic-IBCs of 
Countries T, V and U, except that when the University is awarded the 
licence to operate the IBC, the approving authority also ‘give you an 
entity as well which is a corporate vehicle which you can use to hire 
people’ (AI9).  
 
Similar to the other ic-IBCs, it is an asset-light model where ‘other people 
invest in infrastructure and the people, and we provide the intellectual 
property and the academic integrity and quality as well’ (AI11). AI17 
clarified that ‘the partner is in-charge of infrastructure, buildings, hiring of 
suitably qualified staff … and the University is responsible for QA, and 
quality control, appointment of lecturers, and all academic matters and 
affairs’. AI10 confirmed that ‘a requirement of the X government (is) that 
you needed to have an infrastructure partner’. 
 
AI7 noted that ‘there is a bit of friction there (with the OP), in finetuning 
units … because X’s gone completely different study periods to the 
others’. ‘That’s a bit of a bugbear with the unit controllers (or unit 
coordinators) because they have to write separate unit outlines for the 
different study periods ... then, we have to make sure that all the 
assessments, the tests, mid-semester tests are written as well’ (AI7). 
Further, ‘the schools are so stretched as it is now, because you can’t 
have a push for research as well as be … stretched … because the 
admin involved for the unit controller (or unit coordinator) is phenomenal’ 
(AI7). 
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AI7 thinks that these complications could have been better handled if the 
University decision-makers have paid ‘enough attention’ and listened ‘to 
people who are in the know’, e.g., on the topic of ‘study periods’. AI7 also 
remarked that ‘we’re happy to sign off contracts where we have these 
(senior decision-makers at the faculties) saying we’ll go ahead with it 
without asking relevant questions … drill down … how are we going to 
resource this?’. 
 
The additional work in supporting the ic-IBC’s dissimilar teaching periods 
was unwelcome especially when the ‘promised very high numbers from 
the partner … has not eventuated’ (AI7). AI7 articulated the perception 
that the University ‘just wanted to see a branch campus open, and … be 
associated with it, and now it is left to the admin staff to clean it up’, but 
also acknowledged that since ‘we’re in X for 20 years … we have to 
make it work’. 
  
8.5 Operating Environment 
 
AI11 noted that Country X is a ‘completely new market for us’. There are 
Australian universities there but ‘they are not particularly big’ (AI20). This 
is in contrast to the European brands which are ‘very strong’, and Asian 
universities that are ‘a lot cheaper’ (AI9). 
 
Country X’s regulatory environment has been described as ‘clear and 
you know where you stand … the government makes it very clear, these 
are the rules, this is how you register, this is what you will be classed as 
when you register, this is what we are going to do annually … they are 
very clear, very prescriptive’ (AI9). AI19 further noted that the regulatory 
environment ‘suits TNE, and they’re looking to expand ... they have 
international student markets’. 
 
On the other hand, the operating environment ‘could be a challenge in 
particular ways ... around the law … around a whole range of different 
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social issues and how it affects us’ (AI2). As an example, AI17 identified 
cultural and social limitations prescribed by the authorities in Country X, 
because the Country is ‘one of the more challenging locations … for any 
university ... because … come through as different to Australia ... all the 
support for LGBT and stuff like that’. AI19 agreed, saying that ‘one of the 
issues that we have in most of the locations is around homosexuality … 
for University A ethics and for University A policies and University A 
procedures’. 
 
To date, the University is ‘reasonably comfortable at the moment ... we 
have to see, we have to try it out’ because the ‘political environment … 
legislative frameworks, the business environment, the political social 
environment all have a bearing on what you can or can’t do' (AI2). AI17 
added that ‘you contextualise what you do’. 
 
9.0 There is Still Space for FPs (2001 to date) 
 
The University’s preference for ic-IBCs seems to be crowding out FPs. 
AI3 explained that FPs are now avoided ‘from a quality perspective, and 
certainly from a branding perspective’. This perception is only partially 
true with respect to Business programs – due to the quality imposts of 
the BSA accreditation on the UBS (AI13). The ic-IBCs are considered ‘a 
lot less risky’ because of the ‘greater control’ over academic quality, and 
hence we would expect to see ‘not too many partnerships with 
universities in terms of courses (i.e., limited range of FPs)’ (AI13).  
 
AI3 also rued the fact that FPs posed ‘a much higher risk’ as a result of 
the OP having to ‘deal with … 25 - 30 different sets of universities’. AI11 
added that ‘when you have a limited range of programs, that is not a 
campus’. While the preference is for ic-IBCs, the University still uses a 
range of ‘different models’ like ‘campuses, articulation, onshore, offshore 
… to diversify its risk’ (AI4). 
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AI14 argued that ‘franchising went out of favour with most universities … 
particularly Australian universities because it was just a dangerous risky 
game’, quoting the experience of ‘the University of New South Wales … 
they lost an awful lot of money’ in their aborted Singapore campus. 
However, AI14 also noted that ‘you will still find that, for example, many 
British universities franchised their units in … Singapore, in a way that 
Australian universities tend not to’, and quoted an Australian exception, 
‘Murdoch (which) is in an arrangement with Kaplan’. 
 
9.1 University Motivation for FPs 
 
AI11 is of the view that ‘there is space for them (FPs)’, but that these do 
not constitute ‘a major part of what we do … now’. Some of these FPs 
‘are important’, e.g., the ‘mature’ YSR FP arrangement ‘is important … 
very much because of the community-building type status of that 
particular arrangement rather than commercial … and I don’t think it is a 
big supplier of students here, into Australia ... it is sort of an unusual 
arrangement’ (AI11). The OP’s motivation for delivering these FPs is for 
‘upskilling’ staff, while for the University, they are helpful in ‘cross-selling’ 
the University’s ‘leadership programs’ (AI2). In the case of a ‘joint PhD’ 
program with a prestigious technology institute of Country Q, the 
University’s motivation is strategic (AI13). 
 
The WSL FP arrangement is a faculty-level collaboration that is regulated 
through the central International Office (UIO) (AI5). AI17 noted that this 
collaboration provided the University ‘access to a lot of … Country W 
students … where you wouldn’t normally … where if University A … 
didn’t have a presence in Country W, it would slip’. AI17 clarified that the 
FP’s ‘location has to be strategic’ to access large student cohorts. 
 
In Country O, the collaborations are a combination of articulation and 
TNE delivery, where upon graduation, ‘they get a Bachelor’s degree from 
their university and a Bachelor’s degree from our university’ (AI19). 
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Although the University ‘don’t make much money … it brings students 
here, to Australia’ (AI11). 
 
9.2 The FP Delivery Model 
 
Some staff of the University referred to FPs as ‘partnerships’ (AI11), 
distinguishing them from the ic-IBCs which are referred as ‘campuses’ 
(AI7). FPs were also known as ‘twinning programs … but when you look 
at it really objectively, it’s very similar to the franchise model but it isn’t a 
franchise agreement ... (where a) franchise agreement … really labels a 
franchisee, franchisor, this is not like that’ (AI9). AI11 concluded that 
‘effectively in a business sense, they are a form of franchise’, or 
traditionally known as the business format franchise, as discussed in 
Section 2.5.3. 
 
In the past, there is really no one FP delivery model (‘franchised 
programs … each model is different … so, it’s really hard to put them all 
in one basket, and say this is how they operated, and this is good and 
that was bad’ – AI20). While it was clearly the responsibility of the OP to 
‘do all the marketing; they hire all the local staff’ (AI14), AI7 explained 
that the FPs varied mainly in terms of the roles and responsibilities of the 
OPs in areas like admissions, teaching and marking of assessments. 
They also varied in the mode of payment of royalties (AI20). There was 
even variation between faculties, e.g., the extent of offshore teaching by 
faculty staff (AI20). There seems to be a tacit concurrence within the 
University ‘to allow them (i.e., the OPs) to run them at their way’ (AI20). 
This concurrence might have prompted AI10 to describe the FP model as 
‘largely hands-off’ because ‘you are giving control over your IP largely to 
a different operator’.  
 
AI20 explained that, in the past four years, the FPs that the University 
still runs have been transitioned to be ‘conformed … more to University A 
policy and procedures’, and the processes governing FPs have been 
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changed, including ‘getting students to enrol directly with us, to pay 
directly to us’. On offshore teaching visits, AI20 shared how ‘because you 
had UBS that had a different model where they weren't sending staff ... it 
was more efficient … economically … we (i.e., the Faculty of Humanities) 
were advised to try and cut back on the teaching visits’. AI20 concluded 
that ‘now those offshore programs look very similar to a campus’. 
 
Following AI20’s comments about FPs looking very similar to ic-IBCs, it 
was interesting to note AI11’s explanation about how the Country U FP 
(UCT) was converted into an ic-IBC (UCM) – ‘UCT has been a long-
standing arrangement and it’s been converted from … something that is 
delivered in the name of the partner to something that is now regarded 
as a University A campus … it’s as much about branding and about how 
it is presented to the student as much as it is about a change in the 
arrangement … there is no fundamental change in terms of the 
underlying financial and commercial arrangement really … in many 
sense’. Similarly, AI13 said that ‘basically it’s the same structure, same 
staff, there is no change just rebranding … its basically UCT, it’s just 
being re-modeled and re-branded’. 
 
It was quite surprising to hear AI6 report that the University ‘developed 
strategic plans for each of those campuses (i.e., ic-IBCs) ... (but) we 
don’t have strategic plans for these (i.e., FPs) because they are 
outsourced models’. AI6 clarified that ‘but for each of these, they’ve 
become part of a bigger machine (i.e., the University’s global university 
vision); and that is a benefit … becomes more sustainable in a way’, 
reflecting the hope that the University’s ic-IBCs will cross-subsidise the 
FPs. AI11 added the hope that ‘we can link them into a campus 
arrangement’ in the future, as in AI5’s view, ‘perhaps in the fullness of 
time, they might show the promise to become more of an IBC like in 
Country U’. 
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9.3 Challenges in Delivering FPs 
 
Although somewhat below the radar, FPs are not immune to challenges 
arising from regulatory and cultural differences, and operational 
weaknesses. In fact, FPs ‘create potentials for quality issues’. AI20 
related how the Country Y authorities insisted that student fees must be 
paid to the host country partner, despite a TEQSA requirement for fees 
to be paid directly to the University. In order to operate in Country Y, the 
University had to explain the anomaly to TEQSA and yield to the local 
regulations. 
 
AI7 also reported difficulties encountered in managing the WSL FP, that 
are of a cultural nature. These relate to students turning up late and 
enrolling late, which required the back-dating of applications, resulting in 
‘a cost factor, time factor and people get frustrated’. AI7 and her team 
had to be more proactive by alerting students of deadline well ahead of 
time in an effort to ‘reduce the incidences … and try and change that 
culture’. The team also ‘had a big issue with … plagiarism … they didn’t 
see it as plagiarism’, and ‘so a lot of effort was put in place from 
University A to try and change … the whole notion of plagiarism’. 
 
AI10 remarked that FPs are ‘largely hands-off’, and while ‘so to some 
degree, the franchisee is taking the risk in terms of student recruitment, 
taking the risk in terms of most of the costs, is taking the risks certainly in 
terms of capital investments, ... there are however, significant risks … 
because you are outsourcing all of these aspects but also you are giving 
control over your IP largely to a different operator’. He explained that 
there are risks in the ‘operator not delivering your IP properly, the risk of 
them using staff that are not properly equipped to deliver the IP, the risk 
that they won’t deliver the IP in the style that you would want it delivered 
because obviously their costs, space and methods of delivery are not 
yours poses significant risks to the university in as much as it can 
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damage the brand … because the degrees are being marketed … as 
University A degrees’. 
 
9.4 Termination of FPs 
 
The consensus on the reasons for FP terminations over the years has 
been poor quality students admitted (AI13), poor ‘quality facilities … 
(and) teaching staff’ (AI6), poor quality students and academic results 
(AI6), ‘issues with strategic alignment and quality’ (AI5), and ‘viability in 
terms of numbers of students, and … quality of students’ (AI4). AI14 
noted that the ‘major problem from University A’s perspective is that 
franchised arrangements create potentials for quality issues’, and are 
hence ‘avoided’ (AI3).  
 
More recently, with the ‘University … so focused on rankings’ (AI12), 
AI11 reported that ‘as University A has become more highly ranked and 
is trying to grow its reputation, locally and globally’, the University is 
moving away from FPs, and towards ic-IBCs.  
 
When asked if OPs were incapable of meeting the University’s 
expectations, AI11 disagreed, and explained that ‘they absolutely can 
and have in the case of UCT ... we put a lot of focus around the 
consistency of student experience around the world’. However, if OPs 
continuously ignore ‘red flags’ in reviews such as student satisfaction 
surveys, and there is no ‘buy-in’ to improve, ‘you’ve got to terminate’ 
(AI9). Such was the situation in Country T when the University decided to 
let lapse the TMC FP because it was a ‘poor quality provider’ (AI12), 
despite it contributing ‘a major stream of students (to the home campus) 
for a long, long time … (and) very commercially successful’ (AI3). AI13 
added that TMC’s OP did not meet the new BSA accreditation 
requirements as it was a ‘small institute’; this might be a misinformation 
on AI13’s part because the University continues to operate FPs with 
small institutions such as WSL. 
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AI1 reported that terminations ‘create some difficult relationships … limits 
your opportunities’, quoting the experience in Country T where the 
University could not re-start any TNE operation for many years after, due 
to the reputational impact of the termination. AI1 also added that 
‘teachouts (are) built into costs’ at the contract negotiation stage. 
 
10.0 University A TNE Value Chain Activities 
 
The University has had a ‘long history working with partners’ (AI19), and 
as a result, have developed very comprehensive TNE management and 
monitoring policies and processes (‘well-developed processes’ – AI19), 
in compliance with University A policies on teaching and learning, 
research, and community engagement  (AI5). These comprehensive 
(‘large number’ of processes – AI5) value chain activities were a far cry 
from the rudimentary processes of the University’s early TNE years, 
which were on retrospect, ‘not at appropriate standards’ (AI6, Section 
App I 1.0). Unsurprisingly, the rather lax processes of the early years 
contributed to low quality students admitted with ‘sceptical entry’ 
qualifications and producing ‘woeful’ pass rates (AI13), which impacted 
the University’s reputation (AI2, AI19). 
 
The early TNE years were characterised by ‘basically outsourcing 
something ... providing IP through the programs that are being taught … 
moderating assessments’, which translate into the University having ‘a 
little less control’ and ‘assuming more risk’ (AI6). Its current 
comprehensive value chain activities are now geared to ensure delivery 
at ‘comparable experience offshore’ (AI19) and deliver on the 
University’s three roles of ‘community engagement, research and 
teaching ... so it will be fully-fledged university … rather than … if it’s just 
teaching then that’s really not a campus’ (AI10). AI19 further clarified that 
‘our model now is that we develop content, we control content, we 
moderate content and quality from Australia, … we control all academic 
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matters … they control delivery’. These commitments necessarily imply 
that the University’s preference is for ic-IBCs, rather than FPs. 
 
One would think that the policies and processes governing ic-IBCs and 
FPs would be patently different. However, AI7 claimed that ‘the same 
labour is involved ... operationally, we’re still providing the same thing, 
same functionality regardless’. AI19 added that ‘in fact, a lot of our 
operations are really franchised agreements ... they’re not branch 
campuses in the true sense of what the industry understands them ... we 
call them branch campuses, but … we represent them to our accrediting 
bodies actually as franchised arrangements ... (except for TSW which ‘is 
a little bit different because it’s a joint-venture’) so from a franchising 
perspective, that’s actually what they are’. This Section will examine the 
value chain activities involved in both ic-IBCs and FPs, and attempt to 
identify the differences. 
 
10.1 Starting Up 
 
In the past, the initiation of TNE operations was undertaken mostly by the 
schools, and especially by the highly entrepreneurial UBS (AI7). Citing 
other industries that go offshore, AI14 described how ‘businesses get 
involved in joint-ventures; some businesses go over … partly like 
University A and set up a kind of a green field site from scratch ... other 
universities might franchise its product into that market ... in many ways, 
international education operates like many other businesses, asking 
‘How can we expand our business globally? What models are available 
to us, and which models suits us best, given our strategic, mission and 
so on?’. 
 
AI18 described the current process of approval for new TNE operations 
as being centralised. The initiation is now ‘done by the DVCI’s office … 
done centrally ... it’s become much more central’. Schools ‘might put 
forward a recommendation of an opportunity, but it will have to go 
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through the faculty … it would be determined by central’. The central 
team will ‘have to do their due diligence … that it’s strategic, it’s viable, 
and … make sure you have safeguards … a viable relationship … 
organisations and institutions that have come forward … provide 
evidence of what they’ve done … show what they have achieved with 
other partners’.  
 
The rationale for the centralisation of the approval process is because 
the central team, consisting of specialists in strategy, finance, operations, 
risk management, ‘are responsible for making the right choices, and 
committing to strategic and financial … and making sure all the due 
diligence … contracts … that that’s absolutely critical ... that they do 
make the right decisions on behalf of the University’ (AI18). It is also 
critical that there is buy-in from senior management, and that decisions 
are clearly and consistently communicated to all involved (‘it makes a 
huge difference when you’ve got buy-in from the very top; from the Vice-
Chancellor down … and  … really, consistently telling the message to all 
staff’ – AI9).  
 
The approval process, which can take up to 18 months (AI1),  involves 
developing a comprehensive business plan that includes ‘understanding 
the market, understanding the risks, the return … how much we are 
going to gain or lose. ... an exit strategy if we have to go … contracts, so 
all the legal stuff and also understanding who does what’ (AI4).  
 
While the centralisation above applies to all campus arrangements, there 
is evidence that some existing FPs might have been set up via 
memoranda of understanding between the Faculty and the OP. AI13 
mentioned one such FP, where ‘joint PhD programs that we have got 
with Country Q’s Technology University partner … is still through MOUs’. 
AI5 reported that WSL, which commenced in 2001, 'operates at a faculty 
level; not at a uni-to-uni level’. It is likely that these TNE operations are 
legacy operations that were set up prior to the centralisation of TNE 
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approvals. This is evidenced by AI20’s description of TEQSA’s 
involvement in the more recent 2006 set up of the YSR FP operation. 
 
In retrospect, AI20 is of the view that the University needs to ‘One, be 
proactive; two, do your research; three, make sure that you understand 
all the local drivers like government policy, financial, economic, all those 
things that could impact the success of the program, the competitive 
landscape, really … do that assessment first ... and then, before you 
make the announcements, make sure that you progress the process; 
you’ve got a contract; you’ve got government approval ... and then, 
you’ve got an implementation plan .. so, you’ve mapped out how it’s 
going to work ... and of course, after it’s been set up, then you need to do 
your regular checks’. 
 
10.2 Contractual Agreements 
 
All of the University’s TNE operations are specified in contractual 
agreements (AI19). AI6 reported that ‘the key thing is mutually beneficial 
and that’s where contract managers come to a point where at the end of 
the day, everyone … has to leave happy with the contract that they have 
got’. For the University, the objective of the contract is to ensure that 
‘minimum standards are adhered to’ (AI19). It is imperative that OPs 
‘understand the way we work and fit within that … we are not dictators 
but it is University A’ (AI3). 
 
10.2.1 Improvement in the University’s TNE Contracts 
 
AI6 remarked that previous contracts have been found wanting 
(‘historically it’s been one of our weaknesses … contracts … have … 
been developed in isolation of each other, in isolation of our strategies ... 
it was abit fragmented’). The content of current contracts have been 
updated within the last 12 months, and have benefited from the 
University having ‘negotiated a lot of contracts’ in the past. They are now 
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considered more comprehensive and consistent ‘in what we asked for’. 
This includes the requirement for ‘minimum numbers that the TNE (i.e., 
the OP) pays for irrespective of how many (students) are actually 
enrolled’ (AI12).  
 
It would also seem that the University ‘has gotten better at working out 
who they want to be in partnerships with and doing the contracts around 
that  … I think we’re probably naive around 10 years ago … whereas I 
think now they are much more mature in terms of their approach around 
that’ (AI4). 
 
10.2.2 Comprehensiveness of TNE Contracts 
 
These comprehensive contracts cover detailed requirements ‘like the 
number of computers per student in student labs … the internet 
connectivity, the level of support that students get … the software … 
those things are all dictated and all defined’ (AI19). AI4 added that 
monitoring processes and review points are ‘built into the contract’, while 
AI5 explained that these ‘contracts have a period built into them and 
review provisions and they have KPIs (key performance indicators) … 
research … and provisions … if certain things happen for them to … 
revisit’ the KPIs.  
 
AI7 seems to disagree with the perception that these contracts are 
comprehensive, when she reported that TNE processes are ‘not in any 
contract’, and since ‘each contract is different … we try to align where we 
can’ based on her team’s extensive TNE experience. AI7’s remarks 
indicate that detailed operational processes might not be codified within 
these TNE contracts. 
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10.2.3 Duration of TNE Contracts 
 
It seems that newer contracts are signed for very long periods, e.g., 10 
years (AI1) or 20 years (AI12). AI1 commented that ‘even if we were in a 
contract that’s 10 years long, we’re really looking at 20, 50 years ahead’, 
reflecting the University’s long-term view of TNE participation. On which 
party would lose most in the event of a termination, AI1 is of the view that 
both would lose equally because these collaborations are ‘long-term’ in 
nature. 
 
AI5 is of the view that these contracts are very comprehensive and do 
not require re-visiting; that most disagreements arise from ‘the issue of 
levels of enrolments’. AI17’s experience with ‘managing these contracts 
is the only time we looked at the contract is when there’s a problem … 
it’s usually because we’re trying to hold the partner responsible for their 
end of the bargain’. 
 
10.2.4 Negotiating Power or Relationship? 
 
AI17 is of the view that ‘the University holds a lot of power over the 
partner’ because ‘the initial contract … it’s drafted by the University’. The 
University’s negotiating edge over its OPs also extend to contract 
renewals, as AI4 explained : that the VCS OP ‘has been interesting over 
the years ... they've pushed back a fair bit ... there's sort of a new 
contract … there's been some push back by the University on that 
because I think the University is more mature in its processes around 
managing those things’. 
 
But ‘once the operations commence, then I think the partner wields a bit 
more power in terms of making amendments or deeds of variation to the 
contract’ (AI17). AI17 went on to explain that the OP usually ‘put very 
optimistic figures in those projections to lure the University’ into the 
arrangement, which includes ‘a financial plan with estimated student 
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numbers’. However, ‘after the operation commences, then the partner 
has the potential to tell the University that they’re not able to get those 
student numbers because of certain barriers that the University’s putting 
up in terms of the admissions standards or stuff about … timetables or 
study periods’. More specifically, AI14 thinks that ‘our partner there (i.e., 
the OP of the recently started XCD operation) can be a little bit over 
confident … but I think they will learn if they have not learnt already that 
it’s not going to be a market where you can move in and suddenly 
acquire a thousand students’. 
 
AI19 similarly believes that the University has greater bargaining power, 
by virtue of its ‘not equal’ position as the principal ‘contracting a service 
provider’ in a ‘sub-contract arrangement’ and that ‘all of the academic 
control sits here (i.e., University A home campus)’. This ‘not equal’ 
superiority of the University extends to its participation in the TSW ic-IBC, 
a ‘50-50 joint-venture enterprise’. However, AI19 believes that after ‘we 
get the contract signed … we agree on all of the contractual terms, and 
then, we put the contract aside and its about our relationship’. AI19 
added that ‘if we are going back to contract terms and conditions, and 
saying, ‘You have to do this because of this’, and that’s either party ... 
then, we’ve got our relationship wrong’.  
 
The success of the TNE arrangement relies on ‘a lot of trust and respect’ 
(AI19). AI6 expanded on this further, saying ‘you have to be very 
respectful of their (OPs) ambitions and their vision … what you’re really 
doing is trying to augment the journey or enhance the journey that they’re 
on by supporting where they want to go, and aligning it to your own 
strategy … so, the key thing is mutually beneficial and that’s where 
contract negotiations come to a point where at the end of the day 
everyone leaves … happy with the contracts that they have got’. Further, 
referring to conflict resolution, AI6 added that ‘it’s always a conversation 
… you raise issues; you work through those … and you negotiate the 
outcomes’. 
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10.3 University Infrastructure 
 
To operate offshore, TNE programs require physical infrastructure such 
as classrooms, laboratories and libraries (AI11). In fact, these ‘bricks and 
mortar … are a huge part’ of TNE operations (AI4). And indeed, ‘the cost 
of the investment and infrastructure ... that’s not a small amount either’ 
(AI11).  
 
But more specifically, the success of the TNE operation hinge 
substantially on ‘quality facilities in the right locations’, and the TSW 
location was quoted as an example of the ‘best place to have a 
university’ (AI6). On the other hand, the University is considering moving 
the VCS campus as ‘it’s not an ideal location for it’ (AI6). This campus 
move was mooted in ‘working group meetings’ (AI19), responding to 
student dissatisfactions around ‘the actual location, the access to food 
and beverages’ which were picked up from ‘annual reviews … of KPIs … 
on facilities’ (AI9).  
 
Interestingly, when the University took over the Country X TNE 
operation, the OP was looking for a new university partner to make use 
of its ‘communication facilities’ that were invested while in partnership 
with the previous university partner – a case of a solution looking for a 
problem? (WS 2018). 
 
10.3.1 Components of University Infrastructure 
 
The amount of investment in infrastructure is obviously less for FPs 
compared to IBCs (‘As we moved to a campus arrangement, we require 
a lot more from our partner than we would do if we’re just a … one or two 
courses delivered by a partner in a non-campus arrangement’ – AI11). 
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Operating FPs within OPs’ own infrastructure implies the use of the OPs’ 
own existing infrastructure, perhaps with some modifications to meet the 
requirements of each franchised program. This contrasts with the 
operation of an IBC (and in the case of University A, an c-IBC), where 
the campus is custom-designed such that ‘once you walk into a building, 
it should look exactly the same as University A’ (AI7). AI6 further 
described ‘each of the different campuses have … (University A) look 
and feel ... so, if you walked into the XCD campus, you will feel like 
you’ve just walked into Building 409 or 407 ... and the branding is the 
same; the signage is the same; the furniture is the same ... you feel like 
you’re in University A … designed to look like that’.  
 
This detailed attention to ensure a University A look and feel is part of the 
University’s global university vision of providing ‘comparable … 
University standard facilities’ (AI1), ‘comparable campus experience’, 
and the ‘same level of satisfaction … the same level of experience’ 
(AI19), benchmarks that are inherent in TEQSA requirements (Section 
App I 5.2e). AI1 did acknowledge that these campuses were ‘never going 
to be as big as here (home campus)’. Similarly AI15, who operates in 
one of the campuses, commented that the campus that she works in is ‘a 
smaller scale’ version of the home campus. 
 
Apart from the look and feel, and furnishings, the TNE infrastructure 
includes ‘land’ (AI10, AI15), ‘buildings’ (AI4, AI17), ‘classrooms and labs’ 
(AI1), ‘IT, internet access, and access to library databases’ (AI11), and 
computer software (AI19). The facilities might be owned or they might be 
leased (AI1). In all ic-IBC cases, the University’s aspiration is to operate 
out of stand-alone facilities (e.g., TSW, VCS and UCM). To this end, the 
new XCD operation which currently operates out of a floor of a shared 
building, will be moved into ‘a free-standing Country X University A 
campus where we can offer that comparable campus experience with full 
faculties in there as you would set up here … that is our ultimate aim’ 
(AI19). 
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TNE infrastructure also includes ‘research infrastructure’, which only a 
small number of OPs can appreciate and value, e.g., the OP of TSW, 
which is ‘not a company that’s out for money and … they want to build 
research infrastructure; they want to be enhancing the possibility of 
research … so they see it as a benefit’. (AI10). AI10 continued that the 
University might need to ‘put resources into Countries V, X and U to get 
the partners to see that ... but over time if we can show the benefits of 
research, then obviously that will be built into the financial model’. This 
research aspiration is clearly not an impost on FP business delivery 
models, as these operations are highly focussed on teaching – except in 
the Country Q joint PhD operation (AI13). 
 
These detailed requirements are clearly defined in the TNE contracts, as 
AI19 explained ‘things like the number of computers per student in 
student labs – that’s all defined in our contract … the internet 
connectivity, the level of support that students get ... the software 
required – those things are all dictated and all defined in our contracts’. 
AI1 added that ‘we’ve got to have University A standard facilities; so 
whether it’s classrooms, laboratories ... that’s just written into the 
contract’. 
 
10.3.2 University Preference for Asset-light Business Delivery Model 
 
Contrasting the University’s ic-IBCs to its own regional Australian 
campus, AI2 commented that the University has ‘no responsibility for 
infrastructure’ in the operation of ic-IBCs. In fact, AI14 remarked that it is 
‘not possible’ for the University to provide TNE infrastructure offshore. 
AI11 clarified that ‘our model is that other people invest in infrastructure 
and the people, and we provide the intellectual property and the 
academic integrity and quality as well’. This is preferred because it is ‘a 
less expensive option’, which comes with a small cost, i.e., ‘you’re 
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basically giving your brand or your name, but the infrastructure is 
established with the local’ OP (AI14).  
 
Further, ‘having a branch campus is risky because you own the equity’ 
(AI13). ‘We are not only comfortable but that’s the model (asset light 
model) that we preferred to go with because we don’t want to take the 
risk of putting in capital but we want to get the benefits of having what we 
call a campus’ (AI10). The leveraging off the OP’s facilities ‘removed the 
risk of capital investment... maintenance... don't need to lease ... building 
… but what you're giving up as a result of that is a slice of your revenue’ 
for the University (AI6). This leveraging for both FPs and ic-IBCs reflects 
a risk averse approach towards offshore infrastructure investments on 
the part of the University. 
 
AI1 explained that ‘they (OP) give us the vehicle to be present in a 
market … earning significant amounts of income, … able to develop 
research in those areas, increasing our profile’. The asset-light model 
applies to both FPs as well as ic-IBC, where the University ‘don't really 
own them, but we are operating in partnership with someone’ (AI6), 
except in the case of TSW, where the University has some equity 
(Section App I 2.5). The campus is part of brand-building, which ‘assist(s) 
in building our reputational capital in those regions which improves our 
rankings on the QS and THE surveys ... which again lifts our status 
globally which in return stimulates student demand, both onshore 
international and at those campus locations and the ones that are 
outsourced’ (AI6). 
 
10.3.3 OP Motivation for Infrastructure Investment 
 
Most physical resources (AI1), including ‘locations’ and ‘hard 
infrastructure’ (AI19) are invested by the OP as an ‘infrastructure 
provider’ (AI5), for both FPs and ic-IBCs. For most for-profit OPs, the 
reward is in sharing the revenue from teaching and providing services to 
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students (AI6, AI19). Some OPs also have additional interests in 
capacity-building, e.g., TSW and UCM, where the former is a State 
Government with interests in regional development (AI6, AI8), while the 
latter is a large conglomerate that has clear corporate social 
responsibilities in alleviating poverty (AI19). AI12 likens the model to a 
hotel management model, where the brand owner, Trump lends its name 
to the infrastructure owner, and gets paid for the use of the name. AI9 
uses the Hyatt example of how the brand owner has to ‘make sure the 
franchisee follow the standards’. 
 
Some facilities cost a lot more than others, e.g., ‘labs and the facilities … 
depending on the engineering’ for Engineering programs in Countries T 
and X (AI6). However, ‘the rewards are high … and at a particular price 
point of course … engineers pay more than you might pay for an 
accounting program’ (AI6).  
 
The physical infrastructure of TNE, especially custom-designed ic-IBCs 
are very costly investments (AI6, AI11, AI14). Therefore, an OP will 
necessarily have to be ‘a partner of substance. ... an organisation with 
resources, and ... of substance’ (AI1). AI5 added that ‘a lot of universities 
have come and gone, we managed to remain there, and this really 
requires your infrastructure provider … to actually be really smart’. 
 
10.4 Academic Administration 
 
The University’s academic administration infrastructure for TNE has 
traditionally been concentrated in UBS (under the Faculty of Commerce 
and Law) because the majority of TNE programs delivered came from 
UBS (AI3). The other faculties had very small numbers of offshore TNE 
students (AI5). UBS had an international office (UBSI) that acted as a 
‘post office’ between the schools that offered the TNE study units and the 
TNE OP (AI7). It’s function was TNE administration, quality assurance 
and ensuring compliance to bring about risk reduction, and also oversight 
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of academic delivery (AI20). At one time, the UBSI had in excess of 40 
staff to manage the more than 31 TNE operations, and there was hardly 
any lull period in the management of TNE operations at the UBSI (AI7). 
 
10.4.1 The Hub-and-spokes TNE Administration Model 
 
With the move towards a global university vision, the University 
restructured its TNE academic administration into what has been known 
as the hub-and-spokes model to manage both FPs and ic-IBCs (AI20). 
The hub-and-spokes model started operating from January 1, 2018 (AI7). 
In the hub-and-spokes model, a central International Administration 
Office (IAO) functions as the main liaison or ‘hub’ between the TNE OPs 
and the University’s four faculties (‘the spokes’). AI7 reported that ‘once 
we have signed the contract, we (IAO) take over’. The IAO acts as a 
single contact at the University for the OP, avoiding the need for the OP 
to liaise with multiple schools within the University (AI19). The team 
leader of the IAO reports to the central University International Office 
(UIO) (AI7). 
 
The UBSI is the predecessor of the IAO, which now has a much smaller 
staffing force of two executives working under a highly experienced team 
leader (AI20). The reduced workforce at the IAO (compared to the UBSI) 
was made possible through a few deliberate changes in TNE policy, 
process and organisational structure (AI7). First, there was a ‘change of 
practice’ in the way TNE was administered. This ‘centralisation’ was 
effected by creating a central IAO that services the four faculties. It also 
entailed the ‘clawing back’ of the approximately 28 teaching periods to a 
handful of teaching periods. Second, many of the UBSI functions were 
transferred to the schools (‘schools taking on more’ – AI7) through a prior 
exercise (in 2014) known as SKILL (pseudonym) which introduced an 
operating environment that rationalised the functions of each of the 
University’s functional areas. The roll-out of this operating environment 
was part of the University’s exercise in centralizing a number of back 
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office functions like finance, human resource management and 
marketing, as well as ensuring that all TNE students were treated the 
same as home campus students (AI20). This requirement to treat TNE 
students ‘in the same way as a University A home campus student’ was 
the driver for transferring ‘board of examiners’ and results collation ‘back 
to the schools’, a move that resulted in ‘a big chunk of our time … gone 
back to the school’ (AI7).  
 
Third, a number of TNE functions were also transferred to the ic-IBCs 
(‘branch campuses have taken on a lot more responsibilities … 
processing admissions, processing enrolments’ – AI7), including a recent 
trialling of unit coordination at two of the ic-IBCs (AI15, AI19). Fourth, the 
adoption of technology helped in cutting down a huge amount of work, 
e.g., ‘online enrolments’, the sending of assessment questions via 
electronic mail (‘we’re able to send exams and tests by email … we 
weren’t allowed to do that fifteen years ago’ – AI7), and the provision of 
study materials via Blackboard, an virtual learning environment with an 
online course management system (AI19). The resulting IAO now 
functions with three staff with many lull periods when the staff would 
‘constantly ask if there’s anything else we can do … so, things have 
changed so much … if you’d speak to the girls fifteen years ago, … they 
wouldn’t have time, any time in a day … doing stuff’ (AI7). 
 
10.4.2 The Hub-and-spokes Model in Practice 
 
The new hub-and-spokes model is still considered new and not fully 
operational. In fact, AI20 reported that ‘we’re still trying to iron out and 
understand what it means – the change’, and that ‘the model they’d 
settled on is really not the same as the hub-and-spokes model and my 
biggest criticism is that it was decided before it was considered how it 
would be implemented … so now we’re going through the process of 
trying to work it out; which is a much slower process than that of working 
it out at the start’. AI20 added that ‘it was just like a light bulb here and a 
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decision was made’. In rolling out the hub-and-spokes model in 2018, 
AI20 had noticed that ‘there’ve been some concerns that we’re bending 
too much to the partners’ needs, which is an issue that we had in the 
past … we don't want to go back there again’, indicating that the model 
might have weakened the University’s governance of TNE operations. 
 
The IAO is now responsible for a fewer number of functions, viz., 
administering the vetting of OP teaching staff to be ‘faculty-sufficient for 
BSA’, preparing study units to be offered at each TNE location, sending 
unit outlines and assessments to the OP, and liaising with University 
academics and the OP (AI7). It also functions to ‘police the (TNE) 
situation’ because the ‘schools refuse to take on’ the responsibility for 
assuring equivalence (AI7). AI7 clarified that ‘if we weren't here, it would 
take a long time for the schools to treat other locations the same way 
they treated University A home campus’ students’.  
 
Having been newly set up, the IAO has not fully assumed the functions of 
the Engineering Faculty (AI7). It is comfortable with the Nursing School 
(at the Faculty of Health) dealing directly with the Country V ic-IBC 
because of ‘a very, very solid relationship’ with the ic-IBC, and the fact 
that the scope of work is ‘much, much smaller’, administering only ‘one 
program’ (AI7). 
 
From the perspective of the IAO manager (who was heading the UBSI 
previously), the hub-and-spokes model has resulted in a reduction of 
staffing and costs, and ‘more ownership’ at each functional area and the 
OP (AI7). However, from the perspective of a Dean International (AI20), 
there was no difference at the faculty (‘I don’t think we’ve saved money’ – 
AI20). AI20 reported that the faculty removed the Director International 
position, but the ‘deputy heads of schools brought in other positions’. 
Further, now ‘there’s no one with responsibility for international’ at the 
faculty (AI20). 
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AI20 complained that the heads of schools were by-passed by the IAO in 
some academic TNE decisions, which the IAO was not experienced to 
decide on (‘you can’t get professional staff in the IAO making any sort of 
call on how that program is delivered … they just don’t have the 
expertise’ – AI20). AI20 also reported that there was insufficient 
communication between the OP and the schools (‘I think the more we 
talked, the more we collaborate, the more we share, the better it is for the 
both of us ... it’s not competitive, we’re not trying to … knock someone 
else … we’re all part of the same organisation, and we can both benefit if 
we collaborate more closely’). 
 
AI8 is of the view that the new model resulted in ‘not much support for 
the unit coordinators’ from the IAO. The unit coordinators were mostly 
supported by the faculty’s teaching support staff, who provided services 
like ‘creation of our Blackboard sites ... help with the inputting of results 
... and upload to the University A system … give us advice on changes to 
processes associated with Blackboard … changes to the oLecture 
system (an online learning management system) … also be involved 
when we find or suspect a student of academic misconduct’ (AI8).  
 
In speaking ‘from the angst that I receive from a unit coordinator’, AI7 
commented that the unit coordinators were ‘disconnected from the 
partners’, that ‘they’re just providing a unit outline … somebody else is 
teaching but they have all the issues that go with results, and the 
workload that’s involved in that ... they don’t see the … relationship there 
... because, they’re so far removed from it’. AI7 also added that the unit 
coordinators who used to be paid for TNE work out-of-load (Section App 
I 1.5) ‘know what it was like … see these as extra work for no return’. In 
describing the unit coordinators’ disconnect, AI19 remarked that the unit 
coordinators ‘largely never meet their (offshore) teaching staff’. 
 
The IAO staff are very experienced TNE executives, and having 
‘encountered so many obstacles over the years, we know how to 
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manipulate and get the things done’, and ‘align where we can when the 
contract is silent on certain processes (AI7)’. The team has also been 
working with some OP staff ‘for more than fifteen years ... they don’t 
change … I think they can trust us enough to know that we’ll get things 
done for them and vice-versa’ (AI7). AI7 is certain that ‘if we were to 
leave tomorrow, the three of us were to leave tomorrow, I think it would 
be difficult for somebody to just walk in, and take over’. 
 
10.4.3 Lingering TNE Academic Calendar Planning Challenges 
 
While the University was able to reduce its multiple TNE teaching periods 
to a more manageable number, there were still many offshore teaching 
periods that were ‘totally out-of-sync’ with the University’s home campus 
teaching periods (AI11), and still posed ‘a big issue’ (AI4). These study 
period ‘challenges’ were mainly the result of market forces in locations 
where a northern hemisphere school calendar (AI4) is practiced, e.g., in 
Countries V and X (AI11). AI18 explained that ‘they are aligned with the 
conditions in the local environment’. 
 
In the past, some of the study units were run nine times in a year, and in 
one calculation, it was discovered that ‘38 units were run 300 times in a 
year’ (AI4). AI4 labels this wide offering a ‘smorgasbord … that's a huge 
amount of work …  busy work, … it doesn't strain your brain, it just takes 
a lot of time’. AI11 reported that each time a study unit is run, ‘you have 
to have additional set of exams, the course co-ordination around all of 
that … there is a fair amount of work involved and that’s why we tend not 
to do it for financial return first and foremost … the revenue we get is 
likely eaten up by those additional things’. AI4 described the unit 
coordination of this smorgasbord of study unit offerings as ‘hard work’ 
and ‘complex … writing the academic calendar is a nightmare but I’m not 
underestimating how difficult it would be to get some consistency around 
that’. 
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The crux of the academic calendar planning for TNE lies in the use of 
mainly semesters on the home campus, while TNE operations offshore 
need a combination of semesters and trimesters, but mainly trimesters 
(AI8). AI7 described how, over time, VCS was able to push for alignment 
of their study periods with the home campus because they ‘have been in 
the game for awhile … there was some sort of appeasement there’; UCM 
is already in line with the home campus study periods. However, XCD is 
‘totally out-of-sync’ with the home campus (AI11), and ‘there is a bit of 
friction there, in finetuning units’, because the ‘OP is very strong’ (AI7).  
 
In exploring a solution, AI4 asserted that 'look, I would go to a trimester 
system in a heartbeat ... I think it would be fantastic ... I think 
commercially, to say to an international student that ‘you can come here 
and do your degree in two years instead of three’, huge financial savings 
… to kids here, ‘you can get your degree in two years instead of three or 
two-and-a-half instead of four’’. AI4 also remarked that ‘Deakin’s done it 
… they are a big complex university, if they can do it, I don't see why we 
can't do it’. 
 
10.4.4 Quality Assurance of Assessments 
 
Previously, the University would not allow its OPs to mark its 
assessments, both continuous assessments as well as final 
examinations. Over the years, this regulation has loosened, and now 
Country T, U and X ic-IBCs are allowed to mark both continuous 
assessments and final examinations. Longer term, the ‘vision is to get 
Country V’s VCS on board with the rest, where they mark everything’ 
(AI7).  
 
One of the last, most tightly held academic processes is moderation, 
which is currently the responsibility of each participating faculty. AI2 
envisions the day when ‘rather than moderation being us moderating 
them, I would want to see each of the partnerships moderating each 
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other ... we share the burden more’. AI18 described this envisioned 
maturation of TNE assessment quality assurance as ‘full integration’ with 
the host campus. 
 
At the end of each teaching period, ‘the teaching staff at location and the 
unit coordinator (at the home campus) … have to look at any units that 
have a plus or minus 15% variation on the grades … there has to be a 
specific report to examine what the problem is, or … why it’s so much 
higher; why it’s so much lower’ (AI19). The rationale for the grade 
outcomes review is underpinned by the assumption that ‘students do the 
same assessments, same exams, so … if the quality of the students is 
the same, the outcomes would be similar’ (AI17). 
 
10.4.5 Ownership of Programs 
 
The University has seen a ‘maturation of … strategies’ over the years, 
and ‘it is so good to see that we’ve gone from … ‘here we are, here’s our 
intellectual property, we’ll tell you exactly what you should do’ … to the 
campus like TSW, where they’re fully engaged with colleagues’ (AI18). 
The Country T ic-IBC, TSW having had a very long history, is considered 
having ‘perhaps a higher level of autonomy’ compared to the other ic-
IBCs (AI8). It was therefore not surprising that the ic-IBC there ‘actually 
own a couple of their courses ... none of the other locations own courses 
... the ic-IBC has their own PhD program and they have, like a Master of 
Policy Science … which they actually owned’ (AI19).  
 
10.4.6 Monitoring of Academic Delivery 
 
In order to comply with the University’s policies and regulations, as well 
as meet external accreditation requirements (AI1, AI18), there is a need 
to regularly monitor compliance (‘of course, after it’s been set up, then 
you need to do your regular checks’ – AI20). The objective is to ensure 
that ‘our academic processes apply there (TNE locations) as they do 
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here ... so policies that we have around the academic stuff are the same 
policies and processes that they have to offer it the same way ... easier 
said than done’ (AI4) – part of the University’s global university vision of 
a network of integrated universities, its quest for comparability of student 
experience, and compliance with TEQSA and BSA (Section App I 10.3a). 
 
These regular monitoring exercises include ‘quarterly reports’ and 
‘annual reports’, which AI20 thinks ‘we’ve nailed that’, meaning that they 
are well established and working smoothly. AI19 added that ‘it’s not 
complex … it’s very structured’. The annual reports review KPIs like 
‘pass rates, retention rates, student enrolment, … student enrolment 
trends, student feedback on facilities, student feedback on teaching and 
learning’ (AI9). TNE operations are also subject to the 5-yearly TEQSA 
reviews (AI1). 
 
Operationally, the monitoring encompasses the administration of student 
satisfaction surveys, teaching staff evaluations (AI12), and moderation of 
marking (AI3). At the school level, ‘most of our annual reviews revolve 
around academic quality and academic issues, and not financial ones, 
not commercial ones’ (AI4). 
 
On an ongoing basis, the ic-IBCs also have an additional layer of 
monitoring through its on-site PVCs (AI2), the joint academic boards 
(AI1), management boards (AI5), and joint committees (‘to look at KPIs’ – 
AI9), all of which are specified in the TNE agreement (AI5). 
 
AI6 explained that ‘the management control mechanisms you have in 
place … are the process for looking over your shoulder, but you’re not 
covertly looking over your shoulder ... you’re quite transparent around the 
fact that there’s particular controls in place’. AI6 added that these 
controls do not imply that ‘you don’t trust each other, but because you 
want to monitor the effectiveness of the arrangement on both sides and 
how you’re mutually working together to achieve outcomes ... trust is 
 741 
there, but the controls are in place from a management perspective’. AI9 
affirmed this view, saying ‘we certainly don’t want to look like that’s what 
we are doing (i.e., looking over the shoulder) ... we have to maintain 
quality, and the only way to do this is to have checks’.  
 
AI4 reported that in most cases, the non-compliance ‘tends not to be the 
partners, it tends to be individual staff who might be teaching in the unit’. 
When such events occur, ‘the unit controller (or unit coordinator) in the 
first instance would try and manage it ... if it didn't (work), then it would be 
escalated to, usually, the head of school ... and if the head of school 
couldn't do it, then it would probably go to the IAO’.  
 
AI4 shared two such cases. In the first case, she discovered that an OP 
teaching staff was delivering the class in the students’ native tongue (not 
in English) when she visited the Country O TNE operation. AI4’s initial 
response was ‘ah okay, that's interesting; these classes are supposed to 
be in English, but this person is running it entirely in Country O 
language’, and spoke to the OP teaching staff and presumed it would be 
rectified, ‘but again this is in Country O teaching, there’s distance … so 
you can't confirm compliance’. 
 
In the second case, an OP teaching staff emailed another unit 
coordinator that ‘now I am going to run this class at different times … I'm 
going to teach this as a block of classes every 5 weeks instead of 12 
weeks’. AI4 reported that ‘every now and then you get that, but you get 
the same thing with staff here as well … so it's not unique’.  
 
10.5 OP Teaching Staff 
 
The University used to send its own teaching staff to TNE locations to 
teach as part of its older TNE business delivery model (AI13). It still 
sends teaching staff to selected FPs, e.g., YSR where ‘we sent teachers 
to teach part of the course … and in WSL, which is actually very light 
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touch, and probably too light touch’ (AI20). It no longer sends teaching 
staff to the ic-IBCs – partially for cost savings (‘not viable model’ – AI19), 
and partially because of the tight quality vetting of OP teaching staff 
(especially for BSA-accredited programs) which ensured the deployment 
of suitably qualified local teaching staff at each location (‘we are ensuring 
they are qualified (so) we have no reason to travel’ - AI13). 
 
It is therefore critical for the success of the TNE operation that ‘suitably 
qualified academic staff’ are engaged on-site (AI17), and poor quality 
teaching be detected (‘red flag’) and addressed promptly (AI9). While 
both FP and ic-IBC OPs ‘employ their own staff … they can’t employ any 
teaching staff without our approval ... we absolutely control appointment 
of these staff’ (AI19). 
 
10.5.1 The Challenge of Engaging Academically-qualified Teaching 
Staff 
 
In some countries, the University faced great difficulty in engaging the 
right staff (‘huge issues finding staff’ – AI13). This could be due to the 
scarcity of suitably qualified staff, e.g., in the early years of TNE in 
Country U, where ‘the people who do have PhDs or Master’s degrees 
would generally leave Country U to seek opportunities’ (AI17). The OP in 
Country U has been commended for being proactive in upskilling its own 
teaching staff at the OP’s own cost, many of whom are now in PhD 
studies (AI17).  
 
In some countries such as Country V, the ic-IBC engages ‘pretty much 
still all casual sessional staff … and they’re often working at other 
institutes as well’ (AI12). These sessional teaching staff depend on 
‘teaching that they do across multiple campuses, multiple universities’ as 
their source of income, and ‘so they’re career lecturers and not so much 
researchers’ (AI8). While some of these career lecturers might not be 
suitably qualified (‘faculty-sufficient’ in BSA terms), there are also those 
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who not only are faculty-sufficient, but also active researchers in the 
Country’s local universities (AI15).  
 
Further, AI8 found that ‘most of them (part-time teaching staff) 
proactively engage with me ... I suspect the ones who are doing it on a 
part-time basis probably recognise the precarious nature of their 
employment’, underpinning a good governance reason for engaging part-
time faculty. On the other hand, AI8 observed that ‘if you look at TSW, 
because those people are full-time, so that’s their employment, they’re 
less likely to engage with you because they know that they are … they 
have their employment, that’s their job’. 
 
In addition to academic quality, the interview with AI13 also explored the 
loyalty of OP academic staff who are paid by the OP but receive their 
instructions from the University’s unit coordinators. AI13 was unsure of 
their loyalty, saying ‘that is a good question actually and never really 
understood it … I am not sure if the OP in this case just perform the role 
of an outsourced HR (human resource provider) per se ... because they 
have been in this game, know the market, and so on and so forth’. 
However, AI13 is assured that ‘as far as day-to-day function is 
concerned, the OP will not be able to appoint anybody unless it is vetted 
by me, if the person is going to be involved in delivering my unit’. 
 
10.5.2 The Challenge of Retaining Academically-qualified Teaching 
Staff 
 
The other challenge for TNE OPs is in the retention of academically-
qualified staff. TSW in Country T has been known to have difficulty 
retaining its teaching staff because ‘they’re not paying them enough’ 
(AI7). In some other countries, these teaching staff might have been 
terminated because of poor student evaluations or other reasons, for 
which the unit coordinator might differ on (‘No one, no student said to me 
they had problems with that particular instructor’ – AI8).  
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To ensure there is some stability in the teaching function, some ic-IBCs 
have resorted to engaging a minimum number of full-time teaching staff 
(‘if they're fulltime academic faculty … more commitment … and that 
relationship would be longer term’ – AI12). VCS for example, has five 
full-time teaching staff, compared to a pool of about 70 part-time teaching 
staff (AI15). The majority of teaching staff at TSW are full-time, while 
UCM has a mixture of full-time and part-time teaching staff (AI8). 
 
10.5.3 Adapting to Reduced Offshore Teaching Visits 
 
AI8 rued the loss of travel for teaching staff, arguing that teaching visits 
can make the teaching ‘much more effective’, especially ‘if we were able 
to go to some of these destinations particularly in the earlier stages of the 
programs’. AI8 added that there are benefits in being able to ‘engage 
with the local instructor … to make sure the local instructor will 
understand some of the more tacit knowledge requirements of the unit ... 
to build relationships with the local students as well … think of 
relationships that we are missing out on with potential alumni who have 
senior positions in those’ locations. AI8 also took the opportunity to ‘train 
OP teaching staff … and calibrate marking’ when he used to travel to 
offshore TNE operations in the past. 
 
The University’s unit coordinators had to accept that there was not going 
to be any more teaching visits offshore, and to ‘well … you find 
processes and systems that will replace that’ (AI8). In order to 
compensate for the loss of face-to-face contact with the TNE operation 
and people, various communication channels are used, e.g., ‘skype 
meetings with individuals so that we can get to know each other more 
closely’ (AI8), or the more traditional ‘phone and email’ (AI13). However, 
AI13 admitted that ‘unfortunately, because of the distance and the fact 
that we only interact with them over the phone or email, it is proving to be 
a little difficult’. 
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AI13 also commented that ‘a lot of our units now run in this flipped mode, 
where the lecture is flipped ... I use something called an oLecturer, there 
are still Powerpoints, but it is interactive and there is voice for each slide, 
and you have got activities you have to engage with, short videos and so 
on ... so you feel like I am still there in your home or in your bus, 
wherever you are viewing that’.  
 
10.5.4 Getting OP Teaching Staff On-board 
 
To AI13, it is critical in ‘getting (OP) staff on-board’, making sure that they 
‘understand not just the content but also the pedagogy of the delivery 
mode ... understand the systems, e.g., Grade Centre (a grade 
processing system), Turnitin and so on and so forth ... understanding our 
systems, understanding the assurance of learning process, 
understanding rubrics, what is the distinction between a 5, 6, 7, 8 grade’. 
 
AI7 reported that there is a wide variation in TNE ownership among the 
University’s unit coordinators - ‘some do go above and beyond, and then 
you’ve got the other extreme who wouldn’t even know who their local 
instructors are’. The ones who are more involved would go to great 
lengths to ‘spend a lot of time talking to staff overseas making sure they 
understand not just the content but also the pedagogy of the delivery 
mode’, and to identify ‘PhD’s over there, assisting them, helping them 
take off their research career’ (AI13). AI8 shared how he provided ‘quite 
a fair bit of prescriptive notes advising ‘This is what you need to do in the 
workshops, now when you do this, this is this, this is this, this is this’’. 
  
On the other hand, there also seems to be some condescension for OP 
teaching staff, as AI4 explained - ‘I will say staff's attitude towards 
offshore campuses has change a lot over the years is like they look down 
on it a little bit as they were just delivering the teaching and they weren't 
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… that great … very highly critical I suppose to be most of the language 
around that’.  
 
10.5.5 Outsourcing Unit Coordination 
 
The academic delivery of the University’s study units relies substantially 
on the school’s unit coordinators, and ‘all of the units have a unit 
coordinator who would be based in the home campus’ (AI14). AI4 
clarified that the most labour-intensive processes in TNE are ‘the 
academic ones ... moderation, co-examining ... basically all the things we 
need to do to ensure that we have consistency across all the campuses, 
very time consuming … unit controllers of units (or, unit coordinators) are 
doing a lot of the work’. AI4 added that the work ‘doesn’t strain your 
brain, it just takes a lot of time’. 
 
The unit coordinator’s role encompass the vetting and approval of OP 
teaching staff (AI8), preparing study unit outlines (AI7), writing 
assessments (e.g., mid-semester tests and assignments) and 
examinations (AI11, AI19), marking of assessments and examination 
scripts (AI7, AI12), moderation of offshore marking (AI19), and OP 
teaching staff orientation, training (AI13) and liaison (AI8). Some unit 
coordinators incorporate additional features to their study units, e.g., 
talks by successful entrepreneurs in an entrepreneurship study unit (‘I 
have to find different businesses for these different time periods … so 
that’s a greater imposition on my time, to find those businesses and to 
run exercises and workshops’ - AI8).  
 
The wide scope of the unit coordinator’s role makes the work ‘very 
intense’ and ‘very hard’ (AI12). The pressure mounts especially when the 
unit coordinator has to manage the same study unit across several TNE 
locations and across several study periods, drawing descriptions like 
‘bugbear’ (AI7) and ‘absolute nightmare’ (AI4) from informants who have 
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had first hand experience with unit coordination work. AI1 noted that the 
multiplicity of teaching periods is ‘the biggest problem we have’.  
 
In the case of AI4, an additional examination had to be set for Country P, 
when it was discovered that the original examination date was a public 
holiday in that country. AI8 added that ‘your job as a unit coordinator 
becomes harder if there is turnover’ of OP teaching staff – due to the 
need for new teaching staff orientation and training. Lack of planning can 
also contribute to the stress of unit coordination, as AI12 discovered 
when three study units had to be revamped several days prior to delivery 
offshore (‘I was given 3 units that hadn’t been revamped since 2007 ... so 
it’s been almost … 10 years and they were dreadful ... my lead time 
completely rewriting and repopulating was … I had no lead time so that 
… was a rush and I was literally on the edge of it all the time ... so on a 
Sunday night I'd to have it finished, ready for the tutor in Country V to 
start teaching on a Monday morning’).  
 
The drawing of unit coordination work into the University’s workload 
management system dampened the motivation of many unit coordinators 
because of the loss of remuneration related to TNE unit coordination. AI7 
reported that unit coordinators used to be ‘paid to travel … for every 
exam paper they wrote … for every unit outline they wrote … outside of 
workload … happy times for them, and to the extent where they would be 
neglecting their home campus workload … then, 2011 came … and 
everything was brought into load … people weren’t being paid; the 
incentive wasn’t there’. AI17 described how ‘the University used to take a 
bit more of a liberal approach to offshore operations … within the 
University’s financial model ... there wasn’t a lot of levies placed on the 
faculty, which means that … for example, if we had a student studying in 
Country V, even though the tuition fees were less than what an 
international student would pay in Australia, the return to the school was 
actually better because we didn’t get the levies for capital … parking, 
those sort of things ... then, under a centralised model (i.e., workload 
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management) the disbursements have changed’. AI17 continued that 
‘the feeling was that … while these provided some financial benefits to 
the individuals, the return on the investments in terms of gross margin to 
the University was not sufficient ... and that it was also a distraction 
which took people away … or what was used as an excuse for a lack of 
research productivity’. 
 
While the workload management system seems to be ‘more efficient … 
for the University’ (AI12), there might be a toll on the unit coordinators 
themselves, having ‘no low or peak time … it’s always peak’ (AI12). 
Senior management of the University are apparently aware of the impost 
of TNE on teaching staff’s home campus teaching and research 
commitments (‘It’s a distraction from teaching, here in the home campus; 
doing a bit of your research … then, all of a sudden you are told you 
have a class in Country X, Country T, Country V; you’re going to have to 
moderate, you’ve got to provide unit materials, you need to add some 
local lecturer queries, it is quite a bit of work for them … so, that 
messaging from the Vice-Chancellor down through the faculties ‘This is 
why we are doing this. This is why it is important’ - that’s critical’ - AI9). 
 
The University’s workload management system for TNE delivery ‘places 
a cap on offshore … in terms of hours ... looking after offshore is not 
taken from your teaching delivery … it's actually taken from your 
research allocation to manage all those ... so, that's not counted in your 
normal teaching delivery’ (AI12). AI8 explained that ‘there’s a formula 
that essentially says this many hours for moderation, this many hours for 
offshore coordination and it’s based on a set number of hours given 
whenever you are coordinating a unit plus a number of hours depending 
on how many students are enrolled at those locations ... when you’ve 
reached your quota of hours then the school negotiates with you what 
you can let go ... so it could be … less marking ... and so I would have to 
look at outsourcing my marking to somebody else, or perhaps even 
outsourcing a class, so someone else does that’. AI8 added that the 
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University and school preferences ‘teaching delivery’ over ‘marking’, and 
so, ‘if we can minimise our marking the better’ because ‘it’s more 
expensive to pay an instructor to deliver a class than to pay an instructor 
to mark assignments and assessments’.  
 
The pressure on unit coordinators seems to have increased, particularly 
at UBS with its current deficit of several million dollars, as ‘our workloads 
increased to reduce the sessional budget … (because) we are in 
financial dire straits’ (AI12). This deficit was attributed to lower onshore 
international enrolments (AI12).  
 
AI4 also reported that there seems to be ‘some tension’ between the 
University’s unit coordinators and offshore teaching staff arising from the 
supply of study materials to offshore teaching staff who ‘are still heavily 
reliant on our materials … (and) actually not developing much up there’, 
despite ‘the university … really moved much more to a view of 
recognizing these are campuses of the University and they are just the 
same as us’. This tension might have been due to the disconnect 
between the unit coordinator and the TNE operation, described by AI7 
(‘disconnect … from the partners … they’re just providing a unit outline; 
somebody else is teaching but they have all the issues that go with 
results, and the workload that’s involved in that ... so, they don’t see the 
relationship there because, they’re so far removed from it’). Further, the 
‘key processes of moderation ... teaching ... marking ... equivalence ...  
involves a fair bit of contact between staff ... (and) I think we can do 
better on that … we probably don't trust each other as much as we 
should’ (AI2). 
 
In its quest to outsource further, the University was trialling unit 
coordination by local OP teaching staff at two ic-IBCs, viz., in Countries V 
and T (AI15, AI19). AI15 argues that, at least for Country V where AI15 
operates from, the Country is ‘very well known for logistics, well known 
for finance, the banking sector … why not make use of the experts here 
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... you’ve got lots of great speakers, you’ve got great industry 
connections here and you can get really experienced industry-connected 
teaching staff to share that knowledge’. Similarly, AI4 made an economic 
argument for outsourcing unit coordination to the OP, saying that ‘at the 
university level, if you looked at the cost model, it's much more expensive 
for us … they deliver the program much more cheaply, and they charge a 
lot less than we do, but they haven't got the cost that we’ve got’. 
 
10.6 Management of TNE Operation 
 
In managing a TNE operation successfully, the University must manage 
both the administrative aspects as well as the academic aspects (AI11). 
The academic aspects are now overseen by the University’s hub-and-
spokes arrangement, led by the IAO, which in turn reports to the UIO 
(Section App I 10.4a). All of the administrative management at the TNE 
location is undertaken by the OP, under the University’s strict standards 
of delivery (‘we controlled absolutely everthing’ – AI19). 
 
While a mature and highly structured management infrastructure (‘very 
structured, very detailed’ – AI19) is helpful in managing the large and 
complex TNE operation (AI4), there are also detractors among staff who 
think that the University ‘is not flexible in how those processes and 
critical processes go ... we often get told the systems can’t do it ... the 
system won’t allow it’ (AI8).  
 
10.6.1 Organisational Structure of University TNE Management 
 
Within the University, the administrative management of TNE operations 
is located in central units, and the faculties and schools. At the centre are 
the units that oversee strategic planning (AI2), contract negotiations and 
management (AI11), finance, HR and marketing (AI20), and the UIO 
(AI7). While the faculties and schools are mainly involved in the 
academic administration of the TNE operations, the PVC of the faculty is 
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part of the senior executive team that oversees all TNE operations, both 
ic-IBCs and FPs (AI16).  
 
The senior executive team comprises the VC, DVCs, faculty PVCs, 
senior executives responsible for operations, finance, strategic planning, 
corporate relations, and the ic-IBC PVCs; this team meets every week for 
about three hours to monitor the TNE operations, and as a result, ‘we 
know what’s going on … we’re very much involved in it’ (i.e., TNE 
operations) (AI2). The ic-IBC PVC joins the weekly meeting ‘by video 
link’, and is considered ‘very much in the room in terms of what our 
expectations are’ (AI2). 
 
An ‘interesting’ feature of the University’s branch campuses is the 
deployment of PVCs on-site at the branch campuses (AI17), which fulfils 
a ‘need for relationship managers in place’ (AI6). The ic-IBC PVC, the 
‘eyes on the ground’ (AI15) reports to the Provost, and is a part of the 
senior executive team (AI2). The ic-IBC PVC also sits on joint academic 
boards and key joint committees (AI15).  
 
As an ‘academic manager’, the ic-IBC PVC is responsible for managing 
and monitoring all academic matters at the ic-IBC (AI1). Recently, the ic-
IBC PVC was also required to drive research and community 
engagement at the ic-IBCs (AI15). Perhaps the on-site supervision by the 
PVC makes the ic-IBC a ‘much deeper partnership … much, much 
stronger line management … control over those operations, versus a 
model where you're … basically outsourcing something (i.e., FPs) (AI6). 
 
There is some indication that staff of the University are not all informed 
about the management structure of ic-IBCs, with some staff holding the 
belief that the staff of the ic-IBCs are employed by the University since 
they are the University’s branch campus staff. An example was picked up 
when AI4 referred to administration and marketing staff of TSW and 
UCM as ‘our staff anyway’. 
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10.6.2 Key Aspects of TNE Management 
 
Aspects of TNE management that are key to the University include 
student recruitment, student engagement, marketing, branding (AI19), 
teaching and learning facilities (AI15), career placement and alumni 
(AI12), contract management (AI11), student support services (AI15), 
research, and community engagement (AI16). Many of these aspects are 
tightly controlled by the University, e.g., student entry requirements 
(AI19), standards required of facilities (e.g., computer labs, software, 
classroom sizes) (AI19), website design and style guidelines (AI19), and 
more recently, even the design and layout of ic-IBCs (to be similar to the 
home campus) (AI7). AI19 commented that these standards are ‘all 
dictated, all defined in our contracts’. 
 
AI6 reported that the University also provided the OPs access to the 
University’s systems and support staff so that the OP can ‘capital-
leverage central capabilities by not having to replicate those’, e.g., 
administration of student surveys, and ‘use our teams rather than having 
their own strategy area, their own research area, their own risk 
management area’.  
 
The success of the OP depends on how efficiently it manages the TNE 
functions devolved to it by the University. AI6 told of a partner which 
failed to ‘manage the entry requirements and enrolments’, leading to 
poor quality students and academic results. The University pulled out of 
that A$7 million per annum revenue branch campus operation, and sent 
a ‘clear message … (that) if they didn't guarantee quality in terms of the 
quality of the students and performance that they would be gone’.  
 
Some OPs have been known to have ‘well-developed systems and 
processes … spread through a huge range of markets in the region so …  
they are able to respond to enquiries rapidly from students’ (AI15). One 
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particular OP has its own English language program to help students 
improve on their English proficiency (AI15). AI5 added that the OP has 
‘to actually be really smart when it comes to managing its programs and 
managing its relationships with the industry’. AI17 commended TSW, 
saying ‘it was probably the most genuine extension of University A 
because TSW has its own HR department, its own staffing ... when jobs 
are advertised in Country T, they appear on the University A website as 
well’. 
 
While few and far between, conflicts (amidst ‘pretty amicable sort of 
relationships’) are usually managed within the framework of ‘contracts, 
systems, clauses and procedures’ (AI3). Similarly, AI1 thinks that 
‘contractual arrangements … pretty set out the conflict process’. The OP 
obviously has little room to manoeuvre, given that ‘the partner has to 
understand the way we work and fit within that ... we are not dictators but 
it is Uni A’ (AI3). While University A does not ‘give them (i.e., OP) any 
academic autonomy ... we have probably largely found a way to … do it 
to them with respect ... and try to make sure that whatever we’re doing is 
win-win for both of us’ (AI19). AI19 believes that this respectful approach, 
which is the result of ‘a long history of working with partners’, is ‘probably 
attractive’ to OPs. 
 
AI6 explained that most conflicts are resolved ‘through negotiations’, and 
gave the example of having to ‘give and take on the royalty amounts that 
you might be receiving or the conditions … you’re trading, like any 
contract negotiation, you trade’. In one instance of a minor conflict 
involving the provision of suitable student services, the DVCI ‘pushed 
pretty hard’ to get to a ‘compromise’. Sometimes ‘subtle pressures’ had 
to be deployed when faced with the remuneration-reporting disconnect 
(where OP teaching staff are paid by the OP but take directions from the 
University’s unit coordinators). AI2 also added that conflicts are pre-
empted and mitigated through ‘Council’ interactions, ‘plenty of 
connection’, and ‘visits’. 
 754 
 
10.6.3 Funding for TNE Operations 
 
The management of TNE operations obviously entail expending funds 
(AI11), and ‘one of our biggest costs is our salaries’ (AI19). Through 
years of TNE experience, the University has now been able to develop a 
‘pretty lean operation’ (AI19), which comprises outsourced FPs, and 
‘asset-light’ ic-IBCs (AI11).  
 
AI7 does not ‘think anyone’s done a … true value cost of what TNE 
costs’. AI20 commented that ‘that’s another thing that we’re better at now 
than we were when I first came; that we didn’t account for all the costs … 
and this was very typical of universities across Australia and may be 
globally … we looked at the money coming in, but didn’t think about the 
teaching staff we were sending out, and the cost of sending them out, 
and what are the opportunity costs of having them out there because 
we’ve got to then employ other staff to teach on the programs here … so 
it seems obvious now that these weren’t really included in the 
calculations previously … we do those now’. Even teachout costs are 
now built into TNE contracts (AI1). 
 
Both the outsourced FP and ic-IBC business delivery models leverage on 
the OP’s resources, processes and networks in exchange for a ‘slice’ of 
the fee revenue (AI6), or more specifically, ‘taking a fee for the courses 
that we have intellectual property’ (AI2). The University has elected to 
control only ‘the academic processes and the hiring and so on, then 
we’re managing the academic business of the organisation ... we have 
partners to manage a range of other things’ (AI2). It would be ‘at the 
university level … much more expensive for us to (deliver) … they (i.e., 
the OP) deliver the program much more cheaply, and they charge a lot 
less than we do, but they haven't got the cost that we’ve got’ (AI4).  
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AI3 remarked that ‘without having the local infrastructure provider ... 
running the whole thing direct … would be quite difficult ... more costly’. 
The OP carry all on-ground costs, e.g., ‘employment costs and leases’ 
(AI6), but usually benefit from the lower cost of operating in many of the 
University’s TNE locations (‘the offshore locations have lower costs’ – 
AI19).  
 
In discussing the multiplicity of study periods, AI11 thinks that ‘the 
revenue we get is likely eaten up by those additional things ... meeting all 
the requirements in the contract, and the contract management, and 
going to graduations’. AI8 is of the view that ‘we only get a fraction of the 
fees ... so obviously the university’s done it’s sums and has deemed that 
it’s still more financially viable’ to engage OPs. However, while ‘the 
branch campuses are not a huge part of our revenue … but then 
because of the way in which these budgets are, the margins make a 
huge difference’ (AI2). AI2 explained that the University is currently 
making margins of about 1% to 2%, but aim to raise this to 5%, in line 
with the objectives outlined in the 2018 KPIs (Strategy & Planning Office 
University A 2018). As a not-for-profit institution, the University also sets 
apart TNE surpluses for ‘re-investments’ (AI6) and research (‘the 
University kept back some part of the royalty that was being paid by TSW 
and that was put into a research fund’ – AI10). 
 
AI19 reported that the University and the OP have to consider market 
forces as well as their respective costs of operation in setting fees, and 
that ‘if they're too cheap, then students wouldn’t come here’, or ‘if that’s 
too expensive, they won’t get the student numbers’. Also, ‘everyone’s got 
to be able to cover their costs ultimately and hopefully more than cover 
their costs … especially for OPs … they’re not in this for public good as 
University A are’. This is a ‘conversation that happens everywhere at 
every location’.  
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10.6.4 Relative Gain/Loss for TNE Partners 
 
The informants were asked to identify the TNE partner who would gain 
the most from the TNE collaboration, and the TNE partner who would 
lose the most in the event of a termination. They were also asked for the 
reasons for their choices. The responses collated indicate that most 
informants are of the view that the OP would gain the most in a TNE 
collaboration, and also lose the most in the event of a termination – all of 
them attributing these outcomes to financial impacts. A minority of the 
informants thought that the University would gain/lose from reputational 
impacts. The table below summarises these perspectives. 
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No. Partner Reason for Perspective Informant 
A Which partner would gain the most from the TNE collaboration? 
1 University Brand value; reputation AI9 
2 University Brand AI14 
3 University 
Engage with/learn from countries; working with 
future leaders 
AI18 
4 OP Financial AI3 
5 OP Gain financially AI20 
6 OP Money (OP makes more) AI9 
7 OP Respect; credibility; revenue AI17 
8 OP (VCS) No reason given AI4 
9 
OP (TSW) and 
University 
Win-win for both AI4 
B Which partner would lose the most in a termination? 
1 
University 
(VCS) 
Reputational loss AI4 
2 University Reputation AI14 
3 University Credibility AI16 
4 OP Financial; hard infrastructure AI2 
5 OP Not making money AI6 
6 OP Invested all the money in infrastructure AI9 
7 OP Share price AI17 
8 OP (TSW) Invested infrastructure AI4 
9 
University and 
OP 
Minimal impact on both AI1 
10 None Mutual and orderly termination AI3 
 
Table App I.3   Which Partner Gains Most/Loses Most in TNE  
(University A) 
 
10.6.5 Refinement of the TNE Framework for University A TNE 
Operations 
 
The foregoing exploration of TNE value chain activities at University A 
provided rich insights into specific activities that are considered mission-
critical by the University. The TNE Framework of Table 2.4 (Section 
2.5.5) is now updated to include : 
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1) continuous assessment, 
2) examination grading, 
3) moderation of continuous assessment, 
4) moderation of examination grading, 
5) research, and 
6) community engagement. 
 
Of the above additions, ‘Research’ had originally been in the Hutaibat 
value chain (Section 2.7.3). ‘Community Engagement’ is a new value 
chain activity, while the remaining additional activities are refinements of 
existing activities. Due to the lack of details, it was not possible to provide 
greater granularity for ‘Research’ and ‘Community Engagement’. These 
additions and refinements are incorporated in the table below. 
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No. TNE Processes Direct Models Outsourced Models 
Hybrid Governance Models 
Country T   
ic-IBC 
Country V  
ic-IBC 
Country U   
ic-IBC 
Country X 
ic-IBC 
Countries W 
and Y r-FP 
Country O  
r-FP 
A Primary Activities 
1 
A
ca
de
m
ic
 
re
cr
ui
tm
en
t Curriculum 
design S
 S S S S S 
2 Curriculum 
delivery H
S HS HS HS HS and Sr HS and Sr 
3 Student recruitment HS HS HS HS HS HS 
4 
Te
ac
hi
ng
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
Award S S S S S S 
5 Curriculum 
designed S S S S S S 
6 Curriculum 
delivered H
S* HS HS HS HS and Sr HS and Sr 
7 Continuous 
assessment H H H H H H 
8 Examination 
grading H S H H S S 
9 Moderation 
of continuous 
assessment 
S H S S S S 
10 Moderation 
of exam 
grading 
S S S S S S 
11 Alumni relations 
H H H H NR NR 
12 Research HSandS HSandS HSandS HSandS NA NA 
13 Community 
engagement H
SandS HSandS HSandS HSandS NA NA 
B Support Activities 
1 TandL physical 
infrastructure 
provision 
HS HS HS HS H H 
2 
S
tu
de
nt
 
su
pp
or
t Academic HS HS HS HS H H 
3 Admin/Pro-
fessional H
S HS HS HS H H 
4 Academic staff 
support S
iandH SiandH SiandH SiandH Sr Sr 
5 Divisional 
management SandH SandH SandH SandH SandH SandH 
Abbreviations :  1)   S – Sending Higher Education Institution/Provider 
   2)   H – Host Higher Education Institution/Provider 
   3)   HS – Undertaken by H, but wholly-controlled by S 
   4)   HS*– Undertaken by H, but wholly-controlled by S; with some recent unit  
     coordination by H using S materials 
5)   Si – Sending Higher Education Institution/Provider providing service 
       in situ 
6)   Sr – Sending Higher Education Institution/Provider providing service 
       remotely 
7)   NR – not referenced 
8)   NA – not applicable 
 
Table App I.4 TNE Framework for Organisational Economics  
Research (University A) 
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10.7 Risks in TNE Operations 
   
The University ‘learnt a lot about risk control’ over the years of managing 
TNE operations (AI5). It now ‘measure(s) risk quite avidly’, and have 
more well-developed ‘risk management approaches … and treat them 
effectively’ (AI5). AI18 even goes as far as to suggest that the University 
‘need to be a bit more creative’ since ‘universities are always low risk-
taking … from the commercial perspective’. 
 
10.7.1 Sources of TNE Risks 
 
AI4 is of the view that the risks associated with the four main countries of 
TNE operation are, in descending order, Country X, Country V, Country 
U, and Country T. Country X ic-IBC is perceived to encounter the highest 
risk level as a result of the newness of the operation (AI13). Country V ic-
IBC’s risk lies in the highly competitive business environment. The ic-IBC 
in Country U is anchored by an OP which is a large conglomerate, and 
hence relatively low risk (AI11). Country T is the most stable, the 
University having operated there since 1999 (‘well run campus’ – AI4).  
 
TNE risks are associated with the business delivery model (viz., 
‘outsourced model is probably more risky’ – AI6; franchised programs ‘a 
much higher risk’ – AI3), the operating environment (‘more risk because 
the market's very competitive’ – AI6; ‘legal risks’ – AI13), knowledge of 
the operating environment (‘better understanding of the market 
environment ... a little less risk’ – AI6), the background and experience of 
the OP (‘with a very experienced partner ... so, not as risky’ – AI6), and 
the phase and size of the TNE operation (‘the more mature the campus 
is, ... the critical mass that it's developed, the less the risk’ – AI6). 
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10.7.2 TNE Risk Mitigation 
 
Risk mitigation in TNE is based on ‘simply licensing or franchising to 
someone else and get them to run it’ (AI13), because ‘they carry the risk 
around … employment costs, leases’ (AI6). ‘When you look at overseas 
campuses, your risks around operations are in large part passed on to a 
third party provider ... they are also able to employ people much more 
cheaply than the university here ... the university has employment 
arrangements that mean that it would make it a much more costly 
arrangement even if you are trying to do it overseas ... we don’t have the 
expertise to employ people overseas : the HR, the taxation, all those stuff 
around health and safety and managing the staff overseas’ (AI11). The 
OP ‘would make more but then they are also taking on much more risk 
and much more cost’ (AI9). AI6 supported this view, saying that ‘they 
would need to benefit more to be worth their while’. 
 
Risk mitigation should start right at the very beginning by expending 
effort in identifying and appointing ‘somebody that they can trust and is 
relatively risk-free’ (AI14). AI14 explained that ‘franchised operations … 
in many respects can be a crap shoot’ (an uncertain matter), and that 
‘you’ve got to go through an enormous amount of hassle to choose 
somebody to franchise it to … and there’s no guarantee that at the end 
it’s going to be successful because there’s a lot of people in some places 
who are just so keen to enter into this kind of franchise ... and this was 
certainly the case in Country V in the early 1990s, when there were a lot 
of people ... offering … and many of those failed … and you probably 
wouldn't be able to find them now’.  
 
After starting, the University would need to invest in ‘quality control … a 
lot more control’ to mitigate risks (AI2). AI2 argued that ‘naturally as soon 
as you have an organisation branded as University A, then there's a risk, 
a much greater risk of your reputation … (because) your name is on the 
gate’. This can be mitigated by ‘a lot more control … over … 
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development of the curriculum, the organisational management … 
appointment of staff … facilities … teaching staff … much stronger line 
management control over those operations’ (i.e., ‘much closer 
operational engagement with our branch campuses’), resulting in ‘less 
(reputational) risk’ due to ‘much closer operational engagement with our 
branch campuses’. 
 
Internally, at the University, risk mitigation starts with doing ‘your due 
diligence and primary market research … understand that you are in the 
right market at the right time, with the right courses, (then) you are able 
to exercise a greater degree of confidence’ (AI13). Outsourcing TNE to 
an OP also allows the University to diversify its risks through multiple 
delivery locations (AI5). The ‘profit ... helps diversify our revenue base 
which reduces our financial risk because we’ve got things in a number of 
different places’ (AI2). 
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Themes, Concepts and Stories from University C 
 
University C is a small Australian university that has punched above its 
weight in the TNE sector. With a student population of more than 23,000 
students, it has almost 8,000 TNE students (Section 4.3.4.3). Its TNE 
history has not been very long, starting around the early 1990s. It has 
however, experienced phenomenal growth in its Country V TNE 
operations – causing a distinct tipping point in its TNE journey. This 
tipping point resulted in the set up of a host country office (HCO) in 
Country V to manage the large numbers of TNE students, as well as 
driven a comprehensive, University-wide TNE review that produced a 
White Paper to guide its future TNE trajectory. 
 
This section explores the insights of University staff as they recall the 
early years of the University’s TNE journey, the Country V TNE 
experiences that triggered the tipping point, the potentially reputation-
wracking swap of offshore partners (OP) in Country X, and the 
University’s plans for the future. It will also detail the University’s current 
TNE value chain activities and the influence of the operating environment 
on TNE performance. 
 
1.0 Early TNE Operations (1992 – 2004) 
 
The University’s early experience with TNE was marked by adhoc start-
ups that were mainly driven by schools or faculties, which were in turn 
motivated by financial returns both to the schools/faculties as well as to 
the teaching staff. Some, like the Country T TKD operation did well, while 
others failed due to either insufficient student numbers or poor quality 
delivery. The University has ‘gotten rid of them’ all (CI4). While the 
terminations were mostly mutual and damage-free, CI2 argued that ‘the 
damage is more internal to be honest’.  
 
 
 765 
1.1 Country T Franchised Programs (TKD) 
 
The TKD FP started in 1992, and was ‘very popular with our staff in 
terms of quality of students and quality of instructions’ (CI2). CI2 
explained that ‘we did a bit of a dual model, some of their staff, some of 
our staff’ teaching on the program. And ‘so many of our Business staff 
were very disappointed when TKD ended … about four or five years ago’ 
(CI2). 
 
CI6 recalled the University’s programs were taught at three campuses of 
TKD, and reminisced that it was ‘very much different from any of the 
other partners because it was an education institution, primarily 
educational ... there was a library, there were academics with offices – 
and the people who were doing the teaching in the classes were full time 
academics ... you’d go there and this is a bit like being at home, because 
it was like that … not like walking into an office block which is like a lot of 
other places ... so the fact that TKD was actually an education provider 
made a difference’. 
 
CI6 believed that the FP operation was terminated because ‘there just 
wasn’t enough students … and our courses were growing at VKP (i.e., 
Country V FP competing for resources)’, and that TKD ‘was moving to 
become a university college, so they were going to be offering their own 
university degrees … perhaps it was that move to being a university 
college that meant it wasn’t as big a thing for them to be teaching our 
degrees anymore’. CI2 also recalled that TKD ‘decided they wanted to 
become a university … and so they were keen to finish the partnership 
with us … so they went on to become a college and then a university and 
I think in fact they are now been bought out’. CI6 also recounted how the 
University’s IT programs ‘went for 2 - 3 years; we didn’t do very well 
there and we stopped as soon as we could … because there just wasn’t 
any growth in terms of student numbers at all for us’.  
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On the teachout, CI2 described how ‘we're still teaching; we've still TKD 
students that I told you about, on the books that we're teaching or 
helping, years after we’ve finished the teachout … we're still just finishing 
with a couple of the students ... we’re still assisting the students’. CI2 
continued that ‘we still keep in touch with them ... we don't want them to 
feel that we've abandoned them … so we allow them to enrol externally 
at TKD prices to assist them so they’re not external international paying 
students which is at a higher rate’. 
 
1.2 Country N Franchised Program (NCE) 
 
The University started a small bi-lingual Chiropractic program with an OP 
in Country N in 2004 (CI4). CI4 added that ‘it was experimental … it 
didn't work very well’, while CI2 recalled that there were ‘some quality 
issues ... (when) our lecturers obviously did not speak Country N 
language so it may be delivered in English, but I think their assessment 
was in Country N language’. CI4 explained that ‘our concern in Country 
N was quality control and because we delivered in-country and we had to 
fly in and fly out’. The fly-in-fly-out was obviously ‘costly’ (CI2). 
 
The FP ‘lasted 6 or 7 years’ (CI2). Ultimately, the University decided to 
‘let's do what we can to teachout and to get out of there’ (CI4). The 
teachout was ‘very expensive to teachout when you’ve got 3 students in 
the Chiropractor program’ (CI2). 
 
1.3 Country V Franchised Programs (VSN and VSC) 
 
CI6 recalled two FPs that the University ran in Country V in the late 
1990s, viz., VSN and VSC (CI10). VSN was an employers organisation, 
while VSC was a private holding company with education provision as a 
secondary business (sgpbusiness 2019). These FPs required the 
University’s teaching staff to ‘teach a unit over there for two weeks’, 
where ‘the students would have readings before, then we do the two 
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weeks and then they’d have a week to finish their assignments and so 
on, and then they would be at the exams after that’ (CI6).  
 
The interesting insight that CI6 provided on this period of the University’s 
TNE journey was that ‘in common with TNE in a lot of Australian 
universities, that was being run out of a school ... it wasn’t run and owned 
specifically by the universities ... (and) back then, a lot of schools would 
get involved as a source of discretionary income ... so they could have 
some money to spend on themselves’. CI10 also recalled ‘different 
schools or faculties were doing bits and pieces’ of TNE during those 
early TNE days, and that ‘they’re (i.e., the teaching staff) actually being 
paid for this … on top of their normal salaries ... it was quite lucrative for 
them and they’d come here and … (they) loved it’. CI10’s own 
experience was to ‘fly down, and I would teach a couple of weekends ... 
and you know you’d be given an envelope and filled with cash … that 
was great’. 
 
The out-of-load payments came to an end when universities detected the 
‘huge amount of money’ that the schools/faculties were making, and 
decided to ‘manage this … (for) risk management and financials’ (CI10), 
leading to the introduction of the academic staff workload management 
system. Moreover, ‘those sort of very cowboy, sort of the 1990s really 
was a bit frontier, frontier lands - where people were going in and setting 
up things with small companies’ (CI6), were considered ‘very high risks’ 
(CI1) and ‘often quite opportunistic, a bit reactive’ (CI10). They resulted 
in the University centralizing future TNE approvals (‘very much controlled 
by our senior executive group’ – CI3).  
 
2.0 University C TNE Tipping Point (2005 to date) 
 
As the focus group study of University C revealed, the University’s TNE 
tipping point occurred when the University’s Country V TNE operations, 
in particular the VKP FP, experienced ‘a very phenomenal growth’ 
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(Section 4.3.4.3.2) that resulted in ‘a very large beast’ of a TNE operation 
(Section 4.3.4.3.3). The large TNE operation showed threats to academic 
integrity, University reputation and revenue streams, triggering the 
immediate set-up of a host country office (HCO) in Country V, and an 
urgent review of TNE across the whole University (Section 4.3.4.3.4). 
The TNE review of 2012 resulted in the publication of the 2013 White 
Paper to guide the University’s TNE trajectory. The University’s tipping 
point is really the story of the evolution of its Country V TNE operations. 
 
2.1 Country V Consolidated Franchised Programs (VSM) 
 
In the early 1990s, the University had ‘sort of bits and pieces (of small 
TNE operations) and then we had VSM’ (CI10). University C’s Country V 
TNE operations stabilised with only one OP, i.e., VSM by the mid-2000s 
(CI1). The VSM OP is an industry association of about 100 members 
(CF2). 
 
This FP offered mainly Business programs, and two Arts programs, viz., 
Journalism and Screen (CI3). CI4 explained that two different delivery 
models were employed, viz., a fly-in-fly-out delivery by University 
teaching staff, and a joint delivery by University and OP teaching staff. 
By virtue of professional accreditation, the Accounting undergraduate 
degree had to be fully taught by University teaching staff, and thus 
employed the fly-in-fly-out model where the teaching staff spent two 
weeks in-country. The University’s ‘MBA was done in a series of 
intensive teaching programs where half the unit was delivered by a 
University academic and then the other half of the unit by a local teacher’ 
(CI4). The joint delivery was less demanding for the University since it 
required only a three-day weekend presence in-country. 
 
This operation ran for a good 12 years, having finished in 2016 (CI1). CI3 
explained the course of events that culminated in the termination. The 
VSM OP was described as ‘a good partner for many years’. CI3 
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continued that ‘they were doing well and then they had a change of 
management ... and their direction ... it wasn't anything that went bad 
with our partnership  ... they weren’t focused’. So, the University ‘tried to 
work with them as much as we could ... the University said ‘hey guys, the 
numbers are really declining, you know … what can we do to help you?’ 
… so we set a plan with them; we had targets; we did marketing 
together; we did all sorts of things together … we held their hand and we 
tried’. And ‘in the end, it was a mutual decision’ to terminate, and now 
they ‘pretty much don't do education anymore’.  
 
CI2 commented that ‘VSM gradually declined and we moved out from 
that partnership, and they were happy to get out of it … so that was by 
mutual agreement’. CI3 explained that the teachout process was ‘really 
easy for us ... both parties agreed and we agreed to work together ... it 
was really easy ... it was smooth and easy ... we had plans for the 
students to … just move across (to the VKP OP) ... and they continued 
exactly in the same units that they would ... it worked ... it was beautiful 
... we’ve got nobody (left to teachout) … it’s clean because we just went, 
‘OK, we're going over here (i.e., VKP FP) now’. CI3 added that there was 
‘no damage ... it was good it was lucky ... the thing with teachouts with us 
is making sure students are not disadvantaged’. 
 
2.2 Country V Dual OP Experiment 
 
Three years after VSM started, the University initiated another FP with an 
international TNE provider in Country V. The new FP initially offered 
programs that were not in competition with VSM, viz., ‘Psychology, 
selected programs, as well as Hospitality and Tourism Management/ 
Marketing double major, and some IT double majors – which we, VSM 
don’t offer’, explained CI7, a very experienced TNE manager in Country 
V.  
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Then, in 2011, ‘VKP started to offer many other double majors that VSM 
had been offering’ (CI7). The delivery of the same programs at two 
locations within the same location was unusual, and University staff 
‘were bewildered by that’ (CI1). The move was attributed to the then VC 
(‘that was another one that the Vice-Chancellor did’ – CI1; ‘that was what 
the previous Vice-Chancellor decided on’ – CI7). CI1 reflected that ‘I 
can’t imagine they (the VSM OP) were very happy’.  
 
On retrospect, the extension of the VSM programs to VKP was probably 
motivated by the anticipation that the VKP OP could grow the market for 
the University, as ‘they were big, and they had greater aspirations, 
greater resources, the means to deliver the kinds of things … to be a 
better partner than the VSM OP … they had Country P (i.e., they were 
already operating TNE there), … at that stage, I think they were open to 
going jointly with us to other places to possibly set up another campus ... 
those possibilities were at least plausible with the VKP OP and 
impossible with the VSM OP’ (CI1). 
 
And indeed, the appointment of the new OP to start up the VKP FP did 
not disappoint the University, but turned out to be the TNE operation that 
triggered its TNE tipping point through ‘a very phenomenal growth’ 
(Section 4.3.4.3.2). The VKP OP was known among University staff as a 
‘marketing machine’ (CI3), and a ‘good marketing team … well-oiled 
machine’ which the University was ‘struggling to keep up with their 
performance’ (Section 4.3.4.3.2). It was probably the competition by VKP 
that cannibalised VSM’s student numbers, as CI3 explained, ‘VKP 
started to really shoot up ... VKP were really marketing, you know, 
heavily … VKP shot up and left VSM behind’.  
 
CI7 explained that the delivery of ‘exactly the same’ University programs 
through two different providers led to ‘comparison; students get 
confused’. The prospective students ‘tend to compare lecturers … we 
compete on pricing ... we have to slash the price … to fight’. Ultimately, 
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the market prognosis was ‘not good for University C overall … the 
experience ... because once you deduct the price … price equals quality 
as well ... I wouldn’t think this is viable long term’.  
 
CI1 commented that while the University was not ‘particularly upset with 
our relationship with the VSM OP, we hoped to keep it going and have 
VKP’ as well, and ’the University had even appointed an on-site Principal 
at VSM to help oversee academic delivery for about two years’ (CI3). 
However, the delivery of the same University programs through two 
providers in the same location turned out to be ‘quite messy’ and ‘not a 
viable practice’ in a country like Country V ‘that’s so small’ (CI7). It was 
also ‘a waste of resources’, and potentially the host country regulatory 
authorities might ‘also question why we have two partners in just one 
location, especially if we are offering the same type of courses’ (CI7). 
 
2.3 Country V in situ monitored Franchised Program (i-FP) 
 
The VKP FP was described as a ‘wonderful success story … a profitable 
model for the university’ (CI7). But the ‘very phenomenal growth’ also 
posed serious threats to academic integrity, University reputation and 
revenue streams (Section 4.3.4.3.4). The University responded by 
expeditiously setting up and funding a host country office (HCO), headed 
by an on-site Principal in 2013 (CI7). This HCO was part of an 
intermediate term strategy in the White Paper that had to be expedited 
before the entire set of formal recommendations were approved 
(University C TNE Project Team 2013a, 21-22). The Principal was later 
re-designated Dean. Throughout the interviews, the informants used the 
terms Principal and Dean interchangeably. 
 
The VKP FP is still ‘all about franchising … the VKP OP licenses … an 
agreement, where we run our programs ... the curriculum would be 
exactly the same ... everything is exactly the same as what we do in  
University C’s home campus … just that we run the programs offsite in 
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this part of the world … the partners pay a so-called licence fee to the 
University’ (CI7). The only difference between this FP model and others, 
lies in the set up of the in-country HCO, which provided a platform for the 
University to ‘involve ourselves more, including setting up a proper office 
in Country V and … minimizing those risks’ of non-compliance by the OP 
with University and regulatory standards (CI1). To distinguish this FP 
from other FPs, it is labelled as an i-FP (franchised programs with in situ 
oversight) (Section 5.1.2.3). 
 
2.3.1 Partner Motivations 
 
Most informants thought that the motivation of the OP was financial 
returns, e.g., ‘it’s the money’ (CI7), ‘they always have, in their view they 
have, like ‘how much money they can make’ … they’re in for the profit, 
not for the goodwill of it’ (CI2). CI1 is of the view that ‘the VKP OP would 
have made a lot of money ... we were pretty cheap ... we’re at the bottom 
end, really’, which is not surprising given that ‘they are very strategically-
minded, (with) highly intelligent operational management’ (CI8). 
 
For the University, CI6 observed that ‘obviously there’s money … there’s 
financial benefits to the University’ in having a presence in Country V. 
However, ‘financially, we don't make that much per student for TNE … 
(but) branding's a big one ... the idea is that if we have a good brand in 
Country V, then we will also get TNE students, but we'll also get Country 
V students, or students from a wider area ... coming here (i.e., Australia) 
as international onshore, full-fee paying students and they're the ones 
who bring us significant amounts of money’ (CI5). CI10 added that ‘for 
the University, here (i.e., the Country V i-FP) is really important, because 
it's, you know, a quarter of the total enrolment’ of the University. The 
income is significant considering the ‘funding pressures ... so basically 
the Australian government has said to all universities, ‘you can't grow 
your domestic load’ or at least, you can but we’re not going to fund you 
anymore … for growth in your domestic load … so the options are 
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international onshore or offshore … (and) international onshore is sort of, 
maxed out’ (CI10). 
 
Further, referring to the set up of the HCO, ‘the idea of the Country V 
office is to have a lot more control and oversight of our whole operation’ 
(CI3). While initially not the rationale for the HCO, the ‘good gross margin 
… (has also) seeded the research centre (in the HCO)’ (CI2). 
 
2.3.2 Business Delivery Model 
 
The VKP i-FP is ‘a franchise operation when you look at who has control 
over what parts of the operations ... so we are dealing with the academic 
side of it, but the delivery is done by the VKP OP’ (CI6). CI1 explained 
that the VKP business delivery model is ‘somewhere in between … a 
model where you set up your own campus where you have more staff 
there; or staff fly in and out and do their own teaching’. The University is 
‘not just licensing IP … we got some risk management there as well ... 
but we‘ve not got great costs there ... we obviously now have got an 
office ... we’ve got  more involvement and greater costs there than when 
we started but we’re getting a higher fee share’. 
 
While the University provided the intellectual property, quality assurance 
and student administration systems (CI6), the OP provided the premises 
and facilities (CI6), the corporate proprietary limited vehicle (CI3), the 
regulatory compliance (CI7), the marketing (CI3, CI4, CI6), the sourcing 
and funding of teaching staff (CI4, CI7), and student services (CI4, CI6). 
The host country regulator also ‘insist that it's the private education 
institution (i.e., the OP) that carries the registration of the foreign 
university’ (CI10). 
 
The strength of the VKP OP lies in their ‘marketing machine’ (CI3), a 
‘well-oiled machine’ (Section 4.3.4.3.2) that includes ‘very extensive 
agents in the sub-continents, in the AS region’ (CI2). CI3 added that ‘they 
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heavily market ... they spend a lot of money on marketing and, they really 
know what they’re doing’. The OP ‘also have a significant amount 
invested in being related to own our brand name and our reputation’ 
(CI4) since it is the licence-holder of the University C programs (CI10).  
 
To operate the FP, the VKP OP has invested significantly in setting up 
teams to handle admissions, enrolments, program management, lecturer 
management, and examinations management (CI5), as well as IT 
systems, including one to manage classroom allocations (CI9). The high 
level of investment by the OP also means that the ‘price comes down to 
it’, i.e., the University receives a smaller share of the fees (CI8), as a 
result of ‘a bigger flow of income to the VKP OP’ (CI10). CI11 surmised 
that since ‘they’re (i.e., the OP) taking the infrastructure risk and the 
capital risk … most of it, … their share of the revenue model has to take 
that into account’. 
 
In the past, i.e., about 2011 or 2012, the University used to employ a 
Principal who would be stationed within the VKP institution (and VSM 
institution) with the OP’s staff (CI3). This arrangement did not work out 
because the Principal was ‘kind of institutionalised because they sat in 
the VKP and VSM OP offices ... they became one of them’ (CI3), and ‘to 
an extent there was a perception that they were being captured by the 
organisation (i.e., the OP)’ (CI4). CI3 explained that the University ‘found 
it was very difficult for us to work under those situations ... we realised 
the best thing to do was to have a person directly employed by the 
University to sit … in a separate location, away from the full operation of 
the OP, and to look after the whole operation’. This was how the HCO 
came about, and ‘the idea of the HCO is to have a lot more control and 
oversight of our whole operation’ (CI3). The HCO was led by a Principal, 
who later became Dean (CI11). CI1 added that ‘it’s about minimizing 
those risks’, i.e., the risks of non-compliance by the OP of University and 
regulatory standards, while CI10 argued that the HCO ‘makes a 
difference having as we like to say boots on the ground we're operating’. 
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On reflection, CI1 remarked that ‘it was very high risk in those days (i.e., 
the early days of TNE) ... now, I think we’ve made Country V a little bit 
more secure ... in fact more secure than Country X really because there 
were more people paid by the University’ (in Country V). The University 
appointed one or two full-time teaching staff at the HCO for every School 
represented (CI2). 
 
The preceding comments about the HCO, and comments by other 
informants confirmed that all of the intermediate term strategies 
recommended in the University’s White Paper of 2013, except for the last 
two (which were not evidenced), were implemented (University C TNE 
Project Team 2013a, 21-22). These strategies were 
 
1) recruitment of full-time University C academic staff to be located in 
Country V. These academics would teach and coordinate units as 
well as mentor and coach host country teaching staff and students.  
2) recruitment of learning support staff to assist students requiring 
such support   
3) introduction of teacher training for host country teaching staff   
4) introduction of student facilitated study sessions to improve 
attainment levels   
5) provision of scholarships to attract high performing vocational 
training graduates   
6) development of a student exchange program so that some Country 
V students might  experience the University C home campus 
experience and mix with students and faculty in the home city   
 
Apart from the University’s programs, the OP runs ‘its own diploma and 
educational services ... (including) a franchise to do ACCA (a British 
professional accounting award) qualification training on their campus’ 
(CI4). In addition, the OP also delivers degree programs awarded by 
eleven other universities from around the world (CI3). CI4 commented 
that the OP does ‘risk diversification by having other programs and other 
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degrees with different financial models to them’, and that this is a 
‘danger’ to the University because it poses ‘serious concerns about 
potential conflicts of interest … (but the) University doesn't share those 
concerns’.  
 
These concerns include the possibility of cannibalisation of prospective 
students by internal substitutes, offering a sub-optimal range of 
programs, and loss of market access on termination. The first concern 
was articulated by CI6 that since the OP has ‘other partners as well ... 
you got to think that the sales team will direct students to the course … 
that gives them the most benefit … that’s their job, they are to do that ... 
we can’t blame them for that’ (CI6). But more fundamentally, the bulk of 
the OP’s Bachelor’s degree students (offered by its 12 university 
partners) come from the OP’s own articulated Diploma programs (CI4). 
 
CI3 referred to the second concern, that ‘the VKP OP sometimes don’t 
want to run programs that we feel … should run well’. And finally, in the 
event of a termination, CI7 added that ‘they (i.e, the OP) still have other 
universities to back on ... but we don’t have any’. However, CI3 
concluded that these concerns are probably mitigated by VKP’s size, i.e., 
that ‘the OP has come to the realisation I think, over the last few years, 
that they need the University maybe more than the University needs 
them ... (since) we’re their biggest partner ... we must be making the 
most money for them’. 
 
2.3.3 The TNE Review and White Paper 
 
The rapid growth of the VKP FP operation triggered the set up of a TNE 
Review Team in 2012 to study the implications of this rapid growth as 
well as recommend a plan to grow and manage the University’s TNE 
operations (University C TNE Project Team 2013a). The review which 
employed a variety of methods, including school meetings, town hall 
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meetings, the Delphi method and archival research, led to the publication 
of a Green Paper, and subsequently a White Paper in 2013 (Ibid.,).  
 
The White Paper concluded with four recommendations, viz.,  
 
1) establish ‘non-negotiable minima’ in TNE delivery, recognising that 
in some cases the adoption of these standards will render certain 
units/courses/disciplines and partnerships unsustainable or 
unattractive for either the partner, the University or the School 
2) develop and enforce a policy framework around very large unit 
offering cohorts (500-1,000 students)  
3) investigate the requirements for establishing a reliable, high 
quality, digital interface between the University and our 
Country V partners to facilitate high quality outcomes of both 
the delivery and administration of the University’s TNE 
enterprise  
4) engage with a professional marketing agency to enhance the 
appeal of its TNE offerings. Particular attention should be paid to 
the drive to improve quality and to the distinctive University 
advantages e.g. local academic and administrative staff, local 
Principal, blended learning, internships, local research capability, 
increased face-to-face contact with University staff with international 
reputations  
 
On the four White Paper recommendations, the informants reported that 
the University did enforce its non-negotiable minima in TNE delivery 
(CI3, CI5, CI8), address the delivery to large cohorts (CI3), and 
professionalise its marketing to strengthen its appeal in Country V (CI3, 
CI8). There was however, no evidence of the third recommendation 
being implemented, i.e., the digital interface between the University and 
the OPs. These observations were made by University staff with 
managerial and academic responsibilities.  
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It was interesting that the University also implemented a set of 
intermediate term strategies, while developing the White Paper. The 
Chair of the Review, the Country V Principal (who was later appointed 
Dean at the HCO), and the Vice-President (Offshore Partnerships) 
‘identified a need for immediate action in relation to some issues ... they 
recommend a quality assurance (QA) strategy of building local capacity 
(i.e., the HCO) to support the Country V cohort of students that represent 
close to one third of the University’s total enrolment’ (University C TNE 
Project Team 2013a, 21). This strategy is proposed to be funded through 
‘both partners impos(ing) a quality enhancement levy on each student in 
every unit ... the amount to be levied is (Country V)$60 per unit, per 
student, adding around 3 per cent to the total cost of each student’s 
program ... (and) both the VKP OP and VSM OP would pass on this 
additional contribution to students but may wish to absorb some or all of 
this increase’ (Ibid.). The resulting HCO was supposed to support both 
the VKP and VSM FP operations. However, the VSM FP operation 
terminated in 2016 (Section 5.4.2). 
 
CI1 reflected on the impact of the White Paper, saying that ‘that White 
Paper really established the Country V office … and changed the 
contract so that we got more … control; made us change the contract so 
that we would get a higher fee share as well ... but we would have to 
involve ourselves more, including setting up a proper office in Country V 
and ... of the Country X aspects, we wanted more control over 
admissions because that was a bit loose ... we wanted a Dean appointed 
by us, not by them ... so we did want to take more control in Country X as 
well, as a result of the White Paper’. 
 
CI6, who ‘was part of writing it’, is of the view that the White Paper ‘was a 
great paper’, and had some impact on the University’s TNE operations 
(‘TNE has been as a result of that for University C’), e.g., having ‘staff in 
Country V teaching is an improvement on what it was’. 
 
 779 
However, CI6 contended that the White Paper is now largely ‘consigned 
to history’, and that the University did not go ‘as far as it could’ because 
of ‘money ... change in management, change in direction’. In addition, ‘I 
think we can go a lot further still ... but I don’t know whether that is going 
to happen’. 
 
It was noteworthy that one University staff with strategic responsibility 
was not familiar with the White Paper, and remarked that ‘I didn’t read 
the White Paper … I need to review it obviously to see if it provides what 
we've done … by sheer commercial want, and educational will, if you like’ 
(CI11). 
 
2.3.4 TNE Performance 
 
The high number of students at VKP can be attributed to the OP (‘they 
drove recruitment, significant recruitment in the first 8 years of operation’ 
– CI2), and its high pressure sales team (‘sales is all pressure … to meet 
targets … they have various tiers (of payment for student recruitment) ... 
if they go through the first tier … for example, the Bachelor of Business in 
Marketing, they're given this tier - they need to get in, so maybe 30 
students, as a minimum; and you know sales is all about money ... so if 
they reach their target then they get their reward ... and then there’s 
higher and higher (tiers of) rewards ... (and) if they can keep on meeting 
their targets and there's a chance of you know high increment, and high 
bonus’ (CI9). CI2 commented that the OP has been ‘brilliant’, and called 
it ‘a juggernaut in Country V’. 
 
The OP is very skilful in deploying the University’s on-site staff for 
student recruitment, e.g., CI8 is regularly engaged to conduct marketing 
previews both in Country V, as well as overseas (Countries O and Y) 
although CI8’s designated role does not include marketing (CI8). CI3 
added that even the Dean gets involved in marketing, as he ‘constantly 
goes to Open House events; he goes to recruitment events’. The OP 
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promotes the HCO in marketing, declaring that the University ‘has its 
own Country V Dean; you can speak to the Dean anytime you like’ (CI3). 
The market loves ‘the fact that there is a … white person who's 
representing the University here in Country V ... and he speaks well; he’s 
articulate; he's professional … that means a lot’ (CI3). 
  
The very large student numbers for University C, compared to the other 
university partners of the OP, could also be ascribed to the University’s 
‘curriculum advantages over other universities, and we also had some 
price advantages over other universities … we had a much more flexible 
curriculum than most universities’ (CI2). CI1 commented that ‘we were 
pretty cheap ... we’re at the bottom end, really’. The early curriculum 
advantage, where ‘people want to get in and they want to do the courses 
quite quickly ... they like the fact that they can … do a three-year degree 
in two years’ (CI3) is being levelled in the market as other providers 
replicate that mode, ‘which is a bit of a problem there because we’ve lost 
that advantage’ (CI2). 
 
At the end of the strong eight-year growth in student numbers, the VKP 
operation experienced a small dip in student recruitment because the 
University ‘changed the curriculum’ (CI1). CI1 explained that the 
University ‘changed the delivery mode from 12-weekly classes to six 
fortnightly classes … and they’re very long, four hours long … we 
changed that a little bit to reduce the hours on a night time from 4 hours 
to three-and-a-half ... it’s a very long … people getting there late; it’s a 
very long night ... people working all day long; then they come and study 
at night for four hours’. The market has adjusted to the new delivery 
mode, and ‘our numbers are coming back for this year ... so I would 
anticipate we will be back to 2016 levels by the end of this year’ (CI1). 
 
The current (i.e., 2018) market environment has been affected by the 
state of the country’s economy (‘economically things have gone a bit 
slow ... everyone's struggling ... numbers are not rising as quickly as they 
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maybe have experienced in the past’ - CI3). The government had also 
‘changed things; it’s impacted on numbers slightly’ (CI3). The slow-down 
might have been the impetus for the University to take ‘a step back from’ 
offering a new Executive MBA, and return ‘an area that we had leased 
(which) is coming up for renewal; the staff that there’s now will be moved 
in with the other staff where we had a lot of teaching spaces that we’re 
probably never going to use’ (CI4). 
 
Although student numbers have ‘gone back a little bit’, the University, 
with more than 5,000 students at VKP, is ‘still one of the biggest foreign 
universities operating in Country V, if not the biggest’ (CI10). CI10 is of 
the view that the VKP operation is ‘mature, hopefully not in decline’. The 
largest beneficiary of the VKP operation is ‘the Business school with the 
largest number of students … it’s been a consistent growth for eight 
years … steady for two years’ (CI2). The student numbers for IT 
programs, although small has been growing (‘though they (i.e., Business 
school) have been contracting and we have been expanding over the last 
two years’ – CI6). 
 
The University is concerned with the contracting numbers for Business 
programs at VKP as it ‘will be a massive risk to the school of Business 
here … our Business school … is so dependent on Country V, not totally, 
but very dependent ... so that’s a bit of a risk of over exposure’ (CI2). 
Nevertheless, ‘there are some people in Business who are still very 
sceptical of the absolute benefits of transnational education … who are 
very hesitant to give praise to the Country V i-FP and the outcomes 
there’ (CI2). 
 
2.3.5 TNE Contract Renewal 
 
The VKP operation started in 2008 on a five-year contract (CI10). It was 
renewed for another five years in 2013, and a further ten years in 2018 
(CI4). CI1 reported that the White Paper contributed to a number of 
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changes to the second contract, including the establishment of the HCO 
through funding from a quality enhancement levy that was imposed on 
students, and the increased control over academic processes. The 
longer third contract of ten years ‘says a lot about the confidence on both 
sides’ (CI10). 
 
CI2 commented that ‘the contracts weren’t as strong or as tight as we’ve 
now got’, and that recent contract renewals were ‘much more thorough 
than … we did in 10 or 11 years ago ... (and) so obviously the data on 
their (i.e., OP’s) track record, their financials, then their ability to recruit, 
their network of recruiting agents, their reputation with the government 
and regulatory body’ were scrutinised. 
 
The recent contract ‘is a win-win … much more controlled than it was 
previously, and I think to our benefit, we are getting a better return but we 
are committed to growth with the OP’ (CI2). CI6 added that the ‘latest 
contract is more favourable in terms of financial returns to the university’. 
The quality enhancement levy, introduced in the second contract was 
‘done away with because we've got an increased fee share to cover that 
(i.e., the funding for the HCO)’ (CI4). 
 
The negotiations for the recent contract ‘took about 18 months to be able 
to complete … it was exhausting … it was complex … but I think that 
both parties saw the future potential ... and I think when both parties did 
their financial modelling … (and) when we both … looked at the total 
value of the partnership, it was quite striking for both parties over the ten-
year period’ (CI10). The stakes were high in the negotiation because ‘it's 
almost a situation where there would be mutually assured destruction if 
either one of us pulled out of the relationship … although you know I 
think that the OP will probably continue on without us, and we probably 
continue without them … but it is acknowledged I think by both sides that 
it is a relationship that works for both parties’.  
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There was a point when the University did consider going it alone, but 
decided against it because ‘they (i.e., the OP) bring capabilities that we 
don't have as an institution ... the local knowledge, the agent network ... 
not just their agent network offshore but also they've got people in-
country … like in Countries O, T, R, Q and Y ... their reputation, their 
brand in Country V … (and) the efficiency of their model ... pretty 
sharpened ... I mean if you go over to the campus … rooms are ticking 
over; their very forward, contemporary campus and brand new smart 
classrooms … it's what they do quite well ... and those would be things 
that I think any institution like University C would find difficult to 
reproduce’ (CI10). The University also acknowledged that while ‘certainly 
they (i.e., the OP) probably value the IP, … they've got other university 
partners that offer business degrees ... there's nothing particularly novel 
about that’ (CI10).  
 
CI4 elaborated on the circumstances surrounding the negotiation for the 
recent contract, saying ‘in almost every contractual situation there is a 
dominant party and a weaker party ... in our prior contractual 
negotiations, because of different circumstances, I think that this 
organisation has gone into them giving the perception of being the 
weaker party; a desperate sale, if you like ... it didn't help that when the 
contract re-negotiations were going on in 2015, 2016, that the University 
here went through its own traumas … with (governance issues and 
changes in) its Vice Chancellor and others ... that automatically put us on 
the back foot in terms of … trying to get the best possible opportunities ... 
and I think to that extent, the contract reflects that we were the weaker 
party to those negotiations’.  
 
2.3.6 Country V Alumni Engagement 
 
The University’s long TNE presence in Country V has resulted in a large 
number of alumni, numbering about 18,000 (CI9). These alumni are 
actively serviced by an alumni team comprising of volunteer alumni, and 
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supported by the University’s home campus alumni office (CI7). The 
HCO ‘lend them (i.e., the Country V alumni team) the office’ for their 
activities (CI7). CI9 added that ‘when they come here (i.e., the HCO), we 
want them to feel as if they are coming home ... and so the way we do 
this is through workshops and through other activities … could be a fun 
activity for their families, could be movies, could be like soap-making or 
socials’. The support from the HCO for the alumni team is ‘adhoc ... we 
want to engage them a little bit … not so structured’ (CI9). 
 
Apart from supporting the alumni and their families, the HCO staff also 
see alumni engagement as a potential for branding (‘the alumni is our 
brand ... and they should also be like our PR; I wouldn’t call them our PR 
machine, but you know, PR strategists’ – CI9), and recruitment for ‘a 
second degree or a Master’s’ (CI7).  
 
The alumni activities are run by a formal team of alumni which conduct 
its annual general meeting (AGM) ‘every two years … so we give the 
alumni the opportunity to elect their own president, vice president, 
secretary and treasurer ... so they will come up with ideas on what they 
want ... we don't want to pressure them ... they would come up with 
something ... they came up with this idea of … a movie’ (CI9). 
 
2.3.7 Completing the Portfolio with Research and Community 
Engagement 
 
While the initial set-up of the HCO did not include research and 
community engagement as an intermediate term strategy, these activities 
were made possible through the ‘good gross margin … that’s seeded the 
research centre’ (CI2). CI2 also added that the HCO has been leveraged 
for research, and ‘that’s why we’ve got a research centre there now’. 
 
The research centre (‘SCORE’, a pseudonym) is now headed by a full-
time head (CI4), who has ‘done a great job ... and in-fact we are getting 
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more traction from investors in Country V than we are in the University’s 
home city for some of our research particularly in agriculture’ (CI2). CI11 
also commented that ‘we’ve been very successful in research grants and 
research funding pools in Country V’. 
 
The University, through SCORE now has ‘access to different Country V 
and other organisations to do collaborative research projects … and they 
seem to be picking up more and more as the institution becomes better 
known, especially within the Country V government authorities and 
trusted as an organisation that can deliver’ (CI4). The University’s full-
time academic staff, numbering about five persons, have ‘the usual 
expectations of research and there've been an allowance for research’ 
(CI4). CI9 clarified that the ‘allowance for research’ that CI4 mentioned is 
the arrangement where ‘our lecturers will teach two trimesters and then 
one trimester for research’.  
 
CI5 reported that her School ‘have a full-time Psychology lecturer in 
Country V … (who is) based in the HCO and she does a lot of research 
in Country V … (and) I'm running a project at the moment with her that's 
looking at academic integration and institutional commitment for 
University C TNE students versus University C onshore students’. When 
asked if the HCO full-time academic staff is remunerated for research, 
she explained that ‘she's also on a salary ... so it's just part of our job that 
we were required to do research and to supervise student research 
projects … and she teaches some of the units’. CI5 also clarified that ‘it 
might be the case that in some of her projects, she does get funding into 
SCORE, but I think, um, it's worth saying it's SCORE ... so if she gets 
money that goes into SCORE, she doesn't get any money out of that, 
personally ... so, it exists within SCORE, and she's helped get the money 
in there, but she doesn't benefit financially at all from that money’.  
 
On the part of the OP, there is no expectation that the OP or its 
academic staff be involved in research or community engagement 
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(CI11). However, CI11 commented that the OP is involved in some 
‘community engagement … and some government connections ... and 
those are the things but not to do pure research’. CI7 added that the OP 
‘are quite supportive, especially when we have certain events … like … 
events promoting work placements, … we have some workshops that we 
want to introduce to the students … they are very supportive in terms of 
monetary, (and) letting us use their premises’. 
 
2.4 Country V Operating Environment 
 
The Country V operating environment has been described as ‘a high risk 
environment for foreign institutions’ (CI8). CI10 quipped that ‘some of the 
big brands of course came here and then left’, referring to several world 
renowned universities, some of which were set up to support the 
development of local government institutions. For VKP, the majority of its 
students (60% of total VKP student population) used to be domestic 
Country V students who have completed their vocational studies and 
looking to topping up with a degree (CI10). With the growing options 
provided by additional local government universities, this proportion has 
dropped to 50%, which has ‘hurt us a little bit’ (CI10). CI7 is of the view 
that ‘the growing market no longer is Country V … our universities should 
also look at opportunities elsewhere’. It is imperative that universities 
‘have to cater to all these changes and I think that for a university to 
survive now, we need to make changes’ (CI7). 
 
2.4.1 Economic and Business Environment 
 
From the economic and business perspectives, CI7 asserted that ‘in the 
micro view, I would say this market is very saturated’. The number of 
government universities has grown rapidly to meet various local needs; 
there are now six government universities, some of which ‘have 
collaboration with external universities like University W (a TNE-active 
Australian ‘Others’ university)’ (CI7). Citizens of Country V have an 
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affinity to their own government institutions, as CI7 described ‘I’m with 
the local university’.  
 
Having a larger number of government universities also means that ‘you 
are increasing the number of places’, which in turn implies that ‘the entry 
requirements might be slightly lower’ (CI7).  Therefore, ‘they take the 
bulk now; before, they were taking the top tier and now they have come 
down (i.e., accepting lower performing students) and this is what we are 
getting … so we have less students to be shared among all the foreign 
institutions’ (CI8). CI7 explained that ‘the demand is not there ... it’s 
already more or less fixed ... and you have added so many other public 
universities’. 
 
There was a period when the Country V government ‘actively solicited 
foreign overseas (like some of the top 100 in the THE ranking) to come 
here, and those universities were brought in on subsidies and when the 
period of subsidy ended, those universities said, ‘well, we can't survive’’ 
(CI10). Some of these foreign institutions could not survive because they 
were charging very high fees, and ‘Country V citizens are actually more 
price sensitive when it comes to education and you might think … so, 
University E (a top 10 business school) (Badre 2017) is still very popular; 
it does very well but the bulk of our students are very price sensitive’ 
(CI10). 
 
CI7 shared that domestic students usually assess four key criteria in 
selecting an institution of higher education, viz., ‘location, price, ranking 
and … duration of the course’. Location as a key criteria has been 
demonstrated by VSM’s experience in moving from the CBD to the 
suburbs, resulting in its business having ‘disappeared almost overnight 
… (because it was) less convenient for students’ (CI6). Duration is 
important ‘because students can complete three academic years, in two 
years … (and) ‘that’s the reason why we run in trimester basis instead of 
semesters’ (CI7). In terms of ranking, there seems to be ‘no competitive 
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advantage between universities ... all our Australian universities, you can 
only look at their rankings’, which are similar (CI7). 
 
2.4.2 Regulatory Environment 
 
The operating environment has also tightened up in terms of the 
regulatory requirements imposed by the government. There were two 
events that precipitated this tightening, viz., ‘some high profile failures’ 
among private institutions (CI6), and the results of the 2011 general 
election.  
 
The government had proactively marketed itself (CI10) as a regional 
education hub since 2003 (Lee 2012, 2). This push led to the proliferation 
of private higher education institutions, some of which were ‘fly-by-night 
schools … students paid the full sum, and then in the end … got 
cheated’, while in some of the others ‘the curriculum was not exactly 
what was taught in the main campus’ (CI7). For these reasons, the 
government ‘introduced DQF (a pseudonym for the government’s 
regulatory authority in education) into this sector … (and) shook up the 
market in 2011’ (CI7). 
 
The education sector became ‘very regulated’ (CI7), and DQF was 
perceived to be ‘perhaps overzealous’ (CI6). It was not difficult to 
understand why when the informants shared their experiences with DQF.  
First, all programs are ‘required to register with DQF’ prior to delivery 
(CI7). Second, all ‘lecturers must be approved by DQF’. Third, institutions 
‘need to issue a student contract (CI7), and ‘if the student wants to 
change a major, they have to have a new contract ... (which costs) 500 
dollars’ (CI6). CI6 added that ‘if we change the name of a unit, it has to 
be approved by the DQF before it can be offered to the students ... if we 
change the structure of our courses and so on ... we’ve never had 
anything not approved, but it takes time’. This was demonstrated recently 
as CI5 shared that ‘regretfully we haven't had very much time to market it 
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(i.e., a new post-graduate program) because it took a long time to get 
approvals from the DQF and then obviously we couldn’t start recruiting 
until we’ve got those approvals’. 
 
In CI7 words, ‘everything needs to be approved by DQF, and any 
changes that we make, we will need to submit for approval … however, 
while the Country V government has to look after its own reputation ... 
but that lack of flexibility makes things difficult’ (CI6). The inflexible 
environment is not helped by the mass media, as CI6 explained – ‘when 
we have students who complain about academics … it’s just one step to 
one of those people writing a letter to the national daily or complaining to 
the DQF ... and they are very prominently reported by the press’. 
 
The other ‘turning point was 2011 after the general election’ (CI10). CI10 
explained that the governing party ‘lost two seats and two electorates … 
and that had never happened before ... that was a real wake up call ... 
and the feeling was that the electorate were very concerned about 
foreigners generally’. CI10 described it as ‘an early outbreak of sort of 
the nationalism that you now see in the United States … the sort of 
resulted in Trump … or Brexit in the UK or … the shift to the right that 
you see in parts of Europe and Australia as well ... so this idea that we 
need to look after our own national interests first’. But somehow 
‘education got caught up in all that’. For example, ‘very talented 
international students were coming in on full scholarships, but then the 
local kids were missed out’. There were also grouses that ‘our city was 
becoming congested ... it's hard to get a job ... only Western expats 
taking over their good jobs at the top end, and at the bottom end … 
foreigners from the neighbouring countries are taking other jobs ... and 
so, the citizens are getting … squeezed out … and at the same time 
housing prices are going up; we can’t afford ... so there's a lot of 
concerns about foreigners’. CI10 concluded that ‘the government, after 
the elections was over, they got the message and they tightened up on 
immigration, they tightened up on the perceived benefits given to 
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foreigners’. CI7 added that ‘now they tighten up the requirements, and 
they don’t … easily allow students … issuing of student pass (for entry 
into the Country), including barring students from ‘certain countries ... (or) 
certain states in some countries (with poor immigration patterns) 
…because some of them might stay on illegally’.  
 
In a discussion on the value of tight regulation, CI10 is of the view that 
‘regulation can actually lift the reputation of the entire sector and those 
that are willing to adhere to the regulatory thresholds ... and I think that 
makes it easier for consumers to know that it's a reputable industry … 
what it says on the box I'm actually going to receive’. CI10 contrasts this 
with the time ‘before Country V had its private education act, there were 
a lot of cowboys ... and what happens is that when you get degree mills 
setting up in unregulated areas and you've got no way of discerning 
quality is that it becomes quite confusing for prospective students and … 
the whole sector develops a bad reputation’. 
 
CI10 also acknowledged that ‘of course regulators can become quite 
pedantic and they can focus on things that I think are not so relevant to 
the educational experience of students’, giving the example of the 
University’s ‘inability to deliver a program here (in Country V) … that we 
don't offer on campus’. While there is justification for this restriction 
‘because they want to make sure that is tried and tested in the home 
market, … but what if you don't have the industry in the home market to 
support it?’. CI10’s experience in operating within Country V’s regulatory 
environment led to the conclusion that ‘it's (i.e, regulations) really unclear 
actually’.  
 
2.4.3 Political and Policy Environment 
 
CI2 reported that the Country V ‘government decided that they want to 
have more people doing STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, 
Mathematics) ... so they are putting pressure on international providers, 
 791 
universities to offer more STEM courses, because they (are) skilling their 
work force for the future, so that’s a risk’ for the University. The 
government had also in the past, ‘decided that there was a range of law 
providers that they no longer recognised’, but the University’s law degree 
‘survived, but other quite prestigious universities didn’t … so that’s 
always a risk transnationally’ (CI2). 
 
CI10 related that ‘the other thing that's changed is the whole government 
narrative around the value of university education ... there's been this big 
push against so-called paper qualifications and ... a big focus on skills 
but also saying you don't need a university degree to be successful ... 
you need to explore other options’, e.g., vocational diplomas. CI10 
continued that ‘the main issue with the vocational students is that they 
might go and work for a while but then they realise that they get stuck at 
a certain level (and) without … having a university qualification, they 
couldn’t go any further, they couldn’t earn more money ... so of course 
they want more money so they get a degree ... but the government is 
trying to change that as much as possible ... I don't think that they are 
succeeding’. Country V society has evolved and now ‘also young 
Country V citizens don't want to work in … what they consider to be dirty 
industries ... because they all want to go work at a financial district right 
away … they want to sit in air conditioned offices, and then go down to 
Starbucks’. CI7 added that ‘the government is also not very supportive of 
(university providers) … because they see that it’s very saturated, there 
are too many graduates – white collar’. In fact, the government allocates 
(Country V)$500 per citizen, per year for skills upgrading (CI7). When 
asked if the University might enter the skills development area, CI7 
responded with ‘no … because we’re a university … but we are also 
looking at changing our curriculum to cater to that as well’, and that the 
OP has plans to offer skills programs through ‘their own subset (i.e., 
subsidiary)’. 
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For international students studying in Country V, the Country is a 
‘politically stable environment and a peaceful environment’ (CI9). 
However, domestic politics and policies are currently hindering a higher 
intake of international students. 
 
2.4.4 Cultural and Social Environment 
 
CI9 asserted that ‘for us, the main stress point would be … our lower 
population growth’, which is observed in the ‘lower than expected’ 
numbers for VKP, the ‘merging of secondary schools’, and the recent 
government initiative to source nurses from a neighbouring country (CI9). 
CI9 added that the government hoped ‘that they would stay … and 
migrate here ... so to grow our young population’. However, this view 
seems somewhat incongruent with CI10’s view of the current nationalist 
sentiments pervading the Country. 
 
On academic delivery, CI4 reported that ‘simply being distant from us 
causes me some concerns; there are different cultural and social 
standards that I have to be mindful of to accommodate within my view of 
what is equivalent student expectations in a jurisdiction like Country V 
are different from expectations of students here (i.e., on home campus) 
… (and it is important) for me to explain and demonstrate what my 
expectations are’. CI4 explained that ‘students in Country V tend to be 
reluctant to be active learners, to actually engage with the teaching staff 
in discussion and discourse … ‘just tell me what I need to know’’. For 
students on the home campus ‘we're probably a bit better at actively 
encouraging that engagement because we have permanent academic 
staff that know that that’s one of the best ways for students to learn ... 
you can’t do the same to the same extent when you're doing this stuff 
offshore’ (CI4). 
 
The ‘majority of our students in Country V are part-time, so they are all 
working … they come in after work, they grab some McDonalds or KFC 
 793 
on their way to their classes ... they sit there and then they go home ... or 
they go shopping at half-past ten ... I don’t think there’s much of an 
opportunity for social interaction between the students as it would be in a 
university campus’ (CI6). CI6 continued that ‘it is much more difficult to 
do group work in Singapore than it is here (in the home campus) ... 
because if the students have to do that at night, well they have to do it on 
the weekends ... they can’t do it after class because it is too late at night’. 
 
CI9 reported that there is a cohort of students among civil servants, who 
know that ‘if they complete their degree then there's a higher chance of 
them … (to get a) promotion, … and increment (and) ... credential’. For 
this market segment, VKP provides them with the flexibility of taking 
fewer units per study period, even to the point of ‘just take(ing) one’ unit 
(CI9). 
 
3.0 Changing Offshore Partner in Country X (2008 to date) 
 
Although the University had been operating in Country X for ten years, it 
decided to terminate the operations due to poor student numbers and 
suspect quality of delivery. However, a newly appointed Vice-Chancellor 
decided to reverse the termination decision, but re-started the operations 
with another OP. 
 
3.1 Country X in situ monitored Branch Campus (ic-IBC) 
 
This section explores the University’s first TNE operation in Country X, 
and describes its eventual termination. 
 
3.1.1 Background and Motivation of the OP 
 
An  in situ monitored collaborative branch campus (ic-IBC) is a branch 
campus that is operated by an OP with some university partner staff 
presence on-site. The beginnings of the University’s first ic-IBC in 
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Country X can be traced to an approach by a privately-owned global 
multimedia corporation that had a region-wide franchise for a ‘24-hour 
finance news network’ (CI1, CI6). Their strength obviously lies in the 
media sector, and the focus of the ic-IBC was in ‘the arts, the media, 
(and) film’ (CI2). The OP’s parent organisation initially held the franchise 
for the news network covering the northern AA region of countries, and 
later added the southern AA region as well (CI1). 
 
CI1 explained that ‘previous to working with us, they didn’t have any 
education arm, no educational experience at all … it is a media 
company’, while CI4 saw the OP as not having ‘any educational 
institutions of their own ... it was simply a management body that saw 
education as a field of business to get into’. CI4 added that ‘they had no 
academic background ... (and) they simply recruited sufficient staff that 
they needed to deliver our units, and a couple of academic 
managers/administrators to have oversight of the program … (and they) 
didn't have that global network that the VKP OP have available to them, 
and the expertise that comes from having a large global network’. 
 
CI1’s perspective of the OP’s motivation to set up the ic-IBC was that the 
OP ‘wanted to do some training for their own staff ... that’s how they 
approached University C and said, ‘We wanted to use your IP; we’ll set it 
up in Country X; we think there’s a market there ... we need to train our 
own staff as well’ ... we wanted to get into education ... (but) I don’t think 
we ever saw any of their own staff’. One of the principals of the OP ‘had 
an aspiration to be involved in university work’ because ‘although he 
wasn’t an educator himself, his father was very high up in the Country Q 
education’ sector. However, in CI3’s view, the OP plainly ‘see that there's 
money to be made’ out of private education. Similarly, the University’s 
perceived benefit was mainly financial (CI1). 
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3.1.2 TNE Business Delivery Model 
 
In line with the University’s preference for asset-light TNE operations 
(CI11), the Country X ic-IBC engaged an OP which was the 
‘infrastructure provider’ (CI6), where the campus ‘was (a) fully funded 
infrastructure by the OP … we didn’t put anything into it’ (CI1). The OP 
invested ‘significantly in infrastructure around film, (and) media’ (CI2) to 
cater for programs in ‘Journalism or Screen Production, or Creative 
Media’ (CI1). This significant investment was not unexpected given that 
‘they have studio, they’ve got equipment … they were in that business’ 
(CI1). 
 
The OP was responsible for employing all academic and administrative 
staff, with the University approving all teaching staff prior to engagement 
(CI1). The Country X ic-IBC was commended for having started well by 
employing several full-time core teaching staff, and supported by other 
part-time teaching staff, compared to other TNE operations where almost 
all teaching staff are part-timers (CI1). CI6 also commented that ‘we have 
quite a stable group of people teaching with us in Country X … we had 
the same 3 or 4 people teaching for us in Country X since we’ve been 
there’. The on-site teaching staff were responsible for teaching and 
grading of all assessments, including examinations, while the University 
retained the role of moderation of all assessments (CI6). 
 
To monitor the TNE operations, the University seconded Deans on-site, 
and there had been ‘five Deans in the eleven years I’ve been here’ (CI2). 
However, CI2 added that there were ‘some failed Deans earlier on, didn’t 
work out, so that wasn’t a great start’. These appointments were found 
wanting because ‘it was always a bit grey … they were kind of paid by 
University C, but they were kind of institutionalised because they sat in 
the OP’s office ... they became one of them …  so we sent them 
somebody that works here over there …. (and one of them) was 
institutionalised; he became an OP person and he’s still with the OP to 
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this day’ (CI3). CI1 reported that the University currently has two on-site 
staff reporting directly to the University, viz., one Dean and an 
admissions officer. 
 
In terms of the programs, it was interesting to note that apart from the 
degree programs delivered by the University, the OP also delivered its 
own Foundation as a feeder into the University’s programs (CI1). CI1 
explained that ‘that’s where the OP I think made their money with the 
Foundation ... because there’s always good numbers in the Foundation 
program ... it could have been 100 every semester but as much as … 
(or) bigger than each intake of the University each semester’. However, 
‘we didn't have much control over that; it was their program’ (CI3). 
 
This Country X ic-IBC was the University’s first foray into the MM/AA 
regions (CI3, CI1). The OP’s ‘aspirations were quite broad’, having 
ventured into one of the AA countries with another British university, and 
had ‘wanted to expand University C into a southern AA country and … 
we were keen on that’ (CI1). However, CI1 added that ‘they actually 
never ventured into those other countries ... it’s never come up at the 
Dean’s level’. 
 
3.1.3 TNE Performance 
 
The Country X ic-IBC had been running for about ten years when it was 
terminated in 2018 (CI1, CI10). The OP had been ‘looking around at 
Australian universities’ prior to identifying University C, and they were 
attracted to the University’s interactive TV research institute, but 
‘essentially they wanted IP and they wanted to start their own … their 
own area’ (CI1). The OP ended up selecting Communication, Business, 
IT and Education programs for the ic-IBC (CI1). 
 
While ‘their first conversation was with the Vice-Chancellor’ (CI1), one of 
the University’s senior executive deputizing the VC met the OP’s CEO 
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‘and explored the opportunities’, and ultimately ‘signed off on that deal’ 
(CI2). The relationship between the senior executive and the OP’s CEO 
had been close and described as ‘a yin and yang in Country X’ (CI2). 
 
CI1 described the environment in Country X during the negotiation stage 
as ‘flourishing ... really expanding at a hell of a rage ... all based on 
speculation, real estate prices and construction industry … Country C 
was booming … I think it had a quarter of all the cranes in the world or 
something ... it was extraordinary’, and ‘they (i.e., the OP) had a grand 
plan and they were funding it accordingly anyway, … we were in some 
way, like many organisations, buoyed or seduced even, to go to … 
Country X’, although ‘it was not part of … the University’s strategic plan’.  
 
However, the ic-IBC had ‘never been a lot of students’ (CI6), hovering 
between 500 and 600 students (CI1, CI3). CI1 added that ‘probably in 
the last four years, it’s been that level ... it’s been up and down a little bit, 
because we changed the entry requirements for the Master of Business 
Administration ... something like 2012, maybe … we changed the rules to 
say you had to have experience ... you couldn’t go straight from a 
Bachelor’s degree into the MBA ... we lost a lot of … students’. CI4 
commented that ‘one of the underlying problems or issues or concerns 
was the lack of sustainable volumes of students recruited into our 
programs’. The OP was commended about having ‘all the will and the 
best intentions to grow’, and indeed, ‘we worked relatively cooperatively I 
think for six, seven, eight years but the last few years became difficult 
when we wanted to grow’ (CI2). On the part of the OP, they ‘did try very 
hard, but I’m sure they lost money, and we certainly didn’t generate 
enough profit to sustain’ (CI2). 
 
The poor performance of the ic-IBC was attributed to  the ‘incredibly 
competitive environment’, and the onset of the ‘the financial crisis’ which 
caused the majority of the students, who are mostly international 
students, to leave the Country ‘in droves’ (CI2). CI2 also added that ‘they 
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(i.e., the OP) hadn’t done the market intelligence … as well as they 
should have because it’s an expensive start-up and it’s more expensive 
to deliver (Communication programs) than Business (programs)’. 
Similarly, CI1 commented that ‘we (i.e., the University) just didn’t do any 
research on this ... I presume that they proposed something interesting  
… you’ve got to understand this was 2007,  before the … global financial 
crisis’.  
 
Although CI6 was of the view that the failure of the ic-IBC was not ‘a 
quality thing’, CI3 contended that the University ‘was to blame too for the 
fact that this relationship maybe didn't go as well as it could’. CI3 
explained that ‘I don't think that he (the University’s senior executive who 
signed the contract) nor the people that worked in TNE at the University 
set things up as well as they could have been set up ... and we made 
mistakes … we let the OP have too much control and we are so far away 
that I think people just said, ‘oh you know, let's … let them get on with it’ 
… let them do this, let them do that … you know, it's going OK, it’s not 
going grave ... it’s all alright, so let them get on with it ... they seem to 
know what they're doing’.  
 
However, ‘when we (the new TNE team at the University) came on board 
like five or six years ago … and we're going, ‘Jeez, what's going on in 
Country X? Why are we letting them do this? Why are we letting them do 
that?’ (CI3). In describing the infringements, CI3 went on to say that 
‘sometimes we found that the host country teaching staff weren't being 
approved appropriately, like a teaching staff might be approved, and 
then, after week two, that teaching staff, for some reason, couldn't 
continue ... and then somebody … would take over which we don't know 
about’. The University also ‘were a bit more loose or lax with our 
admissions in Country X … we didn’t take control of that ... so there was 
always some pushing going on in relation to admissions’, despite the ic-
IBC having ‘the admissions staff, and … the Dean … employed by the 
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OP’ (CI1). CI2 attributed some of these infringements to the fact that ‘the 
contracts weren’t as strong or as tight as we’ve now got’. 
 
CI3 was also of the view that the OP was not ‘great at marketing … not 
as well known worldwide ... (and) don't know education as well’ (in 
comparison with the University’s other OP). While ‘they own their own 
buildings and stuff ... the people that actually own the OP really weren't 
education people’ (CI3). CI2 explained that there was a mistake in ‘the 
curriculum offerings …. I mean if we would have started off in Country X 
with a really strong push on Business (programs) and then grown into 
other areas, it might have been a better strategy, but the OP convinced 
us and they were committed to Media and Film (which apparently 
appealed to a smaller segment of the market)’, and ‘until Business 
started to grow, the other areas have been very low … from day one’. 
 
3.2 Country X Re-constituted Branch Campus (ic-IBC) 
 
CI11 had a candid take on the changing of OPs in Country X at the 
conclusion of the first OP’s contract, saying ‘we’ve had an interesting 
time swapping partners ... we’ve had to swap out in Country X … the first 
partner that is a family-cum-educator, from the family business to a 
company that’s been set up … the new OP with a global network ... that 
deliver these services, which are their core business’. Although the 
negotiations with the new OP ‘went on for a long time, … I think it's fair to 
say that we're happy with the arrangement … it's a better arrangement 
than we had with the previous OP ... so we're happy and they’re happy’ 
(CI3). CI11 added that ‘it’s a very different relationship there now ... and 
the fact that we can negotiate some really good outcomes for new, long-
term partnerships … fifteen years with the new OP, with a further ten 
years as a possibility … stands us in good stead to ensure that we’re 
working with partners that are there for the same reasons that we are’. 
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3.2.1 Country X TNE Partner Swapping 
 
CI4 reported that ‘we've been in partnership with them since I think 2008 
... (and) the contract comes to its natural end at the end of this year (i.e,, 
2018)’. Prior to the conclusion of the contract, the then new VC ‘came 
on-board as our Vice Chancellor, (and) he told the OP that we're going to 
be pulling out at the end of the contract’ (CI3). The OP was naturally 
‘upset with us leaving … they said, ‘we set this up … we’re still in debt for 
having set it up’’ as the ic-IBC ‘was (a) fully funded infrastructure by the 
OP … we didn’t put anything into it’ (CI1). In fact, the host country 
Regulator was also ‘very concerned … that they would lose another 
international university’ (CI2), and ‘unhappy with both parties … it caused 
some level of concern among Australian circles as well; this was the way 
the Regulator viewed it ... it was ‘can we trust Australian institutions?’ … 
they might have had a flow-on effect there ... it looked bad for the 
University to pull out after making commitments to the city - in the 
Regulator’s view … they take a long view of it obviously’ (CI1). The 
Regulator ‘scrutinised us closely thereafter’ (CI2). 
 
The view of many University staff was summarised by CI3, that 
‘everyone here thought, we've been flogging this horse for ten years ... 
it's been tough work ... maybe we should just get out’. In 2016, the 
University appointed a new VC, who had previously been working in 
another Australian university that was active in TNE (CI3). The VC had a 
different view, ‘believed that Country X is a good place to be ... TNE-wise 
... (and) believed that we've spent 10 years of building a reputation in 
Country X and to actually get out … and throwing that away (was a 
waste)’ (CI3). Further, ‘if you ever want to get back in in the future … 
very difficult and the Regulator do not look very kindly upon people who 
decide to go and want to come back in five years’ time ... I think the VC 
knows how other universities are busting their guts just to get in as well’ 
(CI3).  
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Hence, in ‘late 2014, early 2015 was when the University reversed its 
view that it should get out of Country X … we were going to get out of 
Country X altogether ... it reversed its view’ (CI2). This reversal was 
attributed to the VC who ‘had the final say’ (CI3). CI10 described the pull-
out as ‘under a different leadership ... and then a new leadership comes 
along and they have different ideas’. CI3 added that ‘I think everyone's 
attitude, now that the decision was made by … our new Vice Chancellor 
to stay in Country X and with the new OP who is a much more 
experienced partner, people have turned around and said, ‘oh, you know, 
at least we've got a partner that understands (education)’.  
 
Since the University announced its decision to terminate its TNE 
operation, the OP then went ‘searching for a new partner’, and 
succeeded in signing up University A to replace University C (CI3). In the 
meantime, University C reversed its decision to leave Country X, and 
engaged a new OP to continue its TNE operation there (CI2). CI1 
commented that ‘in the end, we decided that we’re not going to leave 
Country X; we’re just going to leave that partner’.  
 
The reversal was described as ‘decisions that happened at higher levels 
than mine’ (CI6). When it was known across the University that ‘we’re 
going back to Country X with a new partner … you can imagine the Arts 
Dean, (and) the Engineering and IT Dean are a bit sceptical because it 
hasn’t been a land of milk and honey ... it’s a university decision, we seek 
feedback but we’ve got a whole range of new offerings that the new OP 
want to offer’ (CI2). Further, ‘there’s a lot of commercial-in-confidence ... 
we were committed to Country X, we were committed to a new partner 
but the details … the Deans weren't across the details of that deal … but 
now we know who the partner is, now we know we’ve got the course 
portfolio and some of these may not run depending on their market 
intelligence, but the schools really would have had 12 months to start 
getting ready for 2019 implementation’ (CI2). 
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The re-starting of the TNE operation under the new OP was not smooth; 
‘we were forced (by the previous OP) to follow the strict rule of the 
contract, which was that we go for ten years and then start teaching it out 
... we wanted to convert, we wanted to transition out of the relationship 
but we’ve been held to the relationship until now, until the end of this 
year … the University would have wanted to go sooner ... but we were 
held to the contract’ (CI1). CI1 went on to explain that ‘we destroyed the 
trust ... because we decided we didn’t want to stay in Country X three 
years ago ... we’re the ones who wanted to get out of the contract … and 
they pushed back on that’. Similarly, the University A offshore partner 
‘couldn’t work with University A until there were some legal things in 
place’ (CI2). In fact, the OP ‘created another (legal) entity, and that entity 
went with University A ... very clever’ (CI1).  
 
3.2.2 Background of New OP 
 
The new OP is an acknowledged global player (CI11) with a ‘proven 
track record (working with) … Universities A and B’ (CI2). CI10 added 
that, apart from being ‘very experienced’ and ‘a good partner’ (in TNE), 
the new OP also has a ‘good agent network’. It does seem ‘that part of 
the strategy of going with someone like the new OP, is that given the 
scale of their operations, we’re more likely to get more students attracted 
through them to our programs’ (CI4). 
 
CI2 was of the view that the new OP would be ‘profitable’ to the 
University and present ‘good synergies’ through its AA region 
connection, given the University’s own extensive ‘research in AA … great 
coverage with some really good universities across the continent … in 
food production mainly, but also mine site closures, (and) environmental 
impacts’. CI2 also added that the location of the TNE operation will 
position the University to benefit from the ‘growth of the middle class in 
AA’. 
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3.2.3 TNE Business Delivery Model 
 
The host country Regulator required the University to ‘hold the licence’ 
(CI3), and operate as an IBC, which CI3 defined ‘in my view is (like) 
University A in Country T where they've built their own, or they own their 
own building, etc and they don’t have a partner’. CI3 explained that ‘in 
Country X we called it the branch campus and that's what it looks like ... 
the University's name is on the building … right now ... and you don't 
even know that you're working with anybody else ... and it does look like 
it's a branch campus’.  
 
The Regulator ‘want it to look like University C is the branch campus and 
that's it ... there's really no one else ... the OP are just in the background 
helping the University to run it ... so no one really knows about the OP … 
they (i.e., the Regulator) don't want anyone to really know about the OP’ 
(CI3). Further, the Regulator ‘don't want them (i.e., the OP) involved in 
the actual delivery of courses ... (but) they’re just an infrastructure 
provider … (although the OP is) an education provider’ (CI3). The OP 
‘have to provide the infrastructure … and the staff … we do rely on them 
to employ people to teach our units ... and paying them … so it goes a bit 
beyond, in my view, it's not really a branch campus but people do refer to 
it as a branch campus’ (CI3).  
 
Similar to Country V’s i-FP, the Country X new ic-IBC is expected to be 
helmed by a Dean, who will be paid and reports directly to the University 
(CI11). CI4 reported that ‘there're subtle differences in that the Country X 
Dean is actually located where the teaching is done ... (while) in Country 
V, the Dean is physically separated from the partnership’. CI1 noted that 
‘we try to emulate (our TNE model in) Country V as much as we can in 
Country X’. 
 
The University is also in the process of appointing ‘program coordinators’ 
on-site (CI3). Although these program coordinators are already in place, 
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they are ‘paid by and report to the partner’ (CI3). These are ‘the real key 
people in each discipline, one person in each discipline, that … had been 
with the University for quite some time and that were doing really well ... 
(except that now) the OP have agreed that they can report directly to … 
our Country X Dean ... so we can have a lot more control over all their 
teaching staff … (which is) much cheaper ... (as) we’re not paying for 
them’ (CI3). The appointment of program coordinators seems to be a 
refinement of the University’s Country V HCO model, where the 
University hires its own academic staff, some of whom are also unit 
coordinators (Section App I 2.3b). The new Country X ic-IBC seems to 
be less costly for the University in terms of the employment of program 
coordinators. 
 
In the past, the Regulator permitted the previous OP to deliver its own 
Foundation program, and ‘that’s where the OP I think made their money 
with the Foundation ... because there’s always good numbers in the 
Foundation program ... it could have been 100 every semester but as 
much as … (or) bigger than each intake of the University each semester’ 
(CI1). CI3 observed that the Regulator ‘has wizened up as well ... now 
OPs can't run their Foundation program ... we have to run the Foundation 
program .... it has to be badged as University C and it has to be run by 
University C’.  
 
The re-constituted ic-IBC currently operates out of the same premises as 
University A, but by ‘mid 2019, the OP will have sourced new premises 
and the ic-IBC operations will move out ... in fact the DVCI is in Country 
X now … looking at accommodation’ (CI2). CI11 reported that ‘we need 
to give the (new) partnership a good 6 - 12 months to get established 
and then we’ll more than likely establish a small office around the Dean 
like we have in Country V, and we’ll add research opportunities there. … 
in the region, not just in Country X’. The research opportunities will be 
managed in the same way as the Country V HCO, and ‘we’re thinking of 
something similar to that in Country X … we’ve certainly talked to the 
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Regulator there … and various ambassadors to Country X and so forth, 
… to be able to create something similar … (so that) industry, defence 
and education, and various other industries located there … would 
benefit from a university providing some research around … innovation 
and some of the skills we have on the environment, water, and also 
technology as well’ (CI11). 
 
3.2.4 TNE Performance 
 
CI3 reported that ‘word got out there when a rival institution was saying 
things like, ‘you don't want to sign up with University C because 
University C are going to get out of Country X’ ... so there were rumours 
floating around for a little while, while we were trying to decide what was 
going on ... I don't think it helped our reputation ... but I don't think it 
damaged our reputation too much’.  
 
It was also difficult to assess the performance of the new TNE operation 
during the period of transition between the two OPs when the interviews 
were held (CI1). However, CI3 is upbeat and of the view that ‘this 
partnership with the new OP is going to be so much better because we 
learned so much over the last ten years’.  
 
The ‘transition period’ (CI3) was described as attracting a ‘higher risk just 
at the moment … I think we’re at a special moment because as it turns 
out, we’re in a contract with the previous OP ... but it’s now been 
announced we’re going to go with the new OP from January next year ... 
so, we’re in this transition period, where we’re recruiting … well, we don’t 
do the recruiting, the previous OP does the recruiting, ... (while) they’re 
(i.e, the new OP) not allowed to start yet until January (2019) ... so all the 
recruiting for the new OP is being done by the previous OP for the next 
six months, seven months ... it’s a very unusual situation we’re in’ (CI1).  
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CI1 explained that the new OP ‘can’t do anything just at the moment … 
they’re allowed to set up … they start talking to us; we can talk to them ... 
we can start our plans but they’re not going to deliver any infrastructure 
until January (2019) ... they don’t employ any staff … currently working 
for the TNE operation ... they’re not employing anybody in that regard 
just yet ... although … I presume they’re looking for staff at the moment, 
and staff are allowed to approach the new OP to say, ‘I want to go with 
you in January; not stay with the previous OP’’. It was also weird that ‘the 
previous OP have now gone with University A … across the corridor on 
the same floor; in the same building ... (and) you go up the same lift with 
University A students and staff … they’ve only just started at the 
beginning of this year … with their first intake of Foundation units 
students and I think some MBA students’. CI3 observed that the new 
University A TNE operation ‘is going so slowly that they have to put 
people off ... they don't need all the staff ... (and) we are happy to take 
some because we like some of them’.  
 
The performance of the University’s programs in Country X in 2018 had 
taken ‘a little bit of a dip because we've had to work with the previous OP 
on a strategy for this year … how University A can come in ... and how 
University C's going to work alongside and who's going to get what fee 
share ... this year has been a difficult year ... (as) the previous OP have 
had to market for University A, (and) market for University C at the same 
time’ (CI3). Further, ‘numbers have dipped, but not just because of that 
(i.e., the transition of OPs) … (but) numbers have dipped generally 
across … in Country X because economically, a lot of families … of 
international students have had to leave because there's not as many 
jobs … so it's a bit of a combination’ (CI3).  
 
In January 2019, the ic-IBC will see the first cohort of students under the 
new OP’s management (CI4). There will continue to be existing students 
from the previous partnership who are ‘going to seamlessly transfer; 
they’re going to continue to be University C students ... there will just be 
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a different management infrastructure around them ... they may notice 
some different administrative staff ... they may even notice some different 
teaching staff, but I hope that some of the current teaching staff will 
choose to stay with the University C program with the new OP’ (CI4). 
 
The University, together with its new OP are contemplating ‘moving in 
the next 12 months to a different site in Country X … so we’re able to be 
more agile and move to where our markets are better suited … in those 
CBD locations ... which I think is a benefit’ (CI11).  
 
CI11 commented that ‘at this stage, I don't think we can judge the 
benefits of being in Country X for University C, fully ... I think in 25 years 
time we might or 20 years time, maybe even in ten years when we’ve 
been there 20 years … (because) if you looked at some of the others that 
have been there 20 years, they … (have) very much more substantial 
numbers ... play a greater role in the community, or in business … have 
got a higher profile, and they’ve got their own campuses’. CI6 on the 
contrary, argued that ‘I don’t believe it (i.e., the Country X TNE operation) 
covers the costs ... I fail to see how classes with so few students can be 
profitable’. 
 
3.3 Country X Operating Environment 
 
CI3 reported that the Regulator ‘didn’t know what was going on’ (when 
the University informed the OP that it was going to pull out of Country X), 
and ‘I think we're on the nose a little bit ... but we're back in their good 
books because we’ve just met with the Regulator last week ... (with) the 
CEO from the new OP … the Country V Dean, the Country X Dean, 
(and) our DVCI’. The Regulator ‘were extremely impressed with the CEO 
of the OP and what the OP does and they learned a bit more about the 
OP ... and they were really pleased that we're partnering up together’ 
(CI3). The Regulator noted that ‘this is a first for us in many ways, with 
the OP, with the English, for instance and stuff like that … and the 
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Regulator is looking at this as if to say, ‘well we can learn from you guys 
as well’ ... in the end ... no reputational damage ... no major issue’ (CI3). 
In fact, the Regulator had ‘wizened up’ over the years, and no longer 
allow infrastructure partners to deliver their own programs (CI3). 
 
CI2 observed that ‘the risk was always greater in Country X (compared to 
other countries where the University operates TNE) because of the 
market, but Country X is so committed as a … country to grow education 
as a central part of their economy’. However, the business environment 
in Country X ‘is an incredibly competitive environment … when I first 
went there in 2010 or 2009, … a prominent American public university 
had just closed down and that was very significant’ (CI2). It was also 
interesting to note that ‘other universities are busting their guts just to get 
in (to Country X) as well ... (but) it's not as easy as people think it is … 
it’s a lot of work’ (CI3). 
 
Apart from the previous OP, who ‘wasn’t an established partner, they’re 
new into education, into higher education’, the University had to contend 
with ‘the regulatory environment and the cultural environment in Country 
X, particularly with the focus that the partner wanted us to take around 
the arts, the media, film, that was probably the biggest risk we took there’ 
(CI3). 
 
CI2 described the ‘political debate in my school about the paucity of free 
speech in Country X ... and there were some concerns also about the 
fact that some of the materials that we were going to use, especially in 
communication studies areas, screen production … would in a sense, 
violate the sensibilities of the … conservative citizens of the Country’. 
However, ‘essentially, the Deans were encouraged to agree ... (and) I 
think there were probably a couple of reasons why in the end we 
basically agreed to do it ... one was (that) free speech in Country X was 
no worse than in Country V … Country V was lower on the free speech 
index than Country X’ (CI2). The academics were also ‘heartened by the 
 809 
fact that it was in an academic zone; it was in a free zone ... so for 
instance, the free media were there … (and) more liberal than any part of 
the MM region’ (CI2). CI2 reported that ‘there was one course that we 
tweaked a little bit ... one single unit was about screen text and we … 
after consultation, … we took some reference to psychoanalysis out of 
one of the units ... and delivered in a different fashion in Country X’. 
 
CI4 also cautioned that ‘we do have to be very mindful of the particular 
cultural and religious backgrounds of the jurisdiction in which we … are 
working ... (and) this does have an impact on some of the materials that 
we can and can't use … in that particular jurisdiction in terms of case 
studies and examples’ and ‘if there's any culturally inappropriate or 
religiously inappropriate material given to students, they have a right to 
complain to the government authority’. But CI4 noted that ‘we just have 
to be careful and we've been doing it for long enough that we know what 
to look for and amend’.  
 
CI6 shared that ‘we have to be a little bit more careful about some of my 
lecture recordings … I have to be very careful about the words that I use 
... (and) one of the case studies that I’ve used a lot here is the target 
case study where they developed a way of determining whether their 
loyalty card members were pregnant ... you can’t talk about that in 
Country X ... so I can’t use that case study in Country X, so I have to 
review that’. However, ‘most of the time that sort of intelligence comes 
from the people that are teaching the courses ... so the lecturer in 
Country would say ‘Look, I can’t use this case study here’ … because if 
somebody complains, then it will go to the government’. 
 
Similarly, CI5 commented that ‘we do lean on our OP teaching staff a lot 
to help us with the context ... I don't know a lot about Country X, and I 
think a lot of the academics here don’t know a lot about Country X ... our 
impression is that it is sort of, like a travel hub, a cultural melting pot, but 
at the same time it does have these really orthodox, traditional values 
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that run through’. As an example, ‘in some of our Psychology units, we 
do touch on things like homosexuality and … it’d be useful once we 
started recruiting people to teach our unit set, (that) the host country 
lecturers can help us with how do we translate that into the context, so 
that we’re not going to be offending anyone, or nobody’s going to be 
arrested’ (CI5). 
 
4.0 Charting the Future (2019 and beyond) 
 
The informants were mixed in their perspectives on the future of TNE at 
the University. Some informants advocated growth as a strategy to 
address funding restrictions in Australia (CI3, CI10). Others ‘think the 
university at the moment needs to be consolidating what it has in the 
shorter term … it needs to be having a balanced budget and all of those 
sorts of things’ (CI6).  
 
4.1 Financial Imperatives 
 
While TNE operations are ‘great for the brand, global presence, Times 
Higher Ed ranking and all of that, but it has to generate an income for the 
University ... we can’t be there with a sense of service and benevolence 
and things like that ... it has to fund the research here, for example’ (CI2). 
CI3 asserted that TNE ‘is important … in this climate, of course … (and) 
that’s probably the main reason we will stay in TNE’, adding that ‘it's 
been a struggle for all local universities in the University’s home state’. 
CI7 added that ‘monetary returns is still one of the factors ... if not, 
there’s no motivational push for us to be outside of Australia … and also 
issues that we face back home … the government is cutting down on the 
budget’. On the flip side, ‘you can't subsidise … these operations from 
domestic institution’ (CI4), an observation that was made in Section 
2.7.4.1 that all TNE initiatives undertaken by Australian public 
universities must be fully costed and fully self-funded. 
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During 1980s and 1990s, ‘there were lots of Australian universities in 
TNE, and then TEQSA came along and I think many of them … pulled 
back ... but now I think there's likely to be a push back into TNE actually 
and that's as a result of funding pressures’ (CI10). CI10 argued that out 
of the two other funding alternatives of ‘international onshore or offshore 
... international onshore is sort of … maxed out’, leaving international 
offshore as a viable means for growing revenue. Although the onshore 
international student market is ‘a massive industry … worth like A$22 
billion, you don't see it growing massively more, … (due to the) the 
exchange rate, the relationship between Country O and Australia is not 
good … at the moment and there's been a pullback of Country O 
students and then the other issue that you find with TNE is that … lots of 
international students who would love to study in Australia … can't afford 
it’ (CI10). Further, ‘some of them want to work in their own countries to 
pay for their education ... so delivering in their own countries starts to 
make sense’ (CI10). 
 
CI1’s view of TNE was that the University is ‘here (i.e., in TNE) only to 
the extent to broaden our base ... (because) University C was very 
subject to government funding ... we don't have a big foundation ... we 
have land but we don’t have other income ... so, we are very at the 
vagaries of the government policies here ... so (we need) to have other 
operations … (in) diversifying (our income sources)’.  
 
While not disagreeing with growing the University’s offshore revenue, CI6 
cautioned that ‘there’s quite a short term perspective of many things - 
because money is tight, and that’s what happens in any business ... 
when money is tight, you start to try and pinch pennies … you try to 
control your spending, and I think that’s one of the things that universities 
are experiencing at the moment because of changes in funding models 
and so on ... so it means there isn’t the luxury of having a longer view, 
there isn’t a luxury of having a strategic longer term perspective … and 
how we might have to take some pain in the short term, to have a good 
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long term outcome’. CI6 was referring to the need for the University to 
invest in more University staff travel to support TNE operations. 
 
4.2 Governance Framework 
 
CI3 reported that the University has ‘a strategic plan, an international 
strategic plan ... and TNE is part of that portfolio’. This strategic plan will 
say ‘that the university wants to grow its international student numbers by 
onshore and offshore’ means, and that ‘the university has very big plans 
with the new Country X OP, and it will be interesting to see how that 
turns out’ (CI6). 
 
The University’s Country V TNE model is considered a model ‘to emulate 
… (including) the fee arrangements and … the operational aspects’ (CI1) 
and because ‘you’ve got your ground, your basic model working pretty 
well, and you know what is working, then branching out shouldn't be too 
difficult, really ... saying that though, it's hard work’ (CI3). CI4 
commended the Country V TNE model, saying that ‘it gives the 
University a strategic focal point to deal with not just the Country V 
partner, but to use the Country V Dean as a kind of regional academic 
presence ... (as) it expands throughout the neighbouring region and up 
into Country O as well’.  
 
In fact, the ‘Country V Dean was also heavily involved in the negotiations 
with the new OP over Country X’s re-constituted TNE operation’ (CI4). 
Informants observed that the Country V Dean had been deployed ‘in a 
number of capacities’ (CI4) and takes on ‘a broad array role now’ (CI3) 
because of ‘his extensive experience in TNE’ (CI3). CI3 noted that ‘we 
see that he may be able to play a bigger role in TNE overall in our overall 
operation, not just Country V ... so the idea of the Country V office is to 
have a lot more control and oversight of our whole operation’. 
 
 813 
In discussing the role of the Country V HCO, CI10 noted the ‘way in 
which Country V is used by multinational companies and University C 
has become a multinational; it is operating in different countries … 
although parts of the university haven’t caught up with that idea ... but 
when you look at other multinationals, that's how they use Country V as a 
base, headquarters’. While the ‘the division of responsibilities otherwise 
seems to work ... in terms of those three pieces (viz., the Country V OP, 
HCO and University C home campus academic administration), the next 
steps we're thinking about in terms of our maturity in this space as an 
institution’ is to address the missing ‘governance framework that 
oversees all of transnational education … (and) to tie everything 
together’ (CI10). The DVCI ‘would like to move to a situation where we 
have a board made up of relevant directors that oversees all of’ the 
University’s TNE, including compliance with TEQSA as well as with QA 
bodies of other jurisdictions (CI10). 
 
CI10 also argued that the overarching governance framework ‘will allow 
us to be much more strategic rather than opportunistic, ... saying, ‘where 
do we actually want to be ... who do we want to be in that country’’, 
rather than entertaining ‘an offer from XYZ university, to come to our 
country to partner with us’. Further, ‘the idealism around transnational 
education for me is around nation building, capacity building ... if we can 
do some good, and if we can do it in a commercially savvy way that’s 
sustainable economically then I think, why not?’ (CI10). 
 
4.3 Geographical Expansion 
 
The University is on a quest to expand its TNE offerings to new 
countries, as CI3 attested that ‘there are certainly plans and certainly … 
a desire to build (more TNE operations), and to increase TNE numbers’. 
This desire is observed to be motivated by several drivers. First, several 
informants commented that the University rated very highly (‘something 
like 14th in the world’ – CI1) in the Times Higher Education rankings for 
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internationalisation (CI1, CI2, CI3, CI10). This achievement was 
attributed to, inter alia ‘the staffing, the background of each of the staff, 
like where do they come from, where students come from, whether we 
are set up in other countries’ (CI1), and the Country V TNE presence 
(‘we do well in Times because of Country V mainly … our presence of 
6,500 students in Country V makes us do very well’ – CI2). 
 
The first driver is related to the second, viz., ‘the university's reputation ... 
so reputation is linked to rankings; internationalisation … is something 
that the ranking agencies include as part of their assessment of a 
university ... but it does distinguish I think a university where it has other 
locations where it delivers its programs, where it has research offshore, 
where it has engagement, it has alumni that is global ... they’re really 
points of distinction’ (CI10). The enhanced reputation has been well 
employed by the University in its branding, ‘when you look at the 
advertising that we do, now it’s University C home city, Country V, 
Country X … and they heavily brand that now ... because I think senior 
leadership group feel that it's good for the University's reputation’ (CI3). 
CI2 added that ‘our transnational is great for the brand, global presence, 
Times Higher Ed ranking and all of that’. 
 
Third, the enhanced reputation helps with recruiting international 
students onshore, as CI3 explained, ‘globalisation … it’s great for you, for 
the University's reputation ... if you want to be an internationalisation-type 
university and you want to actually recruit international students onshore 
as well, this is really good for your reputation … (and also the impact of) 
alumni ... we have so many in Country V now ... have them in Country X, 
and have some in Country T and we're expanding’. 
 
Fourth, the University’s Country V TNE operation seems to be at a 
mature stage, and has limited growth potential. CI10 explained that ‘I 
would like to see us expand in the region ... I think we have to ... the 
Country V market has become very mature ... it’s become actually quite 
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challenging for private education participants ... (and while) it’s still a 
good market for us because we’ve got our brand here ... we need to think 
of expanding’. 
 
Finally, the University takes a proactive perspective towards TNE as 
documented in its international strategic plan, where ‘the latest iteration 
talks about being the gateway to region AS … so it wants to really be 
part of the AS growth story and to diversify its interest throughout region 
SS and maybe go towards SA’ (CI10). CI3 added that ‘they definitely 
want to expand the TNE operation ... we're looking at five (new) countries 
at the moment’. 
 
As an example of the University’s geographical expansion, CI3 shared 
that ‘the Country V OP are getting into Country H … and we probably will 
go with them there ... so we'll be having another TNE location with this 
OP ... and that will be happening very soon ... (in a country with) lots of 
young people ... lots of young population’. This new foray was confirmed 
by CI10, who is leading the initiative with the Country V OP, saying ‘it's 
going to be open on June 20th (2019) ... just offering post-graduate 
business to begin with … (and) we are going to be charging Country V 
fees for our programs’. CI10 is excited about the prospects (‘I’m raring to 
go’), especially given the young population (‘it's stats are 44 percent of 
the population under age 25 ... so, it’s a huge market potential ... so 
we're excited about that’). However, CI10 is also cautious about its 
prospects, musing that ‘we have to figure out the difficulty … for us is 
figuring out how to do it at our level which is affordable ... that's the 
challenge … (while) there's lots of demand in Country H and I'm sure that 
if you survey the population and said, ‘would you like an Australian 
university degree from a reputable institution like University C’, there’d be 
hundreds of thousands of people who’d say, ‘yes we would’ ... and, 
‘could you pay for it?’ … probably not ... if only we could somehow … 
bridge that gap between demand and supply’. CI10 continued that ‘we 
have to become much more efficient and try to lower our costs ... but I 
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think the other thing is the financing ... how do we between ourselves 
maybe the private sector, maybe the Australian government, maybe the 
country that we're working in - how do we maybe come together to try 
and finance education’. 
 
The above initiative in Country H seems to be somewhat incongruent 
with CI1’s criteria for starting new TNE operations, i.e., ‘we’d probably do 
that (i.e., emulate Country V’s CBD operation) if we take up another TNE 
campus somewhere else ... we’d look for a country that’s got an 
increasing middle class and market for higher education … has to be 
stable … (with) proper governance’. While Country H has a market for 
higher education, and the University’s TNE delivery location is in its 
capital city, CI10 had some reservations about the purchasing power of 
the market. It is also known that Country H is an emerging economy that 
has relatively lower governance standards compared to other countries 
in the region (Section 5.2.2.2.3). 
 
4.4 Addressing Major TNE Academic Issues 
 
Delivering University programs offshore presents unique difficulties 
arising from market demands, and OP business requirements and 
infrastructure limitations. This section explores how University C resolved 
three major TNE academic issues. 
 
4.4.1 Multiplicity of Study Periods 
 
The competitive market environment in Country V is characterised by 
students who are keen to ‘complete three … academic years, in two 
years’ which dictated the University’s trimesterly delivery in Country V 
although this delivery is out-of-synch with the University’s home campus 
semesterly delivery (CI7). CI3 added that ‘trimesters work in TNE ... 
people want to get in and they want to do the courses quite quickly ... 
they like the fact that they can do them, do a three-year degree in two 
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years’. CI5 observed that ‘I don't foresee any changes with that – 
onshore students want semesters; offshore students want trimesters ... 
so in terms of what the demand is, I don't perceive the system changing 
at all’. 
 
However, the multiplicity of study periods is ‘always a challenge … (and) 
it continues ... but we cope with it, having trimesters … so we have 
January, May and September’ (CI3). CI3 explained that ‘it doesn't leave 
us a lot of time to obviously get exam papers back, to get marks, to get 
Board of Examiners happening and all the rest of it’. More specifically, 
CI5 observed that ‘there's a lot of administration related to collating 
results … it can be an issue for student progressions ... and then it sort of 
screws up their enrolment going forward … (and) it's an issue because 
staff like me who teach trimesters and semesters never get a break from 
teaching … and essentially if you don't have breaks in teaching, you 
don't have space for research’. 
 
The issue is more grave for the Business school because of the large 
number of units, whereas with ‘Psychology we offer all of our units every 
trimester … (but) in other schools they don't ... (and) if they're only 
offering one unit once a year or something like that, then that student 
have to wait until next year to take that unit’. Additionally, ‘we have less 
units as well ... (as) I capped them at 20 students and if the OP want to 
add one or two students, they just get permission; usually I’ll allow it, up 
to about three students above’ (CI5).  
 
Although ‘it continues to be a challenge ... we’re not looking to change’ 
(CI3). However, ‘the DVCA has aligned the trimester calendar onshore 
with the trimester calendar offshore … next year’. For a start, ‘we will be 
considering … offering some of the Business courses on a trimester 
basis here ... to align them with Country V ... so we're looking to align 
here more with there, instead of trying to align them more with here … 
(and) we'll be maybe making some more adjustments … offshore’ (CI3). 
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4.4.2 Offshore TNE Teaching Methodology 
 
The University’s Country V TNE OP operated out of commercial 
buildings that had restrictions in classroom sizes, and the OP ‘didn't have 
the infrastructure to have big lecture theatres ... so to actually have a 
lecture of 200 students or 500 students that are in the classes and then 
break off into other rooms (for tutorials) was not doable … and that's why 
a lot of the classes were three-hour classes face-to-face, which 
combined the lecture and tutorial, which became a seminar and that's 
what we did’ (CI3).  
 
But in 2017, ‘we started to introduce blended learning in Country V … so 
we went from 36 hours of contact time, face-to-face for each unit, each 
teaching period, to 24 … so (that) students were only having to come to 
class for two hours ... and that third hour, was online via LMS’ (CI3). The 
lecture ‘for the most part would be online or some kind of quiz or 
whatever the unit coordinator wanted to do ... and we'll be doing the 
same in Country X as from next year’ (CI3). 
 
4.4.3 Scalability of Offshore TNE Teaching 
 
The University used to send home campus staff overseas for teaching 
and moderation visits to TNE delivery locations. CI6 reflected, saying ‘I 
look back with some fondness about going to Country V to teach 
because I enjoyed it ... and I think the students got a lot out of it … I 
believe that many academics would benefit from actually being in 
Country V and working with students in the country’. CI6 explained that ‘it 
is not so much about being near ... but it’s about having a clear picture of 
what is happening ... so for instance, if you have never been to the 
Country V TNE operation, you don’t know how the campus works there, 
you don’t know how the teaching gets done, you don’t know what the 
rooms are like ... and if you have not met that group of students, again 
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it’s just a list of names in a class list ... and until you get to actually sit 
down and talk to the academics in Country V, again there is a temptation 
… to not take them seriously’. 
 
However, CI6 acknowledged that ‘I’m not sure if that model is scalable ... 
I would have 30 students, now I would have 300 students ... so I can’t go 
and teach 300 students ... I think the models now are far more pragmatic 
and that changed because they had to change to actually make things 
work ... because I don’t think that we could do it the way we used to do’. 
The University now employs a small number of academics in its HCO to 
anchor each discipline (CI3), and relies on the OP’s mostly part-time 
teaching staff to teach (CI6). There is ‘no travel, practically no travel’, and 
the liaison between the University’s unit coordinator and the offshore 
teaching staff is undertaken ‘with great difficulty ... so that’s done with 
email, skype and so on’ (CI6). 
 
Although the Country V teaching arrangement works (‘it’s their (i.e., 
OP’s) business model’ – CI4), it has also attracted some criticisms of 
questionable ownership, dedication and integrity of some of the OP’s 
part-time teaching staff, who have been labelled ‘taxi-cab professors’ for 
having to shuttle between institutions to teach (CI6). For example, ‘they 
are very reliant on positive student feedback, and they are very reliant on 
having good relationships with the professional staff at the partner who 
appoints them … so we have had people who haven’t had appointments 
because they’ve not got on with the clerk that’s managing the 
appointments’ (CI6). Also, ‘I suspect that the lecturers start to look upon 
their students as being their employers ... and the students are the 
people who’ve got the power as to their continued their employment ... 
and again, until you’ve actually spent time talking with the lecturers, it’s 
very tempting to believe that they do take that seriously – and they do 
give the students good marks for other reasons ... but I don’t think they 
do’ (CI6).  
 
 820 
If there’s any consolation, ‘I think the good thing is that we have quite a 
stable group of people teaching with us in Country V and in Country X as 
well ... we had the same 3 or 4 people teaching for us in Country X since 
we’ve been there’ (CI6).  
 
Both CI6 and CI5 spoke about the ‘precarious nature of their 
employment’, and that ‘if you can take a longer term view of it, I think we 
can build a better business in Country V, to have a more developed 
academic work force’. CI6 explained that ‘at the moment we do provide a 
lot of support (for the OP teaching staff) ... the learning and teaching 
certificates and … access to quite a few resources ... but there’s just that 
last step, and if we could be … more as their employers rather than 
someone who provides them with a trimesterly teaching contract … I 
think that would be a great thing ... and to me, it’s the whole model of 
how you describe a TNE partnership ... looking at the different aspects of 
TNE and who has responsibility for what, I’ve wanted to see us have a bit 
more responsibility with the teaching staff’.  
 
CI4 is of the view that ‘taxi-cab professors’ get ‘teaching experience more 
broadly, (and) they will always help inform with how they do the teaching 
with my students ... I don't see the direct downside to it ... they're never 
going to be an institution that's going to be employing 40 or 50 
permanent academic staff – that’s part of their business model ... but we 
are encouraging them to get more, better qualified PhD teaching staff 
and if there’re opportunity, we do encourage them to have more 
permanent faculty ... but it's a business model we’re dealing with’. 
 
4.5 Research and Community Engagement 
 
The University’s Country V HCO provided a base for the University to 
develop research initiatives in the country as well as across the 
neighbouring countries, as CI10 explained, ‘we've also tried to diversify 
the University’s interests ... so, we have our research centre (in the 
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Country V HCO)’. The success of the research centre, including 
attracting ‘good government funding’ (CI2) has led to new initiatives to 
establish a similar research centre in the Country X ic-IBC (CI11). CI2 is 
hopeful that the University’s Country X ic-IBC will find ‘some good 
synergies there … (because) we do a lot of research in region AA, we’ve 
got great coverage with some really good universities across the 
continent … (and) the OP has a good record, good grounding in region 
AA’ as well.  
 
The research centre in Country V has a good reputation within the 
University as well as in Country V, and had just recently ‘spun out our 
first company … from technology that we have developed here in 
Country V’, and the company is ‘partly owned by the University; partly 
owned by its founders (one of whom is CI10)’ (CI10). The company had 
‘a venture capital fund that's come in and funding it ... so that's the sort of 
thing that we would do ... (and) again more diversified than just teaching 
and learning ... that's obviously critical’.  
 
With regards to the University’s new TNE initiative in Country H, an 
emerging economy, CI11 is hopeful that it can help launch new research 
initiatives. CI11 reasoned that ‘when we look at things that we’re looking 
at now, we’re looking at some countries that are probably only relatively 
newly politically stable ... have some issues still, but our emerging 
potential markets with 50-odd million people, and a good middle class 
that can sustain into the future … and because they're relatively newly 
stable, or still relatively unstable, depending on which way you look at 
that, that can give the opportunity to do some research and add quality 
back into that community and the government in that … part of the 
market’. This drive is grounded by the University’s aspiration to ‘balance 
the two off, and the good thing about University C is we’re not in these 
countries just to make money off teaching ... we’re ready to give back on 
the research and we’re a research-intensive university’, a sentiment that 
CI10 also espoused (‘the idealism around transnational education for me 
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is around nation building, capacity building ... if we can some good, and if 
we can do it in a commercially savvy way that’s sustainable economically 
then I think, why not?’). 
 
Interestingly, CI2 commented that although ‘we’ve got massive research 
activity in Country O, but we hardly get any Country O students 
(onshore); massive research in Country R, but we hardly get any 
students from Country R’. So there is some indication that offshore 
research might not translate to increased onshore enrolments from the 
countries where the University conducts research in. 
 
5.0 A Review of TNE Business Delivery Models 
 
A number of informants were very experienced in TNE, and shared their 
experiences with various TNE business delivery models. These models 
include the fully-owned and operated James Cook University in 
Singapore and RMIT University in Vietnam, to Newcastle University’s 
Singapore TNE collaborative operations with the PSB Academy. 
 
There were also comparisons of TNE with the private healthcare and 
hotel models (CI4, CI10, CI11), and the isomorphism demonstrated by 
the shift of universities towards more commercialised behaviours, and 
OPs (that are usually commercial entities) having to assume more 
academic responsibilities, e.g., research (CI10). 
 
5.1 TNE Business Delivery Models Reviewed 
 
CI1 reminisced on the University’s early TNE business delivery model 
that can be labelled as franchised programs (FP), where ‘we had control 
over the IP ... we didn’t just give unit guides and coursework materials, 
curriculum to another university to teach and take a licence ... we let 
other people provide the teaching, and we didn't do much apart from 
moderation and unit coordination back here, and some level of 
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assessment back here like the exams we marked here’. This FP model 
was frequently contrasted with the branch campus model, where ‘you set 
up your own campus; you have more staff there; or staff fly in and out 
and do their own teaching ... that’s more intensive and involved, and 
you’d want a higher fee share for that because you’re doing more work’ 
(CI1). The current TNE business delivery model is ‘somewhere in 
between ... (with) a little bit more control ... (where) we’re not just 
licensing IP, … we’ve got some risk management there as well ... but 
we‘ve not got great costs there ... (except for) an office ... more 
involvement and greater costs there than when we started but we’re 
getting a higher fee share’ (CI1).  
 
Most informants would like a wholly-controlled and operated branch 
campus (w-IBC), but also acknowledged the higher costs and risks 
associated with such a model. CI6 argued that ‘there is always risk when 
you don’t have control over all aspects of your business’, and that the w-
IBC conferred ‘far more control … employing the academics; we would 
be leasing the premise in our own names … (and avoiding being) at the 
mercy of business decisions by the partner’.  
 
While ‘having a campus, that would be fantastic, but number one is the 
high risk of not having sufficient students to be sustainable and second, a 
very important factor is that there has to be financial strength and 
massive financial support from the home campus, so everything leads 
back to the worth of the home campus’ (CI8). CI10 described the w-IBC 
as ‘a pretty heavy investment’.  
 
Some of the informants shared their knowledge or, and/or experience in 
the set up and management of various TNE operations across Australian 
universities. Two of the more prominent w-IBCs are the RMIT University 
branch campuses in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam), and the 
Monash University branch campuses in South Africa and Malaysia. 
Although ‘very different offshore operations’, they all ‘mostly had (their) 
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own physical campuses’ except for Monash University Malaysia that has 
‘got a medical campus which was actually run by a partner … which was 
probably less successful … but reputationally, it was good’ (CI11). CI11 
added that ‘the (Monash) Malaysian operation was mainly from the 
private partner, … but academics and IP was provided by the university; 
whereas the university owned the South African campus … it was a 
different kind of operation – Monash didn’t own the land in Malaysia, or it 
didn’t own the facilities’. 
 
In the case of RMIT Vietnam, the university ran the branch campus on its 
own with ‘some bequests and donations to set up Vietnam … to help with 
the capital infrastructure … but it was quite profitable as well ... (and) in 
terms of profit share, obviously we’re getting 100% of the profit once 
you’ve paid back the capital investment’. The university’s location ‘in a 
suburban … District 7 … didn’t fit with RMIT’s model of being quite urban 
in Australia … however RMIT certainly benefited from creating District 7 
really ... it became an expat hub, and RMIT was one of the first … key 
anchors if you like, to lure investments into District 7 ... (and) District 7 
really grew around the university … which was unplanned, and there’s a 
lot of expat businesses and residences now in District 7’ (CI11). CI11 
noted that RMIT Vietnam was ‘very well respected … (being) one of the 
foreign universities that have done really well and not as a partnership ... 
whereas the others, the French universities for example are partnered 
with national universities and don’t own the infrastructure’. In operating 
w-BCs, ‘you own your own campus, and you need skills to do that, you 
have your own capability to … determine your own strategic future ... and 
you’re more aligned with government and so forth, whereas you’re still 
beholden to partners through the TNE (i.e., FP) models ... so you might 
argue the RMIT model had more capital risk upfront, but then once that’s 
invested, … lower strategic risks in the future’ (CI11). The ‘TNE (i.e., FP) 
model is more agile, has less capital … and probably sovereign risks and 
others upfront, … but then, you’ve got a higher strategic risk into the 
future because your model is tied to a partner’ (CI11). 
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CI8 commended the Newcastle University TNE model in Singapore that 
‘had their own campus together with PSB (i.e., their host country OP) ... 
(where) the students were there, the management were there (in one 
location)’. In the same country, Curtin University had ‘everything like their 
own cafeteria, counselling services, mini library, … its own campus … 
(and) I do believe that it gives that spirit of being a tertiary student, its 
different’ (CI8).  
 
In the case of James Cook University’s (JCU) Singapore campus, CI8 
envied their ‘strong number of full-time staff’, but CI7 cautioned that ‘it’s 
good to have but again the risk might be even bigger ... you would expect 
more risk in the JCU model, operating by itself ... (and) whether 
universities are willing to spend so much … on marketing, on 
recruitment, on human capital … to get students ... you have to rent the 
premises, you have to build it up from scratch … (but of course) JCU has 
full fee’. CI10 related an interesting anecdote about JCU, i.e., despite ‘all 
they’ve put down ... they’ve done a lot a lot of good as well (in 
Singapore), ... although they have the highest rating under EduTrust (a 
Singapore quality assurance scheme administered by the Committee for 
Private Education for private education institutions) (Committee for 
Private Education Singapore 2019) which is the local system of 
registration, but they don't have university status’ and ‘they’re not James 
Cook University ... they’re JCU Singapore’. CI10 added that ‘they have a 
private education company which is wholly-owned by the university, and 
all its works’, and contrasted JCU with INSEAD (also in Singapore) which 
is ‘not subject to the Education Act ... there's a number of others but JCU 
thought they were going to get on that list (of exempt institutions) ... and 
they’re not’.  
 
While ‘it's a pretty heavy investment, but again they've (Curtin Singapore) 
done quite well ... Curtin’s courses are run by Navitas (their OP) ... but it 
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is called Curtin Singapore, it's not called Curtin University Singapore’ 
(CI10). 
 
CI1 remarked on ‘foreign universities that have a campus’ in the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), e.g., ‘Heriot Watt, University of Wollongong, (and) 
Bradford I think ... they’ve very … substantial numbers ... they play a 
greater role in the community, or in business ... have got a higher profile 
… (and) they’ve got their own campuses’. While ‘Wollongong is in 
Knowledge Park, which is over near Media City, … Heriot Watt is (in) 
Academic City ... but it … stands alone’ (CI1). Similarly, ‘Manipal, the 
American University of Sharjah, (and) a lot of others … have got their 
own buildings’ (CI1).  
 
For CI4, ‘in the end that gets down to a question of scale ... (and) I don't 
think it's ever … financially viable for an institution as small as we are in 
the scheme of things ... we are a small university to go through the 
capital investment of establishing our own campus in any of these 
offshore locations’. Quoting the past, CI4 commented that ‘there was a 
history in the early 2000s of some universities going down that pathway 
and feeling the financial sting … when they had made 10-, 15-year 
commitments for the leased premises that were largely sitting idle 
because the market didn't eventuate for them’. The University, according 
to CI4, made the decision ‘probably 10 or 12 years ago ... (to find) the 
right partnership institution who had the responsibility to provide all the 
infrastructure and then in essence we provide the intellectual assets’. 
This model has ‘taken some time to settle in to what I think is as close as 
I'm ever going to get to an equivalent type model … (because) there's a 
lot of time to build up trust and you've got to look at a lot of iterations of 
units, to ensure that you do have that kind of consistency of students 
meeting the learning outcomes that are required’ (CI4). 
 
In describing the University’s TNE business delivery model, CI11 
commented that ‘the difference here at University C is that we don’t have 
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a physical campus ourself ... but we partner with infrastructure providers 
… providing all the infrastructure to deliver IP (i.e., intellectual property) 
… so it’s the lower of risk modelling in terms of capital-intensive risk … 
for the University’. However, ‘the first ten years of operation, it’s been 
very favoured towards … outputs favoured towards the partner ... and 
that was largely around … growing the base … the student base and the 
… buy-in in Country V … it’s largely weighted in the partner’s favour’ 
(CI11). Therefore, ‘we re-weighted those commercial outcomes to be a 
lot fairer towards the University in terms of both risk sharing and IP 
development and the infrastructure partner requirement … their 
overheads … the models are now …  settled, in place in the University in 
that we’ve got a better way to share the revenues coming from the 
partnership with respect to relevant risks, overheads and development 
costs for IP, etc’. CI11 also reported that ‘the advantage to the University 
is that we’re not capital intensive, but we’re not getting a lot of operating 
revenue from them …. but we were growing our student base now, (and) 
we’re getting a more equitable share of revenue’. 
 
5.2 TNE Risks 
 
CI2 asserted that ‘transnational always has moderate risk’ to the 
University, despite engaging ‘experienced global provider(s)’, who may 
be ‘well established … with other universities’. The risks associated with 
TNE might be a result of the University not having ‘control over all 
aspects of your business’ (CI6). CI6 continued that ‘if it was a proper 
branch campus ... if it was a full branch campus, we would have far more 
control’. However, CI7 cautioned that ‘it’s good to have (a w-IBC) but 
again the risk might be even bigger ... you would expect more risk in the 
Country V University J w-IBC model, operating by itself’. In fact, CI3 
acknowledged that ‘there's always mutual risks involved in these things 
… from the university's perspective, although there’s no significant 
capital outlay in terms of facilities, there is the reputational issue … (and) 
there may well be some financial costs … (but) the financial investment 
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risk … (is) on the organisation that chooses to be the one that manages 
and delivers our programs, and they are the ones that have to enter into 
building leases, equipment leases … they are the ones with the sunk 
costs’. 
 
CI2 summarised TNE risks well using the University’s first Country X 
TNE operation, saying the poor outcomes were ‘because they (i.e., the 
OP) were new, and the University was relatively new in the TNE 
environment … it was a risk with the courses, and then of course in 2008 
we had the global financial crisis’. 
 
Risks associated with OPs include over-inflated promises made by OPs 
to University decision-makers, as CI4 explained that ‘I am always going 
to be somewhat sceptical ... I've got to discount the rhetoric and the hype 
that comes from senior management about these brave new 
opportunities ... and the potential for hundreds of students here or 
hundreds of students there’, and using the new Country X University A 
TNE operation as an example, ‘to the best of my knowledge and idea, 
University A have recruited about four students into their program (so 
far)’. The second risk with OPs is in the knowledge and experience of the 
OP, as the University discovered in the previous OP of its Country X ic-
IBC operation, where ‘the risk has really been just related to the partner 
... (it) wasn’t an established partner, they’re new into education, into 
higher education’ (CI2). 
 
Third, CI2 illustrated the risk of poor program selection on TNE 
performance at the previous Country X ic-IBC operation, saying ‘the 
focus that the partner wanted us to take around the arts, the media, film, 
that was probably the biggest risk we took there ... it was more of a 
commitment because their strength was in media … their desire to get 
into media, film was probably misplaced’.  CI2 was convinced that ‘if we 
would have started off in Country X with a really strong push on Business 
(programs) and then grown into other areas, it might have been a better 
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strategy, but the OP convinced us and they were committed to Media 
and Film (which apparently appealed to a smaller segment of the 
market)’. 
 
In OP management, there were two diametrically opposed perspectives 
on the number of OPs that the University should partner in one location. 
CI7 is of the view that ‘having multiple partners in the same location, 
especially if you are talking about Country V that’s so small, it’s not a 
viable practice … because there’s bound to be comparison; students get 
confused … (and) pricing might be an issue’. On the other hand, CI1 
argued against the ‘risk with having one partner … (in case) the partner 
doesn’t keep to the contract … it’s a more difficult situation ... (but) if you 
had two partners, then you could actually shift your interests’. However, 
even if there were no OPs, and the University opted for the w-IBC model, 
‘the risk might be even bigger’ (CI7), and ‘a very high risk’ (CI8) due to 
the higher infrastructure and operating investments needed (CI1, CI11), 
not to mention the ‘local knowledge’ required of the University’s staff 
(CI10). 
 
CI2 also counted the University as contributing some risks in TNE. These 
include lapses in market research (‘they hadn’t done the market 
intelligence’ – CI2), over-reliance on one staff (‘that would be a big risk if 
we lost the Country V Dean … he’s got a lot of credibility’; ‘but he was 
institutionalised; he became a Country X OP person and he’s still with 
the OP to this day’ – CI3), poor set-up of TNE monitoring systems and 
processes (‘I don't think that he nor the people that worked in TNE at the 
University set things up as well as they could have been set up ... and we 
made mistakes … we let the Country X OP have too much control’ – 
CI3), and poor quality assurance processes, leading to ‘reputational 
risks’ associated with offshore programs that are considered ‘second rate 
curriculum that’s being offered in that country to what you offer in 
Australia’ (CI1). 
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Last on CI2’s list of TNE risks is the impact of the operating environment. 
These risks are dependent on the maturity of the country’s regulatory 
framework governing private higher education, and CI2 observed that 
such risks are higher in Country X compared to Country V. A highly 
mature regulatory environment can also adversely affect a TNE 
operation, as CI5 discovered when the Country V i-FP did not have 
sufficient time to market a new post-graduate program ‘because it took a 
long time to get approvals from the DQF’. Different jurisdictions also have 
differing standards of cultural and social sensitivities, resulting in risks 
associated with inappropriate study materials (CI4, CI5). These violations 
can result in complaints to the regulatory authorities (CI4), or in adverse 
profiling in the local mass media (CI10). 
 
In the case of University C’s Country X TNE operation, the transition 
between OPs had been identified as ‘higher risk’ because the previous 
OP insisted that the University ‘follow the strict rule of the contract’ during 
the transition (CI1). The OP’s insistence was because they were ‘upset 
with us leaving … they said, ‘we set this up … we’re still in debt for 
having set it up’, and the University having ‘destroyed the trust ... 
because we decided we didn’t want to stay in Country X’ (CI1). 
 
5.3 Relative Gain/Loss for TNE Partners 
 
The University C informants were asked to identify the TNE partner who 
would gain the most from the TNE collaboration, and the TNE partner 
who would lose the most in the event of a termination. They were also 
asked for the reasons for their choices. The table below summarises 
these perspectives. 
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No. Partner Reason for Perspective Informant 
A Which partner would gain the most from the TNE collaboration? 
1 University Financial CI1 
2 University Financial CI6 
3 University Profit and brand CI2 
4 OP Income CI10 
5 University/OP Branding/Financial CI5 
6 University/OP Internationalisation-branding/Monetary CI7 
B Which partner would lose the most in a termination? 
1 University Financial and Reputation CI1 
2 University 
Time and energy investments  
Financial (for Business School) 
CI2 
3 University Reputation CI6 
4 OP Revenue CI7 
5 University/OP Income (in the short-term/long-term) CI9 
6 University/OP Revenue CI10 
 
Table App J.1   Which Partner Gains Most/Loses Most in TNE  
(University C) 
 
On who would gain the most from the TNE collaboration, two of the 
informants thought that both partners would gain equally, but differently. 
CI5 and CI7 were of the view the University would benefit from the 
branding, while the OP benefit financially. Most of the other informants 
thought the University would benefit the most financially.   
 
Most informants also thought that the University will lose more financially 
and in terms of branding than the OP in the event of a termination. Some 
interesting and insightful informant remarks are reproduced below. 
 
While CI1 thought that the University gained more financially, CI2 
reported that branding has ‘been a great benefit ... so I think that’s 
important for a global university’. For CI5, the OP probably benefited 
‘financially … although I know we have brokered a better deal for the 
University … financially from the share of the student fees’. In fact, ‘it's 
obviously worthwhile for the OP to maintain that relationship ... (because) 
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financially, we don't make that much per student for TNE compared to 
what the OP makes’ (CI5).  
 
The rationale of ‘a good brand in Country V … (is that) then we will also 
get TNE students, but we'll also get Country V students, or students from 
a wider area ... coming here (i.e., Australia) as international onshore, full-
fee paying students and they're the ones who bring us significant 
amounts of money’ (CI5) – a notion that again points to a financial 
motivation. CI6 saw branding differently, and suggested that ‘it gives the 
University exposure in Country V which is a useful thing in terms of 
development of perhaps research partnerships and so on’. While CI7 
mentioned internationalisation as the University’s foremost gain in the 
TNE collaboration, CI7 really meant ‘the University probably would be 
better off, because Australia is so far away from any part of the world … 
(so) having a strategic location … in Country V allows us to be known to 
others … it’s good for the University to branch out to other parts of the 
world to make known to others – that University C is present’ – pointing 
to brand visibility, and not the broader meaning of internationalisation. 
 
Interestingly, CI6 saw ‘the risk for the university as reputational ... it 
wouldn’t be a financial burden at all ... (and) in fact, I think it would be a 
financial release’. Only one informant reported that ‘the damage is more 
internal’, i.e., the loss in terms of staff investments in ‘time and energy 
into work with transnational students and set up and if it doesn’t flourish’ 
(CI2). CI2 also commented that ‘the Business school would be 
completely devastated (in the event of a termination) ... so that’s a bit of 
a risk of over exposure’. CI8 asserted that the University would lose more 
than the Country V OP in the event of a termination because the OP 
‘does not ever put all the eggs in one basket – you see all the schools 
they have, all the universities – and last year they made another 
agreement with, I don’t know which Australian university, for engineering 
– they now have a university for nursing, they are I think, diverging, 
diversifying so that if one is eliminated, they will still have the … numbers 
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... when the star is dying out, you know, there will be others that are 
already there, but merging and getting bigger’. 
 
6.0 University C TNE Value Chain Activities 
 
CI3 asserted that ‘TNE does have a lot of complexities and challenges … 
(and) I think University C collaborates really well with our partners and I 
think we do TNE pretty well as well’. This claim is not without basis 
because the University had ‘learnt … made changes … improved things’ 
(CI3) and consolidated from its tipping point and developed a ‘three-
piece’ TNE value chain framework (CI10) that has been consistently 
delivering on income, as well as research and community engagement in 
Country V. The University had also employed ‘people on the ground, 
University C people on the ground … (that) we feel that that's what was 
missing in the earlier days ... really good people working on TNE and 
international that know what they're doing’ (CI3). This section will report 
on the value chain activities that the University has developed to manage 
its TNE operations. 
 
6.1 Due Diligence and Starting Up 
 
In the past, many TNE operations were started with minimal due 
diligence, as was reported by CI1 who said ‘we just didn’t do any 
research on this (i.e., the previous Country X TNE operation)’. The due 
diligence was also managed by a senior executive responsible for 
International in the Chancellery who assisted the VC, and who ‘signed 
off’ on the TNE contracts. This process attracted some conspiracy 
theories, such as the claim that ‘there has always been a yin and yang in 
Country X’ referring to the relationship between the senior executive and 
the CEO of the OP. 
 
The University has learnt a lot from its TNE experiences and now 
‘consider everything from emerging markets, sovereign risks, alignment 
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to our strategic goals, obviously opportunities for research, and teaching 
as to how that aligns with what sort of markets and quality … how does 
our brand, product, if you like … connect with the country and partners 
we’re looking to work with’ in TNE due diligence (CI11). The hard yards 
of negotiations fall on the Chief Operating Officer (COO) and Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO), while ‘the DVCE would come in on the 
curriculum and the course portfolio offerings and things like that … but 
the Vice-Chancellor signs off’ (CI1). The due diligence process is thus 
‘very much controlled by our senior executive group’ (CI1). 
 
As an example of due diligence, the University ‘looked at Country R for 
some years, and ... we’re looking at other countries at the moment, with 
emerging markets that have some instability but are growing markets, 
and you have to be very careful ... so, we are looking at them because if 
you have first mover advantage in some of those countries, then 
obviously, you know you can build a better reputation, a strong reputation 
over time … but it comes with higher sovereign risk obviously … so, 
you’ve got to balance that and that’s worked very well’. The foregoing 
considerations have guided the University’s planning for entry into 
Country H (CI10). 
 
The negotiations and planning for re-entry into the Country X market was 
also undertaken with a lot of consultations, howbeit at different levels. 
The strategic decision to proceed was limited to a select group of senior 
executives within the Chancellery, which included the VC, the COO and 
the Country X Dean, and ‘no one else was consulted on it … not the 
Deans’ (CI1). Because of the ‘upset’ OP, and the strict regulatory 
environment in Country X, ‘there’s a lot of commercial-in-confidence ... 
but … the deans weren't across the details of that deal ... everybody was 
sworn to secrecy who knew’ (CI1).  
 
After the decision was made to re-enter Country X with a new OP, the 
Deans were approached that ‘we’re going back to Country X with a new 
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partner so you can imagine the Arts Dean, the Engineering and IT Dean, 
are a bit sceptical because it hasn’t been a land of milk and honey ... so 
it’s a university decision, we seek feedback but we’ve got a whole range 
of new offerings that the new OP want to offer’ (CI1). Since ‘now we 
know who the partner is, now we know we’ve got the course portfolio and 
some of these may not run depending on their market intelligence, … the 
schools really would have had 12 months to start getting ready for 2019 
implementation’ (CI1). CI4 confirmed that academics were rarely 
consulted on TNE strategic decisions - ‘not a great deal, no ... these are 
usually made at the senior executive level - PVC, Provost, Chief 
Financial Officer, Vice-Chancellor, Deputy Vice-Chancellors ... the 
hierarchy of these institutions as you know just keeps growing ... I don't 
know how many DVCs or PVCs or what we've got; there just seems to 
be more and more of them’. 
 
6.2 Contracts 
 
The University’s first TNE contracts with Countries V and X OPs were 
observed to be not ‘as strong or as tight as we’ve now got’ (CI2). CI3 
observed that the University ‘learnt a lot from … what might not have 
been in the first contract … then, you obviously talk about that in the 
second contract ... you learn a lot from the past ... so you then make 
things more specific’.  
 
The new contracts since 2016 (CI3) are now ‘more favourable in terms of 
financial returns to the university; whereas in the past it perhaps was not 
… so that has made some difference’ with the benefits accruing to the 
University (CI6). CI2 also confirmed that ‘we are getting a better return 
but we are committed to growth with the Country V OP, so that’s good ... 
so yes, the legal requirements are quite extensive’ (CI2). However, CI4, 
a law academic, is of the view that ‘they are not as good as I would 
otherwise have liked them to be ... in terms of quality control measures 
and holding people accountable ... (and) that is where the bureaucracy 
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and the senior management takeover (to monitor and enforce the 
contracts)’. While some informants thought the new contracts were an 
improvement for the University, they also caused the OPs to make 
corresponding adjustments, e.g., ‘the Country V OP have changed a few 
things ... they used to purchase books … (which) were included in 
student contracts so they would get all of the books bought for them or 
they'd pay for them through their contracts ... (but) that doesn't happen 
anymore … students now purchase their own books’ (CI3).  
 
In CI4’s view, ‘one of the reasons that we entered into these types of 
agreements is to try and place as much of the financial investment risk 
on the organisation that chooses to be the one that manages and 
delivers our programs, and they are the ones that have to enter into 
building leases, equipment leases … they are the ones with the sunk 
costs ... (and) have a significant amount invested in being related to own 
our brand name and our reputation’. As for the University, ‘I'm running 
the same programs, the same units’ (CI4). CI10 on the other hand, takes 
a more conciliatory view of the collaboration, saying ‘we really depend 
upon each other quite a lot … it's almost a situation where there would 
be mutually-assured destruction if either one of us pulled out of the 
relationship ... although you know, I think that the Country V OP will 
probably continue on without us, and we probably continue without them 
... but it is acknowledged I think by both sides that it is a relationship that 
works for both parties’. 
 
On contract enforcement, CI4 mused that ‘the problem with contract 
enforcement is that they're only as good as you are willing to put effort in 
to hold people accountable for their responsibilities and obligations’. 
However, no matter how comprehensive an agreement is, there is bound 
to be loop holes that contending parties can use to their advantage, such 
as the previous Country X OP’s use of a separate corporate vehicle to 
collaborate with University A while they were negotiating termination with 
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University C (‘they created another (legal) entity, and that entity went with 
University A … very clever’ – CI1). 
 
Having a University HCO presence in Country V enabled better contract 
monitoring and enforcement, as CI10 illustrated that when ‘occasionally 
we get a bit muddled up by our partner ... we have to remind them that 
there're certain protocols that need to be followed and just keep 
everyone on the same page’. This regular monitoring is accompanied by 
‘an annual contract review … so there's myself, the DVCI and the 
Country V Dean ... we sit down and we have a long meeting with them ... 
and … we talk about all sorts of different things that we both put on the 
agenda in relation to issues or improvements … we look at statistics; we 
look at how things are performing; we look at numbers’ (CI3). 
 
On contract negotiations, CI4 explained that ‘in almost every contractual 
situation there is a dominant party and a weaker party’. CI4 was of the 
view that ‘in our prior contractual negotiations, because of different 
circumstances, I think that this organisation has gone into them giving 
the perception of being the weaker party; a desperate sale, if you like’. 
Further, ‘it didn't help that when the contract renegotiations were going 
on in 2015, 2016, that the university here went through its own traumas 
… with its Vice-Chancellor and others ... that automatically put us on the 
back foot, I think, in terms of … trying to get the best possible 
opportunities ... and I think to that extent, the contract reflects that we 
were the weaker party to those negotiations’ – hence, his earlier criticism 
about the recently negotiated ‘not as good’ contracts.  
 
Apart from the circumstances that seem to have weakened the 
negotiating power of the University, CI4 also observed that ‘the 
organisation that we're dealing with (i.e., the Country V OP) is big 
enough, business savvy enough; they certainly, from my perspective, are 
better at negotiating terms and conditions that suit them better than the 
university ... well, they’re just good at business ... the Country V OP 
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sends people from Country G whose only job it is to get the best possible 
terms and conditions for every contract entered into ... they know how to 
do that … they know when to say no, pack their briefcases and walk 
away from the table … they attempted to do so ... now I don't think in my 
opinion it (i.e., the new contract) worked out any better’. 
 
Similarly, CI6 noted that ‘the Country V OP is very strong in terms of 
bargaining power ... is a multinational corporation and it is not going to let 
itself be bamboozled by some regional university which is what we 
basically are’. CI6 was however, satisfied that the renewed contract was 
financially more favourable and ‘has made some difference’.  
 
On the University’s contract negotiation capabilities, CI4 shared that ‘we 
employ … a senior leadership of academics first and foremost ... not 
business managers …they're not business people … they think they are, 
but they’re not business people ... they don’t have the experience of 
these things’. Further, ‘it was I think a little bit of window dressing, but I 
think it's a fundamental feature of education … (that) is still being run by 
academics, not by people of business but we're trying to operate in a 
business-like manner and to be perfectly honest, most academics, no 
matter how senior they are, wouldn't know how to operate in a business-
like manner because … they haven't been trained to do it ... they don't 
have DNA skills that have been honed over years of practice to do it … 
but they’re highly intelligent people that think this is easy stuff’ (CI4). 
 
CI10 on the other hand, is more measured in commenting on the relative 
bargaining power of TNE partners. From CI10’s experience, ‘the 
bargaining power is a difficult one ... I think that over academic matters 
… it's something that lies with the University … it's probably easier for us 
to push back on the academic stuff ... (while) the commercial stuff is 
probably with them … the bargaining power is a bit more complex than 
simply saying, it’s them or us. … got to drill down to what issue are you 
talking about’.  
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6.3 TNE Resources 
 
Naturally, a TNE operation will require the provision of space for teaching 
and learning, ‘which is one of the most expensive … thing to own ... 
because … location is one of the most important thing when students 
look for a course’ (CI7). In all of the University’s TNE operations, the 
buildings are provided by the OPs, e.g., the Country X facility ‘was fully a 
funded infrastructure by the OP … (and) we didn’t put anything into it’ 
(CI1). CI3 explained that ‘the building is leased by the infrastructure 
partner’ (in Country X).  
 
It was interesting to note the difference in building presentations between 
the Country V and Country X TNE operations, in that the Country V 
campus is branded as the OP’s, while at the Country X campus, ‘you 
would think you were at University C … and the company that's providing 
the infrastructure has got no paraphernalia or no particular profile to the 
customer, to the student ... whereas (for) the Country V OP, its branding 
is all over it ... (because) they teach their own courses as well … and of 
course, they teach other degrees … degrees from other universities and 
University C is one of the range you can choose from’ (CI1).  
 
The OP-funded buildings will at least provide space for ‘classrooms and 
the administration’ (of the TNE programs) (CI8), ‘computer labs, 
software’ (CI1), and ‘library’ (CI8). These facilities are usually minimal, 
sufficient for the students’ studies, making CI8 long for ‘a real campus 
environment’, featuring ‘the library … (and) at least the librarians 
because I am also doing the librarian’s work whenever needed, ... an IT 
department where students can access something, or can access the 
learning management system or can upload their assignments and 
technical aspect of things, … (and) own cafeteria’. 
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Although the Country V facilities met the basic requirements and ‘there 
hasn't been any issues there’, CI5 mused about how the Country V OP 
does not have ‘1,000-seater, 500-seater lecture halls for some of the big 
Business units especially’, and therefore ‘a student will go to class for 
say three hours and they will get the lecture part at the start and then the 
tutorial part at the end’ instead of ‘here (in the home campus) we would 
usually conduct a lecture and then at a separate time during the week, 
the student would attend a tutorial’. 
 
CI1 noted that ‘the student experience must be comparable, for instance 
... we haven’t delivered certain things (i.e., programs) … for instance, 
something like Games Art and Design would probably be attractive in 
Country V but the OP don't want to invest in laboratories and the other 
software and stuff that you need to develop that; ... we had some issue, 
for instance with Journalism ... we are running Journalism there but 
there’ve been some technical requirements that they have found hard to 
meet’. Further, ‘you need equipment (for) Games Design and the 
Multimedia area and Interactive Digital Design … I think the expense of 
that was prohibitive ... but I think it would have to been more attractive 
than say, Journalism’. In the case of Country X, although ‘the problem is 
… Journalism or Screen Production, or Creative Media we have here, 
you’ve got to invest that first ... now, the OP were happy to do that ... 
they have studio, they’ve got equipment … (because) they were in that 
business’ (CI1). However, ‘I think they would find it harder to do that in 
the Sciences and Engineering because there’re a lot of infrastructure … 
and they wouldn’t be certain about the numbers’ (CI1). 
 
Apart from the premises, ‘you’ve got to have infrastructure in terms of 
public transport access in Country V, … you’ve got to have good 
infrastructure in terms of telecommunications ... without those things it 
would not have worked’ (CI6). CI6 also added that the location of the 
TNE delivery is also critical to the success of the operation, and quoted 
the example of the VSM OP’s move from the CBD to the suburbs when 
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‘their business almost disappeared overnight ... because … it was less 
convenient for the students’. 
 
Invariably all University C’s TNE operations feature OP-funded teaching 
staff, most of whom are part-timers (CI1). However, all such 
appointments are vetted and approved by the University’s unit 
coordinators prior to engagement (CI4). CI8 bemoaned that ‘in terms of 
quality, there’s one thing that I truly believe is that you (should) have full-
time staff, full-time teaching staff; not per hour, per trimester’ (part-time 
staff). To address this issue, the University has appointed and funded 
key full-time teaching staff at its Country V HCO, and program 
coordinators at its Country X TNE operations (CI1, CI3, CI10). 
 
An outcome of the University’s tipping point is the set up of the Country V 
HCO to provide TNE leadership, unit coordination, teaching staff training, 
OP and student support, and operational monitoring (Section App J 
2.3b). The HCO also provides space for ‘supplementary or deferred 
exams’ for a ‘handful’ of students (CI9), and enhances the University’s 
presence through support for alumni activities (CI9), management of 
research (CI4) and participation in community engagement (CI10). This 
Country V HCO will be emulated at the newly re-constituted Country X 
TNE operation (CI11). 
 
CI9 reported that Country V students were initially ‘not used to’ accessing 
the University’s newly launched online study materials within a flipped 
classroom teaching format, but later received ‘positive feedback in the 
sense that they (i.e., the students) are more disciplined’. This teaching 
methodology, coupled with the reduction in face-to-face teaching time 
resulted in lower cost for the TNE operation (CI11). 
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6.4 Academic Administration 
 
The administration of the University’s academic TNE processes is 
undertaken mainly across three entities, viz., the OP’s academic 
administration infrastructure, the University’s HCO, and the University’s 
home campus TNE office (UTO). In CI10’s view, ‘I think that in terms of 
those three pieces I think that works well’.  
 
The objective of the University’s TNE academic administration is ‘to 
make curriculum absolutely comparable ... and the student experience … 
similar  … but what you don’t want is you don't want a second rate 
version of University C in Country V ... there’s no doubt that countries for 
instance, are worried about … their markets are worried about … a view 
that a University C degree in Australia is better than … for the Country V 
citizens, than a University C degree in Country V’ (CI1). Further, ‘they are 
University C students (in Country V), they are students in the School of 
Arts, or the School of Business or the School of Engineering, so we try 
and mirror the same quality’ (CI1). 
 
Hence, TNE monitoring is ‘no different to the way we monitor them here 
(in Australia) ... obviously in enrolments, obviously assessment of 
students, quality of student feedback, completions, retention, all of the 
same variables that we require through TEQSA’ (CI2). CI1 explained that 
‘there are mechanisms to do that ... (to assure) the curriculum’s the 
same, the coursework’s the same, the marking is comparable and 
certainly the admissions’. 
 
While the University TNE infrastructure has been commended by various 
OPs (CI3), it has also attracted some criticism of being ‘purely 
bureaucratism’ (CI4). CI4 explained that ‘from my perspective, … one of 
my primary roles is to ensure that a student who was awarded a 
Bachelor of Commerce in Country V is getting the same quality of 
education or opportunity and degree as the student in the home campus 
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doing the same degree, of the same units and the same major ... so to 
that extent, anything that's put in place to try and maintain that, that does 
add to the administrative workload, but nonetheless to have that 
equivalency, … it's a lot of work, but you're dealing with two different 
organisations ... (and) the business of education seems to become more 
and more bureaucratised anyway’. With respect to the UTO, ‘we do have 
a transnational education area that likes us to go through them for all 
these things ... and my preference is to let them know what they need to 
know when I think they need to know’ (CI4).  
 
6.4.1 Key Academic Processes 
 
The key TNE academic processes described by the informants were 
mainly for the Country V operations because of the large volume of 
students there. Except for regulatory requirements, the basic processes 
are similar for Country X, and will emulate the very successful Country V 
model (CI1). 
 
Marketing and sales are OP functions, which the Country V OP does 
very well, mainly because of the attractive tiered sales incentives (CI9). 
For the OP, the ‘heaviest workload are … the application and the 
enrolment (processes) ... just before trimester starts, the OP gives a bulk 
of enrolments … that’s about 9,000, 10,000 enrolments per trimester’ 
(CI9). The volume is so large that the OP have had to set up a separate 
sales administration team (‘literally good at sales but they may not be as 
effective in administration work ... so, now that they have their own admin 
team to give us the enrolment list’ – CI9). The University’s HCO ‘help the 
OP in terms of their student services ... the turnaround time here is a lot 
faster ... (for) admissions, offer letters … we do it within 24 hours’ (CI7). 
CI3 explained that ‘they do the enrolments after the OP confirms the 
classes … (and) give them the admission application ... they (then) spit 
out the offer letters; they spit out the advanced standing letters and that 
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goes back to the OP Sales (team) ... our staff in the HCO do all the work 
... nothing comes here’. 
 
After application, the OP prepares DQF-mandated contracts that ‘are 
signed between the OP and the student ... the OP will draw up a 
schedule (of units) for them ... so this template has been given by … the 
UTO’ (CI9). The OP ‘will collect all the fees from the student, whether it's 
a bridging unit or a full unit’. ‘And (if) the students don't pay, then they will 
give me a list to encumber the students ... so the encumbrance can 
come at any time but especially they could be one long list, during the 
start of the trimester especially when just before the results are out ... so 
I will hasten them to give me the list and reason being you know when 
they can't view their results, then they will pay up … and also they won't 
be able to get their transcript ... they won't be able to graduate ... so 
there's a lot of obstacles and challenges for the students … so they will 
pay up’ (CI9).  
 
On receipt of the enrolment list, the HCO staff will enter the student 
details into the University’s student management system, a routine that is 
done ‘every four months, one and half months before the start of course,  
… three times a year’ (CI7). CI5 remarked that ‘they do all the 
enrolments for the Country V OP ... so he does all of that ... he enrolled 
everybody, which is ridiculous ... I don't know how he does it’. The HCO 
is an important part of assuring compliance in student admissions, and 
will be emulated in Country X as the University ‘wanted more control over 
admissions because that was a bit loose ... we wanted a Dean appointed 
by us, not by them ... so we did want to take more control in Country X as 
well, as a result of the White Paper’ (CI1). 
 
Long before each trimester, the Country V OP’s program management, 
lecturer management and sales teams will meet to consider the sales 
team’s student projections (CI9). The lecturer management team ‘will 
then table what are the other units, how many classes and how many 
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lecturers (in their IT system) … but they also have to check manually’ 
(CI9). The scheduling of classes and planning for lecturer appointments 
have had to be carefully synchronised because of the large numbers of 
students, and complications arising from differing study periods and 
delivery models of the OP’s multiple university partners (CI9). CI9 also 
reported that ‘they (program management) also have to liaise internally 
because you know there are so many classrooms … about 88 
classrooms’ across two campuses that are ‘walking distance ... basically 
across the road’. This planning work is ‘a lot of work because of the 
timetabling of the classes and also getting the lecturers … (and) a bit of a 
headache, because you have to plan months in advance for the next 
trimester ... and then they will then do the contracts with the lecturers ... 
every trimester … a lot of paperwork ... very … headache’ (CI9).  
 
Meanwhile, the UTO will inform and coordinate with home campus unit 
coordinators to prepare study materials ‘at least 4 weeks before start of 
course’ (CI7). After that, the OP’s lecturer management team will … 
(distribute the) unit guides’ (CI7). The home campus unit coordinators 
also receive from the OP’s lecturer management team, curriculum vitae 
of potential host country teaching staff for approval to teach in the 
following trimester (CI7). 
 
At start of course, the OP conducts a week-long orientation for new 
students, which now usually sees about 800 students per trimester (CI9). 
The on-going process of advising students on their units, conducting 
writing workshops, investigating academic misconduct (e.g., plagiarism) 
are undertaken by the HCO (CI9). Some examples of these ‘day-to-day 
student queries … (are) ‘which unit should I enrol?’, ‘whether or not I 
have satisfied the prerequisite?’’ (CI7). There are also ‘students who 
decide to change their major, change their course, (and) we have to 
issue a study plan so that they can put the study plan into the student 
contract’ (CI7).  
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Unit coordinators have ‘an in-built process of moderation … done in three 
parts - before the start of the teaching period, we encourage our staff 
here to contact and talk to who's going to be their teachers in Country V 
and Country X ... if they're familiar with the regulars and the unit, it may 
just be to bring up to them any minor changes or … changes that have 
been made; to discuss previous offerings that they've been involved in 
and any feedback that we’ve got from students or someone like me that 
looks across the program; and what they're going to be doing in that 
teaching period, and whether the expectations are going to be changed 
or anything of that type’ (CI4).  
 
Second, ‘we encourage our unit coordinators to maintain regular contact 
with the teaching staff so that we don't get any surprises where there's 
issues, and finally, at the end of the teaching period when the results are 
submitted for the Board of Examiners, every unit coordinator must submit 
a report on how that particular unit has run and that teaching period with 
particular focus on the qualities or otherwise of the teaching staff that 
have been involved’ (CI4). CI4 added that ‘if we get negative reports 
about a particular teaching staff that had been involved, and that gives 
me grounds to go to the partnership institution and say, ‘no, this person 
isn't suitable for this unit; don’t nominate him again because we won’t 
accept him’. Additionally, unit coordinators have ‘an obligation to 
moderate the marking … so for Country V, we mark the exams; for 
Country X, we moderate them’ (CI6).  
 
While the University has its own student surveys focusing on ‘the 
teaching and the unit materials’, the OP also administers its surveys to 
gauge ‘from a business point of view, … more qualitative information 
from students about that experience that feeds into your product or 
services that they need to provide or not provide’ (CI4). The University 
and OP share these survey results (CI4). 
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In the early years of the Country V TNE operation, ‘they had a lot of that 
kind of work (training of OP teaching staff) early on … for the past three 
to four years … (however) I've noticed that there has been a much more 
settled and consistent … teaching staff cohort ... I would say that at the 
present time, somewhere between 80 and 90 per cent of the teaching 
staff that the Country V OP employed, have been employed in the same 
units for probably three to four years now’ (CI4). Any teaching staff 
training and familiarisation is now undertaken by the HCO (CI8). 
 
Each year, the University conducts two series of graduations in Country 
V for about 1,000 students in March and October each (CI9). There are 
three ceremonies in ‘October … and another two in March’ (CI9).  
 
6.4.2 Offshore Partner TNE Administration Infrastructure 
 
The OP’s TNE administration, ‘a very huge operation’ (CI7) comprises a 
sales team that is supported by a sales administration team, a program 
management team, a lecturer management team, and an examinations 
team (CI3). CI7 reported that the program management team has ten 
staff who are dedicated to University C programs, and manages 
timetabling and classroom allocations, as well as ‘managing current 
students’ queries’. Similarly, their ‘sales staff … (are) dedicated to the 
University’s programs’ (CI7). However, lecturer management and the 
examinations team ‘would be shared’ across the OP’s 12 university 
partners (CI7).  
 
CI10 values the OP’s inputs because ‘they bring capabilities that we don't 
have as an institution … yes we've got our marketing people but they 
don’t have any expertise in this market … the local knowledge, the agent 
network ... that they have ... not just their agent network offshore but also 
they've got people in-country … like Country O and Country T, Country 
R, Country Q, Country Y … their reputation, their brand in Country V ... 
(and) the efficiency of their model’. CI11 added that ‘we partner with 
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infrastructure providers, if you like ... (and) what they provide is all the 
infrastructure to deliver IP, for want of a better word for curriculum ... so 
it’s the lower of risk modelling in terms of capital-intensive risk … for the 
University’. 
 
CI1 commended the Country X OP, saying they ‘did right from the start, 
by employing fulltime staff in the disciplines that we teach - Business, IT, 
Communication and Education’. When asked if all the OP’s teaching staff 
were permanent staff, CI1 explained that ‘they do resort to part-timers for 
the various units, because there’re so many units ... (and) these four 
couldn’t possibly teach everything ... but at least we’ve got fulltime staff 
there’. 
 
In the University’s Country V TNE operation, CI5 reported that ‘the 
Business school … have a lot of turnover (of OP teaching staff) … 
whereas we (i.e., Psychology) tend not to have turnover’. On the 
contrary, ‘in terms of quality control, I mean generally we’re in a position 
where our teaching staff do a good job so we don't have to … (look over 
their shoulders) and we do sort of extend on their abilities beyond just a 
sessional and give them the ability to have input into the content of the 
unit … which I think some of the other schools don't ... so we see it as a 
collaborative process’ (CI5). Quoting an example, ‘say for my unit, I 
wanted to make a change to an essay topic, I might send an email to the 
teaching staff and say, ‘what are your thoughts on this? How do you think 
that would work in the context?’ … and then we would have a discussion 
about it’ (CI5). 
  
Even though the OP managed the bulk of the TNE delivery, CI7 clarified 
that ‘everything is still governed by University C, not by the OP ... they 
only help us to facilitate, provide the premises, undertake marketing ... 
but still overall controlled by University C’. However, CI7 acknowledged 
‘that certain things we can’t control, e.g., marketing ... so if they’re not 
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doing well, the University won’t be able to recruit more students .... so 
that’s probably the downside’.  
 
6.4.3 University C Country V TNE Host Country Office (HCO) 
 
The HCO had its origins in the appointment of Principals ‘after things 
started to grow … (they were) looking after each of the (two) partnerships 
(in Country V) … one at VSM, and there was one at VKP ... and then for 
whatever reason, they both left’ (CI10). CI3 clarified that the previous 
appointments were compromised because they became institutionalised 
by being too close to the OP (Section App J 5.2).  
 
On reflection, CI10 commented that ‘in the old days there was always the 
tyranny of distance and there was a lot of friction that developed in the 
relationship as well … and … (now) there's a better understanding about 
how we should work together … (while) there are still, occasionally the 
odd points of friction but most of the time, we realise that our interests 
are actually quite aligned and … being local really helps’. Further, the 
large 5,000-strong student operation necessitated the offshore 
processing of admissions, advanced standing and enrolments in the 
HCO (CI7). Setting up the HCO ‘also means that we’re asset light ... we 
have a lease over this office and we've got some furniture and a big 
Microsoft service hub … that's about it’ (CI10). The HCO was such an 
improvement from just having a Principal, that CI3 asserted that ‘it 
changed the relationship utterly ... we didn't have a Dean in Country V 
until 2012 or 2013’, while CI7 commented that the previous arrangement 
was ‘very messy … (but) now it’s so much better’.  
 
The funding for the HCO was originally derived from a quality 
enhancement levy paid by students, an arrangement that was 
recommended by the White Paper (Section App J 2.3e), and agreed to 
by the OP (‘the great thing about a private partner - we said we want this 
happening and they said ‘well we will just increase the charges don’t 
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we?’’ – CI2). The renewed TNE contract did away with the levy through 
an adjusted fee-sharing arrangement (CI10).  
 
The University’s motivation for the HCO ‘is to have a lot more control and 
oversight of our whole operation’ (CI3). It is led by a Dean who ‘oversee 
quality and make sure things are running smoothly’ (CI3). 
Organisationally, ‘our systems can't cope too well with the fact that the 
Country V Dean doesn't really work for the University on paper ... the 
Dean works for HCO Pty Ltd ... (and) paid by the entity not by the 
University’ (CI3). The HCO ‘gives the University a strategic focal point to 
deal with not just the Country V partner, but to use the Country V Dean 
as a kind of regional academic presence ... it expands throughout the SS 
region and up into Country O as well ... (as) they're simply physically 
closer ... (and) the Country V Dean was also heavily involved in the 
negotiations with another OP over Country X … and used in a number of 
capacities’ (CI4).  
 
Somewhat unique with the Country V OP operation, the HCO employed 
an ‘Academic Learning Advisor … (who) goes to the OP’s premises and 
presents to students as well as have students see the Advisor (in) the 
Advisor’s office … (provide) training on how to use LMS (learning 
management system) … does an orientation for new teaching staff’ 
(CI3), and conducts ‘academic writing workshops’ (CI9). The Advisor’s 
services are ‘very helpful which makes us stand out from the other 
universities ... especially for those returning to school after long periods 
of working’ (CI9). There are also three staff ‘in the Student Services area’ 
responsible for the high workload areas of admissions, enrolments, 
student support and alumni relations (CI3).  
 
The HCO ‘now have, in most part, one academic for every discipline that 
we teach in Country V and that person’s employed by the HCO … it's 
around about eight or nine academics’ (CI3). Further, ‘they don’t all unit 
coordinate ... we have a couple that unit coordinate, but the majority don't 
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because our unit coordinators are back here in the home campus but 
they do teach in our programs and they mentor the OP teaching staff in 
their disciplines as well’ (CI3). CI7 reported that ‘all these academics are 
doing research’. One of these academics is also reported to be doing 
joint research with CI5 on a transnational education topic related to 
Country V. These academics ‘report to the school Dean with a dotted line 
to the Country V Dean … and it works so amazingly because they teach 
in our programs like an OP teaching staff does ... (and) the OP ‘then 
reimbursed the HCO for the time that they teach in their program’ (CI3).  
 
CI5 gave an insight into how home campus school TNE representatives 
liaise with the Country V HCO. CI5 liaises with the HCO’s student 
services officer ‘probably say everyday or every second day there've 
been issues, (and) he's usually the one sending me requests for what a 
student wants to do, a unit that they don't make the prerequisites or late 
enrolments or …. third attempts; I deal directly with the officer quite a lot 
... I don't have a lot of communication on a daily basis with the Country V 
Dean, unless a major issue comes up, e.g., if there're conflicts with the 
OP, that would be something that the Dean will deal with’.  
 
CI11 reported that the model will be emulated in Country X, with some 
refinements. There is already a Dean appointed who, ‘like the DVCE, 
carries all the academic matters, students’ concerns, students’ 
enrolment, students’ completion, students’ failures, student cheating … 
whatever it is’ (CI2). However, CI4 pointed out that ‘there're subtle 
differences in that the Country X Dean is actually located where the 
teaching is done ...  (whereas) in Country V, the Dean is physically 
separated from the partnership’.  
 
While the University’s Country V TNE operation is supported by a mature 
HCO, ‘there’s only two staff employed by the University in Country X 
directly, viz., the Dean, and another one who … deals with admissions to 
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university ... (and) the two of them take their orders only from University 
C’ (CI1). 
 
The difference with the Country X HCO (compared with Country V) also 
lies in the appointment of ‘program coordinators …(who are) the real key 
people in each discipline, one person in each discipline, that had been 
with the University for quite some time and that were doing really well ... 
(and functions) like a head of that program’ (CI3).  
 
6.4.4 University C Home Campus TNE Administration Infrastructure 
 
At the home campus, the University’s TNE coordination infrastructure 
was set up from scratch (‘I was given this role, and no one really had 
anything set up’ – CI3) as an ‘office (that) would be the one who will be 
managing all … the back end’ (CI7). It is a small team of two staff led by 
a manager, and ‘we guide everybody as to what has to happen ... so, our 
job is to let you as a school know what you have to do, how you should 
do it, and when you need to do it by, … (and) communicated directly with 
partners (and) provide things to partners via my office’ (CI3). CI5 
confirmed that ‘they (i.e., the UTO) would send reminders … and text 
lists are due by this date and so forth’. 
 
This University TNE Office (UTO) have been working with ‘six schools 
and next year we're going to work with all schools because every school 
will be involved in TNE ... that's eight’ (CI3). The UTO liaises with ‘a 
couple of key people, admin people in each school, that we work as a 
team with’ (CI3). The UTO manager ‘design(ed) the process … and I 
teach our partners what that process is ... I teach the schools what that 
process is ... I set timelines’ (CI3). On the provision of materials to OPs, 
the UTO coordinates this so that ‘it's all consistent and it's all compiled ... 
it's not the School of Law, the School of Business, the School of 
Education, all separate with different ideas ... it's all consistent ... and the 
partners love it ... the partners think we're like ... the best’(CI3). The 
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Country V OP ‘think we are the best, and out of all their 12 partners, we 
do things the most efficiently ... we are their biggest partner’. 
 
On campus, the UTO works with two groups of staff, viz., the ‘the 
academic and then the professional’ (CI3). CI3 asserted that ‘the key is 
to have people on the ground; at your home campus working extremely 
closely with your TNE partner; as well as extremely closely with the 
schools ... so in each school we have a TNE representative at the 
academic level and we have a transnational consultative group (TCG) 
that we get together and meet with’.  
 
CI1 explained that the TCG ‘was all the academic chairs, or at least 
someone from each school who’s responsible for International plus our 
TNE office, plus the Deans ... and they reported … we had three or four 
meetings a year, and we discussed things that were happening ... and 
we pick up information pretty quickly’. Explaining further, ‘for instance, 
we’ve been concerned this semester, whether OP teaching staff were 
getting paid for all assessments that they were doing, to make sure, 
because some of the OP teaching staff were going, ‘I’m not going to 
mark that; they don't pay me for that’, (and) we thought, ‘why don't they 
pay you for that?’ … anyway, so we followed that up internally because 
we’re hearing these little … subtle problems’ (CI1). The mainly 
operational TCG discussions also feed into the ‘annual review between 
the University and the OP’ (CI1). 
 
The UTO manager reports to the Country V Dean, with ‘a dotted line to 
our Director International ... so I belong to University C International 
Office’ (CI3). CI3 went on to described the nature of the UTO work, 
where ‘I've got time differences; I've got distance to cope with ...  
sometimes it’s challenging ... so it's nice that I can have some support 
on-ground here and I'm part of that University C International team 
because I can work closely with the University’s International Admissions 
Manager, the Partnerships Manager, the Director International and the 
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DVCI … I'm the connect between the schools and the partners’. The 
UTO manager needs ‘to build relationships, really good, strong 
relationships with schools and really strong relationships with partners 
…. and I'm the glue, I'm the key, I'm that centre thing’ (CI3). 
 
On academic matters, ‘we also have an academic board for Country X 
and an academic board for Country V … and that deals with the 
students’ experience ... (which) also includes two or three section heads 
in’ each country, e.g., ‘the head of Business, the head of Communication, 
and the head of IT ... and they meet four times a year … (via) skype’ 
(CI1).  
 
In describing communication lines open to unit coordinators, CI1 
explained that ‘if we have a problem here, we contact our TNE office 
(i.e., UTO) ... (and) the TNE office will liaise with the (Country) Deans if 
it’s at that level, if that’s a kind of academic issue’. On the other hand, ‘if 
it’s an operational one, we can go straight to our OP teaching staff ... 
each unit coordinator can talk to our OP teaching staff ... but if we need 
to talk, … get to the management of the OP … we would probably go 
through our Dean there, not the Dean here’ (CI1). 
 
It was interesting to know that ‘a few years ago, the UTO, they did a lot 
more … used to do a lot more and then there was a decision that was 
made to outsource it to the schools ... so a lot of the functions that used 
to be done by the UTO are now done in the schools and I think the team 
was then reduced in size and now they’re more as an intermediary 
communication between the OP and the schools’ (CI5).  
 
CI5’s ‘role is quite unique in the university in that I sort of have an 
administrative, managerial and academic oversight ... so part of my role 
is as academic chair of the programs ... so things like students have 
issues around advanced standing, they haven’t met prerequisites for 
units, if they've failed a unit more than twice, then I have to give approval 
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for a third attempt ... (or) if they’ve got poor progression, then I need to 
speak with them around the progression and strategies, learning 
strategies and all of that’.  
 
Additionally, ‘administratively, I do things like, all of the psychology 
students will email me if they need an extension for their assignments ... 
so, across all the units ... I set up LMS pages ... I put together the unit 
guides, … choosing due dates for assignments and stuff, submitting texts 
lists, submitting approvals for teaching staff ... and I write the unit guides 
… I'll send them to the unit coordinator for approval, but I do a lot of that 
stuff myself’ (CI5). Interestingly, the ‘Business (school) … they're actually 
looking to move to a model like mine, but I think their problem is that 
they’re going to give it to somebody who doesn't have academic 
oversight, so there’s going to be double handling ... whereas in my role, I 
have, you know, the ability to make decisions about things so I don't 
have to consult … I don't have to consult with anyone about staffing and 
stuff, so I just make those decisions’ (CI5). Finally, ‘from a strategic point 
of view, I also sit on the Associate Dean International meetings within the 
University’ (CI5).  
 
The broad capability and capacity of CI5 enabled CI5 to ’just correspond 
directly with people at the OP because I know this person does this, this 
person does that ... they all know me so I just communicate directly with 
them ... but the UTO will do things like, you know, once we filled out all 
the text lists, they will collate them all, then send them to the OP and if 
there're any issues, the idea is that the OP would either go back to the 
UTO, or they will go back to the school depending on the issue’.  
 
Being a senior staff at the University, CI4 described the current 
centralisation of the TNE functions with the UTO as part of the 
University’s centralisation-decentralisation cycles of change 
management, and compared it to the mining industry’s outsourcing-
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onboarding cycles, and ‘think there's just been, again the pendulum has 
gone back and forth’. 
 
6.5 Refinement of TNE Framework for University C TNE Operation 
 
The foregoing observations provide the basis for the refinement of the 
TNE Framework of Section 2.5.5 specifically for University C’s TNE 
operations. The University considered the following value chain activities 
as mission-critical for TNE : 
 
1) on site administration expertise and facilities (in the form of the 
HCO) 
2) continuous assessment 
3) examination grading 
4) moderation of continuous assessment 
5) moderation of examination grading 
6) research 
7) community engagement 
 
Similar to University A (Section App I 10.6e), the TNE Framework for 
University C’s TNE operations also includes research and community 
engagement. 
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No. TNE Processes Direct Models Outsourced 
Models 
Hybrid Governance Models 
Country X 
ic-IBC 
Country V 
i-FP 
Country T, N 
and V r-FP 
A Primary Activities 
1 
A
ca
de
m
ic
 
re
cr
ui
tm
en
t Curriculum design S S S 
2 
Curriculum delivery HS HS HS 
3 Student recruitment HS HS HS 
4 
Te
ac
hi
ng
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
Award S S S 
5 
Curriculum designed S S S 
6 
Curriculum delivered HS HSandSi HS 
7 
Continuous assessment H HandSi H 
8 
Examination grading H SiandS S 
9 
Moderation of continuous assessment S SiandS S 
10 
Moderation of exam grading S SiandS S 
11 
Alumni relations NRp S NR 
12 
Research NRp S NR 
13 
Community engagement NRp S NR 
B Support Activities 
1 TandL physical infrastructure provision HS HandSi H 
2 
S
tu
de
nt
 
su
pp
or
t Academic HS HandSi H 
3 
Admin/Professional HS H H 
4 
Academic staff support HandSi HandSi Sr 
5 
Divisional management HandS HandS HandS 
 
Abbreviations :  1)   S – Sending Higher Education Institution/Provider 
   2)   H – Host Higher Education Institution/Provider 
   3)   HS – Undertaken by H, but wholly-controlled by S 
4)   Si – Sending Higher Education Institution/Provider providing service 
       in situ 
5)   Sr – Sending Higher Education Institution/Provider providing service 
       remotely 
6)   NR – not referenced 
7)   NRp- not referenced but planned for future 
8)   NA – not applicable 
 
Table App J.2   TNE Framework for Organisational Economics  
Research (University C)  
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7.0 University C Home Country Environment 
 
While operating offshore, Australian universities are also subject to the 
local Australian environment, especially the regulatory regime and the 
competition for domestic students. 
 
7.1 Home Country Regulatory Environment 
 
Although the University operates offshore, it is also subject to Australian 
regulations, as CI11 explained that ‘our overseas operations are 
regulated by TEQSA as well ... so, the offerings that we offer have to 
align with our Australian regulated offerings ... (and) we can’t be seen to 
be doing things that are of lesser quality’. TEQSA’s requirements 
encompass ‘enrolments, assessment of students, quality of student 
feedback, completions, retention’ (CI2), ‘curriculum, the quality of the 
academic delivery, student experience … outcomes, (and) employability’ 
(CI11). 
 
Apart from the reviews by host country governments, the University’s 
TNE operations are also ‘reviewed every 3 – 5 years through TEQSA as 
most universities are’ (CI11). Increasingly, country regulators are 
coordinating their quality assurance activities, as CI6 explained, ‘the 
regulators in both sending and receiving countries are developing strong 
relationships and they are checking up – they are pulling their resources 
to check up on each other, and check up on providers’. 
 
University C was one of the first universities to be re-registered under 
TEQSA. As a result of TEQSA’s requirement that teaching staff must be 
‘qualified at least at one qualification standard level higher than the 
course of study being taught or with equivalent professional experience’, 
the ‘allocation of sessional and contractual staff to the teaching of core 
units in the MBA’ had to be reviewed for compliance (Holloway et al. 
2013, 9). 
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For CI4, the regulatory oversight is ‘purely bureaucratism ... it's the 
bureaucracy of education ... if you look at all the different external bodies 
that we know how to be accountable to, that in itself is a bureaucratic 
cost, … the cost of compliance’. Further, ‘the last federal budget I think 
introduced the fee to the universities for the TEQSA application that was 
made, and a fee or a levy on each university to pay for TEQSA and AQF 
(Australian Quality Framework)’ (CI4). 
 
7.2 Home Country Higher Education Sector Environment 
 
CI3 commented that all universities within the state are struggling in 
terms of student numbers. It has been partly due to the competition for 
‘declining numbers of students eligible for university’, despite a small 
increase in the domestic population (CI2). For onshore enrolment of 
international students, the University is also ‘under-exposed greatly in 
most countries ... (although) we’re growing Country Q now so that’s 
good; but then again we’ve got massive research activity in Country O 
but we hardly get any Country O students (onshore); massive research in 
Country R but we hardly get any students from Country R’ (CI2). CI2 
continued that ‘we want to correct that, we want to have a diversified 
portfolio of onshore international students’. CI6 underscored how 
‘international onshore students are a source of discretionary income for 
the university’ and that ‘most of these universities are relying on 
international onshore students to pay the bills ... that’s got to be the 
prime motivation (for TNE)’.  
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Themes, Concepts and Stories from University D Telephone Interview 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 861 
The telephone interview with the highly experienced senior academic 
(DF1) revealed that his University, a Group of Eight university, no longer 
runs any TNE program. It last delivered TNE programs out of three SEA 
countries and one out of a non-SEA country. While this telephone 
interview is lean on details and is not corroborated, it has been 
documented in Appendix K (Themes, Concepts and Stories from 
University D Telephone Interview) for information and possible 
comparison with the views at the other three universities. 
 
No. Region Current TNE Business Delivery Models 
Terminated 
Operations 
1 SEA Country V None Franchised 
2 SEA Country R None Franchised 
3 SEA Country M None Franchised 
4 Non-SEA Country O None 
Franchised; being 
taught out 
 
Table 1   University D TNE Models and Host Countries 
 
1.0 Country V TNE Operation 
 
The TNE program at Country V was initially with one OP, but transferred 
mid-way to another OP. The new OP has ‘excellent student numbers and 
excellent quality’ of delivery. DF1 was then responsible for the Country V 
professional doctorate program. The collaboration ended as a result of 
the host country’s accreditation pressure, to ‘weed out the weaker 
colleges’. DF1 intimated that the University did not have the commercial 
capability to stay the course, remarking that TNE ‘requires much stronger 
entrepreneurship and dedicated effort to work’. He considered Curtin 
University, with its Sarawak TNE operation, as one of the ‘most 
entrepreneurial’. He also identified Swinburne University of Technology, 
Monash University and Victoria University as highly entrepreneurial 
universities. It was insightful to note comments that ‘the people who 
recommended withdrawal from Country V were never comfortable with 
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TNE’, intimating that the University did not have a strategic agenda for 
TNE.  
 
2.0 Country R TNE Operation 
 
Country R TNE was a joint delivery of a TNE program, where the 
students spent half the time in Country R institution, and the other half in 
University D in Australia. The institution is a government-owned 
institution. DF1 remarked that the venture was not ‘primarily commercial’, 
and that students paid in Country R currency. 
 
3.0 Country M TNE Operation 
 
The University took over a MBA program from another Australian 
university so that it would not ‘fall apart’. The motivation was thus to 
prevent reputational damage to the Australian brand (‘reflect badly on 
Australia’). DF1 commented that the operation ‘did not make money’. 
The program was taught out on the recommendation of AUQA. 
 
4.0 Country O TNE Operation 
 
DF1 remarked that this program was a ‘small, niche’ DBA program that 
was managed by another of his colleagues in the University. It was being 
taught out. At the point of the telephone interview, there were still some 
students in the program.  
 
When the project was being reviewed, DF1 submitted both ‘oral and 
written’ recommendations for the University ‘to stay there’. However, the 
University ‘decided not to proceed’. 
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5.0 University Motivation for TNE 
 
DF1 remarked that TNE happens ‘when industry globalises’. He referred 
to his own PhD study on the dependency of institutions on the 
international market, which, inter alia discovered that ‘one-third of their 
staff and many facilities (were) funded by international fees’. In his view, 
many TNEs are ‘purely financial’ and have ‘always been money, money, 
money and everything else is just spin’. He also quoted a conversation 
he had with the head of an Australian university operating in a non-SEA 
country where he said that the campus is ‘primarily to make money’. 
 
6.0 Issues Impacting TNE 
 
DF1 enumerates two main issues plaguing TNE projects, viz., the way 
universities treat TNE programs as commodity, and the related cost 
economisation approach to TNE delivery. He commented that ‘university 
education … must be treated with more respect’. This lack of respect is 
observed from the deployment of teaching staff in TNE, where ‘local 
lecturers’ are engaged because of the high cost of appointing sending-
country teaching staff. This is just one of many strategies TNE operators 
use, and is a ‘result of shaved costs’. 
 
7.0 Summary of Telephone Interview 
 
Compared to the focus groups, this telephone interview was brief and the 
content too lean for many grounded conclusions. Like the other 
Universities, DF1 intimates that universities are mainly motivated by 
commercial imperatives. Interestingly, DF1 is of the view that the 
success of the University’s TNE projects is determined by its 
entrepreneurial capabilities.  
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1.0 Permission to Use Figure 2.8 (Page 60)  
Schmeisser’s Integrating Framework for Literature on 
Offshoring of Value Chain Activities (Schmeisser 2013, 403) 
 
From: Lim Henry henry.lim@hic.com.my   
Subject: Re: Permission to reproduce your diagram in my thesis  
Date: 6 August 2019 at 7:54 PM   
To: Schmeißer, Björn bjoern.schmeisser@wu.ac.at  
Many thanks Bjorn 
 Really appreciate your quick response.  I have checked with my supervisor who 
confirmed that it does not violate the journal’s copyright. Cheers  
Henry Lim   
Executive Vice-President (Operations) HELP International Corporation  
On 6 Aug 2019, at 6:54 PM, Schmeißer, Björn <bjoern.schmeisser@wu.ac.at> 
wrote:  
Dear Henry,  unless it does not conflict with the Journals copyright rules (which I 
don't know), feel free to use the mentioned diagram in your thesis.   
Best,  Björn  ---  Dr. Björn Schmeißer  Institute for International Business  
WU  Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien  Vienna University of Economics and Business 
Welthandelsplatz 1, Building D1 1020 Vienna  Austria  
Tel:+43131336 5124  Email: 
bjoern.schmeisser@wu.ac.at<mailto:bjoern.schmeisser@wu.ac.at%0d> 
www.wu.ac.at/iib/team/faculty/schmeisser  
-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----   
Von: Lim Henry <henry.lim@hic.com.my>   
Gesendet: Dienstag, 6. August 2019 08:30   
An: Schmeißer, Björn <bjoern.schmeisser@wu.ac.at>  
Betreff: Permission to reproduce your diagram in my thesis  
Dear Prof Schmeisser,  I am a PhD student at Curtin University, Australia, studying 
transnational higher education (entitled Australian University Transnational 
Education Programs : An Empirical Investigation of the Business Models). I have 
referred to your diagram (Integrating Framework for Literature on Offshoring of 
Value Chain Activities) in my study of transnational higher education.  I wish to 
request your permission to reproduce your diagram of page 403 in your journal 
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article of 2013 (entitled A Systematic Review of Literature on Offshoring of Value 
Chain Activities) in my thesis. I would be most grateful if you could grant my 
request.  Thank you  
Sen Lee Lim (Henry)  
 
2.0 Permission to Use Figure 2.13 (Page 68) 
Hutaibat’s Value Chain for Higher Education (Hutaibat 2011, 
218) 
 
 
3.0 Permission to Use Table 5.1 (Page 299) 
Country Risk Assessment Map – Second Quarter 2015  
(Coface 2015) 
 
From: HENRY LIM henry.lim@hic.com.my   
Subject: Re: Permission to reproduce diagram in my thesis  
Date: 12 August 2019 at 11:20 PM   
To: COFACE GROUP COMMUNICATIONS communication@coface.com  
Thank you, Luisa  Yes, this is properly referenced. Cheers   Sen L Lim (Henry)  
Sent from my iPhone  
On 12 Aug 2019, at 5:19 pm, COFACE GROUP COMMUNICATIONS 
<communication@coface.com> wrote:   
Dear Sir,  Thank you for your message and request. Of course you can use our 
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diagram. Please just keep Coface as the reference for it. Best regards,  
Luisa  
CUSTODIO  GROUP COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT  
TEL. : +33 (0)1 49 02 19 06  
luisa.custodio@coface.com  
1 PLACE COSTES ET BELLONTE - 92270 BOIS-COLOMBES  
T. +33 (0)1 49 02 20 00 - www.coface.fr  
-----Message d'origine-----   
De : Lim Henry <henry.lim@hic.com.my>   
Envoyé : mardi 6 août 2019 08:46  À : COFACE GROUP COMMUNICATIONS 
<communication@coface.com>  
Objet : Permission to reproduce diagram in my thesis  
Dear Sir,  I am a PhD student at Curtin University, Australia, studying transnational 
higher education (entitled Australian University Transnational Education Programs : 
An Empirical Investigation of the Business Models). I have referred to your diagram 
(Country Risk Assessment Map - Second Quarter 2015) in my study of 
transnational higher education.  I wish to request your permission to reproduce your 
diagram in my thesis. I would be most grateful if you would grant my request.   
Thank you    
Sen Lee Lim (Henry)  
 
4.0 No Permission Needed to Use Conference Presentation of 
Selected Thesis Findings 
 
From: HENRY LIM henry.lim@hic.com.my  
Subject: Re: permission to publish thesis  
Date: 27 June 2019 at 7:20 PM   
To: Werner Soontiens werner.soontiens@nd.edu.au  
Great thanks   
Sent from my iPhone  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On 27 Jun 2019, at 4:29 pm, Werner Soontiens <werner.soontiens@nd.edu.au> 
wrote:  
Hi Henry  
You are correct, given this was only a conference 
paper there are no copyright nor permission issues 
there.  
Werner  
From: Henry Lim [mailto:henry.lim@hic.com.my] 
Sent: Thursday, 27 June 2019 3:45 PM   
To: Werner Soontiens 
<werner.soontiens@nd.edu.au> Subject: permission 
to publish thesis  
This message originated from outside your organisation  
hi werner  
i don’t suppose our joint presentation at the ANZAM 
conference requires separate permission from the 
conference to publish my thesis?  
thanks h  
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